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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to offer an ethnomethodological analysis of institutional 
life at St. Nicholas’, a community home for deviant adolescent boys. I have been particularly 
concerned to examine the therapeutic mode of reasoning which the staff so often employed in 
interpreting the boys’ behaviour as the surface manifestation of their underlying emotional 
disturbance. This constitutes the main focus of chapters three and four. The psychological 
problems from which the boys were typically seen to suffer were routinely attributed to their 
past, punctuated as it was by a variety of deprivations. I examine the construction of such 
historical links in chapters five to eight.
To procure the material necessary for a detailed empirical exploration of institutional 
discourse I spent a year and a quarter “in the field” at St. Nicholas’. In addition to my everyday 
observation of myriad institutional routines and practices I also recorded the vast majority of 
sta^meetings and case conferences, and photocopied dozens of case histories. This form of data 
collection provided the empirical precision necessary for the methodological purpose in hand. 
I attempted to bring to the data an anthropological sensitivity. This involved the partial 
suspension of my normal, practical orientation to the world. By dint of this distancing process 
one is able to identify and analyze the common sense methods through which institutional 
realities are accomplished. These are usually concealed by their very proximity.
By subjecting the empirical material to such close methodological scrutiny, “children 
with problems”, or “disturbed adolescents” emerge not as i\i& starting point, but \h&product of 
the social knowledge and discursive procedures through which staff called their environment to 
account.
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PREFACE AND CHAPTER SUMMARY
This thesis has indeed proved to be a “problem child”. It took long in its conception, 
and has developed slowly and painfully. I have lavished years of attention upon it, and responded 
to its multifarious demands. And it has been greedy; a fact for which one must blame the parent 
in part. It has kept me up at night, interrupted my social life and depleted my finances. Like 
every mother I wanted my child to be perfect, and it has taken many years to accept what is, I 
hope, good enough.
The project which has come to fruition in this thesis began about eight years ago when 
I gained permission to observe the workings of St.Nicholas’. I brought to this project a range of 
theoretical preferences which flavoured my orientation from the outset. I had, throughout the 
second half of my sociology degree, cultivated an appetite for ethnomethodology which I found, 
of the range of perspectives to which I had been introduced, at once the most stimulating and 
radical. Although I later developed an interest both in post-structuralism and hermeneutics 
which have influenced my understanding of social processes, it is ethnomethodology - and the 
works of its arch exponents - which has remained the driving force.
As such the site of my ethnographic fieldwork was of less significance than my 
determination to pursue a particular form of research and mode of analysis. Regardless of the 
actual setting, I was committed to the idea of an empirical piece of research conducted along 
ethnographic lines, in an organizational context amenable to the in-depth analysis of participants’ 
working practices through, in particular, the methodological device of tape recording. My 
ambitions for the Ph.D were broadly structured by these a priori concerns.
The institutional setting which I selected was, however, of considerable substantive 
interest to me. I have always retained a concern for “topic”, the specific characteristics of an 
organizational site, in addition to a fascination with the formal methods which cultural members 
share. I was for instance, following an earlier six month placement in a childrens’ home 
(see page 42), interested in the knowledge and procedures through which staff constructed 
“problem children” as “children with emotional problems”. The community home was an 
excellent context in which to observe this process. For although the residents had been 
“diagnosed” by a series of professionals prior to arrival, the definitional process is never 
complete, and the staff at StNicholas’ were artfully engaged in accomplishing working
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interpretations of the boys and their behaviour for the practical purposes in hand.
While committed to the belief that the boys* institutional identities were the end product 
of a complex web of social practices rather than the starting point, what remained to be 
discovered was how such an accomplishment was discursively realized, and through what 
methods of practical reasoning. Only by virtue of intensive empirical observation of everyday 
institutional life could such discoveries be made.
Of course I had certain inklings about the substantive nature of institutional discourse, 
some of which proved to be productive trails, others quite misleading. For instance, I entered 
the field with a sense that what was distinctive about a therapeutic mode of reasoning was the 
imaginative ways in which its exponents played upon the documentary method of interpretation. 
While it took long empirical experience and analysis to refine this rather crude insight and to 
begin to perceive this “play” in figurative terms (see chapter 3), it was none the less a fruitful 
lead.
By contrast, I started the research with the hunch that each of the different professional 
groups - the residential social workers and teachers within St.Nicholas’, and other groups such 
as field social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists from without - would each employ a 
distinctive mode of discourse which would be apparent upon analysis. Indeed, this inkling was 
given a degree of substantiation in the second month of fieldwork on the occasion of what I saw 
as a breach of the professional boundaries. This occurred in one of Damian Tanner’s case 
conferences when Nicola Hobbs, Damian’s “basics” teacher, read the educational conclusions 
formulated by Kate Lambert, the head of education at St.Nicholas*. The report closed with the 
following observations.
“Individually, the bad behaviour Damian exhibits is more juvenile stupidity 
than serious behavioural concern, but, taken together these individual 
incidents constitute a disturbing lack of social conscience.
Damian seems to feel no guilt for himself and concern or compassion for his 
friends. It is this that concerns me more than the behaviour itself. Perhaps 
Damian needs professional expertise of a specialized kind in dealing with, 
what seems to me, a serious personality defect.”
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Following Nicola’s presentation of Kate Lambert’s report the senior field social 
worker responded thus:
S.F.S.W: Can I ask uhm - who the head of education is?
Nicola: Kate Lambert.
S.F.S.W: Kate Lambert. And is she ah - how qualified do you think she is to (1) or 
perhaps Roger Carter can say - but to talk about a serious personality 
defect? (2) I mean that’s a very serious thing to say - and I wonder whether 
or not she’s saying that ah (1.5) you know - you know almost ah - if one could 
put it in these words - almost irresponsibly?
Roger: No - 1 think what it was - she personally wouldn’t say anything irresponsibly
- because there are two things. I think that she is - uhm - an extremely 
concerned person - extremely experienced (.5) uhm ( 1 ) and (.5) I - would say
- the deputy I value more than any other deputy (I’ve had). And I think - 
she’s obviously expressing (1) uh - her opinion very clearly - uhm - and she 
is obviously extremely concerned - but she is certainly not irresponsible...
S.F.S.W: I mean clearly to-to suggest that Damian (.5) has a serious personality defect 
has got (.5) vivid psychiatric connotations.
Roger: Yes - yes.
S.F.S.W: I’m wondering what her background there is?
Roger: Yes I think perhaps she might have said that perhaps we need to get other
advice then about his - behaviour. . .  because she’s obviously feeling very 
strongly about things.
Although this incident seemed to lend weight to my initial hypothesis about the 
existence of different professional languages and realms of expertise, such expressions were, in 
my experience, very rare, and never again was I witness to one so flagrant as that quoted above.
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What became overwhelmingly apparent, in spite of subtle differences in emphasis, was the 
similarities which united the various professional practitioners, particularly in their adherence 
to a broadly therapeutic mode of reasoning. Nor did practitioners necessarily articulate the 
professional line, so that on page 221, for example, we have a psychiatrist denying that the child’s 
deviance was borne of psychological disturbance, and embracing a theory of his criminal 
responsibility. Such deviations occurred without challenging the cognitive and moral universe 
of participants.
So, while the aims of the present research were broadly influenced by an 
ethnomethodological perspective which was sharpened and modified in its application, many of 
the substantive insights which I hope the research yields were discovered in situ. Such 
“discoveries” did, of course, flow partially from the framework and the perceptual discipline it 
demanded, but they could not have been known in advance, nor did the framework determine 
the findings.
I leave the reader to assess the extent to which my ambitions have been realized, and 
delay my assessment of the successes and failures to the concluding chapter. For the present 
purposes I proceed to offer a map of the chapters so that the reader may find her way around 
the thesis more easily.
Chapter Summarv
Chanter 1 offers a theoretical appraisal of the nature of institutional order and an 
appreciation of its inextricability from the methodological procedures which members routinely 
employ. It is, I contend, an accomplished order. Recognizing that the sociologist too shares in 
and draws upon the knowledge and skills of ordinary members, and therefore cannot stand 
wholly apart from them, does not negate the possibility of analytical insight. The stance required 
is akin to an anthropology of the everyday: at once an immersion in the flow of institutional life 
as well as a suspension of ones common sense orientation to it.
I continue in the second half of the chapter to offer an account of the methods which 
I employed in the service of my fieldwork: in choosing a setting; gaining access; negotiating a 
conducive portfolio of roles. I point out that these conundrums are shared by nearly all 
ethnographers, however different they are in other respects. What more clearly distinguishes
12 -
the ethnographic perspective I favour is the methods of data collection and analysis which I 
employed.
Chapter 2 offers an introduction to the institutional context. In the first part I 
consider the changing historical orientation to “problem children” and the chequered emergence 
of a more therapeutically inclined approach. This culminated in the 1969 Children and Young 
Persons Act which created the community home as an institution. In the second half of chapter 2 
I consider the prevalent organizational features of S t Nicholas’, preceded by a short historical 
appraisal of the institution.
In chapter 3 1 turn to the empirical data to examine the therapeutic propensity which 
practitioners at St. Nicholas’ had to interpret behaviour as a manifestation of the child’s 
underlying emotional problems. I explore this relationship which staff constructed between the 
surface and depth in terms of its elaboration and adaptation of the documentary method of 
interpretation. The defining characteristic is the figurative play which is set up between the two 
levels which may take a metaphorical, ironical or metonymic turn.
Although a pathologizing tendency was the most systematic, two alternative frameworks 
were frequently employed to either normalize or criminalize the boys’ behaviour. In chapter 4 
I investigate the contextual considerations and typifying knowledge which the staff employed 
in allocating the boys’ behaviour to one of the three schemata. These considerations encompassed 
an assessment oi what the. boy had done, when he did it and why he was motivated to perform the 
action. The practitioner’s knowledge of who was responsible for the behaviour was, however, 
perhaps the most influential factor in arriving at an adequate interpretation. The critical 
criterion in distinguishing a pathological from a criminal or normal motivation was the assessment 
of whether the behaviour was in or out of a boy’s control. Although institutional culture was 
therapeutically permeated, another tendency toward routine cynicism, as I call it, was also 
evident. While these two threads often strained in different directions they were nonetheless 
both accommodated within the institutional fabric.
In chapter 51 withdraw once more from the empirical analysis to theoretically examine 
the nature of time and history. Time enters into our social awareness and actions in a number 
of senses. In a “macro” sense, the time in which we live clearly shapes our perceptions of reality. 
In a “micro” sense, participants in even the briefest of conversational exchanges orientate the
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temporal features of them. We are not only made by time and history, but we also make them. 
This is clearly apparent in the work of historical (re)construction. The historian retrieves details 
of the past which happened independently of him, but he furnishes them with a context and 
organizes them in such a way as to lend an overall meaning to them. The events conveyed are 
inextricable from the story which is told about them.
This theoretical appraisal of time and narrative facilitates an appreciation of the 
nature of the case historian’s task. When children are brought into care their past is often 
subjected to scrutiny by a variety of professionals. This often takes the form of a search for clues 
which reveal “what went wrong” with the child. The staff at St. Nicholas’ would often make 
sense of the boys’ contemporary behaviour with reference to the events of their case history and 
other scraps of information acquired along the way. This mode of historical analysis, whether 
formally inscribed in written reports or articulated in informal conversation, is no different in 
principle from other forms of historical discourse. It too is an artful accomplishment which 
involves injecting a wider significance and systematicity into events which are in themselves 
muddled and inchoate.
In chapter 6 1 consider the recurrent moft/of lack which showed up in many historical 
assessments. The boys were characteristically believed to suffer from a range of deprivations 
which encompassed lack of love, care, consistency and adequate parenting. It was this historical 
victimization Wiich was typically held to account for why the child had developed the psychological 
disturbance of which his deviant behaviour was the manifestation.
In chanter 7 I move on from the knowledge upon which practitioners drew in 
identifying familiar historical motifs, to the procedures they employed in erecting an architecture 
of causality. I thus seek to examine the methods through which a series of events are forged into 
a chain of causal connections. Two broad modes of causal connection can be deciphered in the 
data. In the configurational mode the actual relationship between events is implied rather than 
stated. The reader is thus left to secure the links by drawing, above all, upon her social 
knowledge of narrative and, perhaps less importantly, her occupational wisdom. In the rational 
mode by contrast, the causal connection is accorded a more explicit status. Temporal events are 
bridged very often by a theory of the boy’s psychological motivation: event B occurred because 
of A.
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In chapter 8 1 build upon the foundations laid in the previous chapter to develop an 
appraisal of how practitioners galvanized past, present and future events into a coherent 
pattern. This retrospective-prospective process was characterized by a paradigmatic mode of 
causal accounting: an emergent pattern was constructed from a series of events to which new 
items could then be assimilated as "another instance o f ’ a familiar theme.
The thesis may, in summary, be divided into three parts. In the first I am primarily 
concerned to furnish the theoretical, methodological, historical and institutional context. In 
part two I explore the discursive relationship which practitioners constructed between the 
child’s behaviour and the motivations which purportedly undergirded it. In the remaining 
chapters I examine the nature of the relationship which members forged between the boy’s 
contemporary misdemeanours and his emotional history. Thus, if part two draws attention to 
the various ways in which the surface relates to the motivating depths part three takes as its 
primary focus the relationship between the present and the past.
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LIST OF PSEUDONYMS FOR THE STAFF AND BOYS AT ST. NICHOLAS'
STAFF
PRINCIPAL: Roger Carter (for first nine months of fieldwork) 
Peter Scott (for last six months of fieldwork)
DEPUTY PRINCIPAL 
HEAD OF SOCIAL WORK: John Townsend (for first three months of 
fieldwork)
Paul Skinner (for last year of fieldwork)
DEPUTY PRINCIPAL 
HEAD OF EDUCATION: Kate Lambert
U N ITl
UNIT MANAGER:
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKERS
Frank Mercer 
Joe Duggan 
Karen Barker
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKERS: Eileen Walker
Jim Taylor 
Sharon Coulter
UNIT2
UNIT MANAGER:
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKERS:
Bob Burnett 
Mavis Baron 
Lawrence Mansfield
Graham Wait (for last 3 months of fieldwork) 
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKERS: Brenda Derby
Melvin Hardy
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UNITS
UNIT MANAGER:
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKERS:
Philip Hooper 
Jan Butler 
George Wallace 
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKERS: Tina Wait
Andrew Chetland 
Colin Lynch
UNIT4
UNIT MANAGER: Thomas McKinney
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKERS: Mike Griffith
Joyce Page
Colin Thompson (for a period of my fieldwork) 
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKERS: Sandra Crossley
Caroline Dixon 
David Walsh 
Sam King
NIGHT SOCIAL WORKERS: Duncan Tylor 
Sheila Sands
TEACHING STAFF 
HEAD OF EDUCATION: 
SENIOR TEACHER: 
“BASICS” TEACHERS:
ART TEACHER: 
WOODWORK TEACHER: 
BUILDING INSTRUCTOR: 
P.E. TEACHER:
Kate Lambert
Gary Pallin (for last six months of fieldwork)
Nicola Hobbs
Ruth Jenkins
Peter French
Judy Mallum
Brian Potter
Jason Roberts
Jack Dennis
Alan Evans
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SOCIAL AND PRACTICAL SKILLS 
INSTRUCTORS: Agnes Turner
Malcolm Appleby 
AFTER-CARE WORKER: Agnes Turner
BURSAR: Tom Paine
STAFF PSEUDONYMS IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER
MALCOLM APPLEBY: 
KAREN BARKER: 
MAVIS BARON:
BOB BURNETT:
JAN BUTLER:
ROGER CARTER:
ANDREW CHETLAND: 
SHARON COULTER: 
SANDRA CROSSLEY: 
JACK DENNIS: 
BRENDA DERBY: 
CAROLINE DIXON: 
JOE DUGGAN:
ALAN EVANS:
PETER FRENCH:
MIKE GRIFFITH: 
MELVIN HARDY: 
NICOLA HOBBS: 
PHILIP HOOPER: 
RUTH JENKINS:
SAM KING:
PRACTICAL SKILLS INSTRUCTOR 
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 1 
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 2 
UNIT MANAGER UNIT 2 
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 3 
PRINCIPAL OF ST. NICHOLAS’ (For first 
9 months of fieldwork)
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 3 
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 1 
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 4 
BUILDER INSTRUCTOR 
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 2 
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 4 
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 1 
P.E. TEACHER 
“BASICS” TEACHER 
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 4 
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 2 
“BASICS” TEACHER 
UNIT MANAGER UNIT 3 
“BASICS” TEACHER
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 4
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KATE LAMBERT:
COLIN LYNCH:
JUDY MALLUM: 
LAWRENCE MANSFIELD: 
THOMAS McKINNEY: 
FRANK MERCER:
JOYCE PAGE:
TOM PAINE:
GARY PALLIN:
BRIAN POTTER:
JASON ROBERTS:
SHEILA SANDS:
PETER SCOTT:
PAUL SKINNER:
JIM TAYLOR:
COLIN THOMPSON:
JOHN TOWNSEND:
AGNER TURNER:
DUNCAN TYLOR:
GRAHAM WATT:
TINA WAIT:
EILEEN WALKER: 
GEORGE WALLACE: 
DAVID WALSH:
DEPUTY PRINCIPAL-HEAD OF 
EDUCATION
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 3 
(AND LATER) UNIT 4 
“BASICS” TEACHER
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 2 
UNIT MANAGER UNIT 4 
UNIT MANAGER UNIT 1 
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 4 
BURSAR
SENIOR TEACHER
ART TEACHER
WOODWORK TEACHER
NIGHT SOCIAL WORKER (attached to
Unit 2)
PRINCIPAL OF ST. NICHOLAS’ (for last 
six months of fieldwork)
DEPUTY PRINCIPAL-HEAD OF SOCIAL 
WORK (for last year of fieldwork)
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 1 
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 4 
DEPUTY PRINCIPAL-HEAD OF SOCIAL 
WORK (for first 3 months of field work) 
PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SKILLS 
INSTRUCTOR AND AFTER CARE 
WORKER
NIGHT SOCIAL WORKER (attached to 
Unit 3)
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 2 (for last 
three months of field work)
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 3 
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 1 
SENIOR SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 3 
BASIC GRADE SOCIAL WORKER UNIT 4
- 19 -
BOYS RESIDENT AT SOME POINT DURING MY FIELDWORK 
riN ALPHABETICAL ORDERl
UNITl: RICHARD ASHWORTH 
JAMES BRYAN 
SIMON CUTTS 
ALAN MARSH 
JIMMY MASON 
GRAHAM MELLOR 
JULIAN PINES 
PERRY SAUNDERS 
MARK SMITH 
DAMIAN TANNER 
NIGEL WYATT
UNIT 2: SYDNEY ASHINGTON 
GARY BROOKE 
GERRY CASEY 
LEN COOPER 
KARL FOWLER 
JOHN KENYON 
DAVID MINIER 
SAMUEL NAILER 
LEONPRYCE 
TED VINCENT
UNITS: PAUL BLACK 
ANDYHSHER 
NEIL FOSTER 
BEN JACKSON 
DAVID LYONS 
MARTIN OLSON 
SIMON WELLS
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UNIT4: STEVE BUTLER
CLIVE DENNIS 
IAN DRAYTON 
CHARLES HUDSON 
PETER HUGHES 
CHRIS JONES 
JUNIOUR KNIGHT 
KEVIN MEAD 
BARRY PAINTER 
TONY SALTER 
SAMSON SMITH 
WAYNE TALLIS
DAY BOYS REFERRED TO IN THESIS
KEITH FLETCHER 
STEVE RILEY 
TOM SMITH 
JULIAN YOUNG
EX-RESIDENTS REFERRED TO IN THESIS
RICHARD DICKENS (Resident of half-way house) 
DEXTER ABRAMS
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ABBREVIATIONS
MEETINGS
P.O.’S MEETING = Principal Officers’ Meeting
(Involving the principal, the two deputy principals and the bursar). Held twice 
weekly.
S.S.M. = Senior Staff Meeting
(Involving P.O.’s and unit managers). Held twice weekly.
T.M. = Teachers Meeting
(Involving deputy principal - head of education, and all the teachers). Held twice 
weekly.
C.C. = Case Conference
(Involving the boy, his special worker, unit manager, “basics” teacher, parent/s 
and occasionally significant others such as grandparent/s, field social worker and 
quite often her senior, and very rarely, other professional representatives such as 
education psychologists, etc.). Held every one to three months, otherwise known 
as reviews.
PERSONNEL
F.S.W. = field social worker
S.F.S.W. = senior field social worker
R.S.W. = residential social worker
OTHER ABBREVIATIONS
C.H.E = Community Home with Education on the Premises
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TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOLS
TURNS: The turn of each new speaker starts on a new line with a name 
designating the identity of the speaker.
PAUSES: Each pause in the conversation is timed to the nearest half second and 
placed in round brackets, so that (.5) = half a second, (3) = three 
seconds, (4.5) = four and a half seconds. For example, Peter: We've 
taken on a lot of (1) boys in the last (.5) nine months..
Pauses of less than 0.5 seconds, but longer than usual are denoted by a 
hyphen. For example, Kate: Uhm - I I  think I’d like to (1.5) a ^  Steven 
something - uhm (.5) regarding the delinquency b it. . .
Where the usual fractional pause between words is omitted this is 
designated by a hyphen without a space either side of it. For example, 
Thomas: You see I-I (.5) dunno where you’re getting this idea . . . ”
EMPHASIS: Syllables/words are underlined to denote emphasis placed upon them by 
the speaker. (See previously quoted example).
OVERLAPPING
TALK:
Over-lapping talk is denoted by three bracket openings on consecutive 
lines. For example:
Eileen:
Kim:
 he respected his dad far more than his mother becos of her colour.
But he’s the last admit it - no wav will he {admit it
{
{His dad’s black and his mum’s
white?
Eileen: Yer.
UNIDENTIFIED
WORDS:
These are identified by question-marks in round brackets, each question 
mark denoting how many words I think are involved.
2 3 -
UNCLEAR
WORDS:
These are placed in brackets with a question mark either side of word (s).
PRELIMINARY Preliminary context-setting comments in my own words are placed in
COMMENTS: square brackets preceding transcript.
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTIONS:
Summary descriptions in my own words in the body of the transcript are 
placed in brackets and acknowledged afterwards.
If brackets appear in original (written) text this is also specified.
EXCLUSIONS: Where I miss out a short piece of text or talk this is denoted by three 
dots.
TRANSCRIBERS Where I wish to emphasize a tone of voice or physical expression/
DESCRIPTION: gesture, for example: (laughs), (slaps desk with hand) etc., I do so in
brackets following relevant section.
LINE Each line of transcript is numbered on the left hand margin so that
NUMBERING: particular parts of the transcript may be referred to in the analysis.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTEXT
A) The Nature of Institutional Order
Introduction
A paramount challenge to sociology has been to account for the persistence of 
institutional patterns. How does behaviour become routinized and, hence, spawn stable 
domains of activity? The Parsonian solution to the problem of social order has been convincingly 
refuted. Institutional strength and endurability lie not in a structure of external constraints 
which seep into the normative consciousness of individuals as need dispositions or the like. The 
scission between the solitary atom and the social collective is untenable even as a heuristic 
device, because it inevitably denudes one of its constitutive potential. In the neo-functionalist 
model the actor is reduced to the husk like repository of all things social. Even with a veneer of 
Parsonian sophistication, this is basically a Pavlovian view of human agency. Reacting directly 
against this model of the “judgemental dope” Garfinkel began to develop an account of social 
order premised upon cognitive-moral assumptions. Social facts are not objects to be passively 
imbibed, but an active,
“ongoing accomplishment of the concerted activities of daily life, with the 
ordinary, artful ways of that accomplishment being by members known, 
used, and taken-for-granted. . . ”
[H. Garfinkel (1967) - p.vii]
Heritage’s eloquent definition of an institution as “the robust product of an interlocking 
network of reflexively accountable practices” [J. Heritage (1984) - p.229] nicely captures its 
processually accomplished nature. Whether one is considering a relatively simple routine of 
everyday interaction, or the amalgam of practices which constitute the organization of a 
bounded institutional domain, the insight remains the same. It is the capacity of actors to 
orientate to an extensive stock of social knowledge and repertoire of practices in which the 
cognitive foundation of order lies, and its moral counterpart, in their ability to call themselves 
or others to account. Indeed, Heritage’s reference to members’ accountability harbours a 
productive ambiguity. It at once describes the way in which institutional modes of reasoning are 
inscribed in verbal and written accounts, as well as the members’ recognition that they may be
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called to moral account for their actions, especially if they are in breach of the socially defined 
rules. Far from denying the orderliness of social order, or the facticity of social facts, a 
cognitive-moral orientation lends depth and elasticity to our appreciation of reality as a social 
process in time.
i) The Typifying Process as Analytical Object
The capacity for social reproduction is bound up in the reflexive dynamic. Each action 
is assimilated to, or modifies the world it enacts; the cognitive canopy is extended to accommodate 
it. This is not an idle repetition. /Reproduction is at once a creative production in which actors 
bring their interpretative prowess to bear in performing appropriate actions and making sense 
of those of others. It is this which inspires admiration for the skills and resources actors wield 
in the ongoing construction of reality; a celebration which leaves most sociologists cold, and 
uncomfortably so because it pulls the rug from under their seat of privilege.
Two analytical components are distinguishable in the production of a normal, familiar 
environment. In the first place it requires the activation of a body of social knowledge, and the 
typifying schemata which compose it, and in the second place, the capacity to utilize the 
procedures through which any experience can be plugged into a wider network. Meaningful 
sense is made in this process through which items are accommodated within “a horizon of 
familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship” [A. Schütz (1962) - p.7]. The operation is instantaneous 
and multiple; in a flash actors are able to locate a complex array of appearances within schemata 
which lend them typicality. In the empirical dynamic of reality production, the knowledge and 
procedures of its accomplishment are interdependent. If one is the yarn, the other is the process 
through which it is spun into the patterns which characterize a particular institutional fabric.
The procedural mechanism at work in linking the phenomenal world of appearance 
to an underlying typificatory pattern is the documentary method of interpretation which:
“consists of treating an actual appearance as “the document of,” as “pointing 
to,” as “standing on behalf of” a presupposed underlying pattern. Not only 
is the underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary evidences, 
but the individual evidences, in their turn, are interpreted on the basis of 
“what is known” about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the 
other.”
[H. Garfinkel (1967) - p.78]
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Until “actual appearances” are incorporated into a pre-existing schema, they lack 
significance. And yet, the “underlying pattern” derives its authority from no other source than 
its propriety in relation to those same actual appearances. In the fiuid and reciprocal elaboration 
between the presenting item and the ghost firamework of typification the reflexive spark ignites 
the fuel of reality production. Through the workings of the documentary method the ordered 
world we share is perpetuated, or manageably modified at each encounter with new appearances. 
What accomplishes the work of maintenance, modification and repair is our cognitive orientation 
to and moral belief in the “underlying” patterns and procedures which define our social being. 
We at once presuppose and rely upon the existence of the realities we are in the process of 
making. The persistence of institutional patterns is grounded in these strata of sedimented 
knowledge and practices which have permeated the core of common sense, and are brought to 
life through the documentary dynamic.
An important dimension which Garfinkel added to Mannheim’s and Schutz’s conceptions 
of the documentary method was to extend it beyond merely a sociological method, or a means 
of eliciting subjective meaning in the manner of Weber. Garfinkel saw it as a ubiquitous feature 
oiall modes of social reasoning, lay and sociological alike. To prioritize mundane practices, and 
give them the attention usually accorded the extraordinary, the analyst must temporarily and 
partialfy distance herself from the cultural assumptions in which she, too, is immersed. Paradoxically, 
to demonstrate the constitutive power of common sense reasoning the analyst must depart from 
it; a sojourn which requires no little effort and ingenuity. As Leiter points out:
“From the analyst’s perspective, the facticity of objects and events may be 
viewed as a product of the members’ use of the documentary method. From 
the member's perspective^ he is not working with appearances, but with facts 
which have factual meaning. To use the documentary method, then, 
involves presuming and relying upon the facticity of the social world at the 
outset while simultaneously creating that facticity through the use of the 
documentary method.”
[K Leiter (1980)-p.l70]
[Emphasis in original]
In this respect discourse analysis of the ethnomethodological kind is not naturalistic. 
Remaining faithful to the data does not consist of staying exclusively within the actors’ frame of 
reference. Indeed, as I have said, the analyst must strive to actively bracket certain taken-for-granted 
assumptions which she shares with her subjects, so as to explore the practices in which they 
consist. This is not a call to convert the analyst into an artless observer; a feat which would be
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impossible even if it were desirable. To make such a claim would be to endow the analyst with 
the status of cultural dope, or unfettered scientific observer, at the very same time as one is 
objecting to such a status vis a vis people in general. The anthropological stance is an important 
moment in the analytic process, but only one, to adopt hermeneutic vocabulary, on an arc of 
operations.
Analysis of the documentary method as a topic alerts one to the inextricability of 
reality from the methods through which it is accomplished. Facts are not outside discourse; they 
are structured by the typified assumptions and expectancies which actors bring to bear in making 
sense of the world. I call this subterranean network of typifications a ghost framework because 
it is ever present in the background as a generalized corpus of knowledge, but only materializes 
at the point of articulation. An absent-presence, we never fall over the schemata which compose 
the ghost framework, nor are they ever absent from our sense-making practices. Although the 
world is inseparable from the language and practices through which it is realized, a sense of 
difference, or otherness, is a feature of the play of different levels within discourse. Thus, when 
an actor interprets appearance as the manifestation of a particular underlying pattern, she is 
engaging with the ghost network of assumptions which are always already in the discursive 
machine. In the process of mutual elaboration between the levels a generality is accorded to the 
specific, and a familiarity to the strange.
An obvious implication is that objects and events are imbued with meaning relative to 
the pattern in which they are incorporated. Hence, what appears this way may, in a moment, 
from a different perspective, or with new information appear that way. Even within the most 
homogeneous of institutional domains perceptual contrasts and modifications occur since such 
ambiguities are attendant upon all forms of practical reasoning. Institutions do, however, 
exhibit systematic tendencies in the kind of interpretations participants make about the nature 
of appearance. While the threads are drawn from the world of everyday common sense 
reasoning, they are spun into a particular design and accorded an emphasis which lends the 
institution its relative specificity. Examination of any piece of the fabric will jointly elucidate the 
reasoning germane to everyday life, as well as that characteristic of the institution in particular. 
My reading of the forthcoming empirical material, for instance, suggests that therapeutic 
accounts exaggerate and modify the procedures which are, nonetheless, indigenous to everyday 
reasoning.
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The strategy I adopt in order to examine the play of institutional discourse is similar 
to what Silverman and Torode call “interruption” whereby discourse is itself “interrogated” to 
see how it forges the link between appearance and essence; talk and the world to which it refers. 
Silverman and Torode distinguish interruption from interpretation, by which term they refer:
“to the practice of treating language as the mere ‘appearance’ of an 
extra-linguistic ‘reality’ pre-supposed by the interpretation. This practice is 
itself not what it appears to be: it does not do what it says. For it is impossible 
to formulate an extra-linguistic reality, e.g. ‘nature’, ‘society’ or ‘grammar’ 
except in language. Thus in pretending to uphold a non-linguistic and so 
neutral reality the interpretation in practice imposes its own language upon 
that of the language it interprets.”
[D. Silverman and B. Torode (1980) - p.7-8]
Interruption, by contrast:
“seeks not to impose a language of its own but to enter critically into existing 
linguistic configurations, and to re-open the closed structures into which 
they have ossified.”
[Ibid - p.6]
The project undertaken in this thesis also attempts,
“to reveal the interplay between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ within language 
itself. As against the view of language as a reality sui generis, whether 
transparent or opaque, we insist that language necessarily refers, as appearance, 
to a reality other than itself. But, we propose, the way in which it does this 
is to refer to other language. Thus plurality is inseparable from language, and 
it is the play of reference from one language to another language that 
suggests the reference of language to a reality other than language.”
[Ibid - p.8]
[Emphasis in original]
By interrupting the documentary method of interpretation the analyst may explore 
the play it sets up between the document and the ghost pattern it purportedly manifests. In this 
respect Silverman and Torode offer a useful way of articulating the kind of intervention the 
discourse analyst might make. However, the severity of the distinction between interpretation 
and interruption has connotations which are damaging to a more reflexive appreciation of 
language use. It assumes the analyst can interrupt linguistic processes without having interpreted 
them, (an operation which I consider impossible), and by logical extension, that she can 
completely step outside of the interpretative methods that ordinary people use. For, although
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lay actors too can interrupt, it is not clear from Silverman and Torode’s account whether their 
unavoidable reliance upon interpretative mechanisms is naive, disingenuous, or embodies the 
quest for linguistic and hence political mastery.
In their call for a form of literal description Silverman and Torode appear to want to 
bury the methodological monsters which a more reflexive genre of discourse analysis at least 
acknowledge, if not celebrate. It appears that the “interruptor” is the mouthpiece for describing 
what is "really going on”, and in so doing engages in a curiously classical form of sociological 
irony given the radical promise of the book.
Language does play a key role in the construction of institutional realities. As a 
"treasure-house of ready-made preconstituted types and characteristics” [A. Schütz (1962) - p. 14] 
it provides the conceptual organization necessary for a stable world to emerge. Language itself, 
however, provides only the necessary but not sufficient conditions. Only when articulated in 
discourse is the system of language brought to life; only when employed to perform actions does 
it fulfil its constitutive potential. Discourse is a doing, or as Ricoeur puts it, an "event”. Unlike 
language, as an internally logical system in itself outside of time, discourse unfolds through time, 
it is marked by the inscriptions of an author and the techniques through which she legitimates 
her version, and it addresses itself to a world outside, including the recipient of discourse [see 
P. Ricoeur (1981) - p.133-134]. While author, recipient and world are entities embroiled in 
discourse and inseparable from it, they are nonetheless the Other to which discourse alludes. 
Language is the prerequisite of discourse, but it cannot survive independently. As Ricoeur puts 
it:
" . . .  language, by being actualized in discourse, surpasses itself as system 
and realizes itself as event.. . ”
[Ibid - p. 134]
The generative force which is doing the articulating is not language perse, nor, I must 
emphasize, the subjective consciousness of the author, as idealist conceptions would have it. 
Language in itself neither simply creates or reflects; it is neither master or slave. Discourse 
emerges at the junction at which actors employ their shared knowledge of the reflexively 
accountable practices to cut out shapes in language. Language and the methods of its 
articulation are different sides of the same piece of paper. Accounts cannot cut into one side
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without simultaneously cutting into the other [see Barthe’s adaptation of the Saussurean 
analogy examined in Silverman and Torode (1980) - p.258].
Accounting thus relies upon members’ interpretative finesse. Since the meaning of 
objects and events are tied to the context in which they appear the actor must do a great deal of 
work to ensure the propriety of her interpretation of them. While items are, in principle, open 
to multiple interpretations, our mutual orientation to an amalgam of sense-making methods 
ensures that we live in a world which is shared sufficiently to be stable. Any strategy for eliciting 
the import of appearances must involve the reading of situational clues; a process which ensures 
that context seeps into the kernel of reasoning itself. In this sense we must:
“abandon our traditional conception of‘context’ as something exogenous to 
interaction or as an external interpretative resource. Instead, we can begin 
to think of‘context’ as something endogenously generated within the talk of 
the participants and, indeed, as something created in and through that talk.” 
[J. Heritage (1984) - p.283]
[Emphasis in original]
This recognition invites the adoption of a perspective which Knorr-Cetina [1981 - p.6] 
termed “methodological situationalism”, from which:
“actions are treated not simply as the products of individual dispositions nor 
of external constraints, but as reciprocally organized within a setting in 
which actors’ cognitive frameworks are instantiated as patterned interaction.” 
[J. Heritage (1984) - p.307]
In summary, the attribution of meaning to appearance requires that it be identified as 
a particular type. Typification occurs through the location of an item within a cognitive 
framework which endows it with the status of “an instance of”. The situatedness of events is 
resolvable only by investing them with a generality which exceeds the specific. The point is, that 
by bringing their knowledge of social and psychological structures to bear in the elucidation of 
individual items, actors are incessantly engaged in the process of forging a link between the 
micro and its macro conditions of possibility. The specific is indexically repaired through being 
plugged into a typifying network which goes beyond it. The methods of repair are themselves 
part of the institutional setting, and in this sense an analysis of the panoply of techniques through 
which participants give micro events macro import must take place in situ. As Cicourel points 
out:
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. .  micro- and macro-levels of analysis are integrated in everyday settings 
as a routine feature of all cultural or social organization. The members of 
a group or society have created their own theories and methodologies for 
achieving this integration.”
[K Knorr-Cetina and AV. Cicourel (1981) - p.65]
The micro and the macro are, in this move, dissolved as entities, and return as moments in the 
on-going construction of a shared reality.
ii) The Tension between Cultural Immersion and Anthropological Alienation
By exploring the everyday accounting activities of practitioners as part of a repertoire 
of “members’ methods for making those same activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all- 
practical purposes” one is giving the mundane “. . .  the attention usually accorded extraordinary 
events” [H. Garfinkel (1967) - p.vii and p.l respectively]. At the very same time the exposure 
and magnification of the hitherto unremarkable features of institutional conduct shows it to be, 
in its own way, a minor miracle. What is required is an anthropology of the ordinary; a method 
through which the analyst can distance herself from cultural practices sufficiently to perceive the 
nature of their composition. Geertz’s anthropological impulse is borne out of the same desire 
to puncture the familiarity which obscures our own cultural competence. In his words:
“The famous anthropological absorption with the (to us) exotic (is) essentially 
a device for displacing the dulling sense of familiarity with which the 
mysteriousness of our own ability to relate perceptively to one another is 
concealed from us.”
[C. Geertz (1975) - p. 14]
Taking physical flight to alien cultures is a dramatic way of achieving a perspective by 
contrast. It is not appropriate, however, to the detailed analysis of aspects of one’s own culture, 
the apprehension of which requires an alternative mode of displacement. Efforts have been 
made to devise a means of producing the shock of the exotic upon the analyst’s native soil. 
Garfinkel’s “breaching experiments” are, for instance, an original and intriguing means of 
calling cultural practices to account. He did so by requesting his students, a remarkably plucky 
group, to go forth and tinker with the normative presuppositions of everyday interactions; a 
disruptive project which has since been called “Garfinkelling”. We need not go into the details 
of the experiments which include the demand for absolute semantic clarity in casual conversation, 
pretending to be a lodger in one’s own home, standing too close to one’s fellow conversationalist,
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and so on [see H. Garfinkel (1967) - pages 35-75]. By contravening the taken-for-granted 
patterns, Garfinkel was able to expose some of the work that is done to sustain them, and the 
moral power with which they are invested. The breaching method, albeit in the words of one of 
the subject-victims of an experiment, “diabolic - but clever”, is sustainable only momentarily; a 
fact to which the nervous tensions experienced by the student-experimentors bears witness. 
What is more the experiments intervene in and disrupt social life in a way that renders them quite 
unsuitable for ethnographic work. Nor was this the purpose for which they were devised.
What Garfmkel’s experiments display is the incessant hive of activity in which we are 
effortlessly and unconsciously engaged in the production of a normal, patterned environment. 
The comforting familiarity of cultural patterns blunts our capacity to perceive their workings; a 
blindness which is not to do with subjectivity or objectivity, but with proximity. Unlike the 
anthropology of alien societies where initial strangeness is gradually eroded by a growing sense 
of familiarity, the anthropology of the ordinary requires the analyst to partially and periodically 
push back the threshold of cultural acquaintanceship to permit a sense of strangeness.
How can one gain access to the mechanisms of reality production while leaving their 
product in tact? On this point statements in the literature are notable for their rarity. 
Methodological chapters in mainstream ethnographies offer a wealth of advice about access 
issues, negotiating a role, gaining trust, among other genuine difficulties for the would-be 
ethnographer. Some speak with endearing modesty about the bungling of the frail sociologist 
in relation to the potency of the social group. But the methodological monster remains: how 
is one to be at once cultural stranger and member; discourse analyst and bona fide social 
interactant? Clearly what the analyst must do is to attempt to bracket aspects of reality, to 
temporarily suspend judgement in its external a priori existence in order to be sensitized to the 
procedures of its accomplishment. How such a perspective is to be achieved is more complex, 
yet it takes us to the heart of reflexive analysis.
Any form of ethnography worth its salt requires an intensive period of fieldwork. If 
the cultural and institutional sense of reality is generated “endogenously” through talk and 
practical reasoning, it follows that the analyst must situate herself within the setting. In 
Garfinkel’s words, “The formal properties obtain their guarantees from no other source and in 
no other way” [H. Garfinkel (1967) - p.viiij. However, the committment to a period of relative
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immersion in the life of the group under study is the only factor which unites the heterogeneous 
array of approaches which rub shoulders under the rubric of ethnography.
Hammersley and Atkinson [1983 -pages 14-23] usefully distinguish between naturalist 
ethnography, and that informed by reflexive principles, although their conception of the latter 
is limited by its generality. In the case of naturalist ethnography the aim of the venture is to 
elucidate how actors organize and experience their world through the sociologist’s description 
of it. However, a two headed serpent lurks in the apparently noble attempt to tell it like it is, and 
to usurp the ethnographer’s version in favour of an appreciation of that of the actors. Both 
problems lie in the naturalist’s failure to examine what it is to represent, describe, or tell stories 
“about” the world both as lay person or analyst. In failing to attend to discursive issues of this 
kind, the naturalist ethnographer presents her own description either as a window on the world, 
or as a picture of it, in the early Wittgensteinian sense. The practices through which members 
of the observed group and ethnographer construct their versions is displaced in this moment of 
fusion. Once used as unexplicated resource, many of the methods of practical reasoning are 
buried. As Atkinson and Drew say:
“Just as readers and hearers have no direct way of checking the ethnographer’s 
selected descriptions of events in some setting against the events themselves, 
so too would they be deprived of any way of checking his descriptions of how 
he used his member’s competences against his use of them.”
[M. Atkinson and P. Drew (1979) - p.26]
Unless the analyst’s unavoidable reliance upon cultural modes of practical reasoning 
in interpreting the data is acknowledged, and in someway exposed to scrutiny, the reader cannot 
follow through what Atkinson and Drew call the “logic of (his) interpretation” [Ibid - p.26]. The 
question is not, then, whether the ethnographer can avoid this intimacy, or the discursive skills 
which flow from it, but what she does with it. In this sense the analyst’s reliance upon her cultural 
wisdom is not something to be begrudgingly acknowledged, or swept under the carpet. It is not 
only an inevitable, but a lucrative resource which the ethnographer can trade on during the 
course of her fieldwork- The reflexive ethnographer attempts to milk the benefits of immersion, 
while at the same time subjecting the familiar to the process of anthropological alienation. The 
intimacy which allows one to recognize categories of talk, repeats, deviations and so on, and the 
distantiation which yields access to the methods of their constitution, spawns a productive 
tension which is the hallmark of ethnomethodologically inclined ethnography.
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The process of distantiation, whereby the analyst attempts to shed a layer of cultural 
skin, is one with which ethnomethodologists are characteristically familiar. Given its centrality, 
discussions about the nature of this anthropological moment are curiously hard to find. 
Phenomenological discussions are of little use to us here since reflexivity is treated as something 
to be eclipsed in pursuit of transcendental subjective structures; an orientation which re-appears 
in Schutz’s call for presuppositionlessness. Programmatic discussions about reflexivity abound 
in ethnomethodological literature, but stop short of empirical suggestions about how this 
slippery customer is to be held onto. On pages 44-45 below I attempt to outline some of the 
methods through which I achieved an anthropological reading of institutional affairs.
iii) Ethnomethodological (or Reflexive) Ethnography
S. Woolgar (1982) makes a distinction between “instrumental” and “reflexive” 
ethnography as he calls them. Unlike the former, the latter variety are not predominantly 
concerned with what is unique about a setting. As Woolgar says, “the location of ethnographic 
experience provides the stimulus for, but not the exclusive target of^  reflexive inquiry” (Ibid p. 493). 
The empirical material offers the occasion at once to explore the specifics and to gain insight into 
the generic features of cultural reasoning. The forthcoming analysis of therapeutic discourse, 
for example, highlights knowledge and practices which are germane to everyday life in such a 
way that the latter are opened up to analysis. One need not relinquish an interest in the specifics, 
since institutional patterns always express something in excess, the precise configuration of 
which is irreducible. Unless the relative and the universal, the particular and the general, are 
able to talk to and mutually elaborate each other one is left with an imbalance. Either the 
empirical data is merely a vehicle for making generalized theoretical statements or the latter are 
rather awkwardly stuck on to meet the requirements of the academy. A useful tip whenever one 
is struggling with such methodological issues is to shift attention onto how members in practice 
accomplish the manoeuvres which are in principle problematic for the analyst.
Since the accounts of both institutional members’ and ethnographer display their 
interpretative skills they may equally be placed under the analytical gaze. In this lies a further 
distinction between a reflexive style of ethnography and the ethos of naturalism. In its depiction 
of the ethnographer as an empty vessel or receptor the latter exhibits a family resemblance to 
positivism since both envisage the existence of a world which is external to and independent of 
the observer. In the reflexive mode, by contrast, both ethnographer and subjects are seen as
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skilled theoreticians. In this respect, while Schutz’s distinction between first and second order 
theorizing gives rightful primacy to members’ methods over those of the analyst, in other 
respects a hierarchical analogy is misleading since the practices which “lay” actors employ to 
accomplish a sense of social organization are those which “sociological” actors also use. Of 
course the reflexive gaze is distinct from that which obtains under the “natural attitude”, and 
deliberately so as it is designed to subject the latter to the kind of appraisal usually accorded the 
extraordinary. Even so, the anthropological link is only one in a chain of operations in which the 
pull of familiarity and the push of strangeness are equally compelling.
The literary style through which the analyst displays her interpretative and interruptive 
reasoning may take a variety of presentational turns. The more stylized attempts to capture the 
reflexive dynamic in motion involve the author’s ongoing attempt to draw attention to the 
discursive workings of her own account. Given the inescapability of the sociologist’s dependence 
upon her cultural competence:
“the aim would be to retain and constantly draw attention to the problem in 
the course of description and analysis. We might as well admit that the 
problem is both insoluble and unavoidable, and that even efforts to examine 
how it is avoided are doomed in that they entail an attempt to avoid it! We 
need to explore forms of literary expression whereby the monster can be 
simultaneously kept at bay and allowed a position at the heart of our 
enterprize.”
[S. Woolgar - (1982) - p. 489]
[Emphasis in original]
Or again,
“The aim is to heighten the reader’s sensitivity to the way in which reporting 
is done. This seems to demand a mode of presentational cunning which is 
regrettably absent from most current work.. . ”
[Ibid - p. 491]
An ironic display of the ana^ t’s reflexive self-awareness, although largely undeveloped 
in this piece of work, can firuitfully help to elucidate the mercurial nature of accounting practices 
in general. However, potential hazards lay in the use of “presentational cunning” as Woolgar 
calls it. In the first place, the tone of thisge/ire is often arch and affected, and in the second, a 
preoccupation with the sociologist’s methods carries the risk that those of the institutional 
actors will proportionally recede into the background. To claim that one’s own account is a
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neutral and unreflexive vehicle for exhibiting the reflexivity in the accounts of others would be 
to deny the omniscience of reflexivity in all accounts. But to use the empirical site as 
just-another-occasion-for-examining-the-reflexivity-of-all-accounts transforms a celebration 
of reflexivity into self-congratulation; fruitful spirals into arid loopings of the loop.
A more fundamental and widely shared axis of ethnomethodological presentation 
resides in the verbatim reproduction of empirical material. This affords the opportunity to 
explore the basis upon which the analyst’s train of reasoning rests. The precision of empirical 
presentation and exegesis is its characteristic trait. As Heritage says in the conclusion to his lucid 
study of Garflnkel and the ethnomethodological tradition:
“The research of the last thirty years or so has resulted in the creation of the 
sociological equivalent of the microscope. The use of this instrument is 
yielding glimpses of previously unimaginable levels of social organization in 
human conduct and it is clear that major findings at the molecular and 
sub-molecular levels of social structure are there to be made.”
The book ends with an invitation:
“The instrument has been built: the challenge is to start working with it. 
[J. Heritage (1984) - p.311]
I set out in this thesis to extend the workings of “the instrument” to the institutional 
domain of the community home. In particular it is adapted to elucidate the practical activities 
of social workers and teachers in their construction of an ordered environment of which objects, 
such as “problem kids” are an integral part. In this respect the study offers a modest contribution 
to the Studies o f Work project initiated by Garflnkel.
iv) Degrees of Detail and Descriptive Dilemmas
It should be considered, however, that the microscope of which Heritage speaks can 
be adjusted to different levels of magnification which yield alternative types of result. The level 
at which the present study is pitched falls somewhere in between the classical ethnomethodological 
ethnographies on the one hand, and conversation analysis on the other. Cicourel and Wieder 
for example, as representatives of the former tradition, both rely more heavily than I upon
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descriptive glossing.
Undoubtedly a classic of the genre  ^Cicourel’s study of the organization of juvenile 
justice (1968) offers a fecundity of insights into the practices through which various agencies of 
social control such as the police, probation ofGcers and court personnel, define delinquent 
behaviour. Cicourel has large fish to &y. Amongst his interests is the comparison of the systems 
of juvenile justice in two geographical areas. He is motivated to show how different organizational 
policies, and the priorities to which they give rise, filter through to the interactional “coal face” 
and frame the interpretative modes employed. Cicourel also demonstrates the ways in which 
official statistics on a social problem, such as juvenile delinquency, gloss the panoply of 
procedures through which professional practitioners define someone as being of a particular 
type, with particular characteristics.
Relative to most research methodologies, including those in the interactionist tradition, 
Cicourel’s study is replete with detailed analysis of naturally occurring interactions. Its 
ambitious scope, however, inevitably entails the sacrifice of depth in the accommodation of such 
breadth. What fills the breach is the heavy reliance upon the kind of summary descriptions 
reminiscent of the conventional ethnographic mode.
Wieder (1974), by contrast, limits his research to one institutional domain: a halfway 
house for paroled drug offenders. In his grasp of the workings of the resident “code” Wieder's 
work offers a lucrative ethnographic resource from which the fundamental ramifications of 
reflexivity unfold. The central theme of the piece is how the inmate “code” which appeared to 
staff, residents and Wieder himself to undermine the rehabilitative ideal, was not an independent 
entity, as classical penological literature had it. Rather the code was a consequential part of the 
environment which in organizing it described. By invoking the maxims of the code residents 
could gather a collection of behavioural items under the auspices of a coherent range of motives. 
Through their orientation to the code, and their capacity to “tell” it, members of halfway house 
were in the business of constructing an organized environment conducive to practical intervention.
The beauty of Wieder’s work lies in its simplicity. By isolating the workings of one 
interpretative schema he offers an elegant and powerful insight into the reflexive process in 
general. The feature which I consider lacking, however, is his failure to examine the precise 
empirical expressions of the code, in a sustained manner, on a sufficient variety of occasions. As
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a consequence his analysis rather neglects a fuller appreciation of the unfolding of meaning 
vis a vis the code, and the practices through which its efficacy is realized in the course of its 
articulation.
Any style of ethnography, or investigative project of any kind for that matter, employs 
a level of descriptive glossing; a fact which testifies to the inevitable limitations of a reflexive style 
of research. It is hard to conceive of a study which does not assume at some level, for some of 
the time at least, that it straighforwardly represents an objective world outside of itself. Put in 
a language reminiscent of Woolgar’s (1982), even reflexive ethnography always already entertains 
an instrumental orientation, and the most ardent discourse analyst steps outside of her radically 
reflexive stance on occasions to proffer descriptions which she treats unproblematically.
If the sociologist wishes to explore certain of the intricacies of institutional life in the 
context of the setting as a whole, a degree of descriptive filling in is a necessary prerequisite. 
Even if verbatim transcripts constitute the main source of data, as they do in this study, what is 
not so easily displayed is the institutional wherewithal that the sociologist acquires during the 
period of fieldwork and which guides her conception of what is interesting, worth transcribing, 
and, finally, selecting for inclusion in the research report.
The ideal of pure replication, as discussed above, is as impossible as it is undesirable. 
The raison d'etre of any form of analysis is to do something with the material which inevitably 
alters its “natural” state. Clifford Geertz speaks of how:
“A piece of anthropological interpretation consists in: tracing the curves of 
social discourse; fixing it into an inspectable form.”
[C. Geertz (1975) - p. 19]
For:
“The ethnographer “inscribes” social discourse; he writes it down. In so 
doing, he turns it from a passing event, which exists only in its own moment 
of occurrence, into an account which exists in its inscriptions and can be 
reconsulted.”
[Ibid - p. 19]
Similarly, the transcription of tape recorded talk into written text, however faithful.
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transforms its nature. In according naturally occurring talk a permanence by dint of its 
inscription in written form one is recording, in Ricoeur’s words, “not the event of speaking but 
the “said” of speaking” [Quoted in C  Geertz (1975) - p.l9]. For, while the event of speaking 
is necessarily fleeting and contextually negotiable, the “said” of speaking, once transcribed, 
becomes the focus of analytic attention it would never command in its natural state, and is 
opened up to any number of potential re-interpretations. Hence the very “bottling” of talk 
through the process of recording and transcribing, an intervention which is necessary for 
analytical purposes, modifies the nature of the material.
Also, in the interests of practical dissemination and the requirements of academic 
presentation, discourse is also placed on a different spatial dimension. Naturally occurring talk 
is removed from its original temporal and spatial context and flattened onto the written page. It 
is not a case of claiming that either verbal or written language is inherently superior, only that 
a transcript of talk is not “the same” as the talk itself. Such accounts are always retrospective, 
and always convert original material into something else. This “contamination” is only a 
problem if one believes in principal that an unsullied account is possible.
The detailed analysis of transcribed talk lends a level of precision and homogeneity to 
events which are more dispersed and chaotic in their actual occurrence, and which far exceeds 
the attention which actors in everyday life would accord them. In this simple sense alone the 
analysis of data modifies its composition, and necessarily so. For just as a distancing perspective 
is required during the fieldwork, so too an analytical departure from the institutional framework 
and its sequential flow is necessary in the presentation of data. In both instances common sense 
preoccupations are displaced in order to elicit some of their key features.
Since descriptive simplification and analytical modification are unavoidable features 
of sociological accounts I am not advocating their eradication. What is in question is the degree 
and nature of their usage. A characteristic feature of ethnomethodology is its interest in 
accounts of all kinds. Raised to the status of topic, descriptive activities are scrutinized to see 
how they achieve the sense of an ordered reality. Atkinson and Drew’s criticism of the 
ethnographic method [1979 - pages 22-33] is that the scrutiny accorded members’ glossing 
activity is suspended when it comes to the sociologist’s employment of similar descriptive 
devices. For they, too, are part of the scene they describe; they too must be indexically repaired 
in order to be meaningful to an audience who did not witness the events first-hand; they too are
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concludable only for the practical purposes in hand.
Cicourel, Wieder and others such as Sudnow (1965), Bittner (1967), and Zimmerman 
(1969), undoubtedly attended to the data with a hitherto unprecedented appreciation of the 
discursive minutiae. But they each draw quite heavily upon their fieldwork experience as an 
unexplicated descriptive resource. The point, again, is not to eliminate the analyst’s cultural 
competence; it cannot be done away with. What I aim for is a more thoroughly detailed and 
accurate presentation of the linguistic material upon which the analysis is based. This affords the 
reader the capacity for critical appraisal in assessing the plausibility of my own account.
What, however, constitutes detailed and accurate presentation is a moot point. The 
level of magnification and precision with which I transcribe and analyze the data would be 
unacceptable to many conversation analysts whose rigorous attention to the microscopic 
particles exceeds my intellectual requirements and theoretical interests. The issue is not one of 
how much effort the analyst is prepared to expend, but what form of discourse analysis she 
wishes to conduct. Conversation analysis has contributed a great deal to an understanding of the 
structural and sequential organization of conversation, but it is not the only way of conducting 
a form of discourse analysis broadly consonant with Garfinkel’s methodological injunctions.
There is a case, what’s more, for saying that the atomic and sub-atomic level at which 
conversation analysis is pitched obscures as much as it reveals. As Anna Wynne explains:
“This drive to pure replication through atomism (is) mistaken in that 
essence infinitely eludes any level of detail that has been achieved, because 
there are always in principle, beyond whatever is currently technically 
discernible, ever yet smaller particles that could be conceived - neutrinos 
that would lie beneath the quarks and charms. The revelatory power of this 
direction (is) delusory, because below a certain level of magnitude, the 
particles that could be discerned were no longer the ‘same’ object.”
[A. Wynne (1986) - p.l]
The tendency to split the units of conversation into smaller particles evades certain of 
the conundrums so fundamental to early ethnomethodology, such as how actors are themselves 
able to link the firagment to a typificatory whole through the indexically and reflexively informed 
employment of the documentary method of interpretation. Such procedures are performed 
upon a discursive stage more inclusive than that upon which conversation analysis characteristically
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operates.
Exponents of conversation analysis have tended not to be interested in the topic of 
conversation, or its conceptual content. For this reason they have long avoided institutionally 
circumscribed domains in their bid to avoid forms of talk which are in any way extraordinary. 
More recently work has been conducted by analysts such as Atkinson and Drew in specialist 
settings, especially the court room, in order to examine how participants employ and modify 
mundane conversational procedures. Nevertheless what is being said is still displaced in favour 
of how it is being said; a focus which renders a classically ethnographic style of research 
inappropriate.
Conclusion
To accord equal priority to the substantive whats and the procedural hows does not 
entail a reversion to ethnography of a more descriptive or naturalist kind. A reflexively infused 
ethnography entertains both a different form and style of analysis. It takes as its primary object 
the mundane methods which members’ routinely employ to make sense of and organize their 
environment. Attention is thereby deflected from the theoretical and methodological prowess 
of the sociologist, to that of the ordinary actor in whose skill she shares.
B) The Fieldwork Process 
Introduction
In many senses, some of which have been considered above, the task of the reflexive 
ethnographer is relatively distinct from that of her classical cousin. Yet, a number of the 
practical aspects of conducting ethnographic research are shared in common, such as the 
selection of an appropriate setting, the negotiation of access, the cultivation of a suitable 
fieldwork role, and the like. It is to these issues that I now turn.
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i) Selecting an Aporopriatc Setting
If the process of anthropological alienation is the vital second stage of ethnographic 
research, that of cultural immersion is the first. Since organizational meanings are indexically 
tied to the circumstances of their production, and their production is bound up in myriad 
methods, it follows that the ethnographer must try to acquire an insider’s knowledge. For, her 
research:
“is directed to the tasks of learning how members’ actual, ordinary activities 
consist of methods to make practical actions, practical circumstances, common 
sense knowledge of social structures and practical sociological reasoning 
analyzable; and of discovering the formal properties of commonplace, 
practical common sense actions “from within” actual settings, as ongoing 
accomplishments of those settings.”
[H. Garfinkel (1967) - p.vii-viii]
The first phase of the fieldwork process was thus the choice of an institutional setting 
amenable to the intrusions of an observer. My choice of St. Nicholas’ as a potential site was 
influenced by three factors. Firstly, I assumed in a general sense that the community home by 
its nature was an institution in which behavioural interpretation would be rife, and which would 
therefore be particularly conducive to the form of ethnomethodological analysis I wished to 
conduct. Since I was committed more to a methodological perspective than a substantive topic 
I had greater freedom in selecting a fieldwork setting suitable for my purposes.
Secondly, my selection of St. Nicholas’ was influenced by a previous study I had 
conducted as an under-graduate [K. Lewis - 1979] which was based upon a five month work 
placement in a children’s home. In my capacity as a residential social worker I chose to 
undertake an examination of the linguistic processes through which members of staff constructed 
the residents as children with emotional problems. During the course of this placement and in 
writing the report, I began to appreciate the powers of ethnomethodologically indined ethnography 
to explicate the talk and practical reasoning through which institutional realities are constituted. 
I was thus keen to find a setting in which I might exploit the sensitizing experience afforded by 
this previous fieldwork project
More significant in terms of the practical accessibility of St. Nicholas’ was the position 
of my mother - Kate Lambert - within the institution as head of the education department. As 
an established and senior member of staff I knew she would facilitate my initial passage into
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St. Nicholas" and that my relationship with her would alleviate the early suspicions by members 
of staff about me and my motives. I also assumed that initial doubt would be mitigated by my 
superficial acquaintanceship with a handful of the staff who I had met at social occasions over 
the years. My appearance on S t Nicholas’ scene was not as a complete stranger, and my prior 
connections with members of the institution were instrumental in facilitating entry and promoting 
a sense of goodwill amongst the staff, though not unequivocally, as I consider on page 49-51 
below.
ii) Negotiating Access
Kate originally presented my request for admission to the other two principal officers 
- Roger Carter and John Townsend - in August 1982, and they readily agreed. Before I 
embarked upon the fieldwork proper, however, I negotiated a trial period of two weeks to 
determine whether St. Nicholas would be a suitable research setting.
The timing of my entry to St. Nicholas’ was strategically chosen to coincide with the 
beginning of the Autumn term in September 1982. The start of term was a natural juncture in 
institutional life, and my appearance, along with two or three new members of staff, was perhaps 
less striking than it might otherwise have been. On the first and last day of each half term a 
conference was held amongst the staff group as a whole. As my first appearance was at one such 
conference, it provided the occasion for Kate Lambert to introduce me to the staff group. She 
explained the purpose of my presence in the broadest terms, as a study of “interaction” and 
“assessment practices”.
After the initial fortnight I decided S t Nicholas’ was indeed a lucrative setting for 
ethnographic study. At this point I sent an official letter to the relevant local social services 
personnel requesting access to St. Nicholas’ for a period of approximately a year to conduct 
social scientific research. This was duly granted with the proviso that I maintain confidentiality.
During the first phase of the fieldwork process I wanted to ease myself into the 
institution and begin to acquire pockets of knowledge about it. At the same time I hoped to 
ameliorate confusions and suspicions members had about my research and role within St. 
Nicholas’, without being so specific as to foreclose the possibility of future developments. 
Throughout this early period many of the staff and boys initiated discussions about the nature
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of my fieldwork and sought clarification with regard to it. To the staff I would stress my interest 
in the language and theories that they as a group used to interpret the boys’ behaviour. I also 
hastened to add that unlike a great deal of sociology, the perspective I adopted treated their 
interpretative capacities as extremely skilled, and their knowledge something upon which I was 
not concerned to improve. To the boys I emphasized that I was writing a book about what life 
was really like in a community home, and how the staff really treated them; a description which 
they often assumed was tantamount to support for their cause. Their main source of concern 
seemed to be that their names and photographs would not be included in my forthcoming 
“book”!
iii) The Cultivation of a Suitable Fieldwork Role
This early phase of the fieldwork process is immensely important, though one is 
ill-equipped to reap the benefits of it. The ethnomethodological ethnographer struggles to 
acquire a knowledge of institutional culture, while attempting to bring to it an anthropological 
sensibility. The two principles of ethnographic exposition - cultural immersion and anthropological 
distantiation - are not discrete and temporally segregated phases but part of a dialectical process 
which is continually enacted throughout the course of one’s fieldwork.
What is special about the initial period of fieldwork is one’s heightened sensitivity to 
the institutional processes which often lose their clarity during the course of one’s socialization. 
What is required is a delicate balancing act, as Hammersley and Atkinson say:
“In studying such settings the ethnographer is faced with the difficult task of 
rapidly acquiring the ability to act competently, which is not always easy even 
within fandliar settings, while simultaneously privately struggling to suspend 
for analytic purposes precisely those assumptions that must be taken for 
granted in relations with participants.”
[M. Hammersley and P. Atkinson (1983) - p.93]
The adoption of a wholly anthropological perspective would jeopardize the 
ethnographer’s relationship with her subjects since it would require the suspension of a 
“normal” social orientation to them. As the ethnographer is dependent upon the indulgence of 
those she studies this would be a highly risky affair. Equally, the wholesale adoption of a 
member’s criteria would blunt one’s perceptiveness to the mundane assumptions upon which 
institutional realities are built. The way in which I managed the tension between familiarity and
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strangeness for methodological purposes was two-fold. Firstly, my role of non-participation in 
the practical affairs of S t Nicholas' afforded me the luxury of being able to observe meetings of 
all kinds without having to contribute. I could thus adopt an anthropological ear without the 
attendant risk of social embarrassment. But even under these circumstances one's estrangement 
can only be sporadic and partial. It is much easier to slip into the familiar membership mode of 
engagement, even if this is just as a listening level. The suspension of familiarity takes the kind 
of effort which can only be sustained temporarily, as Becker says, it is like “pulling teeth” 
[Quoted in M. Hammersly and P. Atkinson (1983) - p. 32].
This is where the second tension management technique of tape recording is so 
essential. In the retrospective listening through and transcribing of tape recordings one is able 
to attend to the discursive processes in a way which would not be possible during the actual flow 
of talk. The rapidity with which communication gets done is incredible, as anyone who has ever 
undertaken detailed transcription will know. Discourse can only be analyzed in depth if placed 
in a different temporal dimension. By repeated attendance to the particulars, whether in audio 
or literary form once the talk has been transcribed, one can adopt something akin to a Martian 
perspective without the threat of interactional breakdown which accompanies the adoption of 
such a role in the field.
But before the researcher can get her hands (and recording machine) on the data she 
must establish a sufficiently trusting relationship with the members for them to grant her 
on-going and increasingly intimate access. My relationship with Kate Lambert was probably the 
most influential factor in this process. Not only did she sponsor my entry into the home, but 
continued to play a pivotal role in illuminating various features of institutional life. I was 
furnished with a desk in her office; a geographical position from which I was able to witness 
informal meetings, conversations and 'phone calls. Kate’s willingness to share her knowledge 
and expose her working practices so candidly was undoubtedly bom of our kinship. It is difHcult 
to imagine an unknown researcher being given such immediate access, unless she was being 
asked to support a partisan line.
The trust afforded me by dint of my connections with Kate extended to the other two 
principal officers. In particular Roger Carter, the principal during most of my fieldwork, was 
extremely generous in his attitude toward me and my research which he treated unreservedly. 
His promotion of my fieldwork role, in collaboration with Kate Lambert, was immeasurably
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beneficial in easing the transition from the state of outsider to marginal insider.
Although my relationship with Kate was predominantly beneficial, it did create 
certain problems of its own. In particular my apparent intimacy with her, and the principal 
officer’s group in general, generated one or two pockets of suspicion about the objectivity of my 
research. This feeling emerged most flagrantly during my observations of unit 3 in the early part 
of 1983, as I explain in due course. Otherwise, my impression was that while it smoothed my 
access into St. Nicholas’, the ramifications of my relationship with Kate became less signiflcant 
for most of the staff as I became independently established.
The ethnographer inevitably has jome effect upon the group she wishes to study which 
she may exploit to her advantage. One may, as I did on occasions, play the role of naive or 
“acceptable incompetent” as Lofland (1971) calls it, in order to elicit knowledge and, simultaneously, 
promote one’s relationship with members of the organization by endowing them with expertise. 
Or again, one might adopt a sympathetic stance in order to encourage one’s subjects to divulge 
more information, or ask a provocative question to get a reaction. In these ways, and many 
others, the ethnographer employs her panoply of social skills to enhance her understanding of 
the social group.
However, since the ethnographer wishes to study the institution as it typically 
operates, she will attempt to adopt a position within the setting which least disrupts the flow of 
everyday organizational business. This committment prompts some researchers to play the role 
of participant observer whereby they literally become a member of the group in order to 
appreciate its workings wholly from within. Certain aspects of this intimacy are very appealing, 
but it also harbours limitations. As a bona fide member one’s mobility and access are 
circumscribed by the limitations of one’s role. For instance, if I had joined St. Nicholas’ as a 
residential social worker, I could not have observed the array of meetings and the majority of 
case conferences: a) because I would not have been accorded the legitimacy and b) I would not 
have had the time. Also, the effort required to sustain a sense of anthropological distance as a 
fully fledged member would be infinitely greater.
As a non-participant observer I could infiltrate the range of groups and devote myself 
exclusively to the ethnographic task. The effect of my presence was initially more pronounced, 
however, as I did not fit into a predefined organizational role. The question is not whether the
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observer has an effect, for this is inevitably the case, but whether that effect systematically alters 
the interactional dynamics of the group. In most institutional settings, the impact of the 
observer’s presence is likely to diminish in relation to the amount of time she spends there. 
Participants could not stage-manage their appearance over the extended period of ethnographic 
involvement, which in my case lasted for over a year. Nor would they have had the motivation. 
If the researcher is reasonably discrete, as I attempted to be, she becomes part of the 
institutional furniture. In any case, pragmatic organizational concerns take overwhelming 
priority in the conduct of everyday life, in relation to which the observer’s presence is of minimal 
significance.
Of course, one’s non-participation in institutional affairs is never total. I did engage 
in social contact with the boys and staff, and would often be drawn into, or initiate discussions 
about aspects of institutional life, and other less specific topics. On rare occasions I was also 
called to participate in meetings, and even accorded a degree of expertise either as objective 
observer and/or sociologist. But my most prevalent role, particularly in more structured settings, 
was that of “pure” observer. Such lack of routine involvement was strategic in terms of the 
perspective I wished to adopt. It allowed me to maintain a certain balance between familiarity 
and strangeness and to attend to the talk with a largely analytical criterion in mind.
The ethnographer attempts to eek out a position in the group which is comfortable 
enough to pursue her research, though not so comfortable that it blunts her critical faculties. In 
the early phase of fieldwork, and to some degree throughout, the role of “acceptable incompetent” 
[J. Lofland -1971] is a useful one. It allows the researcher to trade on her ignorance in order to 
seek clarification and to ask questions in a way which would be considered unacceptable if 
uttered by the established member. But no onepersona is sufficient to sustain the ethnographer 
through the extended duration of her fieldwork. One can, for instance, play the role of the naive 
for some of the time, especially in the preliminary stages. But to embrace such an orientation 
beyond a certain point would jeopardize one’s credence. Similarly, if one was impartial to the 
extent of never expressing sympathy for members’ views, one would threaten the goodwill upon 
which research of this kind fundamentally relies.
I am not suggesting that the researcher become so embroiled in institutional politics 
that she becomes an affiliate of one particular group, or that she enthusiastically supports every 
group, or individual in its criticisms of others. As Rawlings says: “the ethnographer is neither
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critic or champion, since to be either would involve getting in on the act, so to speak, and 
producing more of those arguments, accounts and descriptions, instead of examining their 
production” [B. Rawlings (1980) - p.l:13]. Least of all should one become involved in trading 
information between different groups, in spite of one’s unique capacity to fertilize the institutional 
grape-vine in this way. Any short term kudos generated by such activity would be undermined 
by the long term diminution of trust resulting from the adoption of such a duplicitous role.
What I do question are the concepts oi total non-participation and absolute impartiality. 
The ethnographer simply cannot render herself invisible even if this were desirable. She must 
negotiate an unpredictable path as nimbly as possible through the course of her fieldwork. How 
ever much the ethnographer struggles to project a persona which is favourable to her progress, 
she only has limited control. For, participants also project certain roles onto her. While I did 
establish a core identity as impartial observer, to which the majority of members subscribed for 
most of the time, other characterizations included (unacceptable) incompetent, expert, confidante 
and “mole”. To offer three examples of the circumstances which gave rise to such typifications 
illustrates the divergent roles to which the fieldworker may be allocated.
One is most likely to blunder early on in the fieldwork before one is fully acquainted 
with institutional expectations. On one notable occasion about a month after I entered St. 
Nicholas’ Paul Black, one of the residents of unit 3, asked me for a lift to the local police station 
to retrieve some tools which had previously been confiscated. Although Paul insisted that he 
found the tools in a derelict garage, and they had not been reported missing in the intervening 
period, the staff of unit 3 were convinced that the tools had been acquired illegally. They 
therefore refused to “collude” in Paul’s dishonesty by providing him with a lift.
Unaware of the controversy I willingly agreed to Paul’s courteous request, thinking 
that it was an opportunity to enhance my relationship with one of the residents. Upon my return 
I was approached by Philip Hooper - the team manager of unit 3 - who explained the 
circumstances and spoke of how both I and they had been “manipulated” by Paul who had 
cunningly “beaten the system”. As an assumed victim of Paul’s manipulative prowess I was able 
to maintain the status of incompetent. My faux pas was attributed to ignorance and gullibility 
rather than a motivated collusion with a resident in conscious defiance of the staff.
In another incident I was drawn into a heated debate which was being pursued in the
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teachers* meeting. The discussion pivoted upon the question of whether it was acceptable to 
show selective X category films to the boys in the video lesson. The P.E. teacher - Alan Evans - 
argued that X rated films should not be shown to any children of fourteen and fifteen, least of 
all if they were emotionally disturbed and susceptible to suggestion, as he believed the boys of 
St. Nicholas’ were. Alan sought my informed corroboration as a “sociologist” who would 
“know” about the media studies which demonstrate the negative effects of violence on the 
screen. Before I had formulated a contribution Nicola rejoined: “And Kim will also know that 
the link between what you see on the screen and how you respond is not straightforward. 
Otherwise we’d show our boys nice little stories about happy families all the time”. Without 
uttering a word I was allocated to a position of support for each argument on the basis of my 
presumed expertise.
Having a cup of coffee with Alan and Judy after the meeting Alan asked me directly 
what my opinion about the topic was. With a tone of impartial pomposity I replied that I thought 
there were two issues to consider. Firstly, whether violence on the screen prompted increased 
levels of violence amongst spectators, or whether it was cathartic in expunging violent feelings 
through vicarious participation. Secondly, whether showing the boys violence which was 
meaningful (and often distasteful) within the context of a particular message was justifiable. 
Judy replied in morally indignant tones that she didn’t think it was “that complicated”. Rather, 
she continued, “it falls on me to control them in my classroom after they’ve seen a film like that”. 
My academic pontification was, in one deft stroke, rendered irrelevant in relation to Judy’s more 
pragmatic concerns.
Neither of the preceding characterizations had particularly negative connotations for 
my research. The following scenario was, however, more disruptive and potentially damaging. 
In early January 1983,1 asked Philip Hooper if I might become more closely involved in unit 3 
affairs in order to gain a better understanding of the internal workings of one of the living units. 
In addition to informal access to the unit, I also wanted to observe and ideally tape record staff 
meetings. After discussing the issue with his unit 3 colleagues Philip granted the access I had 
requested.
From the outset my experience of attending the unit 3 staff meetings was uncomfortable. 
This unease, I think, derived partly from the nature of the living units at St. Nicholas’. As 
intimate and semi-private groupings of boys and social workers, the presence of an outside
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observer was more intrusive. Also, during this period the staff of unit 3 were having a great deal 
of trouble with the boy group, and there was a level of dissention about the most appropriate 
mode of response. Concern spilled beyond the boundaries of the unit, and the principal officers 
called a special meeting with the staff group to discuss the weaknesses and inconsistencies in 
their management of the boys’ behaviour.
The sense of suspicion provoked by my presence in unit 3 should be viewed in the 
context of contemporary events. It was also during this episode that my relationship with Kate 
Lambert proved most problematic. As a harbinger of what was in store, Tina Wait greeted my 
entry to one of the unit staff meetings in late January with the words: “Ah - it’s our little spy”; 
a characterization which the other members of staff nervously laughed off. However, within the 
month Philip Hooper asked me to withdraw from the unit, claiming that the staff needed to 
“reconstruct themselves” as a group, and the presence of an outsider would interfere with this 
process.
Although Philip denied that the reason for my expulsion derived primarily from my 
kinship with Kate, he did suggest that the staff group in unit 3 were traditionally suspicious of 
external forces, and that I was a convenient scapegoat for their anxieties about what was going 
on within the unit. More specifically, Philip explained, the staff were “threatened” by the 
principal officer group and their perceived tendency to intrude upon unit business. My 
connection with a member of that group thus served to fuel their paranoia.
The principal officers’ response to this turn of events was unanimous. They collectively 
interpreted my expulsion as the manifestation of staff neuroticism and a slur both upon their 
professionalism and mine. When Kate reported Philip’s claim that my ejection was in order for 
the group to “reconstruct” itself, Roger pronounced:
Roger: No that’s rubbish. It’s all part of the general paranoia and anxiety. . .  what
they think is that Kim might be reporting back to the P.O.’s meeting. And 
I didn’t even know Kim was in unit 3. But when she’s been so professionally 
ethical about her research it’s annoying that they should think that.
Clearly, my assignment to a more Machiavellian role in the foregoing scenario had the 
negative result of cutting short my observation of unit 3. However, in the scheme of things, in
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relation to the vast amount of data I did gather, my expulsion from the unit was of minimal 
importance, and in itself constituted an interesting piece of data which revealed certain features 
of institutional culture. Soon after this episode I  was successful in my application to observe 
unit 4, an activity which continued until June 1983.
The samples quoted above bear witness to the researcher’s inability to sustain a 
monolithic role over the lengthy period that ethnographic study endures. Although I did 
establish a core identity which prevailed throughout, a number of more peripheral characterizations 
did temporarily emerge. The question is not whether the ethnographer can be eliminated from 
the equation; she is part of the environment, and subject to the process of interpretation by 
others. It is more a case of the researcher doing what she can to minimize the disruptions to 
which her presence may give rise. In a more fundamental respect of course, the ethnographer 
is always a reflexive part of the scene she describes, since it is only by exercising her faculties of 
reasoning that she can make sense of it in the first place.
iv) Methods of Data Collection
The prolonged and relatively intensive nature of ethnographic enquiry at once serves 
to diminish the disruptive effects of the researcher’s presence, and to promote her appreciation 
of the contextual emergence of meaning. It is against this backcloth of cultural immersion that 
any more specific method of data collection must be situated. For my particular methodological 
purposes, the tape recording of talk and the copying of text were essential additions to the 
everyday observations of St. Nicholas’: firstly because note-taking cannot possibly yield such 
detailed and accurate descriptions; secondly, such methods of preservation afford the capacity 
to retrospectively scrutinize verbal and written discourse with a thoroughness one could never 
accomplish in the course of its natural flow. The sheer repetition and intensity of one’s listening 
strengthens or displaces the embryonic patterns which develop during the fieldwork, and adds 
new strands to them. The capacity for such detailed analysis of the minutiae is the linch pin of 
reflexive analysis.
In spite of the importance I placed upon being able to tape record, I felt it was an issue 
too delicate to raise prior to my research, or as a condition of it. I therefore took the calculated 
risk of waiting for a month or so before broaching the subject within individual groups. The 
concept of being recorded can provoke a great deal of anxiety, which I attempted to allay by
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stressing my observance of complete confidentiality, and by reiterating that my purpose was not 
to evaluate their professional effectiveness or linguistic eloquence. By the end of October 1982, 
I had been granted permission to record all teachers’ meetings, principal officers’ meetings, 
senior staff meetings and day conferences.
My requests to attend, and later to record case conferences, was negotiated on a 
different basis because they involved external participants, such as the field social worker, and 
members of the boy’s family. As the social services were in loco parentis to the boys, I initially 
sent a standardized letter individually addressed to each of their field social workers asking for 
their permission to attend case conferences. Approximately two months later I sent a further 
letter asking permission to tape record, stressing the purely practical benefits of this measure. 
Drawing upon my knowledge of the organizational muddle of social services departments, I 
suggested in each of the consecutive letters that the field social worker should only reply if she 
objected to my presence, and that otherwise I would assume her silence was consent. I was only 
refused access completely by one field social worker who wrote back to Roger Carter saying that 
he thought the “stratagem” I had employed in my letter was “really quite artful”, and that he 
would, “be obliged if you ensure that Kim Lewis does not attend the case conferences or 
reviews” of his client. In two other cases I was allowed to observe and make notes, but not to 
tape record. With these few exceptions I was granted permission to attend, and record, all case 
conferences; a decision which was ratified in all cases by the boy and his parents.
One of the objections to the use of a tape recorder in situ is that the participants’ 
consciousness of it alters their behaviour. Certainly in the period immediately after its 
introduction, members of staff were more inclined to draw attention to the tape, usually in a 
humorous way. For instance, at the first teachers’ meeting that I recorded, Judy Mallum asked 
at one point whether the tape was still on. When I said it was, Brian responded:
Brian: I’d like to totally agree with what everyone in the meeting has said.
(Laughs all round)
Peter: I think everyone in this place is wonderful - especially the senior staff. I think
they do a marvellous job. I’ve rarely seen such qualities of leadership.
Brian: Particularly in the art department (in a stage whisper).
- 53 -
After the initial impact, the presence of the tape was only referred to on a handful of 
occasions when particularly controversial issues were being aired in meetings. Consider the 
following extract from a senior staff meeting in which a “hot” topic was being discussed. Thomas 
McKinney is addressing Roger Carter.
Thomas: Roger - why are you actually deliberately like -1 mean is that bloody tape on? 
You are now coming in and you are playing a game again of undermining 
your own position to justify what you’re doing.
Roger: I am not at all.
Thomas: Now listen to what I’m saying for a minute. I will tell you -
Roger: Haven’t I said this time and time again - without that bloody thing on
(referring to the tape recorder).
With the exception of such rare references, the disruptive effects of the tape recorder, like those 
of the observer, dwindle with time until they are eclipsed for all practical purposes.
Clearly not all aspects of institutional life are equally amenable to being recorded. 
While the more circumscribed arena of the meeting or case conference was eminently suitable, 
informal interactions were usually not. In these circumstances the presence of the recording 
machine would have been detrimentally intrusive and a breach of the rules of intimacy attendant 
upon more personal modes of exchange. On such occasions I had to rely upon retrospective 
note-taking or, more unusually, the covert recording of conversation. As I often carried the tape 
recorder around in my handbag, I was occasionally tempted to surreptitiously switch on in the 
course of an interesting informal discussion. Leaving aside the ethical objections to covert 
taping, in pragmatic terms the quality of the recordings procured thereby were usually sufficiently 
poor to be of little use.
The recording of naturally occurring talk, usually in the context of various meetings, 
was the most important source of data collection. The primary focus was thus upon the 
retrospective interpretation of the boys’ behaviour in which staff were so actively engaged.
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However this did not exhaust the methods upon which I drew. During the latter phase of 
fieldwork I employed my developing knowledge of institutional culture to interview the majority 
of staff and boys. The data gleaned thereby formed an interesting supplementary source of 
information, though insufficient in itself. My objection to an exclusive reliance upon interviews 
is not that the subject’s version may be distorted or biased in a straightforward sense, or that they 
are not reflexive. One may of course treat interviews or personal accounts as situated 
accomplishments which are revealing in themselves. One only need consider Garfinkel’s study 
of Agnes, the inter-sexed person [H. Garfinkel (1967) - pages 116-186] to recognize the scope 
of ethnomethodological analysis.
The problem with relying upon interviews as the main source of knowledge about an 
institutional setting is that participants simply cannot fully articulate the gamut of assumptions 
upon which their everyday organizational capacities are premised. As a taken for granted 
resource participants do not have the language through which to articulate their common sense 
methods of practical reasoning. This inability is nicely expressed in the following two extracts 
from interviews with members of staff. In the first piece, having formulated an answer to my 
question about what educational techniques she uses in the classroom, Nicola Hobbs continues:
Nicola: I mean - God no - it sounds so (.5) really stupid said like that. But (2.5) I don’t 
know how - and quite frankly I’d be fiightened to give an example becus I 
would think (.5) it - that would be exactly the thing that wouldn’t - work 
again. You know it’s (.5) not exactly magic - but it’s closer to magic than 
anything...  I-I ^  think anything - like that - is precarious and I- if  I started 
analyzing it - I’d either do it in a self-congratulatory kind of way that would 
kill it dead - or else I would do it in a way that would - allow ^  the (.5) 
inherent - weaknesses (.5) to present themselves to me in such a way 
(laughs) that I probably would lose confidence in them at the time - you 
know. I think it’s very, very unprofessional - unscientific in that area - but I 
think there’s enough around it that’s professional and scientific to carry just 
that bit.
Soon after, in answer to a question about how individual educational programmes are 
devised, Nicola says:
Nicola: This is terrible Kim - I’d no idea this was going to be so difficult. It’s not just
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the tape . . .  it’s the actual questions and actually trying to (.5) present 
something that’s the - mush you live in - as a sort of -
Kim: Yer.
Nicola: train of thought - uh -
Kim: I think that’s one of the dangers of interviews.
Or again, in my interview with Philip Hooper I ask him how he believes the work he 
does helps the boys?
Philip: To develop insight - into the areas of difficulty ( 1 ) in their life - and hopefully
provide them with some sort of tool to -be  able to handle it.
(2)
Kim: Right - clear cut answer.
Philip: That’s a - clear cut pat answer. But in a lot of ways quite meaningless. (Kim
laughs). Well it is isn’t it.
Kim: Yer. . .  I think that’s also a difficulty of doing interviews (.5) that - becus it’s
very difficult to do anything other than ask principled questions - you get 
principled answers.
And later:
Philip: I know what I mean - and you know what (.5) for you that thing means - that
phrase - uhm - and you’re quite comfortable with it - and you can take it on 
- and yes I mean. . .  we’ll come to a common agreement about it. Uhm (3.5) 
it just slips (.5) I dunno - 1 mean it-it slips out so easily - so neatly -
Kim: {Uhm.
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Philip: {into place.
Kim: Well I-I - I’d be uh (.5) less interested in knowing (.5) whether (.5) that was
(2) absolutely meaningful or not - than to ask - why it becomes - slips so easily 
out (.5) what - why you’re able to answer so precisely - and so quickly a
question like that.
As the latter comment suggests, the formulation of such stock in trade answers in itself 
displays the kind of recipe knowledge which practitioners employ; as long as it is situated in a 
context of observing how actors actually behave and formulate interpretations. I reiterate, the 
point is not to eliminate bias, but to embrace the indexical complexities through which ordinary 
sense is made.
Interviews conducted after a sustained period of ethnographic observation have the 
advantage that one has a better sense of what questions to ask, as well as an informed framework 
within which to interpret them. Although I did try to cover a similar range of questions with all 
members of the staff (and a different range with the boys), the interviewing process was largely 
unstructured and each one assumed a shape of its own. Most practitioners seemed to enjoy the 
opportunity to discuss their working philosophies and practices (a penchant which many 
identified as being characteristic of their profession) and the interviews lasted anything from one 
hour to three. Philip Hooper suggested I entitle the interview series the B.O.F. (“boring old 
fart”) stakes and often enquired who was “winning”. Some of the boys were more reticent, while 
others treated the interview as a confessional, or an opportunity to beef about the staff.
The culture of St. Nicholas’ was not, of course, exclusively oral. The construction of 
written accounts was a routine feature of institutional business. The various types of documentation 
provided a fertile source of empirical material which elucidated at once the theories upon which 
practitioners at St. Nicholas’ and related institutions drew, as well as the procedures through 
which they were galvanized into a coherent account. The case histories in particular revealed 
a wealth of discursive practices which I examine in depth in chapters 6 and 7. Other documents 
of interest included case conference reports, court reports, unit logs, incident reports, letters in 
and out of the institution, various working party reports and historical documents, all of which 
I had unrestricted access to. Luckily I was given permission to photo-copy as much of the
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documentation as I chose, which I could then remove from the institution to examine at leisure,
v) Methods of Data Analysis
The analysis of data is not something one saves up until the fieldwork is over. The 
researcher already starts with a set of theoretical and methodological assumptions which 
predispose her to a particular perspective and style of analysis. Also, the researcher is constantly 
in the process of formulating concepts and identifying patterns whilst in amongst it all. Nor is 
this activity different in principle from that which any member undertakes, and unavoidably 
relies upon the same common sense procedures. What distinguishes the ethnographer’s 
purpose from that olthebonafide participant is twofold: firstly the process of analysis is typically 
more self-conscious and deliberate; secondfy, for the ethnomethodologically inclined ethnographer 
at least, the attempt is to partially and periodically suspend aspects of mundane reasoning in 
order to raise it to analytical visibility. In this process the reflexive researcher attempts to shed 
a layer of cultural skin.
During the course of fieldwork one’s analytic attention tends to be progressively 
focused, as Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) put it. What may initially appear muddled and 
incomprehensible gradually assumes a developing sense of conceptual organization by dint of 
the ethnographer’s analytical activity. One’s explicit identification of recurrent themes, practices 
and procedures provides the cognitive conditions necessary for the retrospective reappraisal of 
the data and prospective orientation to discourse of a similar kind. Clearly one’s capacity to 
accomplish such a hearing during the actual flow of interaction is circumscribed. The regular 
retrospective perusal of the tape recorded data during the on-going course of the fieldwork 
draws out features which would have been lost, and furnishes the analyst with a prospective 
orientation to discourse of a similar kind. This, in turn, may help elaborate a more sophisticated 
appreciation of earlier examples of the same type of talk, and so on.
For example, after a period of fieldwork I began to disentangle three recurrent 
tendencies in the way members of staff typified the boys’ behaviour which I glossed as 
normalization, criminalization and pathologization (see chapter 4). Although I had been 
developing a sense of these three interpretative tendencies for some time, their categorization 
as such allowed me to reinterpret earlier, and “hear” later material as documentary manifestations 
of them. What’s more, once I had defined these processes, I began to identify a range of
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contextual complexities in their articulation. For instance, characterizations of this kind often 
seemed to have a dominant and recessive theme, so that while an account may have had 
predominantly pathologizing overtones, it might also have a normalizing sub-text. In this sense, 
“it is frequently only over the course of the research that one discovers what the research is really 
‘about’” [Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) - p. 175], at least at the substantive level.
The inscription of these emergent patterns, ideas and theories in written form (in my 
case in an “ideas fîle”) was important in lending them clarity and prominence, albeit they 
amenable to modification at a later point. In forcing one to articulate implicit and half formed 
conceptions it also provides the space for a reflexive appreciation. This anthropological stance 
involves asking rather simple questions of the data. What background or implicit knowledge 
informs the speaker/ writer; what knowledge is presupposed by the reader/hearer. Similar 
reductions in levels of cultural competence invite the analyst to pose questions about the 
procedures operative in shaping an account, and predisposing the recipients to a particular 
reception of it. A growing sensitivity to the leitmotifs of institutional life are thus orchestrated 
in the course of one’s fieldwork. I had already tentatively formulated many of the themes which 
were finally selected for inclusion in the thesis prior to my departure from the field.
However, for the ethnographer intent upon the detailed exploration of members’ 
accounting practices, a thorough retrospective review of the data is essential. It is at this point 
that the in-depth analysis begins; one simply does not have the time or energy while preoccupied 
with the demands of fieldwork. With a burgeoning amalgam of themes in mind I listened 
through to all three hundred and fifty hours of tape, which included the interviews, and read 
through the thousands of pages of photocopied text, composed mainly of case histories. In the 
process I categorized and transcribed every segment of talk or text of potential interest 
according to the thematic content or the procedural mechanisms of its accomplishment. As I 
addressed the empirical material in this way, the embryonic concepts and patterns which had 
emerged during the fieldwork began to develop, diversify, coalesce and link up in a variety of 
ways.
The procedure I employed to sift through the data in this way was akin to the “constant 
comparative method” described by Glaser and Strauss (1967). As I went through the data I 
created a new category whenever a piece of discourse could not be accommodated within a 
pre-existing one. I also allocated some segments to multiple categories. When I had concluded
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my perusal of all the data, the list of categories generated amounted to over two hundred. The 
procedures through which I identified repetitions, permutations, associations and differences in 
the material would itself have represented a fascinating topic for reflexive analysis. The 
analytical process through which typification is accomplished is shared by the sociologist and 
“lay” member, even if the object of the sociologist’s typification is precisely the methods through 
which members themselves typify the environment.
As the taxonomic process continued, wider thematic typologies began to appear to 
me, under whose rubric many of the individual categories fell. In reorganizing the two hundred 
plus categories in relation to these generic classifications I constructed about a dozen or so major 
groupings, and a number of minor ones. It was at this point that I returned to the empirical 
material, reconsidering all of the extracts in relation to the newly defined and more encompassing 
categories. In examining each group of extracts which I had identified as belonging together, I 
began to appreciate the subtleties and complexities of each internal grouping. At this point a 
third re-grouping occurred which did not so much change the categorical boundaries as the 
sub-divisions within them. This process of diversification and refinement occurred repeatedly 
in the continued dialogue between the analytical categories and the empirical data. In this 
mutual elaboration a productive relationship is set up between members’ analytical categories 
and those of the sociologist. Neither one is sufficient in itself - as I consider on pages 26-27 and 
38-40 - since it is only by doing something with (and therefore to) the data that one can get an 
adequate handle on mundane institutional practices.
While this method of data collection and analysis is immensely rich, it is also painfully 
time-consuming and labour intensive. Yet, the transcription of the tape recordings was not an 
activity whose burden could be shared, even if I had had the financial resources, since the 
attention required by it is an excellent way of concentrating upon the unfolding minutiae. A 
related difficulty with recording and transcribing extensively is that it generates a phenomenal 
amount of data - literally thousands of pages of transcript - from which one then has to select. 
This problem of selectivity is compounded by the methodological injunction to examine the 
intricacies of discourse, not only for what it says, but what it does.
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vi) The Presentation of Data
Whfle reflexive ethnography is of great value, it brings with it a portfolio of methodological 
horrors. In response to these, reflexive ethnographies may appear rather piecemeal, even stark. 
The analyst selects from the vast expanse of potential data a few recurrent themes. She then 
subjects them to excruciatingly or exquisitely detailed analysis, depending on one’s perspective. 
If one wishes to perform such a dense and textured mode of analysis, one simply cannot cover 
very much material. It is because of this dilemma, I suggest, that so many students of discourse 
shy away from the muddle and scope of ethnographic enquiry. It is much neater, and less 
demanding to study circumscribed pieces of discourse, like individual snippets of conversation, 
texts, photographs, or whatever.
Conventional ethnographers classically manage the conundrums of choice by generating 
purportedly comprehensive descriptions of the social group. The only way they can create this 
illusion of completeness is by glossing over the methods and theories through which members 
account for their environment, and prioritizing the analyst’s version. The recognition of 
reflexivity, by contrast, alerts one to the essential incompleteness of all accounts: there are 
always gaps in the filigree of institutional threads.
For the ethnographer committed to detailed linguistic analysis, an alternative is to 
concentrate predominantly upon a few extended pieces of data, which are then given the right 
royal treatment (B. Rawlings -1980, T. Walker -1986). Although this option is very attractive 
as a simple solution to an intractable problem, it did not satisfy my purposes which were to 
elucidate and display various aspects of commonplace institutional reasoning.
My criteria of selection were thus based upon what was recurrent and typical, 
apparently important to participants, and interesting to me at the time. To do the empirical 
material justice I selected just five of the major categories around which I organized the 
empirical chapters. In narrowing the focus so radically I had to exclude vast amounts of data; a 
process which was excruciatingly painful.
A further methodological dilemma resulted from the dual focus of my analysis. On the 
one hand I was interested in the social knowledge and typifying schemata to which members 
orientated in making sense of their environment. On the other hand an equally compelling
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concera was to study the range of scenic methods which members often unconsciously utilized 
in the second by second production of talk, and word by word production of text. Without each 
component of discourse the other could not exist: they work hand-in-hand in the active 
accomplishment of sense. At certain points in the thesis I concentrate on either the knowledge 
or the methods; at other points I consider the interweave between the two.
Another feature which serves to diSeraitiate between alternative modes of ethnography 
is the way in which the ethnographer writes herself into the text, although I do not play the 
reflexive game to its full potential by any means. In the present text I appear primarily as an 
analytical voice which attempts, through the examination of empirical material, to make sense 
of members’ methods of making sense. But my voice is not disembodied any more than that of 
the institutional member. The only way I can accomplish such a reading is by exploiting my 
common sense wisdom, while at the same time constructing it as an object of scrutiny. That 
another voice could be interpolated whose purpose is to elucidate the methods which I - the 
ethnographer cum author - employed to make sense of members’ methods of making sense in 
no way invalidates the exercise. It is because ethnomethods are an integral feature of all forms 
of practical reasoning that they warrant such serious attention.
Conclusion
In this chapter I offered an appraisal of some of the more significant theoretical and 
methodological aspects of my research. I started with an account of the nature of institutional 
order and the procedures of typification to which it is reflexively bound. I spoke of how the aim 
of this research was to “interrupt” the documentary dynamic in order to appreciate the 
mechanisms of its production. Because these procedures are part of our common sense 
knowledge it requires an anthropological effort to raise them to visibility. The analyst so 
engaged must strike a balance between cultural immersion and anthropological alienation: a 
tension which is productive for methodological purposes.
The ethnomethodological ethnographer’s object and mode of analysis thus tends to 
differ from her more conventionally disposed cousin, not least in her attention to the empirical 
details. But there are disagreements within the ethnomethodological school as to the legitimate 
level of descriptive glossing. While this thesis offers more empirical substantiation than was 
characteristic of the classical ethnographies in the ethnomethodogical gg/ire, it does not offer
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the degree of detail provided by conversation analysts’. The appropriate level of detail depends 
upon the kind of discourse analysis one wishes to conduct. What is more, an element of 
descriptive glossing is inevitable, however attentive one is to the minutiae. This methodological 
irony may just as well be acknowledged as swept under the carpet.
In the second part of the chapter 1 attempted to open up a dialogue between the more 
abstract insights proffered in the preceding section, and the actual fieldwork process. Before the 
reflexively inclined ethnographer can bring her perspective into play, she must first negotiate a 
series of processes. The choice of a conducive fieldwork setting, the negotiation of access, the 
adoption of as appropriate set of roles are amongst the activities she shares with the conventionally 
inclined ethnographer.
Beyond this bond of communality the ethnographer’s conduct within the field and her 
treatment of the data will depend upon her grander scheme. For instance, the methodological 
injunction to make the ordinary anthropologically strange must be practically managed during 
the course of data collection and analysis. I achieved a partial suspension of my common sense 
orientation to the world: a) by adopting the role of non-participant observer which allowed me 
to extricate myself from pragmatic involvement; b) by tape recording a great deal of data which 
I could then scrutinize in a more detached way. The broader attempt to convert common sense 
reasoning in to the analytical object thus influenced the methods I employed at the “grass roots”.
From an ethnomethodological perspective, theory, methodology and method are not 
discrete entities. For this reason it is difficult to write an introduction which crisply conforms to 
conventional divisions. What I sought to show was how theory and methodology dovetail, and 
together influence the fieldwork process. At the same time the ethnomethodologist refuses to 
entertain a radical distinction between “lay” and “sociological” theories and methods. This 
communality renders an anthropological approach to common sense reasoning as necessary as 
it is demanding. An extraordinary effort has to be made to see what is under our noses: a 
perspective which makes the fruits of ethnomethodological research look in many respects 
distinct from those of conventional sociology.
The ethnomethodologist characteristically ends where others take off. Thus, if my 
thesis starts from the institutional reality of “problem children”, the remainder of the enterprize 
is dedicated to a retrieval of the methods through which that “fact” is socially constructed.
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Before embarking upon this project let me offer a substantive description of the institutional 
history and setting.
-64
CHAPTER TWO 
THE HISTORICAL AND INSTTTUTIONAL CONTEXT
A) An Historical Overview
Introduction
As the following chapters empirically display, I consider the accomplishment of 
institutional order to be bound up in the language and modes of practical reasoning which 
members routinely employ. Such practices do not, however, evolve wholly from within the 
institutional domain by an act of collective voluntarism. Institutional practitioners are primarily 
part of the wider culture, and are informed by the common sense knowledge germane to it. They 
do not suspend this plethora of assumptions when they step over the institutional threshold. In 
this fundamental sense, wider society seeps into the daily working practices of organizational 
and occupational groups.
In a more specific sense, institutions are enmeshed within a configuration of social 
circumstances which help define the constraints within which members operate. Some of the 
core socio-historical processes relevant to the emergence of the community home will be 
considered below, thus providing a fi-amework for those unfamiliar with the details. My main 
purpose is to trace the development of a welfare-orientated therapeutic approach to the 
institutional care of young deviants, since it is this which influenced the working methods of 
practitioners at St. Nicholas’. As a preliminary however I would like to qualify my understanding 
of the status of such material, and in so doing to challenge the classical sociological distinctions 
between the internal and external, the micro and macro.
Firstly, while institutional ideologies and practices are not generated entirely in situ, 
neither are they determined by external factors. Whether a more nebulous social influence, or 
a concrete one, like a statute, institutional actors must engage with the “official rubric” so that 
it may be “translated into practical actions” [Dingwall et al (1983) - p.20J. External factors 
provide the necessary conditions of institutional existence by furnishing the broad objectives and 
affording it legitimacy. But such conditions are not sufficient. Any set of principles, objectives 
or rules must be interpreted in relation to a particular configuration of empirical circumstances.
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The problem with determinist theories which reduce institutions to the status of a 
“black box” buffeted by elemental social forces is that they are based upon the model of:
“a social world which simply could not work, or at least could only work in 
a very different world to the one in which most of us live. Thus, were it the 
case that descriptions and explanations of social order and particular social 
phenomena could indeed be arrived at, and empirically validated independent 
of the setting in which they are used, then there would presumably be not 
only a much greater degree of certainty in human affairs than appears to be 
the case, but also little scope for originality, diversity, innovation, conflict, or 
social change.”
[M. Atkinson and P. Drew (1979) - p.l9]
Even statutes and organizational charters which are precisely drafted to minimize 
ambiguity could never specify the range of empirical applications because, quite simply, the 
permutations are infinite.
A productive way of exploring the inevitable inter-relationship between external 
influences, and their internal application may be achieved by deflecting attention on to how 
members themselves routinely forge such a link. In the process of constructing an environment 
of normal appearances members interpret objects and events as “instances of” a more general 
pattern. In this process specific local items are plugged into a ghost schemata of typifications 
(see pages 25-31). In institutions which have an established framework of accounting, especially 
bureaucracies, items are routinely accorded significance in relation to the organizational criteria 
of relevance. As Cicourel says:
“Everyday settings, therefore, abound with highly organized ways of dealing 
with and producing macro-evaluations, reports, and summarizations of 
relentless micro-events. There are many ways in which everyday micro-events 
are evaluated and/or reported and/or summarized. In each case the activities 
are routine aspects of some organization and are independent of the way 
social scientists design and carry out their research. . .  Organizations have 
developed methods for resolving complex problems of evaluation, reporting, 
and summarization that constitute natural experimental settings for the 
social scientist interested in micro-macro integration. These everyday 
settings demand assessment as a routine part of achieving and evaluating 
organizational goals.”
[A. Cicourel (1981) - p.66].
It should also be noted that the social forces which help define the space within which 
institutional actors perform are not themselves free-floating entities, or processes. They too are
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accomplished through the talk and practical reasoning which practitioners in a variety of settings 
employ. A piece of legislation, for instance, is the result of pockets of public discourse of which 
official committees are but one, albeit influential source. What is of interest, from this 
perspective, are the procedures through which laws are objectified in the process of their 
inscription and application.
For these reasons, amongst others, a degree of circumspection is recommended in 
considering the following historical gloss. The latter, nonetheless, provides a useful means of 
tracing the broad changes in institutional approaches to "problem children”, and the development 
of a quasi-therapeutic approach enshrined in the community home system. The emergence of 
the community home was bound up in changing social constructions of the young offender, and 
the legislation to which these gave rise. The 1969 Children and YoungPersonsAct which brought 
the community home into being was the statutory culmination of a welfare orientation to 
juvenile deviance. The Act represented an attempt to decriminalize all but the most extreme 
and recalcitrant of deviants and, concomitantly, to increase the provision for care and treatment 
rather than punishment. It thus sought a realignment of power between agents of law and order, 
especially the magistracy and police, and those of care and welfare, in particular social workers.
It would be simplistic to trace a unilinear development toward the more therapeutic 
approach which gained currency in the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s. As Collison says:
‘‘the categories of guilt and need have a long history of conflation and 
difference in discourses of punishment/treatment. . .  This dualism appears 
under a number of rubrics: need/guilt, responsibility/non-responsibility, 
custodial/therapeutic, welfarism/legalism, prevention/deterrence and so on.” 
[M. Collison (1980) - p. 154]
The welfare orientation did, however, enjoy a tangible expansion of influence which may be 
traced through a series of historical processes.
i) The Segregation of Children as Legal Objects
During the nineteenth century children were increasingly identified as a special 
category who fell within the jurisdiction of the law. Their separation from adults was based upon 
the emergent conception of children as a vulnerable group whose physical and moral welfare
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must be guarded. The child protection legislation was one manifestation of this view, as was the 
emergent socio-legal response to young deviants which tended to identify them as a group who 
were susceptible to degeneration, and amenable to reformation through segregation. Until the 
mid-nineteenth century the young offender, at least from the age of seven, was dealt with 
alongside mature criminals. In the second half of the century a two-fold system emerged 
encompassing the industrial school and reformatory.
The emergence of separate institutional provisions for the young deviant was partly 
premised upon their assumed vulnerability to moral contagion from adult offenders. The same 
rationale informed the institutional separation between the industrial school and reformatory. 
The former dealt with a variety of deviant categories from the vagrant, to the child whose 
involvement on the margins of criminal activity was seen to constitute a moral risk. The 
reformatory tended to deal more specifically with the convicted offender. Both of these 
institutions were voluntary, and adopted similar working philosophies. The object was not 
predominantly to punish, although it may appear so from a modem perspective, but to 
resocialize through the discipline of hard work.
Up until the first decade of this century the criminal court was responsible for 
disposing of the child who came before it. By an Act of 1908, a separate jurisdiction for children 
was created in England and Wales in the form of a juvenile court. Recognition of the need for 
a special legal arena for children in trouble constituted an important signpost in the history of 
their segregation from the population of adult offenders. From the outset the juvenile court 
embodied a joint affiliation to the protocol of criminal due process married to a concern for the 
child’s welfare. As Priestly et al say, the juvenile court:
“defined a jurisdiction within which the criminal law still ran in its entirety 
but within which the full impact of judicial proceedings on the individual 
offender was subject to considerable mitigation.”
[P. Priestly et al (1977) - p.3]
In this process:
“the courts themselves emerged as a species of welfare agency in their own 
right; ministering to the age entities they had captured in the net of ‘moral 
quarantine’.” 
pbid - p.5]
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ii) The Conflation of the Troubled and Troublesome
The judicial segregation of juvenile deviants from adult offenders rendered problematic 
the issue of their criminal responsibility, and opened the conceptual space for reinterpretation 
of their status. The categorical fusion between children in need and young offenders has been 
a persistent feature of discourses on child care. As Morris et al say:
“The expansion of the child care service in the twentieth century and the 
development of preventive social work both served further to consolidate 
children in trouble into a single conceptual category: the deprived and 
depraved were one and the same. Couched in the language of 'welfare’ and 
supported by an army of professionals, attention was continually diverted 
from what children do to what children are. . . ”
[A- Morris et al (1980) - p.7]
[Emphasis in the original]
Reformers have repeatedly attempted to persuade government and legal agencies of 
the wisdom of bringing the young offender under:
“the umbrella of neglect and deprivation, where they might be sheltered 
from the ill-wind of public reprobation.”
[P. Priestly et al (1977) - p.5]
This perspective was not confined to the periphery. Government committees throughout this 
century have also recognized a similarity between children who have broken the law, and those 
deprived of the resources assumed necessary for healthy physical and emotional development.
In the 1940’s the Curtis Committee recognized a fundamental convergence between 
the two categories, and advocated a unified statutory service to cater for the child “deprived of 
a normal home life” in the words of the Committee. The Curtis Report formulated a series of 
recommendations of which the Childrens Act of 1948was the legislative fruit. Details of this Act 
are briefly considered on page 69-70 below. For the moment the point is to recognize the 
attempted dissolution of conceptual boundaries between types of children in trouble. This 
thrust gained greatest momentum in the 1960’s in two White Papers entitled The Child, Family 
and Young Offender (1965) and Children in Trouble (1968) which advocated a decriminalizing 
response to all but the most extreme offenders who appeared before the juvenile bench. The
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concept of need thus gained primacy over that of criminal responsibility, at least within the terms 
of the 1969 Act.
Despite the popularity and influence of conflationist theories, a distinction between 
types of juvenile offender has been maintained in principle and in institutional practice. The 
conceptual c^amks of this mode of differoitiation hangg upon the question of moral responsibility. 
While an act of delinquency may  ^from this dualistic perspective, be conceived as the manifestation 
of a child’s deprivation and/or disturbance, it is not necessarily so. The examination of the 
deviant’s underlying motivation is thus considered a necessary process in eliciting the meaning 
of his deviant behaviour.
The distinction between the deprived and depraved and between what Morris et al call 
the acceptably and unacceptably depraved (1980 - p.28) is apparent in the range of institutional 
provisions for children in trouble. Thus detention centres and borstals continued to exist, 
alongside more welfare orientated institutions, despite the efforts of those who drafted the 1969 
Act to minimize the punitive response to juvenile offending.
The historical movement toward the conflation of problem children and children with 
problems has not, then, resulted in the complete abolition of boundaries. In spite of the 
maintenance of conceptual distinctions, there has been a process of convergence in the middle 
ground. It is from this domain that the community home population is drawn; a group of 
adolescents who are at once defined as deviant and disturbed.
iii) The Svstematization of Services and Emergence of a Familv Focus
During the Post War period there has been a gradual systematization of provisions for 
children “deprived of a normal home life” as the Children Act of 1948 defined them. This piece 
of legislation formed part of the architecture of the welfare state and was founded upon the 
Curtis Committee report. Prior to the 1948 Act services for children - whether deviant, 
disturbed or abandoned - were administered by voluntary organizations with no substantial 
coordination or cooperation between the different institutional branches.
The Curtis Report advocated the erection of a simplified and unified network of 
provisions under the auspices of a centralized government department: namely the Home Office.
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A system of accountability was enstated which sought to ensure minimal standards amongst 
residential institutions. The Committee recommended that responsibility be allocated to a 
Childrens’ Department dedicated to the administration and overview of the system.
The systematization was also at an ideological level, since the 1948 Act proffered a 
more child-centred orientation which aimed to minimize the intervention of the state. It 
specified that children should be brought into care only where strictly necessary, and for the 
minimal length of time. Although these provisoes derived from an appreciation of the 
importance of the family, the focus was primarily upon the child, and the orchestration of a 
Childrens’ Department to meet his or her needs in relative isolation from the family.
The prevailing tendency of public discourse since Curtis has been to locate the 
“problem child” within the wider familial context which is thereby opened up to scrutiny. As 
Donzelot so powerfully illustrates in his seminal work. The Policing o f Families (1980), the family 
is a social entity which is constituted through the range of practices which come to bear on it. 
These practices operate with a range of cognitive and moral assumptions about what the family 
is and what it should be.
One of the primary responsibilities with which parents in our society are charged is the 
upbringing of their offspring. What constitutes an adequate up-bringing is a complex social issue 
which varies from agency to agency relative to the purposes in hand. What is significant in the 
present context is how the private domain of family life becomes a public issue when deviance 
spills out into the wider social arena. The display of deviance or disturbance by children is thus 
treated as an occasion for examining the workings of the family as a whole in an attempt to locate 
the problems or pathologies which give rise to such symptoms. This mode of scrutiny is validated 
through the discourse of welfare; the administration of what is “best” for the family and/or the 
child.
Since the “problem child” was most likely to be referred to a field social worker, it was 
she who was considered best placed to undertake family assessment. So it was that the family was 
increasingly opened up to the statutory gaze. As Collison says:
“While the family has been the effective location of coercive and didactic 
institutional practices since the nineteenth century, the major movement
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since Curtis has been for the state to take over directly what previously had 
been the terrain of private philanthropy. The demand for systematized 
strategies for the family created the space for the development of a service 
that could claim privilege in arbitrating between the various knowledges 
that impinged on the family. Social work has developed a particular 
knowledgeable discourse about the nature of social problems. This knowledge 
is eclectic, in that it seeks to appropriate (speak for) all the knowledges 
previously brought to bear on the family (sociological, psychological, medical, 
fiscal, moral).”
[M. Collison (1980) - pages 160-161]
The kind of knowledge in which social workers claimed expertise was in relation to the 
needs of families. Just as young deviants underwent a process of decriminalization, so too were 
their parents constructed as potential victims whose lack of parenting skills was bequeathed by 
dint of their own familial past. The mode of discursive reasoning which developed in relation to 
families was, in a word, welfarist; designed to elicit the underlying disturbance which gives rise 
to the symptom of deviance in its children.
Accompanying the emergence of a family focus, the principle of organizational 
unification shifted away from the Childrens’ Departments of the 1948 Act. While the family 
reorientation was not wholly decisive, it was the dominant motif in the public committees which 
informed child welfare legislation throughout the 1960’s. For instance, the Ingleby Committee 
Report of 1960spoke of the “situation and relationships” within the family being responsible for 
deviance amongst its offspring, and advocated preventive work with families to reduce the 
likelihood of the child entering care.
In the two White Papers published in 1965 and 1968 entitled The Child Family and 
Young Offender and Children in Trouble respectively, the Longford Committee echoed a similar 
theory of causation. The first, and most radical of the two papers proposed the abolition of the 
juvenile court and the creation of a coherent family service with a therapeutically inclined family 
court at its hub. The paper met with a storm of protest from the magistracy and probation 
service. The second White Paper of 1968 appeared as an attempted compromise designed to 
ameliorate criticism and facilitate the passage of legislation. The 1969 Act did legislate in favour 
of the unification of practices centering upon the family. It did not, however, fulfil the promise 
of a non-judicial family service in England and Wales, despite the statutory provision of such a 
service in Scotland.
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Another development in the formulation of a coherent policy was occurring 
simultaneously. The Seebohm Committee was set up in 1965 to review the array of personal 
social services with view to their possible integration. The Committee identified a level of 
fragmentation and duplication in the existing services, and recommended the creation of a local 
authority department to coordinate the amalgam of services relating to the family. The 
Local Authorities Social Services Act - based on Seebohm’s proposals - was passed on the same 
day as the Children and YoungPersonsAct of 1969, and was, according to Burchell:
“the culmination of the movement towards the organization of the various 
social services, which have evolved separately and autonomously into a 
unified and comprehensive ‘family service’.”
[G. Burchell (1979) - p.l30]
In spite of the emergent family orientation, the legislators of the 1969 Act recognized 
the continued need for a residential provision for children whose behaviour was not criminally 
extreme enough to be incarcerated in more punitive institutions such as borstal or detention 
centre, but who were nonetheless considered out of the control of their parents.
Notwithstanding this policy of removing certain children from their families, what was 
evident in verbal and written accounts to emerge from St. Nicholas’ and related institutions was 
how the boys’ deviant behaviour and their problems were so often formulated in relation to their 
family background; a tendency borne out by the empirical material throughout. While the 
emotional origins of a child’s deviance were situated within the emotional context of his family 
history, the therapeutic focus of St. Nicholas’ was largely upon the individual child who was 
charged with ultimate responsibility for coming to terms with the damaging circumstances which 
were, originally, out of his control.
iv) The 1969 Children and Youne Persons Act: The Growth of Social Work Knowledge and 
Power - and its Limits
The burgeoning of a welfarist approach to the young deviant brought with it a 
concomitant growth in the power of social workers both to define “the problem” and devise 
appropriate modes of dealing with it. This expansion of the social work jurisdiction was based 
upon a professional claim to a body of social and psychological expertise, and practical 
experience in the management of deviance. It was matched, at the same time, with a diminution
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of power amongst those groups who advocated a more punitive approach to deviant behaviour 
amongst the young.
The 1969 Act advocated a realignment of forces within the field of juvenile justice. It 
promoted the powers of the field social worker at each stage of the judicial process, and demoted 
those of other personnel involved, such as police, probation officers and magistrates. The 
ascendance of welfarism and social work expertise fuelled the drive toward the decriminalization 
of delinquent behaviour by subsuming it under the generic umbrella of need. The 1969 Act thus 
restricted the use of criminal proceedings for children under fourteen who, it stated, could only 
appear before the bench where there was evidence of neglect. The Act also minimized the 
circumstances in which children of fourteen to seventeen could be subjected to the processes of 
criminal law.
A process of pre-court sifting was recommended by the Act to filter as many children 
as possible out of the judicial system. This task was jointly allocated to police and social workers 
in negotiation with each other. Such discretion with regard to prosecution had previously been 
the exclusive domain of police work.
The 1969 Act thus sought to divert as many children as possible away from the juvenile 
court, and for those who did appear the horizon of social work discretion was much expanded. 
Prior to appearance, for example, the field social worker was given authority, alongside 
probation officers, to compile the social enquiry report. The nature of social work input in this 
respect manifested itself in the therapeutic tone of such reports which tend to situate the child’s 
deviance within the anterior framework of his historical and emotional disturbance. Social 
enquiry reports and other such documents do not, of course, determine the magistrate’s 
understanding of the case, and may indeed provoke resistance to the view which they enshrine. 
They are nonetheless of some import as they furnish the magistrate with the primary source of 
information about the child and his background.
A more tangible sense in which the 1969 Act curtailed the powers of the magistracy 
was in restricting their non-criminal disposals to the supervision order or care order. Hitherto, 
they were able to specify the institution to which a child should go under the approved school 
order. In 1969 social workers were allocated the authority to implement the orders in relation 
to their knowledge of a particular case. Responsibility for the child was thus placed in the hands
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of the social services rather than the institution as such. This entailed, in the words of Dingwall:
“transfer (of) all the powers and duties of a child’s parents to the local 
authority for an indefinite period, terminating on the child’s eighteenth 
birthday. The authority has almost entirely u^ettered discretion over its 
management and placement of the child.”
[R. Dingwall et al (1983) - p. 10]
The 1969Act set out the diverse criteria which must be met in order for the magistrate 
to grant a care order. These include: the existence of conditions in which the child’s physical and 
emotional development is demonstrably being impaired or neglected or he/she is living in a 
household where there is a risk of this; where the child is perceived to be in moral danger; he/ 
she is beyond parental control; a persistent truant or guilty of the commission of a criminal 
offence, excluding homicide.
The new residential provision created in 1969 to meet the need of children whose 
circumstances embraced the last three conditions was the community home with education on 
the premises. The adolescents referred to community homes, including St. Nicholas’, were thus 
considered to be at once deviant in some specifiable way, and disturbed. The latter was not a 
sufficient reason in itself to justify the child’s referral to such an institution. Children who would 
previously have been sent to an approved school for correction were, from 1969 onward, 
referred to a community home where a rehabilitative ideal prevailed. Alongside this ideological 
shift of emphasis, government responsibility for the community home passed from the Home OfBce 
to the newly created Social Services Department.
The Limits of the 1969 Act
It is well documented how, in considering the success of the 1969 Act, one must 
distinguish between the principles it embodied, and the limits of its practical application. The 
thoroughgoing decriminalization of the under fourteen age group did not occur, nor the 
pre-court negotiation between police and social workers. What is more, punitive custodial 
provisions for convicted offenders, such as detention centre and borstal, were maintained 
alongside more therapeutically inclined institutions like the community home.
The 1969 Act did, nonetheless, constitute an advance in the discourse of welfarism,
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and social workers did enjoy a tangible expansion of power, especially in relation to the 
interpretation of supervision and care orders and the expansion of their residential role. 
However, the construction of a homogeneous category of need advocated by Committees from 
Curtis through Ingleby to Longford, was not realized. This was undoubtedly partly due to the 
failure of the incoming Conservative Government of 1970 to implement the more radical 
sections of the Act.
The 1969 Act was also a microcosm of the wider tension between the discourses of 
welfare and those of law and order. In particular, a contradiction lay in the attempt to place a 
heart of welfare in a judicial body. For a legal criterion to retain any meaning, the concept of 
moral responsibility must remain a central issue in the determination of an appropriate disposal. 
From a therapeutic perspective, the deviant’s responsibility is very often mitigated by his 
disturbed emotional history. Thus, legal and therapeutic modes of reasoning tend to strain in 
different directions.
A number of negative consequences have been seen to flow from the scrolls of the 
1969 Act and the contradictions it enshrined. The “law and order” lobby, represented by the 
magistracy for instance, believed it went too far in challenging the doctrine of individual 
responsibility. From the perspective of the welfare lobby, especially social workers, the 
piecemeal implementation of the Act compromised the ideals upon which it was founded, and 
threatened to reinstate the damaging dichotomies it was designed to foil. An alternative 
approach is articulated by the Justice for Children group, composed of academics and lawyers, 
who argue that:
“in rushing to anbrace need as an orchestrating category for state intervention 
in the control of youth, certain fundamental rights. . .  have been subsequently 
denied by welfarism.”
[M. CoUison (1980) - p.l65]
Consequently, in the words of Morris et al, themselves members of the aforementioned
group:
“children became ensnared in a series of discretionary processes within 
which the safeguarding of the rights of individual children was subordinated 
to what were seen as wider social problems.”
[A. Morris et al (1980) - p.7]
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Far from enhancing welfare and justice for children, the Justice for Children lobby 
argue that the infiltration of therapeutic principles into the court room deprives children of legal 
protection against the vagaries of welfarism.
v) The Emergence of a Therapeutic Orientation and its Residential Application
The ideals of the 1969 Children aftd Young Persons Act have never been wholly 
realized either in the legal adjudication or residential placement of children who enter the 
system. It did however amplify a process which was already well underway. The 
therapeutic-cum-welfare orientation to social problems began to infiltrate a number of deviance 
processing agencies from the 1930’s onward. The profession of social work in particular was very 
influential in fostering a therapeutic approach to children in trouble. This was partly attributable 
to the import of Freudian theory into social work training courses during the War and Post War 
period. The authority with which psycho analytic concepts were invested was manifest in the 
prevalence of the casework approach during this period. Since then an eclectic array of theories 
have been adopted and developed in relation to both field and residential social work, some of 
which directly and vehemently challenge the validity of a therapeutic approach to deviance. A 
therapeutic mode of reasoning did, however, continue to exert influence upon social work 
practice, and was prevalent, though not universal, amongst the staff at St. Nicholas’ during the 
period of my fieldwork.
From a therapeutic perspective deviance is conceived as the manifestation of its 
perpetrator’s underlying emotional disturbance. Through this manoeuvre a variety of behavioural 
episodes can be reduced to a symptomological status. The “problem child” is thus transformed 
into a “child with problems” who is in need of help rather than punishment. Clearly, this mode 
of interpretation helped to promote the convergence between deviance and disturbance and 
lent it theoretical legitimacy.
The therapeutic principles upon which the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act was 
built are apparent in the Government publication, Care and Treatmentin a Planned Environment 
(1970) which refers specifically to the community home project. The paper speaks of how:
“The new legal framework (post 1969) should enable greater weight to be 
given, in deciding what treatment a child needs, to the background and
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causal factors underlying his behaviour, although it must still be recognized 
that presenting symptoms in the form of difGcult or anti social behaviour 
should also receive attention in the treatment situation.”
[Paragraph 1]
Or again:
“It is the children who present symptoms of anti-social and aggressive 
behaviour and those whose disturbance is such that it calls for particular 
investigation and treatment, including the withdrawn child with marked 
personality difficulties who will require community home provision with 
specialist resources, which also offers education on the premises. . . ” 
[Paragraph 14]
The change in the name of the institution - from approved school to community/zome 
- was itself indicative of the ideological reorientation which was taking place. In this transition 
the emphasis changed from the discipline and training characteristic of the approved school, 
staffed mainly by teachers. The community home was to prioritize the therapeutic welfare of the 
child, and the cultivation of a warm, caring environment to compensate for the deprivation from 
which the majority were assumed to have suffered. To quote once more from Care and 
Treatment in a Planned Environment:
“All aspects of a child’s day are used therapeutically, that is in such a way as 
to heal the effects of past damage and to promote emotional and social 
growth; the ordinary group living arrangements in the home contribute a 
major part of the treatment methods.
These children need the warm and accepting environment which such a 
community home can offer.”
[Paragraphs 25 and 26]
It is clear from the preceding quotation that the evocation of a home (rather than a 
school) does not entail the adoption of a family model. Such a model, which characterized the 
organizational arrangement of childrens’ homes and, in certain respects, the approved school, 
was based upon a conjugal mode of management with house mothers and fathers (or headmasters 
and matrons) assuming the traditional role of surrogate parents. This naturalistic mode of 
discourse was quite different to that upon which the community home was based. Rather than 
doing what came naturally the therapeutic approach aimed to illuminate the psychological 
significance of behaviour by subjecting it to a particular kind of scrutiny.
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The creation of the community home opened up many job opportunities for residential 
social workers and encouraged a movement toward their greater professionalization. Within 
the approved school system teachers had been the most numerically and hierarchically powerful 
professional group. Within the community home system, by contrast, the axis of power shifted 
in favour of residential social workers. Their role within the approved school and childrens’ 
home had been extremely limited; confined very largely to taking care of the child’s functional 
needs. With the emergence of a therapeutically orientated community home system the 
residential social worker was required to engage in a more specialized and complex set of 
practices.
The demands of this new, more therapeutically infused role attracted new recruits to 
the community home, some of whom were professionally trained. Senior institutional positions 
were increasingly filled by practitioners with a greater therapeutical knowledge of their task. 
Similarly, many of those who were not trained began to seek secondment to enhance their 
knowledge and facilitate promotion. Even those workers who remained unqualified had the 
skills of therapeutic theorization, imbibed by dint of their immersion in institutional culture.
Conclusion
The emergence of an interpretative framework which influenced working practices at 
St. Nicholas’ can be traced through the historical processes identified above. Before I proceed 
from a diachronic to a synchronic description of the organizational setting, I include a brief 
history of St.Nicholas’. This helps elucidate how the particular institution in question fitted into 
the wider picture, and gives a flavour of the local history to which members themselves 
sometimes referred.
B) A Brief History of St. Nicholas’
A residential institution for deviant boys had stood on the site of St. Nicholas’ for over 
eighty years when the home closed in 1987. For the first period of its history the building was 
used as a privately funded industrial school. In the late 1930’s, however, it was sold to the local 
county council and became an approved school. Mr. and Mrs. Park were appointed as 
headmaster and matron, where they remained until their retirement nearly thirty years later.
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In 1969 St. Nicholas’ was chosen as one of three institutions from different local 
authorities to participate in a collaborative project administered by personnel in the old 
Home OfBce Childrens’ Department and relevant personnel from local authorities, amongst 
others. The purpose of the project was to monitor the transition from approved school to 
community home, and to develop general guidelines based upon the practical experience of the 
three institutions. The project committee set up a working party responsible for the production 
of reports and working papers which were published under the auspices of the D.H.S.S. advisory 
council. The most famous of these documents was Care and Treatmentin a Planned Environment 
(1970).
In 1973 St. Nicholas’was relocated within new purpose-built premises constructed on 
the same grounds as the old school. In spite of the new building which had been designed to 
embody the philosophy of 1969, and the recruitment of new social work staff sympathetic to a 
more liberal and therapeutically inclined approach, contemporary documents suggest a period 
of disorganization and ideological conflict during the 1970’s. This was partly because the new 
community home system inherited many staff who were steeped in the culture of the old 
approved school and resistant to new methods of working. Mr. and Mrs. Britton - the 
headmaster and matron during the transitional phase - were also very much part of the old 
regime with its attendant disciplinarian values. Their retirement in the mid 1970’s thus provided 
an opportunity to replace the old guard with the new.
Mr. Sands was appointed as successor to Mr. Britton. He was a keen advocate of 
welfarism, and referred to Care and Treatment in a Planned Environment as his “bible”. In a 
written statement in 1980, Mr. Sands spoke of the state he found St. Nicholas’ to be in upon his 
arrival in 1976.
“On my appointment as Principal, I was given to believe that St. Nicholas’ 
Home was organized along the lines of “Care and Treatment in a Planned 
Environment”. Indeed, this was to be expected in view of the involvement 
of (the local authority) and St. Nicholas’ Home in the preparation of that 
Report.
When I commenced my duties, I found that this was not so.
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a) While a few members of staff understood the philosophy of the book, 
most did not.
b) The staff, depleted in numbers, were dejected and depressed.
c) Control of the boys was, all too often, physical (I had to reprimand three 
members on this account in my first three weeks), reflecting the staffs 
image of the former Principal as one who beat up the boys in his office 
and who... ruled by fear.
d) Boys were absconding frequently.
e) Taking and driving away cars by boys, and burglaries by them were 
commonplace.
f) Members of staff operated on the principle that authority and control 
were exercised “from above” - “the sort of hierarchical structure which 
inhibits free communication” between adults and children which was 
condemned (Care and Treatment in a Planned Environment, 
Paragraph 38) as causing “resistant sub-cultures to flourish.”
This situation could hardly be further from the philosophy of “Care and 
Treatment in a Planned Environment” and it was, properly and obviously, 
my task to tackle the problem.”
Mr. Sands issued the statement from which the preceding extract is drawn after being 
suspended from duty in 1980 for “gross mismanagement”, as the director of social services called 
it. This accusation emanated originally from a coterie of staff within St. Nicholas’ itself. They 
claimed that Mr. Sands’ managerial incompetence had led to a damagingly high staff turnover, 
and the breakdown of a level of discipline necessary to control the boys and prevent their 
involvement in deviant behaviour. Mr. Sands refuted the validity of these accusations in other 
parts of the statement quoted from above.
Even Kate Lambert, head of education, who supported Mr. Sands during the challenge 
to his leadŒship, retrospectively identified the poiod of his rule as characterized by disorganization. 
As she said in an informal conversation with an applicant for the head of social work post during 
my fieldwork in 1983:
Kate: . . .  St. Nicholas’ did get into a terrible mess - uhm -1 was the art teacher here
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in those days - and I might have - twelve kids due to come to me because we 
had sixty - at that time (2) and six of those who should - would come - plus 
twelve others - you know - it was absolutely chaotic. . .  Uhm - and when 
Roger came - he had a hell of a task pulling things together - but I think we’ve 
succeeded very well.
Applicant: What happened with the predecessor? Was he uhm ( 1 ) a sort of ridiculously 
libertarian - fellow - that wanted to -
Kate: Yes (1) I think that (1.5) and also he was a very nice - very honest straight
man - but not strong enough for the job - you know. . .
And later:
Kate: Well this was the state we got into - and - it was a case of either shut us down
- that was very much on the cards - or look at the whole thing through a 
microscope - set up a working party - which they did do. And we sat for - ooh 
(1.5) I suppose (1) six months. And - gradually - by our policy - the numbers
- went right down until we had no boys - then all the staff pitched in - cleaned 
the place up - painted. We started off initially with two boys - and at that time 
it was costing - because it’s pro rata - one thousand two hundred pounds a 
week - to keep a boy here. . .  and ah - 1 remember the headline in the local 
paper was ah (1.5) “One thousand pounds a week and twelve staff to keep 
one boy at St. Nicholas’ over Christmas” . . .  uhm - it didn’t go down very 
well with the local rate payers - you know.
The working party to which Kate refers above was set up in October 1978. Its mandate 
was to reconsider the working methods employed by St. Nicholas’ staff team in an attempt to 
enhance their effectiveness. At this time, as Kate’s account suggests, the number of residents 
was run down to accommodate such a radical reappraisal. As a result of working party 
deliberations a new “sequential model” of organization was adopted. New admissions were all 
placed in “phase one” - and progressed to “phase two” when they were judged to have reached 
a certain level of social and emotional maturity. The educational system was similarly based 
upon the concept of progression through phases. Within a year the model was dissolved because
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it was seen to create bottlenecks in the system, especially in the preliminary phase, and to create 
a “sin bin” for boys who were unable to progress sufficiently to proceed to “phase two” within 
a reasonable time. The concept of “sequential development” was nonetheless retained by a 
number of staff as a working philosophy, albeit no longer inscribed so clearly in the organizational 
structure.
During the course of the three-phase experiment Mr. Sands was suspended, and then 
formally dismissed after the accusation of mis-management was upheld at a tribunal. At the 
beginning of 1981 Roger Carter was appointed as principal. His arrival marked the genesis of 
a more stable period of greater organizational and ideological consolidation. Roger Carter was 
a charismatic figure who maintained a strong sense of leadership while also advocating a more 
therapeutic approach to the residents, and greater democracy in the management of staff. This 
joint affiliation was sometimes considered by staff to create a level of conflict. Perhaps it was a 
feature of Roger Carter’s charisma that on a number of occasions staff could be heard to mitigate 
the contradictions and perceived weaknesses by invoking the redeeming strengths of his 
leadership qualities as a whole. Consider Brian Potter’s response to Kate’s announcement of 
Roger’s resignation.
Kate: Brian - how do you feel. . .  about everything?
Brian: Oh - 1 dunno - I’m a bit confused really. . .  no I was totally sort of - amazed
to hear Roger was leaving (.5) and although I - disagree with a lot of things 
(.5) I think he has been a tremendous principal.
And again:
Brian: He’s such a big personality -1 think something that Mike - Griffith got it right
(.5) when you accept Roger - you accept the whole package - sort of thing. 
And I think on the whole I do accept the package even though there’s a lot 
of things I disagree with -
Kate: {Uhm
{
Brian: {about him. I think his main - strength is (.5) that he’s so committed.
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Kate: Yer.
Brian: And I think if we have someone (.5) they’ve gotta be that committed -1 think
his great strength of-of - how he’s made this place work (.5) is his total 
committment - and it - in-in a wav- that also can be his weakness I think. The 
fact that he gets so emotionally involved sometimes that he can’t make 
judgements.
[Extracted from a T.M.]
Following Roger Carter’s departure in Summer 1983, Kate Lambert filled the post of 
acting principal until Peter Scott was appointed toward the end of 1983. Peter, who remained 
as principal until St. Nicholas’ was closed in 1987, had a very different style of leadership to his 
predecessor. He was more involved in political issues, such as fighting for resources, than in 
working at the “coal-face” with staff and boys. Peter’s managerial predisposition is nicely 
illustrated in the following extract from a teachers’ meeting to which he, as new principal, had 
been invited. Peter stated his intention to fight for more resources for the teachers, and 
continued:
Peter: I’m like a terrier - if I get something between my teeth - 1 shall carry on ‘til
I get what I want. (3) And we could start getting militant - no problem - 1 
mean I like that too - “you wan’ us to teach - give us some materials and we’ll 
teach. If you don’t - we aint bleedin’ teaching anybody.” We’ll go to the 
NUT (.5) we’ll do these sorts of things. You won’t find me lacking there - 
I love a good fight.
Peter Scott’s political acumen was put to full effect in dealing with one of the major 
threats to St. Nicholas’ at the time: that of closure. All community homes were vulnerable during 
the 1980’s; an era in which a different socio-political climate to the welfarism of the 1960’s and 
1970’s prevailed. With a drastic decline in referrals to community homes, many fought to 
maintain a population sufficient to justify their continued existence. The causes of this decline 
are complex and multifarious, but included the high cost of the community home which at St. 
Nicholas’ had reached £800 pounds per week for each boy during my fieldwork. Cheaper 
options such as fostering, childrens’ homes or special schools were thus often chosen in 
preference to community homes by field social workers concerned to balance the books.
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At the same time, by broadening their admission criteria other institutions began to 
compete for the type of adolescent which the community home had previously had almost 
exclusive access to. The “middle ground”, as Peter Scott called it, was being nibbled away in the 
fight for survival. The problem, and Peter Scott’s response to it, is displayed below in his attempt 
to sell a new and wider admission policy to the staff at S t Nicholas’ in a day conference whose 
topic was “the numbers problem”.
Peter: See what I feel about all of you (1) is (1) and maybe you should feel it about
yourselves (.5) I couldn’t admit some of these kids^ere - if I didn’t feel you 
could cope with ’em. (2.5) I mean I actually think that there are (.5) some 
bloody good people working in this school - who given the right kind of - help 
to do it - will manage - some of the most damaged kids in London. And that’s 
what I believe about this school. Now it’s a reality - that if (.5) C.H.E.’s are 
not prepared to take that more difficult boy (.5) the fact of the matter is - 
C.H.E. S will shut (.5) becus in reality - they are the boys we should be taking. 
We shouldn’t be taking nice boys (2) every boy we get should be an animal. 
(2) ’Cus if he isn’t - what’s ’e doing ’e r e . . .  I mean the reason referrals have 
dropped - let’s make no mistake about it - ten years ago - childrens’ homes 
- wouldn’t touch with a barge pole any kid - you mention glue - or (.5) 
slapping (.5) or absconding - or (.5) crime (.5) no - children’s home would 
touch ’im with a barge pole. Now childrens’ homes are full of kids like that 
(.5) ’cus the writing’s been on the wall for them too. No - you either take 
them or you shut. I mean - you know (.5) it’s all the way down the line - it’s 
not just C.H.E. S that are being shut - it’s childrens’ homes as well. So our 
referral rate dries up - largely becus childrens’ homes are absorbing these 
difficult kids as well.
In spite of the extended admission criteria, the opening of a day care unit to cater for 
boys who had been excluded from local schools and an array of public relations exercises, St. 
Nicholas’ was closed in 1987.
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Conclusion
Having mapped out the historical emergence of a therapeutically infused institutional 
approach to young deviants embodied in the community home, and offered an historical sketch 
of St. Nicholas* in particular, I turn to a general description of certain key facets of institutional 
life.
C) The Institutional Setting 
Introduction
Writing a summary of the kind I attempt below represents a particularly difficult and 
frustrating task for the sociologist preoccupied with the complexity and reflexivity of institutional 
life. By extrapolating principles and practices from the muddle of everyday activity, such a gloss 
inevitably presents a compartmentalized, wooden and reified picture of them. The litany of 
descriptive dilemmas which confronts the sociologist are not exclusive to her. Practitioners at 
St. Nicholas’, as elsewhere, routinely found pragmatic solutions to methodologically irresolvable 
issues; and solutions which were “good enough” for all practical purposes. The practical 
purpose in hand is to provide an institutional framework for the reader unfamiliar with the 
environment. This may also help clarify the contextual significance of the empirical material 
explored throughout the thesis.
i) The Structure and Organization of St. Nicholas*
St. Nicholas’ was a residential home for boys between the ages of thirteen and 
seventeen who had been placed in the care of the local authority. In 1973 it was relocated in new 
premises built to give physical expression to a more therapeutic concept of residential care. The 
building was designed to promote “small group living”, as it was called, and to inhibit the risk of 
regimentation and institutionalization characteristic of the approved school As one of St Nicholas’ 
brochures says:
“The layout and style of the home has been carefully designed to provide an 
environment which balances the boys’ needs for privacy and community
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involvement and it is this philosophy which lies behind the domestic scale of 
the buildings and the close integration of all the facilities.”
With view to this balance, the living units, classrooms and offices were situated around 
a communal nucleus composed of an indoor sports and leisure area. The building and carpentry 
workshops, and staff housing, formed another tier on the periphery of the main building, beyond 
which lay the playing fields which extended to the perimeter fence.
St. Nicholas* was situated in an urban environment to which boys had regular access 
during their leisure time. They were also expected to go home at weekends and during holiday 
times unless there were specific reasons why they should not. Just as the boys were encouraged 
to venture outside of the institution, local teenagers were welcomed into the home during 
certain periods of the day, as were members of the boys’ families.
Each of the four living units was furnished with the facilities necessary for its practical 
autonomy, including a kitchen, lounge, bedrooms, toilet facilities, laundry and staff office. The 
units were designed to accommodate eleven boys each, or forty-four across the home. During 
my period of fieldwork however St. Nicholas’ was, at its peak, a little over half full, although it 
still enjoyed its full complement of staff.
While certain expectations about organizational routines and working practices did 
encompass the institution as a whole, each unit was identified by its distinctive atmosphere and 
style of management. Thus, while unit 1 was renowned for the down to earth “basic care” and 
“reality training” its staff offered, the character of unit 4 was defined in terms of the more 
psychologically informed orientation of its staff. The team managers were largely responsible 
for encouraging a particular method of working amongst their staff.
The structure of staffing at St. Nicholas’ was organized in the following way:
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PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY PRINCIPAL: SOCIAL WORK DEPUTY PRINCIPAL: EDUCATION
(For each of four units) 1 team manager
1 unit manager 4 “basics” teachers
2-3 senior R.S.W’s 1 P.E. teacher
2-3 basic-grade R.S.W’s 1 woodwork teacher
1 art teacher 
1 building instructor 
(unqualified)
[For list of staff pseudonyms see pages 15-18]
While the formal lines of accountability were clearly drawn, the institution was not 
strictly hierarchical. Each member of staff, including those in more junior positions, were 
accorded a degree of power and autonomy which I shall discuss on pages 100-101 below. In 
terms of external accountability, the principal of St. Nicholas’ reported to the assistant director 
and the director of the local authority Social Services Department, and the Regional Planning 
Committee. The latter, composed of various social services personnel, was responsible for 
overviewing and allocating resources to community homes within a given geographical region 
made up of a number of local authority areas.
In terms of professional training, nearly all members of staff with the status of senior 
social worker and above, and all of the teachers were qualified. Of the qualified social work staff, 
some had completed training courses specifically tailored to residential social work, while others 
possessed the more generic Certificate of Qualification in Social Work. The basic grade staff 
were untrained, although a number were seconded onto courses during the period of their 
employment at St. Nicholas’.
ii) The Referral and Admission Process
All of the boys referred to St. Nicholas’ had been placed in the care of the local 
authority for the perpetration of one form of deviant behaviour or another. A care order had
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been placed upon them by the courts, under the terms of the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act, 
because they were deemed to be out of the control of their parents or guardians, defined as 
truants, or charged with the commission of a criminal offence. St. Nicholas’ therefore dealt with 
boys whose deviant identity had already been established by judicial means.
In the majority of cases the boys had been involved in multiple forms of petty deviance, 
including truancy, the abuse of minor drugs, solvent abuse and theft. A number had been 
identified as having violent tendencies, and some had been convicted of crimes of violence, 
though rarely of a more serious kind. It would be apt to define most of the residents as petty 
offenders; indeed this was the client group for whom the community home was designed. During 
the latter period of my fieldwork however, a new admissions policy was instigated by the 
incoming principal, Peter Scott, in an attempt to stave off the closure which threatened all 
community homes during this period. He sought to attract and admit a more extreme category 
of referral, both in terms of their criminal convictions and assumed psychological disturbance. 
Peter Scott thereby hoped at once to boost the number of residents and render St. Nicholas’ 
more indispensible as a resource which dealt with a more severe class of problem children.
The main avenue of referral to St. Nicholas’, as other community homes, was via the 
assessment centre where the child was placed for a period of time after the care order had been 
imposed by the court. This phase of residential assessment could last anything from six weeks 
to several months, depending on how difficult a child was to place.
During the period of assessment the child and his behaviour were subjected to 
examination by a team of psychological experts. A compendium of reports were then compiled 
based upon a variety of sources ranging from the everyday observation of a child by residential 
social work stafE in the living units, to more specialist reports written by educational psychologists, 
psychiatrists and the like who would make an assessment of the child on the basis of an interview 
or two with him. The referral papers sent to St. Nicholas’ by regional assessment centres usually 
employed a psychological mode of theorization, as the forthcoming empirical material reveals.
The period of assessment culminated in a conference at which inter alia the most 
appropriate regional placement for a child was discussed. When referral papers arrived at 
St. Nicholas’ they were read primarily by the principal officers (i.e. the principal and two 
deputies) who would mutually decide whether the child was a suitable candidate, and if so which
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was the most appropriate unit for him. The manager of the chosen unit would then be given the 
papers to read and discuss with his staff team. If the unit staff rejected the case, the papers would 
be sent to the second choice of unit, and so on.
Once the child had been allocated to a unit, visits were arranged and, in the absence 
of any major upsets, a formal acceptance issued. Before admission date a "special worker” was 
chosen for the boy from the staff in his living unit. The worker selected for this role was charged 
with primary responsibility for looking after the child’s practical and emotional needs and 
coordinating various aspects of his residence at St. Nicholas’.
Upon admission a contract was drawn up between the child and his special worker in 
collaboration with the team manager and "basics” teacher. This consisted of a list of long-term 
goals individually tailored to the child relative to his perceived level of social, emotional and 
intellectual development. Periodically throughout the child’s stay, at intervals of one to three 
months, case-conferences (or reviews as they were otherwise known) were held to assess the 
child’s progress and his success at meeting the short term goals set at the previous conference. 
In the words of John Townsend, head of social work during the Grst period of my fieldwork, the 
case conference was designed to:
" .. .embody the concepts of St. Nicholas’, i.e. shared responsibility, 
participation and consultation, and formalize the working together of the 
four groups of people - the boy, his parents or significant adults, St. Nicholas’ 
and the social services. Often they contain therapeutic interventions and 
become agents of change.”
[Report written for support group meeting -1981]
A child’s residence could last for anything from about six months to two years or more, 
with the majority of boys remaining at St. Nicholas’ in excess of a year. A great deal of 
preparation went into a child’s departure; a process which it was often said, started from the day 
a child arrived. The boy was encouraged to assume increasing levels of responsibility for areas 
of his life, and was exposed to a life skills programme in education designed to equip him with 
the practical knowledge necessary for his survival in the outside world.
In the case of plaimed departures, sometimes known as "leaving through the front
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door”, arrangements were made many months in advance. In a number of cases by contrast, 
about a third during my observation of St. Nicholas’, the departure was more abrupt; precipitated 
by a spate of behaviour, or a particular incident which was seen to be in breach of an acceptable 
level. Such departures were often referred to as “leaving through the back door”. The 
commission of a criminal act during the boys’ residence at St. Nicholas’ was not in itself sufficient 
to justify his removal. Indeed, on many occasions boys returned to St. Nicholas’ after a stint in 
detention centre.
iii) The Philosophv and Working Practices of St. Nicholas’
In this section I examine certain key features of the offîcial philosophy of St. Nicholas’ 
as it was articulated by members of staff, particularly those in the higher echelons, and as it was 
inscribed in brochures, working party reports and the like. It is not my concern here, or 
throughout the thesis, to ironically juxtapose espoused principles with actual practice, except 
insofar as institutional members routinely generated anomalies of this kind. What the following 
description suggests, as much as anything else, is the ways in which staff at St. Nicholas’ tended 
to gloss their working ideologies and practices (when called upon to do so) and thus to present 
a heterogeneous array of activities in relatively coherent form.
Many of the working practices at St. Nicholas’ flowed from a conception of the 
residents as adolescents with problems. Since the boys were typically defined as being in need 
of help rather than punishment, care and understanding rather than training, the staff attempted 
to cultivate an environment which was comfortable, relaxed and informal. The regimentation 
characteristic of more punitive institutions for young offenders was conspicuously absent, as was 
the rigid status differential between the residents and the staff.
Indeed, the most striking manifestation of informality lay in the relationship between 
the two groups. The boys were encouraged to relate to members of staff in a casual, familiar and 
equal way; a convention which new boys often had to be initiated into. All members of staff were, 
for instance, addressed by their first name, or nickname, regardless of their status. But this was 
only a superficial expression of relationships between the staff and resident group which 
encompassed the display of affection, humour, cheekiness and open hostility - the latter more 
typically articulated by the boys!
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A related feature of institutional life was the toleration shown by the staff group 
toward certain forms of petty delinquency as one might call them. Thus, for example, residents 
of all ages were permitted to smoke throughout the institution, including in classrooms during 
lesson times. Or again, the staff tended to tolerate the regular use of four letter words by the boys 
with only mild resistance, unless their swearing breached a contextually acceptable level. The 
widespread attitude of toleration extended to the boys’ verbally aggressive behaviour and a level 
of damage to the property (such as window-breaking), both of which were considered inevitable 
given the type of child who was resident at St. Nicholas’.
One incident during my first week of fieldwork nicely illustrates the ethos of informality 
which permeated the culture of St. Nicholas’. I was observing a “basics” lesson in progress when 
one of the members of the group arrived late. He immediately jumped on a table and, with the 
use of a thick black felt tip pen, added the name of a football club to an already graffiti-clad 
ceiling. “I didn’t know you supported that football club” said the teacher.
The toleration of a level of deviant behaviour was partly due to the symptomological 
status it was accorded. Consider the following extract from Care and Treatment in a Planned 
Environment, Paragraph 27;
“A therapeutic environment is one in which informal communication is 
encouraged, where there is understanding and tolerance of deviant behaviour, 
where the child has opportunity to express symptoms of his disturbance and 
where both children and adults accept their share of responsibility for 
helping others.”
Deviant behaviour was often treated, at least retrospectively, as an occasion for 
therapeutic interpretation and speculation rather than, or in addition to, more traditional forms 
of discipline. But staff toleration was by no means indiscriminate, nor were the boys allowed to 
simply do as they pleased. Two recurrent distinctions were drawn: a) between symptomatic 
deviance, and that borne of more rational motivation, and b) between behaviour which was 
within acceptable limits, and that which exceeded them, regardless of its motivational status. 
Thus, if a boy broke a window, or verbally assaulted a member of staff, this may or may not be 
construed as a manifestation of his disturbance, depending on how the circumstances were 
interpreted. If, by contrast, a boy physically assaulted and injured a member of staff, the police 
would nearly always be called in and criminal charges pressed against the child even if his act of
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aggression was seen as the manifestation of his emotional disturbance. Such extreme acts of 
aggression were, however, rare.
Although the working practices employed by the staff team did help to promote a 
sense of informality and understanding, they were keen to point out that this did not entail that 
St. Nicholas* was devoid of controls, or “boundaries” as they were often called. Indeed, the boys 
were seen to be in desperate need of certain limits, physical and emotional, within which they 
could feel safe. The challenge was to create an institutional infrastructure which was flexible 
enough to accommodate individual variation, but consistent enough for the residents to feel 
secure.
The boundaries considered necessary for the boys’ sense of psychological stability 
were partially inscribed in the daily routines of institutional life. There were also the boundaries 
of acceptable behaviour which were reinforced most powerfully in the response of staff to 
behaviour which was deemed in breach of them. On such occasions an appropriate reaction was 
considered essential so that the boy “knew where he stood”.
However, traditional forms of punishment were considered inappropriate by many 
staff in relation to the psychological theory of causation they employed. Thus, for instance, 
although members of staff did occasionally have to use physical force of a passive kind to restrain 
the child, the active enforcement of physical punishment was taboo. Only on one occasion 
during my fieldwork did a social worker slap a boy round the face for an act of defiance; an 
incident which caused a furore amongst many of the boys and staff.
St. Nicholas’ had no “lock up” facility, as such a response was considered anathema to 
the principles of the home. Since episodes of deviance were identified in principle as occasions 
upon which good therapeutic work might be accomplished, the provision of a secure room was 
seen to detract from the opportunity. As Kate Lambert said to a group of visiting magistrates:
Kate: Yes - o-often the maximum time - for - for - want of a better expression -
getting through to a child - is in the moments of the highest emotion. Now 
if you’ve got a facility to deal with that - without you having to work with 
words with it - you may - miss the optimum time of -
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Mag: Yes.
Kate: understanding.
Only Peter Scott actively fought for a secure provision to cater for the more extreme 
client group he sought to attract to St. Nicholas*. Despite a pocket of support, the majority of 
staff were opposed to the implementation of such a measure.
The withdrawal of privileges such as weekends home, late nights and pocket-money 
was sometimes used as a means of discipline and deterrence. However, many staff claimed that 
the withdrawal of approval from significant staff was the most effective tool in curbing the boys’ 
deviant excesses: a practice dubbed “negative reinforcement”, borrowed from behaviourist 
terminology. The idea was that through the media of their relationship the practitioner could 
express the anger and disappointment engendered by the boy’s behaviour, which he would 
experience much more poignantly than the imposition of a more conventional mode of 
punishment. This assumption is clearly articulated below in a piece extracted from a discussion 
between the principal officers at St. Nicholas’ and a group of visiting residential social workers 
from another community home.
Roger: We try to-to - run the place - actually - very very much - the whole place is
run through relationships. Individual one to one - 1 mean we each know 
each other terribly well - and ah - it’s very relaxed and ah - that’s the way I 
think we try to run - although we’ve got a structure - we’ve got a - you know 
- we’re very much in control I hope. I’m worried if we’re not.
Kate: Yes - within - within the structure - you can be quite flexible. But if you’re
flexible without a structure - then you’ve got chaos which ah - again - it was 
here at one time - ahm where - flexible became laissez-faire - you know.
R.S.W.1: Problems with kids always boils down to relationships - you have with certain 
kids - and that’s what gets you through I think.
Kate: Well sanctions on a kid’s behaviour are so limited aren’t they.
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R.S.W.3: Yes.
Kate: We don’t want to use a sanction - “you can’t go home for weekends” because
we think the contact with home is so important.
R.S.W: Yes.
Kate: In fact you can do quite a lot of - damage that way... And then again if you
use money as a sanction - they get such limited money - right so you’ve used 
up all your pocket-money so what the hell -1 can do what I like now. So we 
try to sanction through relationships. Again (2.5) if you gain the disapproval 
of someone who you’re very fond of - or have a great deal of respect for - 
that’s a dairm sight harder than having - twenty five pence stopped out of 
your money.
Since the significance of a child’s deviant behaviour was considered in relation to his 
psychological motivation, the application of a universal body of rules and regulations was judged 
by most staff to be inappropriate. Hence, the expression of the “same” piece of behaviour by 
two different boys would not necessarily elicit the same response, as the underlying meaning of 
the act may differ. Roger articulates this individualized response to the boys’ misdemeanours 
in the following extract drawn from a discussion with a group of visiting magistrates from the 
local juvenile bench.
[Roger speaks of how the staff at St Nicholas’ have “norms and expectations” 
rather than “rules and regulations”. One of the magistrates asks if the boys 
themselves know that there is a point beyond which they must not go?]
Roger: Yes -1 think s o . . .  But - but again if I could just - add a proviso to that. What 
is acceptable for Steve -
Mag: Mmm.
Roger: is not acceptable for somebody else. And that is the difficult area to work.
Becus it is very easy to run an establishment where the rules are very - very
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clearly defined - and they apply to everybody - exactly the same. - becus
(.5) and I’m not teaching anyone to suck eggs - becus we are different and 
each human being is different - actually - we need to recognize that-that 
what is O.K for one kid (.5) I would not allow Christopher (.5) to do 
anything crazy - when I wiU allow. . .  David Lyons (.5) to ^  something (?)
- becus David Lyons is not at the level of Christopher. And - “Christopher
- that’s not acceptable from you (.5) becus you are at that level’’. A-and (.5) 
and that is -
Mag: And he understands why?
Roger: Yes.
Mag: He doesn’t feel resentment (?to his peers?)?
Roger: N o . . .  no I don’t think so. And I think that we - we spend - a lot of energy
at St. Nicholas’ working with individuals. Becos it is so important (.5) to - for 
each individual (.5) to feel important.
The working practices of the staff at St. Nicholas’ were orientated, quite generally, to 
the individual resident, his history and set of needs. The initial contract was drawn up with regard 
to the child’s specific circumstances and his progress gauged accordingly. This practice was a 
departure from the approved school philosophy with its emphasis upon uniformity and the 
achievement of collective goals of discipline and obedience. Nonetheless, a framework of 
generic assumptions continued to undergird the individualized practices. The goal of social and 
emotional development, and its desirability was, for instance, an indefeasible assumption upon 
which practitioners based their work. For, as Durkheim recognized, individualism is a collective 
orientation as much as any other.
The declared aim of St. Nicholas’ was to facilitate the boys’ development and to 
provide them “with the opportunities to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to lead 
self-determined, responsible and personally satisfying lives’’, in the words of the brochure. To 
nurture a sense of independence, the child was encouraged to take on increasing levels of
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responsibility for their own actions. This concept is well illustrated by an extract from my 
interview with Philip Hooper, manager of unit 3.
P ask Philip how he would describe the general aim of St. Nicholas’?]
Philip: Uh (2) uh (7.5) it’s alright I’m not gonna give ya - our official philosophy.
How to describe it - as an attempt to - help (.5) the kids (2) look at the areas 
(.5) of difficulty in their lives and - take on some (1) or take on varying 
degrees - of responsibility - in coping with those areas. So - looking at (.5) 
what’s happening to them - and trying to take on (.5) some of the real 
responsibility - not us changing it for them (1) but - trying to get them to look 
at what’s happening (.5) and to see-see - not just look at it - but then to 
actually see it - properly. An-and then (.5) look at ways - of of being able to 
handle it and (.5) uhm (6) and take on some of the responsibility. . .  the kids 
and responsibility don’t always mix - they’re very uneasy partners.
John Kenyon, one of the residents, offered a similar conceptualization of the institutional 
aim in the following extract from his interview.
John: Well. . .  the object of this place I think is that (.5) you know that - you - you
control what you do - you know - you’re responsible for yourself. . .  they try 
and get you used to the - outside world like (1) you know - to-to what you’re 
gonna do when you leave school.
Kim: Yer.
John: You know depend on yourself. So that they encourage you to go out (.5) you
know travel by yourself and - all them sort of things you know.
Kim: Yer.
John: Which helps you quite a bit dunnit. (2) It’s - just - that’s just a good system
to work I think.
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What may initially appear as the “soft option”, a liberal regime in which the child can 
do as he pleases, is in fact considered more challenging for the staff who must be sensitive to 
individual circumstances, and the boys who must bear the burden of responsibility. As Mike 
Griffith says in relation to the latter:
Mike: I think that - very often (.5) when kids come - here from assessment centres
- they have a bit of a culture shock first of all becus they’re used to - to being 
(.5) uhm (1) very much more strictly orchestrated than they are - at St. 
Nicholas’. And I think that they find it (.5) difficult to actually cope with (.5) 
the decision making if you like - which is actually forced (.5) well not forced
- which they’re encouraged to (.5) to uh (.5) participate in.
Trust was considered a vital component in the therapeutic process. Boys were given 
responsibility rather than having rules imposed; an exercise which involved trust and risk in 
equal measure. As Roger Carter said to the group of visiting residential social workers 
mentioned on page 93-94 above.
Roger: . . .  that’s very much what we’re into is-is trying to develop this trust - with
kids - and ahm - 1 think that there are a number of establishments actually
- don’t do it. Ah -1 think that they’re too frightened to do it - and it’s too risky
- and - that sort of thing and uhm - er - they’re frightened that actually if we
- you know - they're not in control ahh - of the situation and uhm - therefore 
they don’t practice it. And I think that one of the things that we ^  practice
- and you have to I think if you’re going to be successful - is to develop a level 
of trust with the kids. And as Kate said - you’re going to lose - and I mean 
gee - you’re losing all the time - and it backfires and O.K so - you go in there 
again - and you work away on it again and that’s what it’s all about I believe. 
And maybe you get to the point where you can’t continué. . .  and you have 
to say - “no - we cannot continue with this lad” - and uhm - that happens - 
it certainly does to us.
An open network of communication was considered a necessary prerequisite of 
institutional effectivity. An elaborate infrastructure of meetings were thus established to 
enhance the free flow of information, ideas and feelings. Indeed the staff at St.Nicholas’ spent
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a great deal of time talking to each other about a range of organizational issues. Such 
“gamilousness” was also noted by Nijsmans in her study of the Westminster Pastoral Foundation 
- a counselling organization. She notes:
“The organization in fact seemed to spend a tremendous amount of time 
discussing what it had been doing so far. Such discussions are an exercise in 
self-understanding, a way of giving meaning to events retrospectively. In his 
attempt to understand what ‘organizing* is about, Weick used the term 
‘consensual validation*. .  .a process whereby members spend a vast amount 
of time negotiating an acceptable definition of what they think is going on.*’
Nijsmans continues:
“Such an approach towards ‘organizing* makes sense within a particular 
perspective on the nature of organizations. If one accepts organizational 
order and rational control as given and inherent ontological qualities, then 
the aim of equivocality reduction by means of consensual validating processes, 
seems irrelevant. If, on the other hand, one looks at ‘organizing* as fluid, 
complex, collective and processual Weick’s theory makes sense.’’
[M. Nijsmans (1987) - p. 307-308]
The meetings at St. Nicholas’ were designed to cut across various staff groups and 
facilitate communication between them. The role of the liaison teacher was also a good example 
of this attempted cross-fertilization. Each teacher was allocated to one of the four units. In 
addition to spending lunchtime in the unit with the staff and boys, he or she was also invited to 
unit meetings. The teacher would thus convey relevant information from the teachers* meeting 
to the unit staff, and vice versa. Similarly, unit staff were welcomed into the classroom to 
participate in the boys* educational programmes. This sense of fluidity, orchestrated mainly by 
the education department, was designed to soften the professional boundaries and to create a 
more open relationship between teachers and social workers.
The sense of the therapeutic which permeated institutional culture extended to 
encompass managerial issues. Staff meetings were occasions upon which practitioners shared 
their feelings and grievances with one another in the course of conducting the everyday business 
of the home. As Nijsmans also noticed, participants:
“were aware of the necessity of listening, of replying in a counselling 
language: I heard what you are saying, but, would it be feasible that. . .  I 
have the feeling that. . .  I wonder how you feel about.. .  Could we perhaps
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explore . . .  ’ were frequently used facilitative statements. The T wonder 
i f . .  .* language is less confrontational and invited members of the group to 
communicate.”
[Ibid-p.399]
It was this infiltration of therapeutic modes of discourse into more prosaic institutional affairs 
which:
“pointed to the profound impact of the occupational paradigm on the daily 
practices of the organizational life.”
[Ibid - p.409]
To quote from one of the periodic day conferences at which the entire staff group 
assembled gives a flavour of this phenomenon. It also demonstrates how managerial and 
therapeutic issues were intertwined. The topic of discussion in the proceeding extract is the new 
admissions policy instigated by the contemporary principal - Peter Scott (see pages 83-84 
above).
Thomas: I’ve still gotta feeling inside here - and I’m gonna chuck it in there... but I still 
have the feeling inside here - that we’re not getting to the nitty gritty (.5) of 
what all this - is all about. Once or twice it got touched (.5) and I think it - 
what’s being touched is the wav the actual referrals - come in - yer (.5) and 
how that actually created within people - you know - either they weren’t 
participating in it or - they were being directed. And all of that like needs to 
be brought out in this forum here. . .  I’m sure there ^  one or two around 
here - who are fucking annoyed - at the way the actual - they were if you like
- directed about their referrals (.5) yer? And I think day conferences are - 
for picking that up - yer?
Peter: Yer - yer.
Thomas: And giving - giving the space for saying - “yes look I - this fellow has arrived
- and I didn’t even know who it was” - you know.
Peter: Yer.
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Thomas: Or something like that.
Peter: Yer.
Thomas: *Cus if that’s happening inside in your units - you’re going to have problems -
Peter: Yer.
Thomas: as-as-as a principal here - you’re going to have problems - I’ll tell you.
And again:
Thomas: It’s a very simple thing look - let’s open the whole thing up. 'We started off 
with the - the aims and objectives inside in this school - yer? and there are 
cardinal words that go with it - and we as workers - are expected to inject into 
kids (.5) shared responsibility - consultation and-and - participation (.5) yer 
(.5) and there are - workers in here who feel that they’re not being afforded 
that courtesy. Now - that...  and I think we should take the bones out of it.
Peter: Huh hum.
Thomas: Yer - and then open it up - in the very secure way of having it in here - not 
way outside there so - where we can’t do anything about it.
While the preceding extract is an extreme example of the mode of discourse frequently 
employed at staff meetings it does illustrate a persistent predisposition. Indeed, St. Nicholas’ 
boasted a democratic mode of management, or a “flattened hierarchy” with a wide, though not 
even distribution of power. The exercise of “legitimate power”, as it was known, was founded 
upon the assumption that all members had the responsibility to execute decisions on the basis 
of their knowledge of and relationship with a resident.
The distribution of power was most apparent in the special worker system at Sl Nicholas’. 
Members of staff from all grades fulfilled this special role in relation to one or more of the boys, 
and were thus accorded primary responsibility for coordinating and executing the individual care
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plan. The special worker did not, however, wield absolute power; he or she was accountable to 
the line manager and the case conference assembly for decisions made in relation to the child.
The benefits of a system based upon the distribution of legitimate power were seen to 
emanate from the sense of involvement and value that members of staff were assumed to 
experience through its operation. This, in turn, was believed to enhance the effectiveness of 
working practice since each member of staff enjoyed a sense of autonomy. As Roger Carter said 
to the aforementioned group of visiting social workers:
Roger: What we in effect say - and what we actually practice is that -1 hate the word
- but - the most junior member of staff - and I do hate that word - the most 
junior member of staff can call a conference on a kid - and has done so 
here . . .  And that - the object of that exercise is to make everybody feel two 
things - one to be effective as workers - because we all like to feel effective. 
I mean I like to feel I’m doing a good job - and everybody likes to feel they’re 
doing a good job - you know - ah - and that is one thing. But also to say to 
kids that each person in the place is an effective worker and is in control 
because it’s very easy to say - “well you’re going to see the old man” or 
something else like tha t. . .  But it’s passing the buck.
While St. Nicholas’ was presented publicly as a thoroughly democratic institution, and 
most staff corroborated this version in my interviews with them, members did occasionally 
express scepticism about the extent to which decisions were jointly made. Nearly all criticisms 
of this kind, though relatively rare, were directed against Roger Carter - principal during the first 
nine months of my fieldwork - who was claimed to have an autocratic and charismatic streak in 
spite of his enthusiastic public support for democratic principles.
In addition to the provision of a caring and consistent environment which was 
conceived as curative in itself, the staff at St. Nicholas’ implemented two more specific forms of 
therapy: that of group work and counselling. The interpretation of these terms and their 
practical execution varied between the different units and individual practitioners although 
certain key assumptions were shared in common. All agreed, for instance, that the establishment 
of a trusting relationship between the boys and members of staff was the prerequisite of any
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more sophisticated form of intervention, and that without this fundamental bond very little 
progress could be realized. But quite how this relationship was employed varied.
In terms of their general orientation, members of staff would often invoke “group 
dynamics’* to account for the boys’ behaviour. In this sense it was a routine part of their 
repertoire of theories through which appearances were invested with a sense of significance. 
More specifically group meetings were held daily in each unit. The shared objective was to 
facilitate communication, encourage the boys’ participation in decision-making, and to make 
them accountable to the group as a whole. The extent to which deeper psychological meaning 
was accorded group processes did vary between units, with the staff of units 3 and 4 tending to 
offer a more elaborate appraisal than those of units 1 and 2.
Individual counselling, as the other most prevalent form of therapeutic intervention, 
was usually conducted between the boy and his special worker. Some staff set aside regular 
counselling sessions with their clients. The majority were more inclined to use particular 
incidents as opportunities to explore the child’s psychological motivation. Counselling was not 
confined to the boy and his special worker. In practice any social worker at any time may have 
used a particular incident as an occasion for therapeutic intervention. However, the level of 
specialized knowledge brought to the performance of this task varied. But even in its more 
sophisticated guise, the work conducted was not comparable to strictly psycho-therapeutic or 
analytic work, but more akin to counselling in which the role of evaluation is given freer reign.
A general distinction could be drawn between the members of staff who defined their 
task in terms of “basic care” and “reality training” most keenly advocated by staff in unit 1, and 
those who defined their purpose in more broadly therapeutic terms. The “basic care” lobby saw 
the most important task as the provision of care and consistency, and the erection of firm, though 
not rigid disciplinary boundaries. Aligned to this was the belief that the staff should respond to 
the boys’ deviant behaviour in a way which was more “realistic” by the criteria of wider society. 
This perspective is clearly articulated by Jim Taylor, a social worker in unit 1.
Jim: I think the main quality that you need to ta - to be realistic (1) and not accept
something if it - although you have to make - certain allowances (.5) uhm - 
that you wouldn’t accept in the street. Uh (1) I think it makes this job 
extremely difficult that we’ve got this sort of (1.5) uh (1) the whole emphasis
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of social work has changed - and we tend to get (1) people who are coming 
in for (.5) varieties of reasons. . .  to help the - poor little children perhaps -
Kim: Uhm.
Jim: and they’re putting up with a hell of a lot just because they’re poor little
children in care - it doesn’t help the kids - doesn’t help us - makes the job (.5) 
very difficult.
While a “realistic” response did not extend to the administration of physical correction, 
other more traditional modes of punishment, such as fining and “gating”, were approved by 
advocates of this approach.
A slightly more disciplinarian mode of management emerged during Peter Scott’s 
principalship, partly as an attempt to control the more extreme client group he had admitted in 
order to increase St. Nicholas’ numbers, and relatedly to enhance the institution’s public image 
amongst powerful groups. As Peter said to the senior staff meeting with regard to a group of 
visiting magistrates due that evening, if they left feeling the way Peter wanted them to, it would 
make their task at St. Nicholas’ a lot easier. He continues:
Peter: That doesn’t mean I wanna Mas them - course I wanna Mas them (a few
sniggers). What I wanna do is set the record straight - becus - they’ve gotta 
view of us which is actually uh - an unreal one. They tlnnk this is a right 
shit-’ole and the kids can do what the ’ell they like - and all the rest of it. The 
first thing I’m gonna get into is the points system (.5) and punishments. They 
love all that - I’ve handled magistrates before. But I’d be very grateful if 
Graham Mellor could be kept within fifty yards of this room.
The majority of practitioners however, throughout my observation of St. Nicholas’, 
adopted a more therapeutically infused approach. While this group also recognized the need for 
“basic care” and the observance of certain “boundaries”, they claimed that effective social work 
with disturbed adolescents of the type referred to St. Nicholas’ required more the suspension of 
certain common sense criteria as their embrace. In the words of Mike Griffith, a senior social 
worker firom unit 4:
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Mike: I think really sort of in general terms - 1 think you need to (2) in some cases
shu (.5) shut yourself off from (2) normal (.5) uhm (2) as-as uhm - kind of 
expressed outside (.5) normal uhm (.5) types of behaviour and to be able to 
actually put up with (.5) what would seem to be (.5) uhm - extraordinary (.5) 
goings on (.5) outside (.5) for an outsider.
Kim: {Uhm.
{
Mike: (For instance if an outsider came past S t Nicholas’ and walked in for a day
- and saw some of the behaviour which was - which had gone on (.5) and was 
allowed to go on (.5) and saw some of the kind of (.5) interaction between 
(.5) a social worker and - one of the client group - uh a layman might think
- ‘Veil - you know - what the hell’s going on at St. Nicholas’ - becus they’re 
allow - they’re allowed to more or less do as they please”.
From this ideal-typical perspective the more reality orientated response to the boys’ 
past deviance had been palpably ineffective. What the residents needed was not a dose of 
reality, but a more tolerant and understanding response which would help them talk through and 
identify the emotional disturbance which underlay their behaviour.
Differences in emphasis such as these did exist without challenging the institutional 
culture. For, underlying real differences in working practice was a body of assumptions shared 
sufficiently amongst the staff to create a sense of coherence. For instance, despite pockets of 
scepticism about a more thoroughgoingly therapeutic approach, a generic mode of psychological 
interpretation was employed across the institution; a predisposition to which the empirical 
material bears ample witness.
iv) Education at St. Nicholas’
The education department at St. Nicholas’ was situated on the premises and operated 
upon similar principles to those employed throughout the home. A comparable emphasis was 
placed upon the need for an informal classroom atmosphere in which the boys could develop a 
close relationship with the teacher; a process considered necessary to restimulate their educational 
appetite. Nearly all of the boys who entered St. Nicholas’ had been defined as educational
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failures, and this sense of inadequacy was seen by the teachers to have infiltrated their self image. 
Because of this the boys were seen to have lost all interest in learning, and the teachers 
considered their primary aim was, in the words of the St. Nicholas’ brochure:
"to create an environment which is conducive to the attainment of success.
This involves an alternative strategy to education. By conventional criteria 
most of the boys at St. Nicholas’ are educational failures, yet it is our belief 
that their potential lies outside this conventional boundary. Therefore the 
aim would be to devise a method of measuring and assessing what is 
meaningful to boys and where their potential lies. In one sense this may be 
seen as engineering an artificial success, but we believe their talents and 
potential is real albeit different to normal standards of educational success.
We further believe that for the development of the whole person it is 
essential to experience success (an experience sadly missing in their lives) in 
order to have a realization of self worth which is an essential ingredient for 
life. Therefore, any educational success we can engineer for a boy, through 
legitimate means, has a spin off effect on his whole life.”
The fundamental need to “manufacture success” was amplified by the head of 
education, Kate Lambert, in a document she wrote in 1981 for one of the regular six monthly 
“support group” meetings. These involved the three principal officers at St. Nicholas’ and 
personnel from the local authority Social Services Department and Regional Planning Committee. 
Newly appointed to her post, Kate’s report articulates the basis of her approach.
“The large majority of our boys arrive with us categorized as “low stream”. 
They are totally disenchanted with education, where they have been caught 
in the 'slip stream’ of failure.
They come to us with little or no self-respect and see themselves as persons 
of little worth.
Our first job as educators is to allow them to experience success often 
manoeuvring situations so that the boy cannot fail to achieve success. 
Herein in my opinion, lies the true professionalism of teachers, manoeuvring 
these situations with no feelings of condescension and contrivance.
The boys when seeing themselves through our eyes must see themselves as 
being worthy of respect. I believe it is not possible to respect others until one 
sees oneself as respect worthy.”
To help cultivate a sense of interest and success the teachers at St. Nicholas’ 
developed a more practically orientated educational programme than that characteristic of the
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mainstream, without reverting to the trade training reminiscent of the approved school. The 
“basics” lessons were comprised of “english and maths for everyday life”, subjects which 
required the application of academic knowledge and skills to “real life” situations. To quote 
once more from St. Nicholas’ brochure.
“In place of the rather abstract knowledge and learning processes which 
characterize mainstream education, we have devised a system of assessment 
and examination which has potential to yield success. This is managed by 
offering a series of subjects which are meaningful within the social context 
of the boys’ own lives. . .  We offer practical and social skills to which the 
boys can relate in their own lives. For instance, in our basics lessons, the 
english is geared towards achieving success in everyday communication and 
cultivating acceptable boundaries of expression.”
The high ratio of teachers to pupils, a maximum of 1:6 in “basics” lessons, allowed for 
the individual attention considered necessary to make such a pedagogic philosophy productive. 
Within the context of each lesson the boy was encouraged to follow his individual programme 
of work, while also participating in occasional group activities and collaborative projects. 
Lessons only very rarely consisted of the “chalk and talk” characteristic of conventional 
education. Typically, the teacher would attend each pupil individually, concentrating upon 
developing the skills required for the educational programme in hand. This modus operandi was 
adopted not only by the “basics” teachers, but also the arts and crafts teacher and, to a slightly 
lesser extent the woodwork and building studies teachers. Other subjects, such as P.E. and 
drama tended, by their nature, to be more collective enterprizes.
By working within an educational framework specifically devised for them, the boys 
were encouraged to measure success in terms of personal rather than externally imposed goals. 
Each child was thus able to work at a pace acceptable to him, and befitting his capacities. Such 
individual treatment was considered necessary because, in the words of the brochure:
“Intellectually boys here represent a spectrum that ranges from heavily 
remedial to exceptionally able but under-achieving.”
The different types of child were not segregated since streaming was seen to exacerbate the kind 
of distinction between success and failure which had marred their previous school experience.
Although the curriculum was not exam dominated, C.S.E., G.C.E. and City and Guilds
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courses were available for those boys with the motivation and skills to embark on such a syllabus. 
Choice of candidates was based upon a criterion of self-selection; no child was compelled to 
undertake an examination course, though they could be encouraged to do so if they were 
considered suitable material. It was a matter of some pride to the teachers that they were able 
to combine an individually orientated mode of education with the provision of examination 
syllabi, and to realize such a high success rate amongst the boys who entered for examinations.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to furnish the reader with an historical and 
institutional context within which to consider the forthcoming empirical material. In particular 
I attempted to show how a therapeutically informed and welfare orientated approach can be 
traced through a series of responses to juvenile deviants. Such socio-historical processes set the 
broad agenda which is "translated into practical actions” [Dingwall et al (1983) - p 20] by the 
practitioners within any given institution. In the second half of this chapter 1 attempted to gloss 
the working philosophies which informed staff practice at St.Nicholas’. Throughout the 
remaining chapters I subject certain of these practices to detailed empirical scrutiny to elicit how 
they constructed an environment of normal appearances. I start with a consideration of 
therapeutic reasoning itself which, like all other institutional practices, is treated as a practical 
accomplishment.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THERAPEUTIC REASONING
Introduction
A most striking feature of institutional life at St. Nicholas ' was the amount of time and 
interest devoted to the retrospective scrutiny and analysis of the boys’ behaviour. In going about 
their daily business members of staff not only worked with and talked to the boys, but also 
regularly talked about them to one another. [See also B. Rawlings (1980) and M. Nijsmans 
(1987)]. My purpose in this chapter is to explore the empirical intricacies of the therapeutic 
mode of reasoning typically employed in this pursuit. Therapeutic sense making, and the 
psychological facts to which it gives rise, are treated as an active “on-going accomplishment” 
[H. Garfinkel (1967) - p vii] which is brought to life when practitioners engage with a body of 
knowledge and procedures to interpret the meaning of events.
Therapeutic reasoning does not reside in an abstract and reified code of principles. 
For this reason I do not offer a description, much less a definition of the therapeutic in advance, 
since its nuances emerge most authentically through the analysis of naturally occurring talk and 
text. The reader is therefore asked to suspend the question of what is meant by therapeutic 
reasoning in favour of a detailed examination of how it operates upon events to produce 
meaning.
Therapeutic talk is at once familiar and strange; a tension which I consider to be a 
productive one for methodological purposes. All institutions within a given culture have a sense 
of familiarity about them because their practitioners draw very largely from the wider cultural 
reservoir of common sense knowledge. Since the discursive practices through which meaningful 
therapeutic sense is made are so deeply embedded in common sense it requires an anthropological 
effort to bring them to visibility. The analyst must partially suspend acquaintanceship with 
cultural objects and processes in order to expose the methods through which they are accomplished. 
What is needed to elicit such details is a kind of willing suspension of one’s normal orientation 
to the world, and moral judgement of it; a methodological stance which can only ever be partial 
since the analyst can never wholly abandon her cultural equipment, and neither would this be 
desirable if it were possible.
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The challenge to a reflexively inclined ethnographer is to cultivate a sense of the 
strange amid the familiar practices bequeathed to institutions by dint of their cultural heritage. 
But there is also something irreducibly in excess of the most widely shared common sense 
denominator which lends the institution its peculiarity. The relative specificity of institutional 
practices is as important a methodological feature as its generality. For, just as engagement with 
the anthropologically alien may alert us to what is underneath our noses by “displacing that 
dulling sense of familiarity with which the mysteriousness of our own ability to relate perceptively 
to one another is concealed from us” [C. Geertz (1975) - p. 14], so, too, the exploration of more 
specialist forms of knowledge can serve to sharpen our perception of the mundane. Therapeutic 
reasoning, as I said in Chapter 1, can usefully be understood as an exaggeration and adaptation 
of the practices indigenous to everyday life. Because it plays on and dramatizes an array of 
cultural practices, it lends them a visibility which they typically lack.
The documentary method of interpretation is a procedure which the therapeutic most 
hungrily feeds upon and thus fruitfully exposes to scrutiny. It is responsible for sewing the 
particular to the general, and surface appearance to an underlying reality. Therapeutic 
interpretations, like all others, incorporate behaviour within a framework of typified knowledge 
about social and psychological structures. When subjected to the therapeutic gaze, deviant 
behaviour is construed as the surface manifestation, or symptom of the child’s emotional 
disturbance. Practitioners thus have an epistemological warrant and a moral compulsion to dig 
beneath the surface in pursuit of an explanatory key. In this process the problem child is 
transformed into a child with problems which are held responsible for his deviant motivation.
What lends a particular emphasis to the therapeutic use of documentary procedures 
is the routinely figurative relationship which it sets up between the item of appearance, and the 
cognitive pattern to which it is assimilated. By stressing the coexistence of levels, enshrined in 
dichotomies such as surface-depth, and conscious-unconscious, therapeutic reasoning invites a 
symbolic play between “presenting” behaviour as it is often called, and the emotional reality 
which purportedly underlies it. Theft, for example, may either be seen metaphorically to 
represent the child’s need to compensate for historical deprivation, or ironically to express his 
need for love or acceptance by provoking rejection. The “same” type of behaviour assumes a 
different significance relative to the emotional context in which it is situated.
The duality of levels to which therapeutic reasoning so dramatically alludes are not
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separate entities, one inside the other outside discourse, language, and the process of social 
reasoning; the one factual the other mental or cognitive. Surface and depth are brought into 
alignment, literal or figurative, in the process of articulation. This sense of duality exists within 
all modes of reasoning from the most esoteric to the most mundane; a fact to which the ubiquity 
of the documentary method bears witness. By prioritizing the figurative play between levels, 
however, therapeutic reasoning casts a perspective on this generic process by exaggeration.
Before embarking upon an analysis of the data certain preliminary issues should be 
addressed. Firstly, it would clearly be absurd to suggest that the staff at St. Nicholas’ were 
responsible for creating therapeutic discourse. Rather, it is a generic mode of reasoning which 
has gradually infiltrated many spheres of social life. Yet it is only through the skilled application 
of therapeutic knowledge to a complex web of empical circumstances that it is brought to life. 
It is with this articulation of the therapeutic within the institutional context that I am primarily 
concerned.
Secondly, the kind of therapeutic reasoning engaged in by members of staff at 
St. Nicholas’ was more diluted and diffuse than it would be in an exclusively therapeutic arena, 
or in institutions which attempt to create a holistically therapeutic environment, such as the 
therapeutic community. Although the trained social workers would have had an acquaintanceship 
with psychological and therapeutic theories and methods, few of the staff had more advanced 
therapeutic expertise. The culture of S t Nicholas’ did nonetheless display a powerful therapeutic 
strain which staff by dint of their membership in the institutional community imbibed on an 
ad hoc basis.
Thirdly, although a therapeutic mode of reasoning was often employed to interpret 
events, it did not exhaust the repertoire of sense making methods routinely employed by staff at 
St. Nicholas’. No one form of knowledge enjoys absolute privilege within institutional life or 
occupational discourse; there is always a degree of pluralism which gives rise to relative 
complimentarity or strain. For instance, the tendency to criminalize or normalize the boys’ 
behaviour coexisted with the more pervasive tendency to pathologize it, as I consider in the next 
chapter. The committment amongst the staff to a therapeutic mode of theorization was 
chequered. While only two were explicitly critical about its ideological and methodological 
assumptions, a handful of others expressed their wariness of promiscuous therapeutic theorizing, 
and the dangers of untutored interventions.
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In spite of this pluralism, institutional practices were neither anarchic or random. 
Systematic tendencies did exist in the methods through which staff made sense of their 
environment, and in so doing made that same environment “visibly-rational-and-reportable- 
for-all-practical-purposes. Le., “accountable,” as organizations of commonplace everyday activities” 
[H. Garfinkel (1967) - p. vii]. Interpretation of the boys’ behaviour, and the therapeutic sense 
so often produced by it, was not a sacred and ritualized practice, segregated from the routines 
of institutional life. On the contrary such practices were an integral part of those “commonplace 
everyday activities” and were in this respect truly mundane. So much so that interpretative 
activity of this kind was accommodated within the bureaucratic structure of St. Nicholas’.
In formal reports, ad hoc unit notes, regular meetings and informal chats, the 
therapeutic mode could be drawn upon at any time to invest appearance with a deeper symbolic 
significance. While the most fertile field of therapeutic theorization was in relation to the boys 
and their behaviour, it had the power and versatility to convert even the most prosaic of 
organizational concerns. Any topic, from the provision of food, to the organization of 
jumble-sales, to the most banal managerial issue, could become infused with therapeutic 
significance. Since all events are assumed to be emotionally meaningful from a therapeutic 
perspective, nothing in principle exceeds the boundaries of therapeutic perusal, and nothing is 
exempt from its transformative potential.
I have exercised my analytical prerogative and authorial power in focusing upon 
therapeutic interpretations concerning the boys’ and their deviant behaviour. In so doing I have 
sieved and purified elements of institutional life, according some a priority to the exclusion of 
others. Selectivity is a fundamental feature of all forms of sociological analysis, (however 
naturalistic their tone), which must necessarily prioritize elements of the research environment 
if they are to provide a sharp enough focus. The irony ofthegenre of discourse analysis employed 
here is that the closer one remains faithful to the linguistic details of naturally occurring 
institutional accounts, the less material one can consider, and the more discretionary one’s 
choice. I have responded to these temporal and spacial limitations by highlighting a particular 
object of therapeutic reasoning. This emphasis upon interpretations of the boys’ behaviour also 
reflects the primary therapeutic preoccupation of the practitioners at St. Nicholas’.
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A) The Problem Child as Child With Problems
A distinctive feature of the therapeutic orientation to deviance is bound up with how 
practitioners define the object of their interpretation, in this case the delinquent adolescent boy. 
Therapeutic discourse transforms the child whose behaviour is publicly defined as problematic 
into a child with emotional problems. The collapse of the depraved and deprived, the deviant 
and disturbed into one coterminous category was the result of a series of historical developments 
in the way young offenders were defined; a process which I briefly considered in chapter 2. The 
unification of categories could only be accomplished by treating the behaviour as in itself an 
insufficient guide to the child’s motivation.
Although therapeutic discourse shares a substantive and procedural resemblance 
with the medical model and other “psy” professions [in Donzelot’s terminology -1980], it cannot 
be unproblematically yoked to them, as sociologically informed critics have sometimes tended 
to. Unlike psychiatry, for example, which is directly influenced by medicine, practitioners of the 
therapeutic reject the theory of innatism. From the ideal-typical therapeutic perspective 
deviance is conceived not as the manifestation of its perpetrators neuro-chemical malfunctioning, 
but an expression of the emotional problems engendered by his upbringing. Roger Carter, 
principal of St Nicholas’ for most of my fieldwork, distinguishes between a psychiatric and a 
therapeutic approach to Junior Knight’s deviant behaviour in the forthcoming piece. It is drawn 
from an informal discussion between Roger, Kate Lambert and a group of magistrates who were 
visiting St. Nicholas’.
1 [Roger describes the violence which Junior directs towards staff and boys at
St. Nicholas’.]
Mag 1: In that particular instance perhaps there was a mental (.5) element that
ought to be looked into if it’s very severe violent behaviour?
5 (2)
Roger: I-I’m not sure becus I think that if one looks at background -
Mag 1: Uhm.
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Roger: ahm - and you look at it and -and-and-and-and say - well you know - hell - 1
mean - you-you know - what would you expect if you - if-if - this has gone 
10 through. And-and - you still try to - to work at it. I mean when Idds have gone
through - uhm - so much disruption in their earlier life - and uhm (.5) a hell 
of a lot in my view of deprivation (.5) and such like - in many cases. And 
deprivation is a-a (.5) the simple word called love anyway.
Mag 1: Uhm.
15 Roger: Uh - when kids are deprived of that (.5) ah - and a number of our kids ^  -
then - then I think - you know - we’ve got problems that we ought to look at. 
And (.5) and that doesn’t mean there’s a psychiatric problem (.5) I don’t 
18 think. (2) Am I right?
Roger refutes the validity of a psychiatric version of Juniour’s deviance as a “mental 
(.5) element” (line 3) originating within him. The seeds of his violent behaviour are planted in 
his “background”, the disrupted and deprived nature of which gives rise to the expectation of 
trouble, (“what would you expect” - line 9). Juniour’s behaviour is at once distanced from 
criminal intent, or mental pathology, and situated in the realm of emotional problems which 
“ought to (be) look(ed) at” (line 16).
Influenced as they were by the predominantly therapeutic tone of institutional 
discourse and their occupational culture, the staff at St. Nicholas’ were predisposed toward 
typifying the residents in terms of their emotional problems. As nearly all the boys who were 
placed at St. Nicholas’ had broken the law, albeit usually for minor offences, the emphasis laid 
upon their psychological disturbance revealed the pathologizing tendency of the staff.
The conflation of the disturbing and the disturbed was partially accomplished through 
the discourse of symptomology which promotes the search beneath appearance. This archeological 
method is apparent in the Government publication Care and Treatment in a Planned Environment 
(1970) which reported on the community homes project instigated by the 1969 Children and 
Young Persons Act. From paragraph 1:
1 “The new legal framework should enable greater weight to be given in
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decîding what treatment a child needs, to the background and causal factors 
underlying his behaviour, although it must stUl be recognized that presenting 
symptoms in the form of difficult or anti-social behaviour should also 
receive attention in the treatment situation.
While the “presenting symptoms” (lines 3-4) could not be ignored, the priority task 
bestowed upon the community home was to investigate and deal with the “background and 
causal factors underlying his behaviour” (lines 2-3). A similar prioritization of “the underlying” 
was apparent amongst the staff at St. Nicholas’. Consider an extract from my interview with 
Roger Carter:
1 Roger: At the same time - 1 c ^  say to you - quite honestly (.5) I could not tell you
(1) uh (.5) what delinquent acts if any have been performed by the kids in 
St. Nicholas’. (1) And I think that again (1) reinforces my view - that 
delinquency is a symptom of something else.
5 Kim: Right - it’s - it’s relatively unimportant.
Roger: It’s an off thing of something else. Uh - (.5) I cannot tell you - 1 cannot tell
you truly - what offences Leon Piyce has committed -
Kim: Uhm.
Roger: uh - Samuel Nailer before he came here. (1) Damian Tanner - before he
10 came here - if he did - 1 dunno -
Kim: Mmm.
Roger: commit offences. (1) But I could tell you (.5) about all three of those boys’
families - and their background.
14 Kim: Right.
The status of the boys’ criminal history is explicitly relegated to a secondary position
u s ­
as the “symptom of something else” (line 4) in both Roger’s account above and that of David 
Walsh, social worker in unit 4, below.
Kim: I notice that you don’t cite delinquency as uh - a common (.5) problem.
(2.5)
David: Well - 1 mean I think delinquency goes in tow (1) with some of the other
things. But I mean-
Kim: Yer.
David: in general - the-the - that’s the way they fit. I mean (.5) yes -1 mean obviously
(1) delinquency is (3) uhm - is there quite a lot of the time - but I - a lot of 
it seems to be secondary (.5) to (.5) some (.5) either emotional (2) stage - you 
know . . .  I think that (1.5) that the damage - uh - a certain amount of 
damage has occurred and then (.5) through that - delinquency may occur.
Kim: Right.
David: But I don’t think you become a thief first - and then become emotionally
deprived later.
[David Walsh’s interview]
The allocation of causal precedence is apparent in David’s account, in which the boys’ 
deviance is seen to flow from their emotional deprivation, and expressly not vice versa. The 
priority is both logical and chronological; a therapeutic insight echoed by Mike Griffith, senior 
social worker in unit 4, who identifies deviance as the symptom of family pathology.
1 [Mike speaks of how some “kids” are brought up in criminal sub-cultures, 
and quoting Matza, how others drift in and out of crime. But, he maintains:]
Mike: Uhm (1.5) there are also other kids i-in St. Nicholas’. . .  who (2) the kind of
(1) the - the - the petty thieving is a sign - kind of symptom of some (.5) 
deeper (.5) disturbance if you like - in them and that their disturbance very
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often is within the family. (1.5) And I think it’s (.5) the (1.5) their (.5) 
attempts at coping with some (2) kind of. . .  pathology in the family and it’s 
their way of - of actually coping - coping with that. . .  with (.5) the majority 
of kids we have. . .  there is an underlying (.5) uhm (.5) family (.5) pathology 
10 - whether the kid’s scapegoated for that -
Kim: Right.
Mike: and that’s part of the reason - that you’ve gotta look - for the reason for
ending up at St. Nicholas’ as part of the - of - uhm (1) wider sort of (.5) uh
14 pressures within the family.
[Mike Griffith’s interview]
Petty delinquency in the “majority of kids we have” (line 8-9), is conceived as the 
manifestation of “deeper (.5) disturbance” (line 5) or “pathology” (line 7) which Mike locates 
within the family domain.
The preceding extracts reveal how the staff at St. Nicholas’ tended to characterize the 
boy group as a whole. While such typifications were part of the ghost framework of assumptions 
which members tacitly brought to their interpretation of any particular case, they were rarely 
articulated in so many words. Indeed, all but one of the accounts above were elicited by an 
interview question, and the one that wasn’t, by a question from a visiting magistrate. It tended 
to be on those rare and usually segregated occasions when such principled questions were asked, 
that such general and abstract answers were given. That this is so does not negate the validity 
of the researcher asking such questions in the course of ethnographic enquiry as long as they are 
treated as supplementary to the infinitely more revealing and intricate arena of naturally 
occurring discourse.
The ramifications of therapeutic reasoning are most fruitfully gleaned from an 
analysis of particular interpretations; for it is here that the generalizing framework must engage 
with and accommodate a unique and complex configuration of contextual details. This 
particularizing knowledge derived in part from the practitioners’ direct contact with the child 
during his residence at St. Nicholas’, and in part from the documented record, or case file which 
preceded his entry. The boy arrived pre-packaged: processed details of his historical and
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emotional disturbance inscribed in a dense file of reports. For, once the problem child had been 
identified by the relevant authorities, his past and present, his unconscious and conscious 
motivation, became public property to be placed “on record”. This process reached a crescendo 
during the period of residential assessment which the deviant child underwent after being placed 
in care. Since the assessment centres tended toward a pathologizing bent, the histories or 
portraits constructed by their multi-disciplinaiy team were also, typically, therapeutic in tone.
The reports which composed the boy’s case file did not determine the sense that staff 
at St. Nicholas’ made of him and his behaviour in a simple sense. Indeed, many staff quoted 
incidents of divergence between the written characterization of a child, and their face to face 
experience of him. Still more expressed cynicism about the methodological validity of the 
psychiatric and psychological reports often based upon one interview and, in the latter case, the 
administration of psychological tests. Many such critics accorded greater credence to the 
“house” reports based upon more sustained everyday contact with the child. In this respect 
members would often employ the kind of methodological criteria a sociologist would to assess 
the validity of an account. In spite of the discretionary stance adopted toward the reports they 
did have the potential to influence present perceptions by providing a typifying pattern to which 
the boy’s contemporary behaviour could be assimilated.
The therapeutic approach pairs a distinctive style of interpretation to a symmetrical 
mode of intervention. It is an action philosophy, the point being not only to interpret behaviour 
but to change it. This pragmatic axis of the therapeutic is clearly articulated below in an extract 
from my interview with Agnes Turner who specialized in teaching social and practical skills.
Agnes: Oh yer - I-I - it’s quite clear - 1 see it very strongly as the kids that we’ve got 
- that aren’t coping for x number of reasons (.5) uhm - that’s the (.5) it’s the 
symptom of the cause (.5) I see that quite clearly. The difficulty -is in (.5) 
it’s one thing for instance - for - a group of people to identify the possible 
cause. (1) But it’s another thing to actually work with the kid (.5) for him to 
be able to (.5) sort of understand the causation and ^ tually (.5) manage as 
well as the growing up process in - sort of overcoming that and working - so 
that he can cope with it outside when he leaves.
Kim: Right - so it’s a sort of translation -
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Agnes: Yer.
Kim: the workers interpretation into action.
Agnes: I think the difficulty is that (1) you know - it’s-it’s - it’s not (.5) not enough
to actually identify the cause (.5) and then literally contain the kids - uhm - 
you know in the unit and - through the processes of St. Nicholas’. I think - 
you know - the important factor is not not only in recognizing it but in 
actually working -
Kim: Right
Agnes: you know - for the kid to actually gear himself to understanding what - you
know - what actually has happened how best to adjust or adapt.
[Agnes Turner’s interview]
An emotional reality, like the economic one in Marxist theory, is believed to underlie 
the frequently deceptive vicissitudes of appearance, and must be defined and worked through 
if fundamental change is to occur. Without the capacity to identify and deal with the precipitating 
emotions, the presenting behaviour remains unchecked.
Mike: I mean often - if you (3) unless you actually (.5) uhm (2) deal with the
underlying (.5) problem - then-then - your efforts to deal with the presenting 
(.5) uhm - problems - are gonna be wasted (1) O.K.?
[Mike Griffith’s interview]
In the extract below, from Roger Carter’s interview, the therapeutic definition is 
married to a commensurate mode of therapeutic intervention.
[I ask Roger if he thinks the boys that come into St. Nicholas’ choose to be 
delinquent?]
Roger: No - I-I don’t believe the boys in St. Nicholas’ (2) or the majority of boys in 
any setting such as a C.H.E. etcetera - freely choose to be delinquent. If they
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did - if I felt that (.5) I don’t think I’d be in the work (1) actually (.5) becus 
I think that (.5) uh - 1 don’t think that I (.5) uh - am in this work (.5) uhm (1) 
to convince kids that it pays not to be delinquent. If I were in that I think I’d 
probably be - if I were in that game - 1 think I’d probably be (1) a prison 
officer... Whereas I just happen to believe - and I believe very strongly (.5) 
actually - that delinquency is only a symptom (1) with the kids that we have
- of a number of other factors.
Kim: Right.
Roger: So most - to me the most important is the things that I’ve described earlier
- is that the - the kids are deprived (.5) and they have lacked love - they have 
lacked identity - all those things. I think they’re the things a-and what a kid 
is in effect doing is - is actually in many cases - being delinquent - saying “look 
at me who I - look who I am”. And that’s the only way - often (.5) that a kid 
can actually achieve some i - sense of identification. And so - uh - 1 see my 
prime task (.5) as uhm - removing the causes - or helping to remove the 
causes which have caused that kid to be delinquent.
Kim: Right.
Roger: So to me (.5) uhm (.5) I do not believe that many kids uh - certainly not in
St. Nicholas’ . . .  want to be delinquent.
Kim: Uhm.
Roger: But I think if you - 1 mean my own experience has told - me this - 1 think
there’s no doubt about it - that-that if you actually work hard (.5) at making 
(.5) uh - the kid's life secure and safe and and uh - a base from which to (.5) 
to uh - function from you actually then remove the need for delinquency -
Kim: Right.
Roger: becus a kid says - “I know who I am -1 don’t need to be delinquent”. I mean
120 -
who the hell - uh - you know - wants “screws” to tell you what to do all the 
time?
Kim: Uhm.
Roger: They don’t.
I quote at such length because this extract captures many of the background assumptions 
discussed throughout this section. But what I want to draw attention to within the present 
context is the symmetrical relationship between the identified cause of the problem and the 
proffered solution. Roger interprets the boys’ delinquent bent in symbolic terms, as the quest 
for an identity to compensate for the historical deprivation of one. If the lack of a sense of self 
and security is the emotional cause of deviant acting-out the provision of an environment 
conducive to the cultivation of these qualities provides the logical basis for its eradication.
The catalyst for change is seen to lie in the child’s awakened insight into the emotional 
problems which generate his delinquency; an assumption articulated below.
Roger: I think there are (1)1 think after a kid’s been here for a while they certainly
are aware that - uh - delinquency is a symptom of som - of something else - 
mainly becus - we I hope - spend our time looking at a kid’s difficulties - their 
problems - etcetera - that surround them. And suddenly they realise (.5) whv 
they’re acting-out this way. If we’re doing our job properly. . .  then I think 
that there is no doubt that the kids (1) uh - began - begin to see that (1) “gosh 
- this is why I am behaving this way”.
[Roger Carter’s interview]
Since the therapeutic interpretations which staff at St. Nicholas’ made were very often 
about the boys’ deviant behaviour they also exposed another play of levels. By contravening 
cultural conceptions of the normal, deviant behaviour provokes a reaction which brings their 
parameters into sharp relief. Conceptions of the normal and deviant are mutually elaborative: 
one cannot identify one without the other. Any particular account of deviance draws upon a 
ghost network of typified assumptions about the normal, right and proper. These assumptions 
are absent presences: they are not explicitly articulated, but without them there would be no
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rules “whose infraction constitutes deviance” [H. Becker (1963) - p.9]. Thus, whenever staff 
spoke of derived childhoods, or damaged personalities, or immaturityj or abnormal relationships, 
such characterizations always already presupposed a corpus of assumptions about normal 
childhoods, personalities, behaviour and relationships. 1 use the term ghost framework as 
explored in Chapter 1, because it well describes the way in which the typifying accoutrements of 
the normal inhabit accounts of deviance. Institutions like St. Nicholas’, whose purpose it was to 
process deviance, provide a lush setting in which to explore the diversity of ways in which the 
normal and deviant reciprocally articulate each other.
B) Therapeutic Figuration
i) Metaphorical Messages 1: Actions Speak Louder Than Words 
The Language of Appearance
From a therapeutic perspective the boy’s behaviour is conceived as a meaningful 
expression of his state of mind. It is my contention that this relationship which practitioners 
routinely forged between the behavioural surface and the motivating depth can fruitfully be 
understood in figurative terms. The boy’s actions were thus assumed to speak louder than 
words; to convey a symbolic message which skilled therapeutic decoders may “crack”. The 
relationship constructed between appearance and its underlying meaning may be metaphorical 
or ironical; based upon a resonance between the boy’s emotions and his actions, or a dissonance.
The figurative stance adopted in any particular case was based upon the practitioner’s 
assessment of a wealth of contextual details. These included her knowledge of the boy’s history 
and character (who), an evaluation of his motivation (why), a consideration of the timing of 
events (when) and of the immediate circumstances (what). Some of the criteria of selection will 
emerge in the empirical analysis throughout this chapter and the next. But I start by emphasising 
the basic symbolic qualities of therapeutic reasoning.
The first group of simple metaphorical formulations provide a foundation upon which 
an appreciation of more complex figurative arrangements may be built. In the preliminary 
extracts the state of a boy’s physical appearance or his bedroom is treated as a metaphorical
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manifestation of his state of mind. Consider the following piece from a T.M.
1 [Nicola Hobbs, one of the “basics” teachers, speaks of how Steve Butler has
been looking dirty and scruffy lately.]
Jason: Don't you think that’s a general sort of pattern though with (.5) boys when
they first come in - wouldn’t say boo to a goose and dress - reasonably - and 
5 get up on time. Once they’ve been here a little while longer - they tend to
get a grip of the situation and they ah -
Nicola: I dunno -
Brian: Doesn’t say much {for us does it.
{
Nicola: {I always - 1 always think that the (.5) when personal
10 hygiene goes - it’s because they’re feeling a bit low.
Jason: Oh I - that-that’s probably {part of it.
{
Nicola: {They push boundaries without - you know - but
they still keep themselves quite neat - you know David Lyons - for example 
. . .  and Andy (.5) you know - they push the boundaries like mad - but they 
15 do keep themselves clean.
Nicola recognizes in the boys’ physical deterioration and lapse in “personal hygiene” 
(lines 9-10), a kind of symbolic surplus-value; something in excess of the “general sort of 
pattern” (line 3) of boundary pushing suggested by Jason. Such changes in the boys’ appearance 
are then transformed into metaphorical statements about their emotional state, “because 
they’re feeling a bit low” (line 10). In the next account by contrast, Thomas McKinney, manager 
of unit 4, explores the symbolic significance of Steve Butler’s improved appearance.
1 Thomas: I mean (.5) he most definitely - well he has in fact made tremendous strides
- yer? I mean he’s he-he-he’s a much fidier looking lad in his head - if you 
know - yer? He’s presenting himself as a (.5) quite a smart young man - on
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ya hands there - yer? Whereas before like he was (.5) head down - bum- 
5 bum-bum - yer? And - kind of spots that he had on his face - they’re kinda
gone - and all-all of a sudden - Steven (.5) Butler actually started liking 
Steven Butler. And what we were having was that - a-a new Steven Butler 
- yer? And (.5) somehow - yes - 1 mean he was definitely questioning 
authority - but I mean that’s what it’s about really (.5) yer? But he also kind 
10 of was viewing - the world in a slightly different vein.
[Steve Butler’s CC]
The “tremendous strides” and inner tidiness are metaphorically represented by 
Steve’s improved physical stature. The smartness and even the disappearance of his spots are 
linked to his new found self esteem: “all of a sudden Steven Butler actually started liking Steve 
Butler” (lines 6-7). It is interesting how Steve’s questioning of authority is interpreted, not as 
the anomalous symptom of a more retrogressive element, but as yet another indication of his 
progress: “What it’s about really” (line 9). This interpretation illustrates the figurative fluidity 
between behaviour and what it represents. Even ostensibly negative behaviour may be 
construed as a symbolic representation of something positive. As D.C. Muecke says of irony:
“We must conclude therefore that what is ‘appearance’ and what is ‘reality’ 
in irony are no more than what the ironist or ironic observer take them to be, 
from which it follows that irony itself is not invulnerable to further irony 
from a new vantage point.”
[D.C. Muecke (1982) - p.31]
The state of the boy’s room is also accorded metaphorical potency in Roger Carter’s 
account extracted from a S.S.M.
1 Roger: Uhm - I-I’m concerned I mean I went into a boy’s bedroom today and I’m-
I’m - really and truthfully to me it was quite disgusting (.5) uhm - the state of 
this boy’s bedroom (.5) and I-I’m - afraid we’re talking about basic care - and 
I’m just - wondering if anyone actually is really taking any notice of me - or 
5 if I’m really wasting my time or (.5) whatever. Or if people cannot accept my
(2) my own (.5) view - and that is that if kids’ rooms are in a hell of a state (1) 
then (.5) we aren’t actually helping them (2) with their own thinking about 
things. I-I-I believe that your room reflects what you feel and I-I believe that
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- we as adults have some responsibility to tidy up - or help tidy up that room 
10 (1) but to help a kid - take care of his room. . .  we’ve all seen it - I’m telling
my grandmother to suck eggs - when a kid is blowing around and everything 
else - his room is in a mess. When he’s feeling not too bad his room is (.5) 
13 quite neat and tidy.
Roger’s account clearly articulates the metaphorical relationship between the state of 
a boy’s room, and his feelings about himself. What is more, the symbolic connection between the 
two is assimilated to the shared body of social work knowledge: something which "we’ve all 
seen” (line 10). Roger uses a lapse in this basic therapeutic wisdom as an occasion on which to 
teach his grandmother to suck eggs, and to rehearse the metaphorical theme.
The following excerpt from Simon Wells’ C.C. demonstrates some of the subtleties of 
the metaphorical mode of interpretation.
1 [Philip Hooper, manager of unit 3, speaks of how Simon is colluding with
other boys in the unit to “play games” and defeat the staff group. Philip says 
how ultimately only the boys will lose from this attitude.]
Philip: . . .  because you’ve had a fair crack of rollickings lately haven’t you. And I
5 think that -1 haven’t been in your room - but I don’t think your room’s as tidy
as it normally is - is it?
Simon: Yes it is.
Philip: It is as tidy as it normally is. Well that’s interesting to hear that because -
often if one is not feeling too good - your room is affected by that. There - 
10 there was a comment - your appearance has changed I think ah - Alan was
saying that uhm -
Jan: But if I can pick you up on the room. Last week - you were so angry with
things you were going to go upstairs and smash the entire room up - weren’t 
you. I mean you didn’t - you didn’t do anything. But you were so angry that’s 
15 what you were going to do.
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In the preceding extract Philip employs his knowledge of the typical link between the 
child’s room and his psychological state to furnish a presumptive orientation to Simon Wells’ 
behaviour. Judging from his present state of mind Philip would assume a concomitant 
deterioration in the state of his room. Philip’s hypothesis displays how one can move as easily 
from the problem to the symptom (or the literal to the symbolic) as vice versa. The line of 
documentary reasoning bobs and weaves between the two.
Simon’s negative response to Philip’s question shows how a diallenge to the interpretative 
efficacy of a piece of institutional knowledge does not threaten its viability. Instead, “secondary 
elaborations of belief ’ [as Evans-Pritchard (1937) calls them] are employed to repair the strain. 
Thus, Simon’s deviation from the norm is categorized as an interesting exception to a rule which 
is thereby sustained. What’s more Philip’s reference to the “comment” about a change in the 
boy’s appearance supplements the cogency of his interpretation about Simon “not feeling too 
good” (line 9), albeit “interestingly” not manifest in the state of his room.
Jan’s contribution on lines 12-15 helps elaborate the metaphorical relationship 
between the boy’s room and his emotions, not by recognizing Simon’s case as an interesting 
exception but by drawing upon recent events which appear to confirm the rule. Thus, Simon’s 
recent threat to “smash (his) entire room” (line 13) though not carried out, is assimilated to the 
typified pattern which is reinforced thereby.
The Family as a Medium of Symbolic Exchange
Actions are accorded a symbolic significance which speaks louder than words in the 
following accounts which convert the family into a medium of symbolic exchange. In Leon 
Pryce’s psychiatric assessment report for instance his deviant glue-sniffing is conceived as an 
attempted solution to the propensities of his adoptive family, the M’s.
1 “I feel that Leon’s problems originate in the family. His parents and
adopted siblings ooze adiievanent but the end results appear to be regimented: 
As if the “M ” parents have successfully manipulated a whole series of 
difficult children into becoming paradigms of artistic sensitivity. Leon 
5 appears to have resisted this process and to be asserting his independence.”
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Soon after
**l believe that Leon took to glue sniffing as a means of standing up to the 
family’s control. By inducing insanity he was able to challenge them on 
unreasonable grounds - he would never stand a chance while employing 
logic. The sniffing gave him courage for rebellion and took him to a position 
10 where it was not possible to reason him out of it. It is notable that the sniffing
was a hidden pursuit although its results were only too obvious.
At (his first placement) Leon felt very rejected by his parents and his flight 
into self-injurious behaviour appears to have been directed at his adoptive 
father’s Achilles Heel - the threat of suicide. From the information available 
15 both gestures appear to have been attention seeking acts, without serious
suicidal intent.”
[Dr. P: consultant forensic psychiatrist.]
We are immediately instructed where to find the locus of Leon’s original problem, in 
his adopted family, the “M’s”. This early part of the assessment (lines 1-5) gives an inkling of the 
primary procedures through which the account is authorized. The legitimacy of the version 
pivots upon the effectiveness with which the “M” parents are discredited and, simultaneously, 
Leon’s deviation from family expectations credited. For instance, the success of Leon’s adopted 
siblings (as indeed his own biological sister) is submerged in the rhetoric of force: the hot house 
fruits of manipulation and regimentation. Their success is dressed as a wound that oozes 
achievement (line 2). In this context Leon’s refusal to be “manipulated” into a “paradigm of 
artistic sensitivity” smacks not of temerity but of courage, not inability but independence.
Leon’s glue-sniffing thus assumes the status of resistance, articulated in a metaphorical 
language with which he can challenge the Logic and Rationality represented by his parents. This 
explanatory schema extends to the suicide attempts described in lines 12-16 which are conceived 
as the documentary symbols not of Leon’s wish to die, but to seek the attention of his parents 
by whom he felt rejected. We are instructed, I suggest, to read Leon’s “flight into self-injurious 
behaviour” as strategically motivated. It is directed at his adoptive father’s “Achilles Heel”, a 
phrase which suggests a design, conscious or otherwise, to resist and to injure the family in whose 
contact, “Leon’s problems originate” (line 1).
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Thomas McKinney invests two recent incidents during Chris Jones’ visits home with 
deeper metaphorical significance in the forthcoming extract.
1 Thomas: I think it’s quite important actually that uhm (2.5) two incidents that ah -
occurred in your house - yer (1.5) one - where if you like - young Chris - you 
feel he’s actually trying too hard. You say - slow down - get someone else to 
do that. I think Chris you see - in his own way - is actually telling you 
5 something very loud there. But he’ll tell you in his own way in his own time
like - and so on and so forth (.5) ‘eus I don’t want to start breaking the 
confidences of the child I work with - O.K? He is telling you something now 
- that’s all. The other thing was that when there was a kind of incident (.5) 
of some kind of law-breaking in the house - yer - he almost took it on board 
10 himself - that he was almost feeling guilty about it.
Mrs.J: Yes.
Thomas: Guilty by his actions or whatever - yer?
Mrs.J: I think he was feeling guilty because he was there.
Thomas: For whatever reasons. What I’m saving is there’s still that part of him - that
15 is amazingly unsure - yer - in relation to what’s happening inside in the in the
space of his house (.5) yer? And sometimes if we act - and if we’re unsure 
17 we almost sort of feel guilt anyway - because we’re unsure.
[Peter Jones’ C.C.]
Thomas treats both events cited above as split manifestations of the same underlying 
emotion: namely, insecurity “in relation to what’s happening inside in the space of his house” 
(lines 15-16). Both Chris’ tendency to try too hard, and his misplaced guilt at the theft from an 
electricity meter in his home, are transformed into symbolic messages which are “actually telling 
you something very loud there” (lines 4-5) but which “he’ll tell you in his own way in his own time 
like” (lines 5-6) because, presumably, he cannot say it in so many words.
Both of the forthcoming extracts allude to the symbolic exchange value of presents
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within the family context. They are drawn from discussions about Simon Wells and his family in 
a unit 3 staff meeting.
1 [Jan Morris, Simon’s special worker, speaks of how Simon had said that he
didn’t want to go home at Christmas because he did not get a birthday 
present from his family, and there were suggestions that there would not be 
money around at Christmas.]
5 Jan: And he’s feeling - feeling - that the message is that he’s not going to get a
Christmas present either. And he’s saying “I’m not going home (.5) for 
Christmas if they are not going to buy me a present”. But I mean really I 
think he’s saying - “I’m not going home for Christmas if they care that little 
about me”. And - and - 1 can see exactly what he’s talking about. . .  But I 
10 mean - the whole thing is so rejecting - 1 mean - O K. - you can be short of
money - but you can buy your kid - a little - something that they feel you’ve 
remembered - and you’ve bought them a present. And I mean - 1 think it 
would completely destroy him - to go home for Christmas and find out that 
no-one had bought him a Christmas present. And he’s probably frightened 
15 of that. And I think - it’s surprising that we haven’t had more hassle in the
last week or so - because I think he’s (2) he’s getting a lot of rejection from 
17 home.
Within the symbolic currency into which the behaviour of the Wells family is converted, 
the exchange of presents is invested with a potent metaphorical value. Notice how Jan gives 
voice to what Simon is really saying, although again he does not say so in so many words. His 
refusal to go home is borne of the sense that his parents care so little for him; a message 
metaphorically documented by the absence of gifts. Jan thus invests Simon with the interpretative 
skills to penetrate the apparent and retrieve the underlying message inscribed in family actions. 
However, while Simon is allocated the power to read between the lines, it is Jan who has written 
the script. Having defined what Simon’s refusal to go home really means, she lends authority to 
his perception: “I can see exactly what he’s talking about” (line 9) and, “the whole thing is so 
rejecting ... you can be short of money but you can buy your kid - a little - something” 
(lines 10-11). Through this mode of authorization blame is allocated to Simon’s parents, and his 
response is rendered appropriate, under the circumstances. Indeed, Jan is surprised that they
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“haven’t had more hassle” from Simon given the rejection he has suffered from home (lines 15-17).
Jan goes on in the same meeting to raise the possibility of asking Simon’s F.S.W. to 
arrange financial assistance for the Wells family over Christmas, as she felt it would be “sad” for 
Simon to be stuck at St. Nicholas’.
1 Duncan; Yer - but I mean - that’s not really the point is it. I mean - eh - you’re not
really saying it’s the money are you.
Jan: I don’t think it is but I mean -
Philip: It’s the {thoughtlessness behind it.
{
5 Duncan: {So I mean -
Jan: Perhaps - if Simon goes home and his parents are a bit - cold towards him -
but he asks for something and they say “yer - O.K. ” - and give him a fiver to 
go out and buy a jumper or something - he can come back and say “Look my 
mum got me that” which he has done - “my mum bought me this sweat-shirt” 
10 - and he can feel good about it - even if they haven’t given him a lot of sort
of warmth in other ways. And - you know - that’s part of why he used to steal 
so very much. Uhm - giving himself presents maybe - 1 don’t know! But I 
mean - he always has pilfered - and here is the first time he has conquered 
that - to a very large extent. Uhm (4) and p’raps the presents and the goodies 
15 make up for some coldness - somewhere along the way - and they’re not
coming now because there isn’t the spare cash around.
In this extract Jan accords the same symbolic significance to material objects whether 
presented as gifts or purloined. In Simon’s case both are construed as a form of compensation 
for lack of warmth in the family. Just as a fiver from his mum this Christmas may give him 
something to “feel good about” (line 10) so too was this seen to nourish his motivation to pilfer 
in the past: giving himself presents to compensate for a lack of familial affection. Through this 
chain of practical theorizing Jan reasserts the importance of financial assistance for the Wells
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family over Christmas, to convert into “goodies” to “make up for some coldness - somewhere 
along the way” (line 15).
Keith Fletcher's commission of a delinquent act is accorded a complex symbolic 
rationale in relation to his family in the next piece. The account is extracted from a meeting 
between the boy’s F.S.W., Roger Carter and Kate Lambert. Keith was a day boy at St. Nicholas’ 
and in residence at a local childrens’ home.
[The F.S.W. speaks of how a fostering placement was being considered for 
Keith at a recent C.C., when his mother suggested he return home to live. 
This amazed them all:]
F.S.W: Becus he had assumed up until that meeting that there was no way (.5) that
he was going home. Well we assumed - ‘eus the offence had also happened 
suddenly that week too - that was (.5) two days or a day (.5) ah - before the 
meeting - we had assumed that he’d committed the offence deliberately at 
that time - so that he could then rationalize a rejection from family onto the 
offence. Becus one of the conditions (.5) from family about him going home 
has always been “keep out of trouble with the police - and go to school”. 
And that’s all they expect of him. They don’t expect anything else from him.
The temporal location of Keith’s offence (of Taking and Driving Away) provides a 
clue to its symbolic significance. His behaviour is divested of his literal meaning, stripped of its 
immediate circumstances, and placed within the context of Keith’s psychological motivation. 
From this perspective his behaviour is interpreted as a symbolic strategy to rationalize the 
rejection he assumed he would suffer from his mother. It should be remembered, of course, that 
Keith himself did not proffer this therapeutic version of events; his actions are inscribed with a 
communicative power in excess of what can be articulated in so many words.
ii) Metaphorical Messages 2: The Case of Displacement
In the figurative manoeuvres characteristic of therapeutic reasoning the subject’s 
actions are constructed as a surface upon which symbolic messages are inscribed. Through the 
process of practical therapeutic theorizing practitioners forge a metaphorical link between the
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boy’s behaviour and the emotions it purportedly represents. The following group of extracts 
display a recurrent mode of metaphorical interpretation whereby the child’s deviant motivation 
is understood as the manifestation of feelings which originate elsewhere. A translocation of 
emotions is involved which invites a metaphorical plzy between the behaviour and its psychological 
origins. The here and now is thus interpreted as a displacement of the feelings which derive from 
then and there.
In the first extract the incidence of delinquency outside of the home is treated as a 
metaphorical displacement of rejection within it. The piece is extracted from the written report 
by an educational psychologist at a child guidance clinic, and refers to Keith Fletcher, one of St. 
Nicholas’ day boys.
1 “It seems to me an extremely rejecting home background and personal
relationships are the key to Keith’s school difficulties. In the short time he 
was (at his secondary school) he appeared to invite fights with his peer group 
and was involved on the edge of crime with other boys and men. He appears 
5 to be “acting out” his anger at the rejection of his family in delinquent acts.”
We are encouraged from the outset to recognize Keith’s “school difficulties” as the 
metaphorical manifestation of his extreme rejection at home, since in this, we are told, lies the 
“key” (lines 1-2). Although the nature of Keith’s “school difficulties” is not yet revealed, the use 
of this phrase has ramifications which structure our perception of his behaviour. It helps frame 
a preliminary definition of the child as having difficulties with the school, rather than they with 
him, and thus carries some of the exonerating coimotations characteristic of the therapeutic 
mode.
The therapeutic predisposition set up in lines 1-2 helps alleviate the figurative tension 
between the emotional cause of Keith’s behaviour and his deviant response. Following a 
description of his aggressively and marginally criminal behaviour (lines 2-5), the piece culminates 
with a therapeutic interpretation of its significance. Through his delinquency Keith is seen to 
“act-out” the anger induced by the familial rejection of which we have already heard.
The symbolic conversion of rejection into delinquency, and the translocation of events 
originating in the home to the school, is discursively realized through the mediating force of
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anger. The persuasiveness of this manoeuvre relies upon the cultural co-participation of writer 
and readers (mimesis (1) in Ricoeur’s terms - see pages 252-254) through which Keith’s anger 
can be meaningfully linked to his rejection. That other emotions such as sadness or withdrawal 
may equally be induced 1^ rejection does not undomine the propriety of an^r as an understandable 
response.
What is purportedly being acted-out in the previous extract is a generalized sense of 
rejection engendered by the events of Keith’s family background. Chris Jones’ compulsion to 
act-out, by contrast, is linked to a specific historical trauma in the following piece extracted from 
his psychiatric assessment report.
1 “I have seen Chris twice, who talked quite readily about the facts, but
divorced all feeling from himself. . .
Chris hardly knows his father who left when Chris was two, and who has only 
seen him three times since. His father sends money and birthday cards to his 
5 sisters but never him. When I asked himwhat he felt about that, his reply was
“nothing, it is not worth bothering about”. He denied missing his dad, saying 
that he had never had one to compare with what it would be like to have 
one.”
Shortly afterwards:
“Chris is not at all in touch with his angry feelings towards his dad or his 
10 siblings but acts them out when he becomes violent at home. His complete
denial about having any conflict within himself would make any 
12 psycho-therapeutic work with him almost impossible.”
In this extract, as in the last, the child’s violence is seen as the metaphorical expression 
of anger home of rejection. The meaningful association between the earlier events and Chris’ 
reaction to them relies upon the reader drawing upon her background assumptions about what 
it must be like to be left by one’s father at the age of two, and to be ignored thereafter. The 
identification of anger as a typical and understandable response provides the requisite cognitive 
conditions for the linkup between a nodal point in Chris’ past and his propensities in the present.
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The symbolic conversion of one thing into another is thus managed by recourse to a shared body 
of typified emotional assumptions.
It is notable that Chris* acknowledgement of the motives which purportedly underlie 
his violence is not a necessary part of establishing their existence. The account draws upon the 
theory of denial; a central plank of therapeutic reasoning. We are told how Chris “denied 
missing his dad” (line 6), how he is “not at all in touch with his angry feelings towards his dad or 
his siblings” (lines 9-10), and about his “complete denial about having any conflict within 
himself” (lines 10-11). Many assumptions are concurrently presupposed in arriving at this 
interpretation. To say Chris denies and is not in touch with his feelings is to prejudge their 
existence. Just as the boy himself may be out of touch with the feelings which motivate him, 
authorized others may be the better judge of them. Indeed it is precisely Chris* dissociation from 
his earlier feelings which is held accountable for their metaphorical emergence in the present. 
Like holding down a buoy, the emotions periodically erupt with uncontrollable force. The ironic 
connotations of denial are considered on pages 161-173 below.
The metaphorical displacement of anger toward mother on to women in general 
informs the next extract from the psychological assessment of Paul Black.
1 “Paul says he is fond of his mother, but most females are talked about as old
slags or tarts. Paul flnds his mother’s grief over the death of Julie as 
something he cannot stand, probably because his mother’s grief diminishes 
his own grief and guilt, and also his need for love and approval is lost because 
5 his mother is preoccupied with her own depressive feelings and needs.
Paul’s anger against females in general was freely expressed in (a previous
placement), and in the extent to which he stirred up trouble with his foster 
8 parents.”
Although the metaphorical link is not overtly bonded, the logic of juxtaposition is 
such, I suggest, as to convey the sense of a connection. The necessary tension which figurative 
discourse spawns emerges in lines 1-2. While Paulfuyj he is fond of his mother, he is derogatory 
about most other females. Quite a lot of the discursive work is made to hang on the word 
says (line 1) which is juxtaposed to the narrator’s version of what he actually does. Since the 
therapeutic practitioner tends to be invested with an epistemological superiority in defining the
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client’s feelings, the psychologist’s version is not open to evaluation in quite the same way, 
although it is by no means beyond the reach of question.
Within the first sentence, however, the implied anomaly is not sufficient to negate a 
literal interpretation. It is possible that Paul’s fondness for his mother does not extend to other 
females; a split for which good psychological reasons could, no doubt, be found. The reasoning 
contained on lines 2-8 renders such an interpretation more problematic. Paul’s fondness for a 
mother whose grief at the death of heryoungest daughter he cannot stand, strains more seriously 
upon the leash of literal credibility. While the two factors are not in themselves wholly 
anomalous, the discursive emphasis on my reading is upon the creation of a disjuncture which 
yields to symbolic interpretation. The diminution of Paul’s own grief and guilt, together with the 
deprivation of love which is assumed to flow from his mother’s preoccupation with her own grief, 
gives rise to the anger which Paul purportedly displaces onto women in general and his foster 
parents in particular.
It was part of therapeutically informed institutional wisdom that the boys may transfer 
the feelings they had toward their parents on to other adults in their lives. This encouraged a 
symbolic orientation to the boys’ contemporary relationships with members of staff which were 
often identified as the enactment of earlier psychological patterns. Such metaphorical transference 
of feeling is apparent in each of the forthcoming extracts. In the first, John Townsend, head of 
social work during the early months of my fieldwork, notes his preliminary response to Paul 
Black’s referral papers.
"He appears to be transferring a lot to male and female staff from his 
parents, and the splitting of the foster parents is classic.”
Or again:
[Roger Carter speaks of how Leon Pryce has a love-hate relationship with 
his long-term foster mother - Mrs. M.]
Roger: And I think that is why - people like Mavis - suffer so much (1) from him here 
(.5) because he had this relationship - he identified - he identifies Mavis in 
particular (1) with Mrs. M.
[P.O.’s Meeting]
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Finally,
[Agnes Turner, in her interview, speaks of her contact with a new day-boy 
- Mathew Walters.]
Agnes: But - yer - you see his parents - 1 mean (1.5) it’s this transference thing - 1
mean I’ve only got to sound in anyway like (.5) mum and dad (.5) and he-he’s 
just up - up in the air.
In these cases, as in many others, the nature and pattern of the boy’s contact with 
members of staff is treated as a metaphorical representation of his relationship with his parents. 
By dint of assumed resemblance - the keystone of metaphor - the historical and emotional 
“reality” which is assumed to underlie appearance can be read off from the symbolic patterns 
inscribed on the surface. Hence, in the following account, Ted Vincent’s separate assaults upon 
two black social workers at St. Nicholas’ are treated as the symbolic displacement of the 
violent feelings he really has toward his father. This interpretation was proffered by Lawrence 
Mansfield, Ted’s special worker from unit 2, following the boy’s juvenile court appearance for 
the second offence of assault. As the conversation was informal, and off the premises of St. 
Nicholas’, I was unable to tape record. The account is based upon notes made immediately 
afterwards.
“Lawrence said that it was interesting how Ted (himself a West Indian boy) 
had assaulted two black, male social workers at St. Nicholas’, and that some 
of the staff in unit 2 considered that this might be an unconscious assault 
upon his father. Ted couldn’t acknowledge aggressive feelings toward his 
father, Lawrence said, and probably felt guilty about them. Black social 
workers acted as ready substitutes for his anger.”
Ted’s violent assaults, perpetrated against two members of social worker staff, are 
seen to bear the symbolic mark of Ted’s anger toward his father. The colour of his victims 
provides a clue in formulating this interpretation, since it suggests the bond of resemblance, in 
this case blackness, necessary for a metaphorical association to gel. It is Ted’s denial of anger, 
induced by his feelings of guilt, in which lay the key to his displacement onto members of staff.
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In a further mode of metaphorical displacement the child’s orientation to others is 
understood as a projection of his negative feelings toward himself. In each of the forthcoming 
extracts the child’s difficult behaviour is treated as a metaphorical projection of his lack of self­
esteem. As with any symbolic manoeuvre, this involves the recontextualization of events within 
an underlying pattern which denudes them of their ostensive meaning. Thus, in her written 
comments about Simon Wells’ referral papers, Kate Lambert interprets his lying, manipulating 
and sly behaviour not as a manifestation of his self-interestedness, deviousness or immorality, 
but as a metaphor of his depleted sense of self-worth.
"In my opinion this lad sees himself of little worth and sees no wrong in doing 
unworthy acts - lying, manipulating, behaving in a "sly” underhand way. I 
believe he badly needs many successful experiences where he can receive 
the attention he so badly needs for the right reasons.”
If the emotional problems derive from lack of self-worth, then the therapeutic 
solution resides in its enhancement. Kate amplifies the need, so often espoused at St. Nicholas’, 
to engineer successful experiences for a child such as Simon so that he may gain the positive 
attention whose absence is assumed to be partially responsible for generating the original 
problem.
A negative self-image is similarly seen to underlie Andy Fisher’s behaviour in Roger 
Carter’s account below,
Roger: You’re denying actually - it goes back to what Kate says - and we go back
again to what Kate says because.. .  I think it’s so important-until Andy sees 
himself as worthy (1.5) of respect - she said - he will fail to respect others. 
And you actually are not respecting the group. I mean she’s spot on again 
here - until you see yourself - ahm as-as ahm - you know - somebody who’s 
got something to contribute - it aint gonna work.
[Extract from Andy’s CC]
Andy's external behaviour to others is treated as a metaphorical deflection of his 
internal state of mind. Similarly, below, the connotations of Leon’s conduct are transformed into 
a metaphotical expression of his diminished self-image. The extract is drawn from a P.O’s
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meeting in which Kate Lambert discusses Leon’s recent behaviour in education.
1 Kate: I watched him Friday - and he went up to one person (.5) just making
provocative remarks to annoy - and one - when - he succeeded in annoying 
that one - he moved to the next one.
Roger: Uhm.
5 Kate: He walked up to Brian Potter and said - “Ow - why are you so W and ugly
- you’re fat”. And (.5) in the end Brian got annoyed - and then he was quite 
satisfied and went into Ruth and said - "you call this a basics lesson - what you 
supposed to be doing” - you know and uh -
Roger: Uhm.
10 Kate: Uhm.
Roger: It’s very sad he - his (.5) he’s got such an extremely low identification and
picture of himself hasn’t he. He - his-his opinion of himself is so low.
Kate: Yer - so he’s got to {prove this all the time
{
Roger: (He’s totally worthless and so he has to go and do these
15 things all the time.
Leon’s provocation and insults are a testament not to his bloody-mindedness, cheek, 
or cruelty, as they may appear, but to his “extremely low identification” and “picture of himself” 
(lines 11-12) to which the appropriate response is sadness rather than blame or punishment. A 
literal sense of Leon’s motivation is thus displaced in pursuit of a metaphorical appreciation of 
its significance. Only by liberating events from the bondage of literal interpretation does their 
symbolic potential emerge; a discursive opening-up which is characteristic of therapeutic
reasoning. In this process the boy’s perceptions and behaviour are relegated to a relatively
insignificant position vis a vis the emotional reality which spawns them.
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iii) Attention Seeldnp and Testing-Out: From Metaphor to Irony
In this categoiy of extracts deviant behaviour is construed as a metaphorical expression 
of the child’s pursuit of attention. The need to be noticed is classically associated with the child’s 
historical lack of attention for which his present behaviour is an attempted compensation. At 
a certain point in this genre of interpretation the metaphorical shades into the ironical; for acts 
of deviance are not only seen in terms of the bid for attention, albeit of a negative kind, but also 
borne of the compulsion to ''test-out” the boundaries of love or acceptance by acting in such a 
way as to challenge them. The boys at S t Nicholas were often seen to be involved in engineering 
their own rejection. The discursive manoeuvre necessary to restore meaning to such an 
interpretation is ironical; behavioural appearance turns the emotional reality on its head.
In the forthcoming material I explore both metaphorical resonance and ironical 
dissonance. Let us start, however, with a consideration of accounts which have a metaphorical 
tone. In the first group, the child’s self-injurious behaviour is interpreted as a desire to win the 
attention and affection of his parents. It thus stands as a metaphorical symbol of the child’s need 
to be loved. In the first piece Frank Mercer, manager of unit 1, offers a richly detailed synopsis 
of Damian Tanner’s motivational rationale.
1 Frank: Yer (1.5) uh we’ll take Damian Tanner. Now (.5) when Damian was first
admitted to St. Nicholas’ (1.5) I saw him as (1) being an extremely (1) on 
paper (2) disturbed boy. Now (1) he was - prior to coming into care he was 
- in - Charing Cross hospital with (.5) rheumatic fever. (2) And the hospital 
5 - his behaviour was so diabolical - in that hospital (1.5) uhm (1) refusing all
kinds of medication - even though if he didn’t take it (.5) there was a 
possibility he may snuff it and die (1) uh that the hospital actually saw fit to 
actually write (.5) a report about it (.5) of their concern for him. (2) Now 
(2) I read that and I studied that (1) and I looked for other factors (.5) within 
10 the assessments that could tie in with that. Now one thing that I tied in with
was the fact that it was a shot in the dark (1.5) that (.5) mum has two sons 
younger than Damian - one of eleven - one of eight. The eight year old is 
mentally handicapped (2) takes a hell of a lot of mum’s time. He’s - now in 
school - but when Damian was younger he would have been a constant 
15 twenty-four hour supervision programme. Damian’s dad was working at
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that time - he’s now retired. And I thought - now then (.5) if Damian was 
willing to make himself really ill - he would get the attention from mum (1) 
that the mentally handicapped child was getting. So I took a gamble and put 
that to *im. I just said - “IVe got a theory about the way you behaved in 
20 hospital”. And he said, “oh what’s that?” I said “I just think that you were
just being bloody-minded - and when they told you - that you might become 
severely ill or (even) might have died - that you - said uh (2) ‘Phew! I can 
get a lot of attention off of mum then’.” And he admitted to a certain extent 
that was true. (2.5) Now whether he was having me on or not - or whether 
25 he wasn’t I don’t know. But because he admitted to a certain extent it was
true - it opened up a lot of avenues for further discussion on that.
[Frank Mercer’s interview]
Frank details the historical detective work he does to elicit the causal origins of 
Damian’s “extremely (1) on paper (2) disturbed” behaviour (lines 2-3), and his discovery of an 
item which provides an emotional rationale. The intensity of supervision required by the birth 
of Damian’s mentally handicapped brother would have diverted his mother’s attention away 
from him. Frank’s train of practical reasoning is given a voice in lines 16-18: “And I thought - 
now then (.5) if Damian was willing to make himself really ill - he would get the attention from 
his mum (1) that the mentally handicapped child was getting”.
The investigative search occurs along the two intersecting matrices: through the 
chapters of biographical time and through the strata of consciousness. My present concern is 
with how Damian’s “diabolical” behaviour in hospital, in particular his life-threatening refusal 
to take medication, is extracted from its literal connotations, and invested with metaphorical 
significance as a psychological strategy designed to wrestle attention away from Damian’s 
handicapped and demanding brother.
Frank’s interpretation of Damian’s motivation is not wholly pathologizing. His 
apparently disturbed behaviour is accorded an element of normality, at least in terms of the 
internal rationality of Damian’s actions. Note in lines 1-3 that Frank speaks of how, “when 
Damian was first admitted to St. Nicholas’ (1.5) I saw him as (1) being an extremely (1) on paper 
(2) disturbed boy”. Two items combine to encourage a marginalization of Frank’s tentative 
interpretation. The first serves to relegate Frank’s own perception of Damian’s disturbance to
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an initial one confined to “when Damian was first admitted”. It also serves to suggest a future 
modification in Frank’s interpretation which followed in the wake of his initial impression. This 
itself feeds into a wider cultural presumption that initial impressions can be faulty and subject 
to later alteration.
The second item which marginalizes Frank’s initial impression of Damian’s disturbance 
draws upon a distinction which was often made between the theoretical assessment of a child 
contained in his case file, and the impressions that staff formulated about him through the course 
of face to face contact Indeed, it was an integral feature of institutional wisdom that the 
assessment of a child may distort his “real” character. In this instance, Frank’s adjudication of 
the Damian inscribed in the referral papers is later subverted by his reappraisal of the child and 
his bloody-minded pursuit of attention.
Keith Fletcher’s apparently self-injurious bent is given similarly metaphorical treatment 
in the following extract from a meeting between Roger Carter, Kate Lambert and Keith’s F.S.W.
1 Kate: Here the other day he told you he wishes he was dead didn’t he.
F.S.W: Yes.
Kate: When we were interviewing him whether he should come here or not - he
said he wishes he was dead (1.5) and ah - 1 found that interesting.
5 (1.5)
Roger: Did he really say that?
Kate: Mmm.
F.S.W: I don’t see him (.5) I don’t see him as a suicidal lad in that sense... that’s why
- 1 mean I don’t take it as a serious threat.
10 Kate: Oh no no nor - {nor-nor-nor do I.
{
F.S.W: {Or actually - or actually as a deeply depressive sort of
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character either.
Kate: He does get deeply depressed sometimes though doesn’t he.
F.S.W: He does.
15 Kate: Very deeply.
F.S.W: He does - but I wonder whether that’s more of his mood - because he can be 
totally high (.5) and elated about (.5) something - and then - very quickly - 
he-can-he-can-he-can drop down. You know - more of a mood swing than 
actually -
20 Kate: Typical sort of manic behaviour.
F.S.W: Uhm - but you see he uhm - again at (the assessment centre) I don’t know
whether it’s mentioned at all in the assessments (.5) uhm (1) he’s had - he’s 
played about with glue-sniffing - someone introduced him to glue-sniffing 
there.
25 Roger: Huh hum.
F.S.W: He’s also - which I which I - 1 tend to feel is a bad sign (.5) in terms of how
he feels about himself - to-to-to-to go into that. Uh - and also - he had a go 
with aspirins - he took - he took a load of tablets (.5) uh - the same day - as 
we were having a family meeting in the - in the evening. So it may well have
30 just been - a (?hint?) to the family. Uhm - so he’s had a go at those sort of
(.5) self (1) mutilating (.5) types of things. Uh - but Fve-I’ve always locked 
onto them not as actually wanting to harm himself - but more to do with - 
“What do I have to do (.5) folks before you - say you love and care about 
me?”
35 Kate: Huh hum.
-142
F.S.W.: Uh - so that he did them - and then rang home (.5) to his older sister - saying 
“ya not to say a word” knowing well she’d blab everything -
Kate: {Yer.
{
F.S.W: {as soon as mum got home.
40 Kate: Mmm.
F.S.W: So that when mum arrived at (the meeting) “What ‘ave you done to
42 yourself? What’s ‘appened” (.5) you know - which-which - he enjoyed.
The F.S.W. works hard in lines 1-20 to extricate Keith Fletcher’s proclaimed wish to 
be dead and apparent periods of depression from a roundly pathologizing interpretation. She 
defines him as neither a suicidal or a deeply depressed character, but one responsive to extreme 
mood swings. The motif articulated by Kate carries with it more pathologizing connotations. 
She finds his proclaimed wish to be dead “interesting” and recognizes “he does get very 
depressed sometimes” (line 13). This segment on lines 1-20 furnishes a preliminary orientation 
to the attention-seeking interpretations to come on lines 21-42.
However, for the moment it is interesting to note how the two versions proffered by 
the F.S.W. and Kate mutually accommodate each other and thus diminish the risk of a “reality 
disjuncture” [M. Pollner -1975] with all the morally disruptive ramifications which flow from it. 
Firstly the F.S.W. s denial that Keith is a suicidal lad is corroborated by Kate in line 10 (“Oh no 
no - nor. . .  do I”). Lines 11-15 generate a distinction between depressive characters on the one 
hand, and characters who get deeply depressed on the other, thus creating the opportunity for 
cognitive compromise. What signals Kate’s acceptance of the distinction (and hence alerts the 
F.S.W. to her willingness to compromise) is her use of the term “though” on line 13: “he does 
get deeply depressed sometimes thou^ doesn’t he”. Its inclusion means that Kate’s characterization 
can be encompassed within the F.S.W.’s: Keith is not deeply depressive (F.S.W. - line 11), 
though he does sometimes get very depressed (Kate, line 13). The term “sometimes” supplements 
the sense of Keith’s depression being a feature of his character rather than being definitive of 
it; a conception reinforced by the F.S.W. s pairing of Keith’s periods of depression to equally
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extreme periods of elation which suggests the propriety of a manic rather than a wholly 
depressive characterization.
The F.S.W. goes on to describe Keith’s involvement in two forms of behaviour which 
she describes as "self-mutilating" (line 31). Both his glue-snifhng and his consumption of a "load 
of tablets” (line 28) are conceived as a "bad sign” (line 26), and the manifestation of what Keith 
"feels about himself’ (line 27). However, her account goes on to distance Keith’s underlying 
motive from a more literal interpretation of its meaning; she sees it not as actually wanting to 
harm himself (line 32). Having dismissed the ostensive, Keith’s self-injurious behaviour returns 
as a symbolic call for love which he feels is unattainable through less radical means: "What do 
I have to do folks before you - say you love me and care about me” (lines 33-34). What’s more 
his "go with aspirins” (lines 27-28) is invested with a strategic rationality both in terms of when 
it occurred (the same day as a family meeting), and Keith’s notification of his sister immediately 
afterwards ("knowing full well she’d blab everything” - line 37), which negates a wholly 
pathological or suicidal motive. Of course, Keith’s need to resort to such behaviour to gain 
attention could be enveloped within another more pathologizing layer of theorization. I read 
this account, however, as an attempt to establish a rationality and consciousness at the kernel of 
Keith’s behaviour which undermines an exclusive definition of its depressive or suicidal status. 
What’s more his gesture is apparently gratified: he gained the concerned attention of his mother 
which, we are told, "he enjoyed” (line 42).
Leon Pryce’s self-injurious behaviour culminating in a "suicide attempt” is also 
interpreted as a metaphorical gesture in the three snippets presented below. To summarize, 
Leon was initially placed in a residential unit in an East London assessment centre while a 
long-term placement was sought. During his stay there Leon became involved in glue-sniffing, 
and made a number of suicide threats while under the influence of glue. This culminated in Leon 
hanging himself from a light fitting, and being cut down in a semi-conscious state by members of 
staff. Soon after this incident Leon was removed to the secure unit in an assessment centre close 
to St. Nicholas’ where a series of assessment reports were compiled. The three forthcoming 
extracts are drawn from this compendium, the first from his psychiatric assessment report.
1 A) "At (the previous placement) Leon felt rejected by his parents and his flight
into self-injurious behaviour appears to have been directed at his adoptive 
father’s Achilles Heel - the threat of suicide. From the information available
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both gestures appear to have been attention-seeking acts, without serious 
5 suicidal intent.”
Or, in the words of a social worker at the assessment centre.
1 B) "It is not clear whether Leon’s suicide attempts were genuine attempts to
kill himself or not, but there is some evidence to suggest that Leon may have 
been using these gestures as a way of getting through to his step-father, a 
consultant psychiatrist ‘If I act mad and attempt suicide, perhaps he will take 
5 more notice of me’.”
Finally, from the educational psychologist’s report.
1 C) “That there may have been other motives involved in his suicide attempts is
suggested by the report that he had pointed out to his foster father during 
a visit to the secure unit, that he was making a “coffin”. This was actually a
4 small box he was making for the craft room I believe.”
In each of the three extracts the author posits an explanation of Leon’s suicidal
behaviour which departs from the literal. With different degrees of tentativeness each
recognizes in Leon’s self-injury a symbolically encoded message to his adoptive father - Dr. M.
In extract A the metaphorical significance of Leon’s behaviour is more confidently 
asserted, though not unqualified. An interpretative frame is erected to which proceeding events 
may be assimilated. The conjunctive “and” following the identification of Leon’s sense of 
rejection by his parents (line 1) suggests a causal connection between the feelings and the 
self-injurious behaviour. This association does not in itself denude Leon’s actions of their literal 
implication. His sense of rejection may - for argument’s sake - have driven him to a suicide 
attempt. The interpretation inscribed on lines 1-3, however, militates against such a reading. 
That Leon’s threat of suicide was directed against his adoptive father’s weakness suggests a 
planfulness which strains away from the sense of suicidal despair. Lines 3-5 embody a specific 
rejection of the literal interpretation. Leon’s suicidal gestures were (at least “from the 
information available” - line 3) without serious suicidal intent. What fills the semantic vacuum
- 145 -
and resolves the tension attendant upon all figurative discourse is an appreciation of the 
symbolic value of Leon's behaviour as a bid for attention.
Extract B is more cautiously equivocal. The status of Leon’s suicide attempts are 
defined as unclear, although “there is some evidence to suggest that they may have been” 
symbolic gestures designed to “get through” to and be noticed by his step-father. Whereas the 
psychiatrist in extract A privileges a particular version of events, albeit couched in the rhetoric 
of how it appears fi’om the information available, the social worker’s report in extract B spawns 
two alternative versions, the ambiguity of which is unresolved: it is unclear whether Leon’s 
suicide attempts were genuine or symbolic.
I include the final excerpt to illustrate how a cognitive canopy, once erected, may be 
extended to accommodate a range of prospective events, which, in their turn help confirm the 
original interpretation. (This retrospective-prospective mode of accounting is examined in 
Chapter 8). Leon’s report to his father that he was making a coffîn in his craft lesson when 
actually he was making a small box synchronizes with the metaphorical significance of his suicide 
attempts.
The symbolic search for attention has taken quite a dramatic turn in the cases 
considered above, involving self-injuiy and even possible death. Not all interpretations of 
attention-seeking fed on such extreme types of behaviour, as the following examples demonstrate. 
The first piece, drawn from one of David Lyons’ C C ’s, shows how attention-seeking interpretations 
may equally apply to more mundane misdemeanours.
1 Kate: Yes - yes - the mischievous bit - likes to be chased - likes to be cuddled - and
I think it ties in with what George said - the uncertainty he had earlier of 
whether he was loved or not. And I feel that - my own impression is that 
behind quite a lot of his horse-play and dashing around - is the need for 
5 people to notice him and want him and to love him. That may be over
simplifying what I want to say - but that’s what I believe. On the one hand 
if you want someone to do something for you that requires - quite mundane 
work - washing-up - cleaning-up - tidying-up - carry this - fetch that - push 
that for me - David is the most willing - and reliable boy in school. . .  there’s 
10 that side of him which is - perhaps - a desire to gain approval.
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David’s “mischievous” behaviour, his “horse-play and dashing around” (lines 1 and 4) 
is figuratively linked to his underlying desire to be noticed, wanted and loved. This motivation 
is given an historical dimension, borne of the earlier uncertainty “whether he was loved or not” 
(line 3). Kate proceeds in lines 6-9 to describe a helpful, co-operative, reliable facet to David. 
An interesting feature of this dual portrait is that the different “sides” are defined as split 
manifestations of the same motivation to seek attention, love and approval, albeit through very 
different means. This is the power of symbolic interpretation: having slipped its literal moorings, 
the “same” piece of behaviour may yield a variety of potential meanings, and the “same” motive 
may be seen to underlie a diversity of behavioural repressions.
In the metaphorical mode of theorizing attention-seeking behaviour a sense of 
semantic resonance connects the behaviour with the emotions which generate it. Where 
accounts of attention-seeking shade into those of testing-out an ironical contrast characterizes 
the relationship between appearance and reality. This shift in emphasis from a metaphorical to 
an ironic mode of theorization is beautifully exemplified in the forthcoming piece. The intimate 
connection between theories of attention-seeking and testing-out is most apparent here 
because the motivation to seek attention is associated with the child’s need to “test-out” 
whether he is loved and wanted by significant people in his life. An elaborate motivational 
bridge links a contemporary behavioural episode to Paul Black’s history in the following 
interaction from a T.M.
1 [Brian Potter, the art teacher, describes an incident where Paul Black
squeezed paint on the art room floor, and then when Brian asked him to 
clear it up, refused and continued to “abuse” Brian for the next twenty 
minutes. Kate reports that she had spoken to Paul since the incident and he 
5 had agreed to clear it up.]
Kate: . . .  It was Paul’s way of saying he did it! (2.5) O.K. (1.5) I was saying to Brian
- really a lot of the kids we have in here are genuinely disturbed - and you can 
fall over backwards making excuses - so it becomes ridiculous.
Brian: Mmm.
10 Kate: “Oh he’s like that because mum ran away with the dustman nineteen years
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ago” etcetera. But I think in certain cases of very genuine disturbance - and 
in my opinion Paul is probably the most disturbed - one of the most disturbed 
boys here.
Brian: Mmm.
15 Kate: And-squirting paint on the floor-as I said it*s a bloody silly thing to do-it’s
not a cardinal sin.
Brian: No.
Kate: It wasn’t the squirting of the paint it was what was behind it.
Brian: Yer.
20 Kate: See - I-I - in my opinion (2) it sounds (2) it sounds very presumptuous to try
to talk. . .  to try to talk psychologically about Paul without qualification - but 
you can’t work - for a long time in this work without - picking up what you 
believe (1) er - are ideas about the kids. And - in my opinion you see - with 
his dad continually rejecting him - he often engineers a confrontation with 
25 someone - that he could see as a good stable father figure (1) ah where he’ll
really make you wild and he’ll curse you and swear at you - and if next day he 
meets you - and you don’t reject him -1 think every now and again he needs 
28 to prove that you’re not going to turn your back on him.
The procedural plenitude of this extract repays detailed analysis. The lengthy 
preamble to Kate’s interpretation of Paul’s behaviour (lines 6-23) can be read as an attempt to 
legitimize her version of events. She first of all distinguishes between historical analysis which 
falls into the category of “excuse”, and, by implication, that which falls into the category of 
“non-excuse”, or genuine explanation. By incorporating this acknowledgement into her 
preliminary comment Kate attributes her prospective account with the status of being genuine 
and valid (i.e. not an excuse). The psychological substance of Kate’s account is simultaneously 
authorized through the typification of degrees of disturbance. The reasoning appears to 
approximate this:
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a) In some cases of genuine disturbance a therapeutic explanation falls within the jurisdiction 
of an excuse
but,
b) in other cases of ‘Very genuine disturbance”, (line 11), such as this one, psychological 
explanation is valid.
While the legitimacy of the latter is not explicitly stated, the reader’s orientation to 
pairings fills the absence. The rule can be reduced to the following:
a) in certain cases this, 
but,
b) in other cases that.
Where “this” is stated, and not “that”, the reader may reverse “this” to get “that”.
Having authorized the validity of a therapeutic mode of account “in cases like this”, 
Kate proceeds to legitimize her own knowledge base. She does so by staging the familiar 
manoeuvre of pre-empting criticism:
a) it sounds this,
b) b u t that.
a) “. . .  it sounds very presumptuous . . .  to try to talk psychologically about Paul without
qualification. . .  but,
b) you can’t work - for a long time in this work without picking u p  ideas about kids.”
(lines 20-23)
Thus, although some psychological ejq)lanations may be “excuses” and/or their authors unqualified, 
Kate’s documented awareness of these possibilities helps demarcate her account from them.
The surface of Paul’s behaviour is explicitly relegated to a superficial status: “a bloody 
silly thing to do” but “not a cardinal sin” (lines 15-16). Its literal significance is displaced in 
favour of “what was behind it” (line 18): i.e. a history of paternal rejection. The essential route 
between Paul’s history, and contemporary manifestations of delinquent behaviour, take us
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through the detour of his psychological motivation. The fîrst link in the chain of psychological 
reasoning involves a metaphorical association. The figures with whom Paul engineers confrontation 
are chosen precisely because th ^  symbolize the father who continually rejected him. The 
second link forges an ironic relationship between the surface and its motivating depth. Paul’s 
abusive and provocative behaviour is designed not to court rejection, but to test-out the limits 
of acceptance, *‘to prove that you’re not going to turn your back on him” (line 28). His 
re-creation of the historical situation is a test to see whether it can be rewritten.
Paul’s desire to test the security of the environment, and the care and consistency of 
significant figures therein, is seen to lie "behind” his episodic deviance. His motivation to test 
the boundaries of acceptability also informs the following excerpt which follows, chronologically, 
on the heels of the last one. Having posited an ironic interpretation of the particular incident 
above, Kate invokes a more general pattern. She addresses Jan Butler, Paul’s special worker 
from unit 3, who has been invited to the T.M. to discuss the boy’s recently disruptive behaviour 
in education.
1 Kate: Uhm (.5) there’s something I wanted to ask you about and find out if it’s
right. It seems to me that when things are on a more even keel - so to speak 
- with the boy - when he’s not in danger of going to court - when - ah - he-he 
hasn’t got anything heavy hanging over him (.5) that’s the time he’ll turn to 
5 glue - or to - very disruptive behaviour. It’s almost as if "things are going too
well - 1 can’t - 1 can’t trust this (.5) I better check-out” {you know
{
Jan: {Uhm - his-his glue-
sniffing - spate (1) which lasted several weeks and culminated - with the (.5) 
old lady’s money being stolen by him - that came after - no apparent reason 
10 that we could understand.
Kate: Mmm.
Jan: (He’d) had a successful holiday with the unit and a successful holiday - with
his parents and ahm (2) it seemed to come out of the blue.
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15
Kate:
Jan:
20
Yer - almost as if this is all going too well - 1 better have a quick check that
(1.5) ah-ah you you know {I’m
{
{Yes - he seems to enjoy feeling that there’s 
something hanging over his head. It’s a control - it’s an external control 
which he can then use (.5) for himself (.5) I mean he can say - “well I’d like 
to do - such and such (.5) but I know I can’t - be-because you know” - and 
then he won’t! And he seems to enjoy a sort of dire feeling of - of some kind 
of threat hanging over him.
Bnan: Maybe that {gives him -
{
Nicola: {He does that
24 Brian: some sort of structure.
The tone of this ironic mode of theorizing is neo-Durkheimian. Durkheim’s claim that 
cognitive and moral boundaries are only crisply adumbrated in response to their contravention 
is given figurative significance in relation to the individual’s behaviour. Dressed in all their 
insecurities boys “of this kind” are seen to need to test the solidity of “boundaries”. By deviating 
from them they are furnished a) with a sense of where the boundaries lie and b) a concrete 
sense of structure erected through the administration of punishment.
It is, perhaps, important to explicitly distinguish my approach to the concept of 
boundaries from that characteristic of functionalism and phenomenology. However different 
in emphasis, both of the latter prioritize the analyses version of what actors are doing when they 
engage in acts of so-called symbolic boundary maintenance. An ethnomethodological orientation 
to boundaries (as indeed any other social phenomena) diverts attention onto the methods 
through which members routinely invest behaviour with a sense of symbolic significance. From 
this perspective questions of whether actors are really engaged in maintaining boundaries 
becomes less important than an analysis of how they themselves theorize and in the process, 
construct boundaries. From the briefest perusal of the foregoing account it is apparent that the 
concept of boundary keeping is not the exclusive property of sociologists. Indeed, it is an integral
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part of common sense knowledge in general, and therapeutic theories of testing-out in 
particular.
In lines 1-6 Kate evokes a motif which she has deciphered in Paul’s behaviour and 
which has the tentative status of “how it seems” to her. Jan’s response in lines 7-13 lends weight 
to the burgeoning pattern. The theorization offered on lines 14-24 is dedicated to a retrieval of 
the motivations which undergird such patterned manifestations. Two candidate explanations 
emerge to account for Paul’s predilection for messing things up when all is apparently well. In 
the first Paul is testing, or checking out the trustworthiness of the environment and those who 
reside in it. In the second, Paul’s behaviour is interpreted as an attempt to ensure the erection 
of a structure of external control within which he feels more secure. Thus, Paul’s involvement 
in deviant activities when circumstances are more settled is understood not in terms of his sense 
of liberation from external constraints, or his desire to go beyond them, as a more literal 
interpretation would have it, but as an ironic bid for their reinstatement.
Notable throughout this extract is how the more an ironic pattern is identified, the 
more events are conceived as a meaningful embodiment of it. Rather than treating Paul’s 
unexpected bouts of glue-sniffing as a testament to their randomness, they are brought into 
causal correlation with the behaviour which preceded them. Periods of reasonably even-keeled 
behaviour (this) followed by (then) bouts of disruptiveness (that), are transformed into this 
because of that: a procedure which is key to the establishment of causality (see Chapter 7). Paul’s 
behaviour is thus constructed as an ironic expression of his need to test-out the reliability of the 
world, and impose an external structure of control for himself. The suspension of disruptive 
behaviour following these episodes is similarly endowed with a consequential status in creating 
the “even keel” responsible for activating a further bout.
iv) Ironical Messages: he kicked me because he wants to be loved
In metaphor the tension between “reality” and “appearance”, or the literal and 
symbolic, is based upon a relationship of similarity. In irony, the relationship is one of difference; 
surface manifestations of behaviour are seen to convey the opposite of what they really mean. 
Thus, for example, a child’s apparent confidence, strength and bravado are treated as the ironic 
document of his insecurity, vulnerability and lack of self-worth. There are many dimensions to 
the ironical nature of therapeutic practice, some of which will be explored throughout this
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section. I start, however, with a series of simple but effective illustrations of the ironic mode of 
interpretation. The first is from Tony Salter’s psychiatric assessment report.
a) “Underneath all his bluster (Tony) is a rather confused, frightened little 
boy, desperately insecure who needs constant reassurance and attention.”
b) “Although on the surface he is quite brash -1 detect considerable uncertainty 
underneath. He is actually quite a sensitive boy.”
[Brian Potter’s art report from one of Richard Ashworth’s C.C. S.]
c) “He was continually testing-out staff barriers, protecting his vulnerability 
behind the facade of abusive bravado. He was concerned to perpetuate this 
image of wreckless anarchy.”
[Report on Tony Salter by a member of staff at his previous residential 
placement]
d) “(Andy is) a sensitive boy who makes up for his lack of confidence by putting 
on a rather ridiculous front of bombastic and attention-seeking behaviour.” 
[Brian Potter’s art report from one of Andy Fisher’s C.C’s]
e) [Kate speaks of an ex-resident called Mark.]
Kate: Uhm - he was a verv big burly skin-head lad - very into football hooliganism
.. .  And uhm - he had absolutely no (.5) he had this (.5) pseudo confidence 
(.5) but he was really very insecure - uhm - but still had to live up to this “big 
image”.
[Kate Lambert’s interview.]
f) “To Juniour the image is so important. That image has to be tough, defiant, 
anti-authority, etcetera. Juniour presents as a young man with very low 
opinion of self - hence the arrogance etcetera to compensate for this.” 
[Roger Carter’s written summary of one of Juniour Knight’s C.C.’s.]
g) “Underneath it was suspected that he was really worried and nervous, and 
that his confidence was very fragile, despite his display of self-assurance. It
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was important to him to look confident, and that everything was going his 
way.”
[Written summary of Graham Mellor’s assessment conference.]
h) “Hopefully with the degree of external confirmation of his ability he will in
time find it less necessary to constantly express belief in his own talents. This 
apparat ovar-confidence is almost certainly borne out of a certain vulnerability 
but it can provoke negative feelings toward him.”
[Kate Lambert’s written educational condusion from one of Damian Tanner’s 
C C ’s.]
I include a selection of succinct ironic characterizations in an attempt to display how 
commonplace they were as a mode of interpretation amongst staff at St. Nicholas’ and related 
institutions. Each contains the essential ironic ingredient: the opposition between surface and 
depth, appearance and the reality which purportedly undergirds it. Hence, an anomaly is evoked 
between the child’s outward appearance of confidence and strength and their real inner 
vulnerability. A number of the foregoing accounts also allude to the motivation which gives rise 
to the boys’ ironic presentation of themselves. It is understood as a protective mechanism, or an 
over-compensation for the very qualities they lack. Hence the paradox!
The following extract nicely illustrates how much an ironic orientation had been 
absorbed into the institutional culture of the staff at St. Nicholas’. The piece is from Nicola 
Hobbs’ education report on Ben Jackson, compiled for one of his C.C.’s.
“He is competitive, both in formal and oral work, but this seems to be more 
a habit of not always serious rivalry rather than a real insecurity about his 
abilities.”
This piece relies for its comprehensibility upon the background knowledge that 
competitiveness amongst “boys of this kind” is often a paradoxical compensation for their lack 
of real security. So tempting is this interpretation that Nicola explicitly distances Ben’s 
behaviour from it, and places it in the context of “a habit of not always serious rivalry”.
I turn now to some more elaborate examples of therapeutic irony to consider the
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discursive manoeuvres through which it is accomplished. The first extract is drawn from a case 
conference report concerning Juniour Knight. Its author is Mike Griffith, Juniour’s special 
worker from unit 4.
1 “His chronic desire to dominate at all costs is still unfortunately ever present
in his general behaviour. He is not willing to listen to advice. I believe it is 
Juniour’s deep insecurity that dictates much of his need to dominate his 
peers. He cannot bear being contradicted, or being shown to be in any way 
5 at fault or wrong. He will try to out shout any boy who disagrees with him.
It is in his relationship with other boys that most of his problems occur. To 
members of staff his massive insecurity and consequent over-assertiveness 
are obvious - but to other boys he just appears impossibly arrogant and this 
9 is highly provocative to them.”
Sandwiched between Mike’s description of Juniour’s/jreje/irin^behaviour on lines 1-6 
is his evocation of the source fi’om which he believes it springs: “Juniour’s deep insecurity” 
(line 3). Lines 6-9 distinguish between the ironically informed experts for whom the relationship 
between Juniour’s “massive insecurity and consequent over-assertiveness are obvious” (line 7-8), 
and the boys who, in the absence of such ironic awareness are susceptible to being duped by the 
appearance of Juniour’s impossible arrogance and provocation.
The following two pieces both refer to the ironic presentation of Samuel Nailer. The 
first is from one of St. Nicholas’ day conferences in which Bob Burnett - manager of unit 2 - offers 
the following profile.
1 A) Bob: I think he’s a very fragile young man - who’s (.5) got this (1.5) little pillar that
he is up on. And in order to stop people knocking him off it he sends out all 
sorts of vibrations about - you know - “I’m the big tough hero - I’m the big 
king-pin around the place - you don’t do anything to me”. And really he’s 
5 very frightened that someone do something to him. And lots of the little
situations he sets up are designed to perpetuate the image of being (.5) the 
big guy that no-one really attacks (1.5). Uhm - 1 think to shatter that image 
would be fatal for him and for everybody else. And so - we’ve gotta find a way 
of letting him down from it gradually (1) and partly that’s what this uhm - his
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10 current placement in detention centre is supposed to do. To allow him the
opportunity to actually change and come back - and - not start completely 
afresh but (.5) but to start from a different perspective (2) to come back and 
13 - supposedly have grown a bit - and learned something.
Second, from a T.M. some time later.
1 B) [The teachers discuss how Samuel is now back to his "old ways" after his stint
in detention centre. Peter French argues that he is worse than he was prior 
to the sentence.]
Peter: He’s set himself up to be - he’s set himself up to be - a hero. He’s come back
5 from - hell you know (Brian laughs) telling all the boys how - you know -
“they tried to break me but they didn’t’’ sort of thing.
Brian: Yer (laughing).
Peter: I think - you know - in reality he’s gotta very very low opinion of himself - and
he builds himself up to - and he starts to believe it - you know.
10 Brian: Yer.
Peter: And the boys are frightened of him.
The ironic link between Samuel’s inner reality and his external presentation is forged 
immediately in extract A. His extreme fragility is held to psychological account for his tough and 
heroic facade. Having formulated a routinely ironic relationship between surface and depth, 
Bob is able to assimilate “lots of the little situations” (lines 5-6) to it. Samuel’s phenomenal 
image is conceived as a protective mechanism from which he must be gradually let down: “to 
shatter that image”, we are told, “would be fatal for him and for everybody else” (lines 7-8).
The same ironic manoeuvre informs Peter’s account of Samuel’s behaviour in extract 
B. On this occasion, Samuel’s tales about his time in D.C. are accorded an ironic status. Their 
very drama and heroism are seen to express the “very very low opinion” (line 8) Samuel has of
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himself, which, in turn, necessitates the erection of a grandiose image. The psychological reality 
and behavioural appearance are mutually elaborative: a circularity which does not undermine 
the discursive logic of irony.
Below, Brian Potter, the art teacher, offers an elaborately detailed account of his 
ironic orientation to Andy Fisher’s behaviour based upon his “wide experience of other boys (.5) 
sort of similar sorts I’ve met” (line 17). The extract is from Brian’s interview.
1 Brian: Hook for salient features I s’pose-like ( l) if l  feel (2) you know Hook at the
surface behaviour and I say - is this - and I always - ask myself - is this surface 
behaviour genuine? Is this really him? And - say for instance with Andy 
Fisher (1) an obvious example (.5) he presented a very cocksure sort of (.5) 
5 surface and - you couldn’t tell him anything (.5) becus he knew. And (.5) but
I regarded that as basically (.5) a defence mechanism - basically a dishonest 
front and - that in fact he was nothing like that. So - then I started to look 
for - keys to what he was really like (.5) and uhm (1) judging (in a number of 
areas) and contrasting that with his insecure background -
10 Kim: Right
Brian: uhm (1.5) and I-I came to the conclusion that he had very little confidence
about anything. Uh (.5) and that he basically despised himself (.5) uh (2) I 
think that’s one of the reasons why he despised almost everyone else. I mean 
I think that (.5) he had - although he appeared to think he was wonderful - 
15 I-I think his actual self-image is very small - you know I think he had a very
- low - opinion of himself. And I put that (.5) I made that assessment partly 
through a wide experience of other boys (.5) sort of similar sorts I’ve met. 
And a lot of it was intuition I s’pose. But uhm (2) it was - it - through a filter 
I think - through that sort of filter I came to those sort of conclusions - you 
20 know.
In lines 1-3 Brian articulates his reliance upon the widespread therapeutic practice of 
subjecting surface behaviour to cynical scrutiny: “Is this really him?” (line 3). Extending this 
methodological axiom to Andy Fisher, Brian interprets his “very cocksure sort of (.5) surface”
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(lines 4-5) as “a defence-mechanism” and a “dishonest front” (lines 6-7). He thus paves the 
preliminary way to a figurative characterization of Andy’s behaviour.
The first step is to recognize a split between the phenomenal and the real, and the 
second to construct a non-literal relationship between the two. To say that Andy is “nothing 
like” thepersona he presents is to forge an incipiently ironic connection to which Brian seeks the 
“keys” (line 8). From a perusal of Andy’s “insecure background” Brian deduces that “he had 
very little confidence about anything” and “basically despised himself’ (lines 11-12). It is this 
analysis which provides the literal bedrock in relation to which Andy’s hatred of others is 
accorded a metaphorical nuance, and his apparent belief that he is wonderful is rendered 
ironical.
In the forthcoming group of excerpts an ironic contrast is also constructed between 
the literal ramifications of a child’s behaviour and his motivation. The axis of the opposition 
differs from the foregoing accounts in which a confident, intimidating facade is assumed to 
betray a vulnerable interior. Below the child’s apparently hostile or aggressive display toward 
members of staff is interpreted in terms of his affection and regard for them. In the first extract 
Joe Duggan, senior social worker in unit 1, proffers a programmatic statement about the nature 
of this paradoxical relationship.
1 [I ask Joe what qualities are important in doing good social work?]
Joe: I think you have to be perceptive - becus you (.5) uhm (1.5) kids - do - kids
at St. Nicholas’ have (1.5) odd ways of sending you messages (.5) uhm - 1 
mean what they they might appear to be (3) telling you (.5) that they ha - that 
5 they hate your guts - where in fact they’re asking you (.5) for love and
affection.
Kim: Right.
Joe: And - 1 think you need -1 think - you need the ability to perceive that. (1.5)
Uhm - you need the ability to (.5) work o u t. . .  what they are trying to tell 
10 you. And - they-they - they play lots of games.
[Joe Duggan’s interview]
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The perceptiveness of which Joe speaks is entangled with an ironic orientation to the 
“messages” which the boys send. While these “might appear to be telling you” one thing, they 
“in fact” convey the opposite: the apparent display of hate mAy really be a call for love (lines 3-6). 
The next example, based upon a similarly ironic interpretation of behaviour, is one which alerted 
me to the paradoxical strain in institutional reasoning quite early on in my fieldwork. The 
exchange took place in a S.S.M.
1 [Roger Carter speaks of how Leon Pryce had been in a “funny mood”
recently, and “he*s hit his hand against the wall a few times today”.]
Roger: He’s a funny lad. He keeps coming up to me to make contact today. I’ve just
been very relaxed with him. At lunch-time he was playing snooker. As I 
5 walked past he threw the cue down - and he obviously wanted me to follow
him. So I walked straight down to my ofGce and ignored him. The games we 
play (says Roger addressing himself to me). But I came back and Leon was 
there and he said “don’t touch me” - which meant of course that he wanted 
9 me to. So I just gently wrestled with him.
The apparent meaning of Leon Pryce’s behaviour is seen to paradoxically subvert his 
underlying motivation; an assumption most patently conveyed on lines 7-9 where Leon’s stated 
wish not to be touched is transformed into its opposite. The forthcoming extract refers to the 
paradoxical means through which David Lyons expresses his liking for Colin Lynch, one of the 
social workers in his unit. The piece is from one of David’s C C.’s.
1 [George Wallace, David’s special worker, describes to David’s mother and
F.S.W. the details of a recent incident which took place between David and 
Colin Lynch.]
George: Colin’s one of the - social workers in unit 3. It’s been a funny way that David
5 has actually sort of brought about this sort of - fairly intense close relationship
uhm where (he’d) strike him with a cricket-bat on his head and throw 
football boots at him in a sort of (1.5) nasty way as such but it’s-it’s a way in 
which he’s sort of relating anyway - uhm - he’s been the only member of staff 
that he’s actually done that to - you know.
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10 Philip: I mean they sound - sort of - quite violent incidents and they did ah - they did
hurt Colin - but it was without the edge of real violence behind it. I mean I 
think you - when you did those sort of things David you were actually 
laughing -1 don't thinkyou were deliberately intending to hurt Colin. I think 
it was a game. And it is a way of - {coming across.
{
15 Kate: (Yes I spoke to Colin just after the incident
and he felt it was over the top horse play on that occasion.
Philip That’s right - that’s right.
18 Kate: And not knowing quite (1) where the line was drawn - between the two.
The preceding account sets up a dramatic and almost comically ironic contrast 
between what David’s behaviour actually means, and how it appears. The seeds of irony are 
planted from the outset. We - the recipients - are encouraged to treat the prospective material 
as an account of how David “actually . . .  brought about this sort of - fairly close intense 
relationship” with Colin, albeit in a funny way (lines 4-5). Yet, in the very next instance we are 
offered a behavioural description of how David assaulted Colin with a cricket bat, and threw 
football boots at him in a “nasty way”; incidents which are defined as “quite violent”, and which 
actually hurt Colin (lines 6-11).
The irony of George’s interpretation pivots on the dramatic distinction between 
appearance and reality. Taken literally his violent, nasty attacks upon Colin may suggest David’s 
aggressive predisposition or his dislike of this particular member of staff. In George’s account 
they are transformed into an ironic display of the “funny way” David engineered an “intense 
close relationship” with Colin.
On my reading, George’s account does not persuasively establish the propriety of an 
ironic interpretation. He fails to furnish the motivational grounds necessary for making such a 
figurative leap. The account is, however, punctuated by certain contextual details which, in 
conjunction, offer an alternative possible reading to the literal. Notice, first of all, how David’s 
violent behaviour is defined as his way of relating (lines 7-8) ; a characterization which diminishes 
its negative coimotation by shifting the cognitive context. What partially fills the ironic breach
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is the typified knowledge which practitioners bring to bear about the peculiar ways in which 
“boys of this kind” relate. Quite why David in particular relates in this way, however, remains 
obscure. The second contextualizing feature on lines 8-9, has an ambiguous status. That Colin 
is the only member of staff to whom David relates in this way may equally fuel an ironic as a literal 
interpretation, since it could be his particular dislike of Colin which motivates David’s violence 
toward him.
Philip Hooper offers further mitigation of David’s actions on lines 10-14. He speaks 
of how David “did hurt Colin but it was without the edge of real violence behind it” (lines 10-11). 
The conjunctive “but” generates a contrast between the effect of David’s behaviour and his 
intentions. In the absence of a literal bond between the two, Philip elaborates David’s real 
motivation. His laughter is conceived not as a sign of his sadistic pleasure, but his indulgence in 
a game, which is his way of “coming across”.
Philip and Kate coUaboratively generate an alternative version of David’s actions on 
lines 10-18: rather than an ironic display of closeness, his behaviour is defined as games-playing, 
over-the-top horseplay, and ignorance of where the line is drawn. The empirical evidence may 
support either George’s or Philip and Kate’s version, although the latter does not necessitate the 
same leap of the discursive imagination which George’s account, as it stands, requires.
In the following piece, drawn from a T.M., Brian Potter offers an ironic version of 
Clive Dennis’ relationship with the part-time “pottery lady”.
1 Well I - I  think (.5) Clive’s - as Gary and I discussed - has got a sort of a - an
attitude. He-he likes the pottery lady very much but - for instance he (.5) he 
made this lamp uh (1) standard - fa - with her - and he wasn’t satisfied with 
it so he blamed her for it. And - uhm (.5) he likes her - but if he likes someone 
5 - and you know with d ive - every - he’s used to - everyone sort of - telling him
to “shut-up - do this” - punch - sort of thing. But (.5) with-with (slight laugh) 
with this lady - she’s - very - she got on very well - with him at first - and I don’t 
think he could sort of handle it really - he’s got a peculiar attitude towards 
9 her.
The anomaly, in this instance, is between Clive’s real feelings for the pottery teacher.
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and the way he treats her. If Clive’s liking for her were literally manifest in his behaviour one 
would expect him to treat her considerately. Conversely, if one were to deduce Clive’s feelings 
from his ostensive behaviour it would suggest - on a literal reading - that he did not like the 
pottery instructor. The irony of Clive’s behaviour is that he both likes the teacher and has a 
“peculiar attitude towards her” (lines 8-9), including blaming her for something which was not 
her fault.
The procedure at work in generating this anomaly is akin to the “contrast-structure” 
of which Dorothy Smith [1978 - pages 39-47] speaks. It is in operation where the conceptual rule 
inscribed in one part of the account is rendered anomalous by the conceptual rule inscribed in 
a second, related part. What is at stake is precisely the generation of an anomaly which exceeds 
simple conformity to, or deviation from a rule. Hence, conformity to the conceptual rule of 
liking teacher would imply being nice/considerate to her, just as deviation implies the opposite.
The resolution to the tension of Clive both liking teacher and having an “attitude” 
toward her is ironic. The chain of reasoning in Brian’s account is forged through an intermediate 
link which is missing from George’s interpretation of David’s behaviour. For Brian brings his 
knowledge of Clive’s past to service in postulating why he behaves in this curious way. Because 
Clive was treated dismissively or aggressively in the past, he cannot handle getting on “very well” 
with somebody in the present. His behaviour is thus given a motivational rationale which 
substantiates an ironic interpretation. (For a discussion of the different modes of causal 
connection - weakly and strongly theorized - see Chapter 7).
v) The Ironv of Denial
In figurative interpretation the literal meaning of surface appearance is bracketed in 
favour of a symbolic appreciation of its significance. Reality itself is not abandoned in this 
process, but situated at a deeper level. Similarly the therapeutically inclined practitioners at 
St. Nicholas’ tended to treat the boys’ deviant behaviour as the symbolic manifestation of their 
emotional disturbance which resided at a deeper level, and required a degree of expertise to 
decipher. In this lies the elective affinity between therapeutic discourse and an ironic mode of 
interpretation. Such figurative proclivities bring with them the assumption of epistemological 
superiority on the part of the ironically informed practitioner, and a concomitant diminution of
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knowledge on the part of the subject. For although, in principle, “irony itself is not invulnerable 
to further irony from a new vantage-point” [D.C. Muecke (1982) - p.31] the boys’ perspective 
was rarely accorded the requisite authority to overthrow staff versions.
A strikingly ironic connotation of therapeutic expertise is the assumption that the 
therapist cum social worker may, and indeed often does, have a more informed understanding 
of what motivates the child than he does of himself. While the child’s corroboration may add 
additional weight to a therapeutic account it is not the prerequisite of establishing the emotional 
reality. Conversely, the boy’s refutation or denial of the authorized version does not necessarily 
impair or destroy its validity. On the contrary, when filtered through the process of therapeutic 
reasoning, the boy’s denial may be incorporated into the symptomology of his disturbance and 
thus made to support the existence of the very thing he denies. In the forthcoming extracts I 
consider the classically ironic manoeuvre through which denial is transformed into its opposite, 
and serves to confirm a particular interpretation and the edifice of therapeutic reasoning on 
which it rests.
Consider first of all an excerpt from Chris Jones’ psychiatric assessment report.
1 “I have seen Chris twice, who talked quite readily about the facts, but
divorced all feeling from himself. . .
Chris hardly knows his father as he left when Chris was only two. In the last 
ten years he has not seen him more than three times. His father sends money 
5 and a birthday card to his sisters but never to him. When I asked him how
he felt about that his reply was “Nothing, it is not worth bothering about”. 
He denied missing his dad, saying he had never had one to compare with 
what it would be like to have one. He doesn’t get on very well with his mum 
who works at night, neither does he have much attachment for his siblings, 
10 except when joining in with (his two brothers) for some excitement.
Chris told me on both occasions quite categorically that he doesn’t want to 
go home because he is frightened that as soon as he returns home he will 
either start stealing or become violent. He could not tell me what exactly 
makes him angry but looked very uncomfortable when I asked him about the
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15 aggressive outburst he had in the school unit here. He told me that he felt
very relieved when he was taken away firom home and put at (the assessment 
centre), and sometimes he wishes that he didn’t have to go home for 
weekends.
Chris is not at all in touch with his angry feelings tow ard his dad or his 
20 siblings but acts them out when he becomes violent at home. His complete
denial about having any conflict within himself would make any 
22 psycho-therapeutic work with him almost impossible.”
Lines 1-2 contain the germ of reasoning developed throughout the account which 
resides in Chris’ denial of the feelings which the psychiatrist presupposes exist. The use of the 
term “divorced” (line 2) is instructive, since it implies an enforced separation between Chris’ 
discussion of facts and his feelings about them.
The psychiatrist proceeds on lines 3-8 to report the facts, and Chris’ denial of the 
feelings. A gamut of ghost assumptions are brought into play in processing the information 
about Chris’ father’s departure and his selective contact with his siblings. These assumptions 
about how Chris must be feeling in the wake of such traumatic events lends ironic potency to his 
claim to feel “nothing”. That Chris denied missing his dad, has important connotations for how 
we are encouraged to read Chris’ version. A phenomenon can only be logically denied, if it 
allegedly exists in the first place. What’s more the very vehemence of Chris’ denial of certain 
feelings strengthens the therapeutic case for their existence: me thinks the deviant doth protest 
too much.
In lines 11-18, the psychiatrist gives voice to Chris’ desire to stay away from home for 
fear his return might engender the resumption of violence and stealing responsible for his 
removal in the first place. However, the sense of Chris’ detachment from the feelings which 
generate his deviance is bolstered by the psychiatrist’s claim that Chris “could not tell me what 
exactly makes him angry” (lines 13-14). The phrase “could not”, rather than “would not” is 
influential; it implies that Chris was unable to divulge his motives rather than being unprepared 
to.
Although the precise connection has not been formulated up until lines 19-20, the
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astute reader may already have entertained the incipient relationship between Chris’ historical 
grievance, and his contemporary deviance. The final paragraph accords to this tentative 
association an explicit symbolic status. Chris’ denial of anger towards his father and siblings is 
held to causal account for its explosive emergence in violence at home, which, in turn, is 
conceived as the metaphorical expression of feelings which, unbeknown to him, Chris harboured 
all along.
TTie second piece is extracted from Eileen Walker’s interview. Eileen was an 
untrained social worker from unit 1, whose use of the theory of denial suggests that it was not 
confined to the more extensively trained staff.
1 [Eileen speaks of Dexter Abrams, an ex-resident of St. Nicholas’ to whom
she was particularly close. Eileen says how Dexter’s parents were different 
colours, and while he respected his mother’s control,]
Eileen . . .  he respected his dad far more than his mother becos of her colour. But
5 he’s the last to admit it - no way will he {admit it
{
Kim: {His dad’s black and his mum’s
white?
Eileen: Yer.
Kim: Ah hah.
10 Eileen: Ahm (2) no way will he admit i t . . .  even now I don’t think he’s ever faced
it. But that is his real hang-up.
Kim: Huh hum.
Eileen: And he loves his brothers - and he he loves his dad - and (.5) he cares for his 
mum (2) but - it’s there.
15 Kim: So he identifies very much with the black element in the family.
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Eileen: He doesn’t want to (.5) but be does.
Eileen presents her version as an incontrovertible reality: “he respected his dad far 
more than his mother becos of her colour” (line 4). Since this is constructed as a fact the only 
two types of response allocated to Dexter are his acceptance of reality or his denial of it. The 
word “admit” is a material force in establishing the “fact effect” in Dorothy Smith’s term 
[1978 pages 32-33]. That Dexter is “the last to admit it - no way will he admit it” (lines 4-5), 
assumes a) there is something there to admit, and b) ironically that Dexter is “the last” to 
recognize his “real hang-up”, “even now”. The reference to Dexter’s failure to “face it” 
(line 10) has similar connotations since the “it” which Dexter has not faced is unassailably given, 
to be acknowledged or, in Dexter’s case, not.
The discursive structure of the following account is very similar to the preceding one. 
It is extracted from my interview with Bob Burnett, manager of unit 2.
1 [I ask Bob to give an account of how he sees Leon Pryce, one of the boys in
his unit.]
Bob: Yer - uhm (2) what I see Leon as at the moment is - uhm - a very under­
confident (2.5) uhm (1) schoolboy. Becus he-he’s (.5) somewhere around
5 about sort of thirteen-ish at the moment.
Kim: Incredible isn’t it - you forget that.
Bob: He’s - sixteen years old - but he’s operating very much {at thirteen.
{
Kim: {Huh hum.
Bob: And - he-he’s so ( 1 ) worried about being able to cope in the adult world. But
10 he won’t admit that. Becos he knows he’s sixteen becos he knows that other
people of sixteen go out and do all kinds of weird and wonderful things (2) 
becos I think he’s had this example from the rest of the family who’ve all 
been remarkably successful (1) uh - we’re talking about success in terms of
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them being sort of accountants and (1) doctors and dentists - and all this sort 
15 of thing - you know.
Kim: Yer.
Bob: Uhm - he’s pretty well aware that he can’t match up to that. And he - really
is frightened as hell of going out and doing that. But he won’t say that.
Kim: Mmm.
20 Bob: Won’t admit to it. He will keep on insisting he wants to go out and get jobs.
Kim: Right.
Bob: Totally unrealistic. (1 ) And so what - 1 think we’ye gotta do is (1) uhm - it’s
not guite like throwing him in the deep-end - becus if we do he-he’ll drown 
and cause chaos. (1) Uhm - 1 think we’ve gotta sort of dip his toes in a bit 
25 - then get 'em wet and then shake 'em dry.
Kim: Mmm.
27 Bob: Gradually work through it.
Leon’s concern about being unable to cope in the adult world, especially given the 
remarkable success of his adoptive family, is endowed with the authority of fact. As such it 
requires no elaboration; it is assumed to stand on its own merits. Although Bob’s account solicits 
partial corroboration ("he’s pretty well aware he can’t match up to that” - line 17), it is the fear 
engendered by this recognition to which Leon, apparently, "won’t admit” (line 20), and "won’t 
say” (line 18). Not only does Leon fail to admit to the emotional reality which Bob assumes, but 
he actively insists "he - wants to go out and get jobs” (line 20). From Bob’s assumed authority 
to define reality flows his capacity to recategorize contradictory accounts as unreal. Hence 
Leon’s claim that he wants to go out and get jobs is dubbed "totally unrealistic” (line 22). Since 
Leon’s denial of the "reality” is defined as the problem, his gradual working through it (line 27)
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is prescribed as the therapeutic solution which will close the ironic gap between reality and 
Leon*s misperception of it.
The next case illustrates how even a logically consistent alternative version espoused 
by the child maybe ironically discredited. The piece is drawn from a report written by a member 
of the residential social work staff at the assessment centre where Damian Tanner was placed 
prior to his referral to St. Nicholas’.
1 "Damian seems to have an inability to talk through his problems. When he
has been confronted with them he has either sat sullenly without saying 
anything, or has refused to listen, humming very loudly, putting his fingers 
in his ears or hiding his head underneath his jacket. Very rarely has he 
5 responded positively to attempts to help him look and modify his behaviour.
And from a later paragraph:
‘‘Damian has never been able to see being in care as being any use to him in 
terms of resolving his problems of delinquency or helping him with his 
behaviour as he usually refuses to admit that there is anything wrong in his 
life. When he does admit to feelings of anger, he usually says that these are 
10 because he is here against his will.”
Two alternative possibilities emerge from the account: first, that Damian has 
problems to which he will not admit; second that Damian does not have problems, an absence 
to which the staff will not admit. However, since the account is framed from the perspective of 
a member of the social work staff rather than Damian, the reader in encouraged through a range 
of discursive procedures to read his account as the discrepant one. From the outset Damian’s 
problems are portrayed as facts about which he is unable to speak. Even when ‘‘confronted” 
with his problems Damian would respond with a range of tactics designed to evade the reality 
which is presumed to exist. But facts by their resilient nature do not go away and even Damian 
on rare occasions would respond to attempts to look at and modify them.
Damian’s version remains consistent throughout: he denies the existence of any 
problems (apart from very rarely) and thus refuses to see being in care as of any use to him.
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However, since his problems are not in question Damian’s refusal “to admit that there is 
anything wrong in his life” (lines 8-9) is tantamount to a denial of reality. The boy’s claim that 
his feelings of anger are “because he is here against his will” (line 10) is consistent with the 
version he has espoused throughout. Yet the weight of authority invested in the official version 
is such that Damian’s account of his own feelings become one more instance of the denial which 
serves to reconfirm what was known aU along.
Another method of identifying the ironic discrepancy between appearance and reality 
emerges in the following two acerpts, the first of which is from Juniour Knight’s assessment 
report.
1 “Although Juniour affected not to be concerned that his mother did not visit
him during the period at (the assessment centre) he was close to tears in 
saying so and his assertions of unconcern are totally lacking in conviction. It 
is my impression that the boy does in fact have a very close afiection for his 
5 mother and is in great difficulty knowing how to repair the relationship
between them.
In both this account and the next the ironic divergence between the authoritative 
version inscribed in the professional’s account, and the child’s version, is partially resolved by 
reference to the child’s ambivalent presentation of himself. Thus, although Juniour affected not 
to be concerned that his mother did not visit him” (lines 1-2), his closeness to tears suggests the 
opposite. It is this divergence which, in spite of the boy’s denial, gives credence to the 
“impression” (line 4) that Juniour is really very close to his mother, and “in great difficulty 
knowing how to repair (their) relationship” (line 5).
The following account also plays upon the ironic distance between Samuel Nailer’s 
apparent lack of concern and his real feelings which are “patently clear” (line 1). The piece is 
drawn from Samuel’s court report compiled by his F.S.W. for the care hearing.
1 “Samuel affects not to be troubled by this but it is patently clear that he is
distressed and depressed by it. He cannot understand why his mother’s not 
visited.”
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And, in a later paragraph:
“Although superficially open and co-operative and presenting a somewhat 
5 gentle appearance, Samuel impresses me as being a very contained boy who
probably denies a good deal of his inner distress and finds it difficult to share 
7 this with anyone else.”
Just as Samuel “affects not to be troubled” (line 1), he also seems open, co-operative 
and gentle. The rule used to elucidate the ironic distinction between appearance and reality is 
classic: although Samuel appears to be x, he is really y. What’s more, y is pretty much opposite 
to X. Notice the linguistic means through which a sense of anomaly is constructed:
Samuel affectsx . . .buty (lines 1-3).
Although apparently X. . .  really y (lines 4-7).
The conjunctives but, and although, serve as the pivot upon which the ironic contrast 
balances. So ensconced is the linguistic rule that the reader/hearer may deduce the reality simply 
by applying the paradoxical principle and turning appearance on its head. In this case, however, 
the reality which subverts appearance is explicitly stated. While apparently untroubled Samuel 
is really depressed and distressed; while superficially open, co-operative and gentle he is really 
closed and denying.
Another feature of the irony of denial is highlighted below in two snippets from the 
educational psychologist’s report on Graham Mellor during his period of assessment.
1 “Graham denied anxiety during tests when it would be appropriate to feel
i t  Graham refused to believe a (resident at the assessment centre) had 
recently died from “sniffing” to hide his real feelings.
And again later:
“Graham coped quite well with the varying demands of testing, but the very
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5 strength of his denial of any anxiety made one suspect that it may well have
been (at least initially) a diffîcult experience.”
The account encourages the reader to extend the same mode of interpretation both 
to Graham’s denial of anxiety "during tests” (line 1), and to his refusal to believe that a resident 
had died as a result of glue-snifGng. In both cases the cognitive connotations are apparent: 
Graham’s denial and refusal, respectively, are subjected to a cynical appraisal of their worth and 
discredited on their own terms. The account relies upon the reader employing her common 
sense knowledge to plug the ironic gaps. It draws, for instance, upon the shared assumption that 
anxiety is the proper and predictable response to doing tests. This background or ghost 
expectancy provides the basis upon which Graham’s apparent lack of anxiety is conceived as 
denial.
A classically ironic therapeutic procedure is apparent in lines 4-6 where the very 
strength of Graham’s denial of anxiety is in itself identified as the sufficient grounds for 
suspicion. The rule of thumb in such cases is that the more a child denies a feeling, the greater 
the proof ipso facto of its existence.
The final extract is in certain respects less strikingly ironic than many previous ones. 
It nonetheless displays certain methods through which practitioners attempt to convert a child’s 
denial into a confirmation of the feelings they assume must exist. The excerpt is from one of Ben 
Jackson’s C C ’s.
1 F.S.W: Uhm - the relationship with ya dad and step-mother here (.5) in London.
Since the news that his dad (and step-mother) will be moving up to Scotland 
(.5) uhm - Ben has come out - Ben has found it difficult to visit his dad. I think 
he feels rejected (.5) it’s almost as if his dad has chosen (his step-mum) 
5 instead of him - which has hurt Ben quite deeply. Uh - 1 think that’s
something that you actually find difficult - to say (.5) or even to admit.
Ben: What?
F.S.W: I mean out loud. And I think that’s what you feel inside - but I think in this
sort of group - it’s not something which you would say easily. I don’t know
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10 whether that’s come out in discussions that you’ve had on a one to one basis
maybe?
Ben: It’s his wife innit!
F.S.W: Sony Ben?
Ben: It’s his wife innit!
15 (1.5)
F.S.W: Well - you’re his son. Uh - it’s - it’s - probably quite a difficult pull for him
as well.
George: You-you were saying that you can’t explain it - but - you know - try.
Ben: What?
20 George: We - we sort of use words like being angry and upset (.5) and - rejected. 
Ben: I’m not bothered.
George: Well what?
Ben: I don’t feel nothing.
George: O.K. - What did you feel at the time? (4) ’Cus the situation has changed -
25 you do feel (1.5) uhm - different about the situation now don’t you. (1.5) So
what were you feeling. . .  at the time?
Ben: Nothing (with a chuckle).
George: ’Cus I don’t wanna start putting words in your mouth Ben - ’cus - you’ll
probably just sort of (.5) you know - brush them aside... Try and explain ’cus
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30 you-you-you - can explain things quite well.
(3.5)
Ben: I didn’t feel nothing.
George: Well how come you didn’t go home then?
Ben: ’Cus I didn’t want to.
35 (1.5)
George: And then that that situation when you found out that dad was going to 
Scotland - brought about this - you see. That’s why I’m saying you obviously 
felt something (2.5) yer?
Ben: Well in a way I thought “well what’s the point in me going home (.5) if he’s
40 gonna go to Scotland.”
George: So you’re saying that you felt hurt.
Ben: In a way - yer.
(2.5)
George: Rejected (1.5) ’cus he was going up to Scotland? If you think about it (.5) 
45 you must have done.
Ben: A little bit.
This piece could - and probably would be read by the therapeutically inclined - as the 
ultimate acknowledgment by Ben of the feelings he had all along. What interests me is how, in 
spite of Ben’s repeated denial of being bothered by his father’s departure to Scotland, both his 
F.S.W. and special worker - George - maintain an ironic orientation to his version.
In lines 1-11 the F.S.W. adumbrates his interpretation of what Ben really feels in spite 
of his inability to say it to others, or even admit it to himself. It is not clear from the account on
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what basis the F.S.W. has formulated his theory; whether it derives from an empirical analysis 
of Ben’s behaviour or a body of generalized assumptions about how a boy like Ben would feel 
under the circumstances. What is significant in the present consideration of irony is that the 
F.S.W.’s theorization of Ben’s underlying feelings is precisely not based upon what Ben said in 
so many words: for it is something which he “find(s) difficult - to say (.5) or even to admit. . .  out 
loud” (lines 6-8).
Ben’s first denial of a kind - “it’s his wife innit” - is met with the challenge “well you’re 
his son” (lines 11-16). In this move the F.S.W. turns Ben’s mode of reasoning against him. For 
Ben’s statement “it’s his wife innit” glosses a chain of ghost assumptions, i.e. “it’s his wife” . . .  
therefore it is reasonable and expectable that he would take her wishes primarily into account, 
to which the F.S.W. responds “Well you’re his son” . . .  so you too should reasonably expect to 
be accorded a priority in your father’s life, etcetera.
In lines 18-46 George embarks upon a multi-pronged attempt to get Ben to articulate 
the feelings that he, along with the F.S.W., presupposes. He first of all offers Ben a language 
through which to express himself: “words like being angry and upset (.5) and rejected?” 
(line 20). Ben’s reply ‘Tm not bothered” (line 21) is temporarily reconciled with the authoritative 
staff version through a temporal relocation: maybe he doesn’t feel anything now because the 
situation has changed; but what did he feel then? Ben’s insistence that he felt “nothing” 
engenders two further attempts by George: he doesn’t want to put words into Ben’s mouth but 
he should try to explain; and if he didn’t feel anything, why did he stop visiting home when he 
heard of his father’s plans? After one further rebuttal ‘“Cus I didn’t want to” (line 34), Ben 
elaborates his motivation for ceasing his visits in terms of his belief that there was no point. At 
this juncture George supplies the veiy words that earlier he refused to put in Ben’s mouth: so 
he did feel hurt and rejected; he must have done (lines 41-45). Ben’s responses are a 
semi-affirmation of George’s version, “in a way yer” and a “little bit” (lines 42 and 46).
Interestingly, Ben’s corroboration of the official version is repeatedly sought, despite 
the fact that his denial, in theory, does not undermine, and in certain respects may be seen to 
prove it. However, the transformation of denial into affirmation, ironic discordance into 
concordance or, put simply, Ben’s final admission of his real feelings, is considered the 
prerequisite of deeper therapeutic change.
- 174 -
vi) Metonymy and the Family System
The different modes of Ggurative theorization considered above do not work in 
isolation one from the other. In the final section of this chapter I consider how the metaphorical 
and ironical are plaited together, by examining a series of extended extracts from three of Steven 
Butler*s CC s. To milk their full potential I want to introduce a third figurative mode which is 
only tentatively developed here.
In metonymy one attribute represents the whole. A comparable relationship is 
apparent in the forthcoming material in which the boy's deviance (part) is interpreted as a 
symbol of family patterns and pathology as a whole. From this perspective the dynamics of family 
life are seen to give rise to certain interactional predispositions. One such tendency, that of 
scapegoating, is conceived as a process through which a member of the family is “elected” to 
fulfill a deviant role by dint of the interactional workings of the system. In this deft manoeuvre 
other members of the family group are exonerated of blame, and exorcised of many of the 
problems which have been displaced onto the appointed carrier. The child’s adoption of a 
deviant persona is thus seen to be motivated by the family dynamic which bestows upon him an 
identity and position within the group. His membership credentials are thus embroiled in his 
occupation of a deviant status.
From the systemic approach to family life employed by Thomas McKinney in the 
forthcoming material, the scapegoating arrangement is conceived as functional. It is a solution 
to the disturbances indigenous to the family as a whole. Benefits of a kind flow from this 
interactional propensity for both parties: the child is given a stable status within the group and 
one which attracts attention, albeit of a negative kind; the wider group can expunge themselves 
of responsibility for family difficulties. The solution, however, is itself conceived as part of the 
family pathology, and as such it is considered to be ultimately frustrating and emotionally 
unhealthy.
Since the patterns are seen to unfold upon the surface of the family, the connecting 
brace is predominantly between the part and the whole. This particular mode of relationship 
invites a metonymic appreciation in addition to the metaphorical and ironic connections 
between surface and depth explored in the preceding sections.
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Steve Butler, the subject of the following accounts, was a child whose residency at 
St. Nicholas’ spanned the year and a quarter during which I conducted my fieldwork. He was 
referred following the closure of the C.H.E. where he had been resident for the previous year. 
Steve was orginally placed in care because of his persistent stealing over a number of years dating 
from the age of six. Steve stole mainly from his family and his delinquency was always solitary. 
This predilection continued sporadically throughout Steve’s residential career. While at 
St. Nicholas’ he appeared in court four times, all for offences of theft, and on two occasions 
received a custodial sentence in detention centre.
A variety of theories emerged during the course of Steve’s placement at St. Nicholas’ 
to account for his stealing. These ranged through the normalizing, criminalizing and pathologizing 
tendencies explored in the following chapter. Thus while some parties, for some of the time, 
claimed that Steve’s deviance was borne of rational self interest and was therefore criminal, 
other parties maintained that his motivation was essentially pathological; a compulsion over 
which he had little or no control. In a third motif Sieve's behaviour was conceived as a response 
to the scapegoating messages conveyed by the Butler family. The disturbance was thus displaced 
from Steve - the identified problem - onto the family as a whole.
Thomas McKinney, the manager of Steve’s unit, was largely responsible for cultivating 
a metonymic interpretation of his stealing. It did, however, assume currency amongst other 
members of staff. While Thomas’ orientation to Steve’s deviance was bound up in his theoretical 
preferences his detailed analysis of the case derived from his knowledge of the boy and his 
written case history, together with the weekly family sessions which he conducted with the 
Butler family for a period of three months or so.
Before exploring the C.C. material, consider an extract from Thomas’ interview in 
which he offers a general theorization of the Butler family dynamic.
1 Thomas: Both (1.5) he - both him and his primary group - desperately want in fact to
bring about a change (2) they desperately want - in fact - to love each other 
(1) Yer? (1) They’re are not quite sure how to do it. It’s almost like a 
“Catch 22” (1.5) they in fact-punish (.5) bits of behaviour (.5) that (.5) they 
5 see as attention-seeking - but because it’s attention-seeking behaviour -
he’s-he’s doing it all the wrong way as far as thev’re concerned. . .  So what
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has happened actually is that the family at the primary level - in fact - have 
anchored into negative responses - or negative behaviour (1) yer? They 
both recognize - and in fact like it’s O K. for them to do so. Both of them in 
10 fact are actually getting rewarded in a strange kind of way (1.5) becus of the
“anchoring” (1.5) yer? Now - my job in fact is uh - I-I - 1 then see my job (.5) 
in fact - as a part of (.5) re-framing (2) that particular piece of action. ( 1 ) Am 
I making sense?
Kim: Yep.
Thomas: Right (.5) in other words to start actually becoming aware of (.5) yer? the
15 kind of (1.5) the-the-the actual anchorings that are going on - yer? And how
they’re responding - and the reason why Steven is doing it that way - ’eus he 
knows he will get that response - but at least he’s getting - ’eus if he acts that 
way - he doesn’t get any response.
Soon after Thomas speaks of how he sees their job at St. Nicholas’ as “purely and 
simply” to:
Thomas: open up a map and say - well look - this is what actually is happening (.5) yer?
20 And at the moment (1) can you actually see - or can you tell me why do vou
think Steven is actually acting that way. And eventually you get them to see 
- “oh he’s acting that way becus when he’s actually good we don’t do 
anything” (.5) yer? “When he’s bad we actually act. O K. it means I’m 
hitting out but I mean at least I’m acting (.5) and he’s getting a reaction”. 
25 (2)
Kim: Right.
(1.5)
Thomas: So what you have to try and do is somehow or other get them - yer - by-by
their own perceptions - to move around and to see - yer - the various 
30 alternatives that I’ve actually had. But if this is the - if this is what they
actually want - that’s still O K. (1.5) yer? ’Cus it’s theirs.
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Both Steve and his family are seen to be “getting rewarded in a strange kind of way” 
(lines 9-10) by the “Catch 22” (line 4) and negative anchorings in which they are enmeshed. 
However, the attempted solution is only superficially effective. Thomas pitches his therapeutic 
intervention at the level of the interactional doings of the Butler family which he, in accordance 
with their purported desires (lines 1-3), seeks to re-frame (line 11). Such re-orientation occurs 
by making family members aware of “the actual anchorings that are going on” (line 15), by 
opening up a map (line 19), and getting them by their own perceptions to see how they push 
Steve into a deviant role by failing to pay attention to him “when he’s actually good” (lines 22).
Thomas’ systemic orientation to Steve’s deviant proclivities is most vibrantly apparent 
in the forthcoming extracts from three of the boy’s C C ’s. These highlight the interaction 
between metaphorical, ironical and metonymic modes of therapeutic figuration. The initial 
piece is from the first of the three C.C.’s considered here which took place approximately four 
to five months after Steve’s admission to St. Nicholas’. A discussion ensues about the nature of 
Steve’s delinquent motivation.
1 Thomas: I’m sure this-this - uhm - uhm - review in here won’t feel that I’m breaking
any confidences at all (.5) but he definitely knows how to - how to get a 
response by actually disobeying you - doing something that’s going to (.5) 
cause you (.5) to kind of (.5) have a blow. . .  And he’s anchored in on - “to 
5 get some response from the old man - 1 need to do this”. Otherwise there’s
long periods of kind of “well - nothing has happened it must - everything 
must be O.K.”. And he finds that difficult I should imagine - 1 mean I don’t 
know but -
Roger: I want to test whether dad still -
10 Thomas: Yes - all the time he has to go back and test the water.
Roger: Yes.
[Thomas uses the analogy of a baby learning to walk, taking a few steps, and 
then returning to his parents.]
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Thomas: What this young man’s doing just occasionally becus he’s unsure of where
15 it’s all a t . . .  But he’s unsure - and he comes back - but he has to - the only
reason he comes back - is to hit you with something (.5) that he knows you 
will respond to. (1)
Mr.B: It’s becoming - it’s -
Thomas: Well no - 1 know - we-we all know it’s becoming this or that - or the other.
20 But what I’m saying like is that’s where it’s at within him.
Or again, soon after:
[Thomas says how Steven needs to tell himself “I told you my old man 
doesn’t like me - because look at the way he’s reacting now”. The last time 
Steve stole from home, Thomas says, he came back to St. Nicholas’ saying 
that his parents didn’t want to see him again, nor he them.]
25 Thomas: And basically what he was doing like was reinforcing his (.5) wanting to
believe in the fact that you don’t like him (.5) for whatever reason. (1) And 
he has to test the water that way. And he knows he can get the response he 
wants to believe in - by doing something that will cause you concern - yer. 
That he’ll get you to respond (.5) in a negative way toward him (.5) so that
30 in fact he believes his original decision (1.5) yer? (1) And that - that’s what
he’s doing.
Mr.B: It’s complicated innit.
Thomas: Oh very (1.5) very. But if I want to believe something badly enough - 1 will 
jolly well make sure I set about it.
35 Roger: Uhm.
Thomas: ’Cus he doesn’t like being proved wrong. But -
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Roger: Deep
Thomas: sorry-
Roger: Deep down of course -
40 Thomas: Deep down of course he’s (?)
Roger: crying for dad’s love and affection and everything else - yer?
Thomas: How do you cope with your own (.5) stubbomess. (1.5) We’ll stop there - 
that’s what we’re dealing with. (1) He doesn’t want to be proved he’s wrong. 
44 Somehow or other - Steven Butler is above all other human beings ( 1 ) Yer?
The first section nicely illustrates the interaction between attention-seeking and 
testing-out; metaphor and irony. In lines 1-4 Thomas interprets Steven’s disobedience as his way 
of getting a response from his father by causing him to have a “blow” (line 4). Thomas goes on 
to suggest a rationale for why Steve must resort to attention-seeking in this dramatic way. He’s 
“anchored in” on it because “to get some response from the old man - 1 need to do this” 
(lines 4-5). The two events are embiyonically connected, not randomly but as cause and effect. 
Steve behaves delinquently because this is the only way he gets a response fi'om his dad. His 
stealing is not what it literally seems, but a metaphorical representation of his need for attention. 
Steve’s behaviour is conceived in terms of his need to “test the water” (line 10) when he’s 
“unsure of where it’s all at” (lines 14-15). The reliability of established familial patterns are 
re-established by Mr. Butler’s negative reaction to the deviance with which Steve hits him.
On lines 14-44 Thomas elaborates the ironical manoeuvre through which Steve is seen 
to provoke a negative reaction from his father despite the fact that “deep down” he’s “crying for 
dad’s love and affection and everything else” (lines 39-41). His deviant behaviour is interpreted 
as being paradoxically bound up in his need to reinforce the belief that his father doesn’t like 
him; a need gratified by Mr. Butler’s negative reaction to his thefts. It is this belief that Steven 
“jolly well make(s) sure” is perpetuated, “ ’cus he doesn’t like being proved wrong” (lines 33-36).
The preceding extracts espouse an ironical version of Steve’s need to engineer a
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reaction from his father which confrrms his negative self-image. That Steve’s adoption of an 
attention-getting deviant role is a solution to the interactional maladies originating in the family 
emerges more flagrantly in the forthcoming accounts drawn from a C.C. approximately four 
months after the one quoted above. Steve had been involved in two further bouts of stealing in 
the intervening months and had served a short sentence in D.C. We enter the C.C. at a point 
where Thomas is addressing Pam Butler, Steve’s mother.
1 Thomas: Stop there for a moment Pam - for a minute. He said - Steven said earlier
on to you - that he’d like to kind of buck his ideas up there - get back home 
on a regular basis.
Mrs. B: Uhm.
5 Thomas: How real is that?
Mrs. B: I dunno (in a weary voice) I -
Thomas: Would you like to tell him. Not tell me - tell your son.
Mrs. B: I don’t know how real it is because I can’t trust Steven at home. . .
Thomas: Y a see -1 am still convinced at the end of the day (.5) you know -1 don’t know
10 whether you agree with this or not yer (.5) that we’re in a slightly - what they
call a “Catch 22” situation. And the “Catch 22” is this - Steven desperately 
wants in fact (.5) his mum and dad.
Mrs. B: Uhm.
Thomas: But unfortunately he is acting in a way where his mum and his dad can’t
15 actually trust him (.5) yer - and therefore then you can’t have your mum or
your dad. And I don’t think it’s been an accident at all - 1 think he’s dead - 
knows exactly what he’s doing when he’s taking - it’s slightly different from 
Kate -1 think it wasn’t by accident that he went off - on the day you went on
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holiday ‘n actually committed the offence that he committed (.5) yer?
20 Mrs. B: Well I said - may be he was getting his own back on {us
{
Thomas: {well
Mrs. B: for not taking him. (Mrs. B. laughs).
Thomas: I - I  don’t know - 1 mean we can go on blaming our - each other - and it’s -
at the end of the day the ball must lie in his lap - yer? . . .  All I’m saying is 
25 that it’s a - it’s a “Catch 22” yer? If I want something desperately (.5) and to
get it (.5) and to get the attention of it - yer -1 might become deviant - means 
that I’m not actually going to get it? Now am I making sense? Am I making 
sense?
Mrs. B: Well I don’t know -1 don’t think Steven can help himself any more I’ve just
30 given up on [?].
Thomas: Yer I don’t think see it’s a matter of actually Steve now - this is where I’m 
slightly different coming in now. I don’t think at the end of the day it’s a 
matter of Steven actually helping himself. He most definitely can’t help 
himself on this one.
35 Kate: No.
Thomas: Yer? Steven in fact has in fact two parents who can actually help.
Mrs. B: Well - I-I can’t.
Thomas: I know you can’t - but you know what I’m saying.
Mrs. B: Well I don’t - becus I don’t know - how we can help him - that we haven’t
40 helped him alreadv (3.5) I’m sorry - but I don’t.
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Kate; I-I agree with you Thomas that he is fully aware of what he’s doing -
Thomas: Yes - yes.
Kate: but being fully aware (.5) he still can’t help doing it (.5) you know.
(3)
45 Mrs. B: To my mind he needs more professional help than I can give him - or his 
father.
Steven’s deviant behaviour is seen to ironically induce the opposite reaction to the one 
he so “desperately wants” (lines 11-12 and 25). While Steve eagerly wants his mum and dad, he 
acts in such a way as to subvert the possibility of their trusting him. In this lies the paradoxical 
“Catch 22” of which Thomas speaks and to which he goes on, in lines 16-19, to append an 
empirical incident. Steve’s recent theft, on the day his parents were leaving for a holiday without 
him, is accorded a non-accidental status (line 16): an ironic expression of Steve’s need for the 
kind of attention which, in adopting such deviant means, he negates the possibility of.
While not fully articulated, on lines 31-36 Thomas hints at the origins of Steve’s 
deviant propensity. Steve is himself displaced as the locus of the problem: “I don’t think it’s a 
matter of actually Steve now - this is where I’m slightly different coming in now” (lines 31-32). 
Since his stealing is not interpreted as the result of his free will, or his pathology come to that, 
Steve is not invested with the power to curtail his own deviance: “He most definitely can’t help 
himself on this one. . .  Steven in fact has two parents who can actually help (lines 33-36). Thus, 
Steven is conceived to know at once “exactly what he’s doing” when he steals, while also being 
incapable of changing his behaviour without the help of his family.
Despite Mrs. Butler’s repeated rebuttal of Thomas’ metonymic interpretation of 
Steve’s behaviour, it is this thread of theorization which continues to inform his reasoning. His 
case reaches a dramatic climax in the following piece extracted from a C.C. six weeks later. In 
it Mrs. Butler reveals to the assembled party how Steve had tried to steal money from her 
handbag on each of the two previous weekend visits home. He had on both occasions been 
caught “red-handed” by his mother. Mr. Butler, who had been told by his wife about the 
attempted thefts only the previous day, responds thus:
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Mr. B: I’m very pleased - with his - education (3) and everything he’s achieved. But 
the stealing - 1 just can’t abide stealing - not-not from - his own (.5) so (3) ‘til 
he learns - to uh (.5) stop his stealing (.5) I shall stop him coming home. . .  
He can come home occasionally - but not to stay (1) not-not - to sleep.
Steven: See I told vou it wouldn’t work out -1 just fucking knew (said in an angry and 
tearful voice).
[David gets up and leaves, slamming the door, and kicking it on the outside.] 
Mrs. B: David.
Thomas: Let him go now. Let him go for a minute. . .
Mrs. B: When did you decide that? ’Cus you didn’t tell me (in angry, tearful voice).
(3)
Mr. B: Well you didn’t tell me - wan’ it.
In response to these events Thomas embarks upon the lengthy monologue from which 
the excerpts below are drawn. It is here that Thomas most explicitly theorizes the familial 
patterns to which Steve’s deviance is metonymically related. It should be noted that Steven is 
absent from the C.C. during the course of Thomas’ analysis which is largely directed toward Nick 
Butler, Steve’s father.
1 Thomas: Look. . .  do you wanna listen to something. I will tell you Steven Butler -
your son - is shit scared of you - that’s to start off with yer - and he is 
committed - in his head Nick - that vou actually - don’t like him.
Mrs. B: Yer.
5 Thomas: He would - look straight at me - and look - “I told you - it wouldn’t work”.
They’re his last words at me - yer? Now that’s what it’s about.
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And again soon after:
Thomas: Look (.5) Nick - 1 mean I - you -I  - you must get bored with me - you*re his 
bloody idol man - do you understand that? Yer? And what you*re doing is 
that he is not living up to vour expectations and you’re smacking him down.
10 Mr. E: But he is (.5) {up - up until the -
{
Thomas: {But he’s not - he -
Mr. E: stealing.
Thomas: But he is not up to your expectations becus you can take that crutch away
immediately. And there was a nice example of it there. But you’re his idol 
15 (.5) yer? He wants to be - why he wants to be like you Nick I haven’t got a
clue (.5) you know.
Mr. E: Nor have I.
Thomas: But he actually wants to be like his old man - yer? ^  his - 1 mean we’ve had 
it over and over when you used to come and see me - all the bits that make 
20 (1) Steven Butler interested in the family (.5) in this family system is Nick
(.5) you. And I tell you what he’s gonna try and do - he’s gonna try and beat 
you at everything - that you will actually take up as a hobby. (3) But you 
know that you have one thing - that he wants - and you’re not gonna give it 
to him - unless he actually is going to - obey you a hundred percent. And 
25 you’re not playing a real game with this man at all. You’re not - you’re
playing dirty with him. You’re - taking away the emotional support when he 
needs it most.
(2)
Mr. E: My emotions are pone now.
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30 Thomas: That’s that’s what - the only way I can put it across to you - and I hope you
can understand what I’m saying to you Ted.
Mr. E: I know what-what you’re saying.
Thomas: Yer? (1) But I have - that man - you know - that young man there - and he’s
- a young man now - he’s not a kid anymore. Yer?
35 Mr. E: Well then he should know.
Thomas: At ten - no not at all. No not at all. At ten - eleven - twelve o’clock at night 
time (.5) talking about the highlights of you - the old man - yer? God only 
knows what fantasy he has inside there about you like - yer? And that’s not 
taking away any of the attributes you’ve got - ’cus no doubt you’ve got them. 
40 (2) But the verv thing he needs most - ’cus he can - he’s matching you now
- bit for bit - in all the kind of trophy hunting bit - yer? He can give you a good 
game at most things which you were any good at - yer? The thing that he 
needs the most - you’re not going ta give it to him (.5) yer? ’Cus he won’t live 
up to your expectations. And therefore what he becomes is what you - what-
45 what is called in-in jargon - he’s the family sin bin (1) and all the vomit and
all the pain and all the emotions that we have got - we can chuck it in on top 
of Steve Butler. (2.5) That’s what’s happening to Steve Butler at this 
48 moment in time.
Steve’s committment to the belief that his father does not like him is held to account 
here as above for what his deviance is really all about. The irony of Thomas’ interpretation lies 
in his conceptualization of Steve’s idolatry of the father of whom he is at once “shit scared” 
(line 2). For, Mr. Butler is constructed as the gravitational force of the family: “all the bits that 
make (1) Steve Butler interested in the family system” (lines 19-20). It is this affiliation which 
defines Mr. Butler’s negative response (“you’re smacking him down” - line 9), and withdrawal 
of support (“you can take that crutch away immediately” - lines 13-14) as dirty play: “taking away 
the emotional support when he needs it most” (lines 26-27).
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The metonymic mode of analysis vividly emerges on lines 44-48 where Steve is 
categorized as the scapegoat; the part of the system which contains the emotional ‘Vomit” and 
“pain” (lines 45-46) which belongs to the system as a whole. It is in the final extract below that 
Thomas’ train of practical reasoning is most systematically articulated. The piece is taken from 
a later point in the same C.C. at which Kate refers back to her suggestion at the previous C.C. 
that Steve’s incessant stealing was borne of psychological disturbance beyond his control to 
which a psychiatric response was appropriate. With this in mind it was agreed that she arrange 
for Steve to see Margaret Wetherall - consultant psychiatric advisor to S t Nicholas’ - for an 
initial assessment.
1 Kate: . . .  we felt it was compulsive stealing - she disagreed with that - diagnosis -
and (3) she put (that) in her report. My part (.5) in the objectives from the 
last case conference - was to ask Margaret Wetherall to see Steven - and to 
talk with him. And I believe Steven did say to her that he would have very 
5 great difficulty stopping stealing.
Thomas: Yes (2.5) but I also think - like -1 mean - here’s McKinney again - look I think 
his stealing in your family - serves a very useful purpose for your family (.5) 
yer? (2) It actually serves a useful purpose becus in fact he’s living up to vour 
belief - and your belief is that he’s no good.
10 Mr. B: It’s not my belief.
Thomas: Well I’m telling you it’s the family belief. It’s what he believes. He believes
- O K. - Nick seems to be the one who’s getting it at the moment - but he has 
beliefs about you as well Pam and I don’t need to go into them now - but that 
the old man actually believes that he’s no good. . .  And if we’re told often 
15 enough by people who are important to us that we’re x y or z - we actually
start believing it. And we’re forever actually testing it out. (1) When we are 
feeling insecure in a relationship we’re forever testing the blessed thing out 
for Christ’s sake.
About a minute later:
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Thomas: You see I-I (.5) dunno where you’re getting this idea that you think that uhm
20 - Steven - had something wrong in his psyche - yer? And therefore then like
it would be a very easy (.5) coat-hanger to hang a coat on yer? And that - 
from once you say ‘Svell - yes - he has a psychiatric problem” - no doubt you’ll 
probably accept him Nick.
Mr. B: We've tried everything else.
25 Thomas: Yer - but I mean what we’re actually saying is look -1 mean that’s (.5) I-I still
think like - he’s into - he’s into accepting a label that he’s been given. (1) 
Yer? He’s been given a very useful role inside in your family - and he’s 
actually obeying it. Now I don’t think that’s anything to do with psychiatry 
at all - yer? That purely and simply is - it’s carrying out the wishes of.
30 Mr.B: Of whom?
Thomas: Of the family.
Mr. B: Well no-one says he - he’s a thief.
Thomas: No - but you’ve been telling him often enough that he’s no good.
(2)
35 Mr. B: No good?
Thomas: Yer.
Mr. B: No - I’ve always - no -
Thomas: Well -1 mean I’ll tell ya - just try and listen - listen to your son will you? Yer? 
I listen to him kind of twenty-four hours a day. And that’s why he can turn
40 to me -
Mr. B: He will say anything.
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Thomas: No.
Mr. B: He would say anything.
Thomas: Not at all. . .  That’s why he can turn to me at the end of the day and say - 
45 “look I told you it wouldn’t be any good” yer? (1) He’s - he’s committed that
you in fact like - will make - you don’t want him to be good almost (1) yer? 
Look - we all know that you do - but I mean that’s neither here nor there - 
it’s the message that he’s picking up (.5) yer? And he’s responding to your 
49 communication.
In lines 6-11, Thomas explicitly alludes to the functional benefits of Steve’s stealing: 
it “serves a very useful purpose for your family” (line 7) by fulfilling the “family belief’ (line 11), 
and particularly that of the “old man” that “he’s no good” (line 9 and 14). It is this belief that 
Steve has purportedly imbibed and which, due to his insecurity, he is forever testing-out.
The very individualization and pathologization of Steve’s behaviour by the Butler 
family is conceptualized as part of their group dynamic: “a very easy coat-hanger to hang a coat 
on” (line 21) and a stigmatizing label which would ironically promote Mr. Butler’s acceptance 
of Steve, for “once you say well yes he’s got a psychiatric problem” - no doubt you’ll probably 
accept him Nick” (lines 22-23).
Thomas continues on lines 25-49 to disentangle Steve’s deviance from a psychiatric 
perspective whidi would situate it within his individual pathology. His behaviour is re-contextualized 
as a metonymic representation of family beliefs and patterns; borne of his acceptance of a label 
which allocates to him a very useful role within the family: that of the scapegoat.
Despite Mr. Butler’s remonstrations against Thomas’ theorization, he proceeds to 
espouse it. While Thomas agrees that no-one has said specifically he’s a thief, he insists “you’ve 
been telling him often enough he’s no good” (line 33). Thomas rebuffs Mr. Butler’s rejection 
of his claims by recommending he just listen to his son; an activity which he claims to be involved 
in twenty-four hours a day. In his piece de resistance, Thomas quotes Steve’s words on his angry 
departure from the C.C: “look I told you it wouldn’t be any good” (lines 44-45). The words 
themselves, and Steve’s presentation of them to Thomas (“he can turn to me” line 44)
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simultaneously authorizes both the fact of Steve’s belief, and the authenticity of Thomas’ 
perception of it. The incident is thus assimilated to Thomas’ explanatory paradigm; transformed 
into one more instance of Steve’s sense of failure within the Butler family.
Finally, lines 45-49 generate an ambiguity which haunts much of the foregoing 
material. Although the overwhelming message to Steve is that the family don’t want him to be 
good, ‘Sve all know that you do - but I mean that’s neither here nor there - it’s the message he’s 
picking up” (lines 47-48) and to which he’s responding. This dual assumption echoes a previous 
expression on lines 1-3 of the first extract from Thomas’ interview (pages 175-176) in which he 
speaks of how the family . .  desperately want in fact to bring about a change (2) they 
desperately want - in fact - to love each other” but “they’re not quite sure how to do it”. This 
relationship between what the Butler family want and what they believe and communicate to 
Steven suggests an ironic split between reality and appearance. Thomas - interactional analyst 
- steps into the breach to expose Steve’s response as functional in relation to a system which is, 
nonetheless, unhealthy. The therapeutic solution - as opposed to the self-negating “Catch 22” 
in which the Butler family are purportedly stuck - lies in the modification of family perceptions 
and, in consequence, the interactional patterns in which Steve’s problems are enmeshed.
Thomas’ characterization of Steven’s status vis a vis the family is strikingly Durkheimian. 
By defining the deviant within their midst the Butler family are seen to open up a cognitive divide 
between he and they, and are, in this process, able to exonerate themselves of blame. As Thomas 
says in his interview, in response to my questioning the validity of taking the child away from the 
family if his problems reside within it:
Thomas: Well I suppose it-it really depends on whether you believe the sum is greater 
than the whole - you know - or the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Kim: Yer.
Thomas: Basically I am - we have Steven Butler inside here at the moment - becus of 
the - in fact the uhm - way the system works within his own family - yer?. . .  
He is a scapegoat - a (?school?) goat - and whatever kind of goat you’d like 
to choose for the rest of his family - yer? And what a nice way for the rest 
of the family to recognize it. (1) And I uhm - because of my own particular
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kind of -1 suppose training and bent really I can actually effectively use that. 
(2) Yer? I-I would call - 1 would call uhm (1) Steve Butler the phobia of the 
family. (2) What would the family ^  if you haven’t got that phobia?
Conclusion
I have attempted in this chapter to examine the variety of ways in which the staff at 
St. Nicholas’ interpreted the boys’ behaviour as the manifestation of their underlying emotions. 
These modes of association between surface and depth can best be understood, I have argued, 
in figurative terms. Thus, the child’s behaviour may be seen to metaphorically represent his state 
of mind, or ironically subvert it. Alternatively, as we saw in the final group of extracts regarding 
Steve Butler, the boy’s behaviour may be seen to express the feelings which properly belong to 
the family system as a whole.
Whereas in metaphor the relationship between appearance and the underlying reality 
is borne of resemblance, in irony it is based upon difference. In metonymy, by contrast, the part 
is treated as a symbol of the whole. I believe that to consider therapeutic reasoning in these 
figurative terms extends our understanding of the documentary method and the multiple uses 
to which it may be put. For, it is only by dint of this procedure of practical reasoning that 
appearance is invested with an underlying signiGcance which constitutes reality for the practical 
purposes in hand. By examining the discursive mechanisms of therapeutic reasoning in its actual 
articulation one is interrupting the “codes” which are usually taken for granted. But:
“Perhaps emancipatory potential only begins to emerge when the power of 
the codes is brought into view - when the usually silent machinery is heard. 
Such viewing or hearing depends upon a certain respect for the codes.” 
[Silverman and Torode (1980) - p.288]
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NGRMAUZATIGN. CRIMINAUZATIGN AND PATNGLGGIZATIGN
Introduction
Therapeutic reasoning is a refinement not only of mundane methods, but also 
everyday knowledge. In particular it resonates with the wider propensity to doubt the veridicality 
of appearance. The scepticism which locates the search for true meaning in a subterranean 
realm percolates up from common sense wisdom into more esoteric forms of knowledge which, 
in turn, having assumed a more technical vocabulary, filters back down to the roots from which 
it springs. The quest for a foundation beyond the ephemeralities of appearance is apparent in 
philosophical discourse from the shadow in the Platonic cave, to the Kantian distinction 
between noumena and phenomena. In routine interactions actors are similarly motivated to 
puncture the superficial in pursuit of a deeper layer of meaning. The metaphors which attend 
this uncovering are instructive. We talk about going to a deeper level, beyond, behind, beneath 
the surface which may be deceptive, a caution encapsulated in maxims like: never judge a book 
by its cover; all that glitters is not gold; beauty is only skin deep, and the like.
In therapeutic interpretations, the search beneath the manifest takes the pathologizing 
turn discussed above. What is sought is the historico-emotional problems of which deviant 
behaviour is a symbolic expression. The vicissitudes of therapeutic reasoning were subjected to 
scrutiny in the last chapter. However, no extended piece of talk, let alone the complexities of 
institutional discourse, can be decanted into one interpretative frame or “pure” type of talk. 
Other systematic proclivities coexisted alongside the therapeutic predisposition toward 
pathologization. A perusal of some of the more systematic of these countervailing tendencies 
help us gain analytical purchase on what is peculiar about it.
A) Routine Cynicism
Accompanying the therapeutic excavation of the behavioural surface was another 
recurrent practice at St. Nicholas’, similarly dependent upon piercing the apparent. Unlike the 
former, however, which was designed to elicit the emotional forces unconsciously at work, the 
latter alerted staff to the boys’ manipulative powers which they may consciously wield in the
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management of appearance. This routine institutional cynicism cautioned staff against being 
duped by streetwise kids who have well developed skills of deception. Even though the majority 
of boys at St. Nicholas* were seen to have emotional problems, they were concomitantly 
endowed with the capacity and motivation to manipulate members of staff. Therapeutic 
understanding and cynical caution were curiously interwoven in the institutional fabric. The 
boys were typically defined as at once the victims of events which were beyond their control as 
well as the skilled practitioners of deception which was within it: a duality which was not 
necessarily irreconcilable.
The boys* propensity to disguise their real motivation was characteristically bound up 
in the rhetoric of “fronts** which were donned in order to manipulate events and people. The 
adoption of a likeable persona in each of the following pieces is attributed to the boy*s attempt 
to stage-manage appearance. The first is extracted from a report written by a member of the 
social work staff at one of Tony Salter*s previous placements.
“At times he would be coy and subtly abusive, displaying charm, and an 
impish, toothy sense of humour. This tactic he would use particularly on 
female members of staff for whom he would substitute kindess or weakness, 
thus in his eyes, prime manipulability. He wheels and deals for fags or 
favours.*’
The array of ostensibly positive characteristics displayed by Tony are interpreted as a 
tactical manipulation of staff in pursuit of “fags or favours*’. Samuel’s charm in the next extract 
is similarly reduced to the status of a veneer which is assumed to obscure his mistrust and 
deviousness. It is drawn from a court report written by Roger Carter.
1 “His arrival at St. Nicholas’ showed him to have absorbed considerable
institutionalization; he displayed a firiendly and likeable nature with a great 
deal of personal charm. At times it is almost too good to be true. Underlying 
this we feel there is a mistrust and a deviousness, whereby if he considers he 
5 can get away with something he will take a chance.”
Notice, in lines 1-3, how the account encourages a cynical interpretation by the reader. 
We are told, in the first place, that Samuel’s early behaviour at St. Nicholas’ showed signs of
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institutîonalization, and in the second how it was friendly, likeable and charming. The 
unequivocally negative connotations which attend the term "institutionalization" prompt a 
particular reading of the apparently positive qualities which follow. The latter, we are led to 
assume, are the symptoms of Samuel’s absorption of the rules of the residential game. Line 3 
displays Roger’s ghost expectations about appropriate behaviour for a child of Samuel’s type. 
Behaviour which deviates from the network of anterior assumptions, even when it errs in the 
direction of being "too good”, promotes suspicion.
A fuller exposition of the panoply of skills involved in the art of deception emerges in 
the forthcoming account by Joyce Page in a unit 4 staff meeting.
1 Joyce: Y er. . .  I mean Wayne never used to-to - wasn’t clever enough in-in some
ways or perhaps not - not sophisticated enough to - like Tony (Salter) used 
to know how to - manipulate the P.O. group - and ah (.5) that was his thing. 
He was really good - he was really clever - at it. And he knew exactly what 
5 he was doing. Now Wayne wasn’t like that - but Wayne - has - is beginning
to leam to be able to do that - so he can use - he can use certain uhm - wiles
- you know (.5) keywords. And he-he can (.5) I’m not saying that-that-that 
that’s what he he’s done totally. But he can (.5) he-he’s now learning 
techniques of pacifying people by changing his mood and using (1) certain
10 - phrases to talk to people - so that - yer - so that he (.5) they then - uhm (.5)
forget the last two hours of-of - you know (.5) absolutely intolerant behaviour
- because suddenly he becomes this this - understanding - intelligent - caring
- hurt - child. I’m not saying - that some of it isn’t real (1)1 mean I’m sure that 
with Tony there is a lot of reality at the back of it - and lots of fears and
15 everything-at the back of it. But -1 mean - he is learning to do that now. And
he hadn’t got that before. I mean you could sort of (.5) make him back down 
and-and - really reveal something. But now he’s - he’s becoming able to 
cover that (1) cover what - he’s really thinking and feeling - isn’t he. He 
19 doesn’t reveal (.5) so much now does he.
The fact that the manipulative management of appearance involves a set of skills, even 
a talent which those so endowed consciously execute, emerges in lines 1-5. Unlike Wayne who 
was lacking in this respect, Tony Salter is presented as being replete: he is “clever”, “sophisticated”
- 194 -
and “really good” at it. Wayne is presented as a student of the art of illusion who is learning the 
“wiles” and “words” and the adoption of an appropriately semiX\\&persona to pacify staff and 
deflect their attention from bouts of intolerant behaviour.
However, if this were the whole story it would be difficult to reconcile routine cynicism 
with the therapeutic tendency to define boys “of this kind” as emotionally disturbed. Lines 13-15 
point the way to a solution. The manipulative prowess is wedded to the underlying psychological 
domain “of fears and everything” which presumably engenders the need to dupe. It is this realm 
which is presented as “real” (lines 13 and 14) and lying at the “back of it” (line 15). Lines 17-19 
echo this metaphorical distinction between a surface “cover” and underlying reality of thinking 
and feeling which Wayne used to reveal, but has learned to conceal.
The emphasis on Wayne learning a technique (lines 5,8, and 15) and becoming able to 
cover up (line 17) suggests the identity of an apprentice. In the following excerpt, by contrast, 
drawn from Barry Painter’s psychological assessment report, the reader is presented with the 
performance of a Master.
1 “Barry was very easy to be with and easy to test, because he geared all his
energies to pleasing the tester and presenting himself as attentive and 
acceptable. He had a wide range of strategies for achieving this, ranging 
from the apparently deliberate use of intensive eye contact and a body 
5 posture which leaned toward the tester (which conveyed flattering
attentiveness) to attempts to be seen as a peer and as someone who should 
be let in on the “secrets” of testing. He seemed keen to win his goal of a 
return home and also keen to neutralize any dangerous aspects of the tester, 
and his investment in working sedulously towards these two goals for more 
10 than an hour must have demanded tremendous amounts of effort. Barry
must have been drained of physical and nervous energy after consistently 
keeping up this winning persona. One felt that Barry is accustomed to 
putting much energy into “survival” and that it is survival skills which are his 
best developed feature. His effusive charm was easy and automatic. 
15 Unfortunately, as the psychiatrist was later to observe, Barry was so defended
that one saw very little unstudied spontaneous behaviour on which to base 
judgements. One saw some very subtle, infrequent signs of considerable
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tension underlying his habitual wide smile and at one point towards the end 
of testing (by which time, perhaps, the strain of the effort to please was 
20 becoming overwhelming), he spoke very angrily to the tester. He was most
indignant that she interrupted him prematurely to make an interpretation 
before he had fully expressed his meaning, and he responded furiously "You 
didn’t let me finish!”
Although Barry was so patently manipulative, one did not find that this 
25 elicited feelings of mistrust or dislike, but rather a feeling that he was simply
trying too hard.
A distinction is again drawn between the front which Barry presents to the “tester” 
and the manipulative motives which underlie it. A range of behavioural items from his ease 
(line 1), to his attentiveness (line 2), to his body language (lines 4-6), to his assumption of the 
role of equal (lines 6-7), to his “effusive charm” (line 14) and “habitual wide smile” (line 18) are 
conceived as documentary manifestations of Barry’s efforts to please and impress the psychologist 
in order to return home and neutralize any threat (lines 7-8).
The sense that his “winning persona” (line 12) is stage-managed is established first by 
recognizing it as a skilled operation within the boy’s conscious control, and second by acknowledging 
the amount of work invested in it. In relation to the first point we - the readers - are given a 
“preliminary instruction” [D. Smith (1978) - p.32-33] for how to read Barry’s presentation of self 
in terms of his manipulation of a range of apparently deliberate strategies (lines 1-7). Secondly, 
the ease of his manner is paradoxically married to the very hard work he must do to sustain it. 
An anomaly is generated from the outset. Something which is “very easy” is not normally 
associated with the expenditure of a great deal of energy, and yet we are told in lines 1-3 that 
Barry’s very easiness required “all his energies”. Again, his “effusive charm” which was “easy 
and automatic” is constructed as the result of sedulous work (line 9) which “must have 
demanded tremendous amounts of effort” (line 10). The disjuncture is resolved by recourse to 
a theory of Barry’s behaviour as a studied performance which is contrived to give the illusion that 
it is natural.
The only breach of this fastidiously maintained pattern is when Barry responded 
angrily to the psychologist’s interruption (lines 17-23). Far from threatening the validity of a
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theory, instances of deviation often serve to bolster i t  The outburst is decoded as “proof’ of the 
prolonged effort which is now “getting too much”, rather than a challenge to this version of 
events. Its temporal situation (at the end of the testing) further bears witness to the theory of 
Barry’s sustained effort perpetrated throughout the account.
Only lines 12-14 hint at the origins of Barry’s deceptive prowess and accommodate it 
within the suggestion of a therapeutic framework. The boy’s highly developed survival skills, and 
the efforts put into their sustenance suggests, by implication, that survival is something that has 
not come easy for Barry; it is something that he has had to leam to work hard at. Since the 
survival of a child in our culture is ensconced in family responsibility, I certainly bring my ghost 
assumptions about normal families and child-rearing patterns to bear in hearing Barry’s survival 
efforts as flowing from an up-bringing which was in certain respects deficient.
The recognition of a boy’s manipulative skills, whether embryonic or fully fledged, did 
not concomitantly de-skill the staff. On the contrary, accounts of this kind demonstrated 
precisely their powers to see through even highly sophisticated performances and to routinely 
employ the necessary level of cynicism to avoid being duped. This suspicion extends, in the next 
group of extracts, to the boys’ accounts of their own motives which are subjected to the scrutiny 
of doubt, especially where they employ quasi-therapeutic terminology.
The first excerpt below shows how practitioners at St. Nicholas’ did not employ an 
attitude of indiscriminate cynicism; the extent to which a boy’s account was discredited depended 
upon the composite picture staff had of him, and the timing of its articulation. In the following 
piece Joyce Page, social worker in unit 4, responds to my telling her about an incident to which 
I was witness in the early days of my fieldwork. One weekday afternoon Peter Hughes had 
absented himself from St. Nicholas’. On his return he was questioned by three members of staff 
about why he had failed to attend school. Peter replied that he needed to have some “time and 
space to work out what was going on in my head”. His explanation was met with a mixture of 
qmicism and mock. I suggest to Joyce that in my experience staff tended to be suspicious when 
boys employed j argon of this kind, especially when used to account for deviant behaviour. Joyce 
replied:
1 Joyce: . . .  I don’t think it was actually that he said that - but that he said that at that
particular time.
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Kim: Right.
Joyce: And (1.5) and the way in-in which it was done. I mean I don’t under-estimate
5 his need (.5) to-to - to have some space. But Peter to have some space to
think about things - if it’s not gonna solve anything I would -1 would think
Kim it depends very much on who it comes from. You see he was a 
manipulator so (.5) if you’re getting that kind of (1) uh - jargon from a-a 
manipulator (2) uhm (.5) then I think you’re - you would - you would be very 
10 cynical about i t
Kim: Right.
Joyce: Now - if you’re getting (2) and you see the same thing is true of Steve Butler
- Sta - Steve Butler i-is manipulating (.5) all over the place at the moment. 
So that once - when he starts (.5) I mean he may be being honest - and that’s
15 the problem. I uhm - when he starts to say things like - uh - you know - uh
- “I - I-I’m a compulsive thief’ - and - “and I talked to my mum about it - my 
mum’s going to get me a -a  hypnotist.” Now (5) I know where he gets some 
of those ideas from - so that (.5) I-I am cynical.
Kim: Right.
20 Joyce: And in a way it’s a kind of cover-up for what (.5) what he’s really involved in
. . .  Becus I know that he (.5) he didn’t (2) I mean if he said to me (.5) “you 
know when I go out - 1 just wanna keep pinching” (1) uhm (.5) but Steve 
doesn’t admit that he pinches you see - so he thinks that if he mes (1.5) uh 
24 - this (.5) uh-uh phrase (.5) it’s not the same thing.
Joyce’s account displays the subtleties involved in selecting an appropriate interpretative 
framework to explain a child’s motivations. She cites three contextual features which influence 
the extent to which a boy’s account is conceived as genuine. Interpretations of when and how 
the account is delivered, and by wham, combine to suggest what sense may be made of it. Of 
these only the who factor is given extensive elaboration in Joyce’s account. In instances where 
the child is already defined as “a manipulator” as is the case with both Peter and Steve, this
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facilitates a reading which is sympathetic to the prevailing profile. Jargonesque accounts of their 
misdemeanours by boys who are known for their deceptive dealings automatically prompt a 
cynical appraisal of their sincerity, even though they “may be being honest” (line 14).
A sensitivity to whether the account is articulated in the child’s own words, or ones he 
has “picked up” sharpens Joyce’s capacity to assess its status. Steve Butler’s reference to being 
a “compulsive thief’ rather than admitting that he just wants to keep on pinching, throws doubt 
upon his credibility since, presumably, this does not sound like the kind of description that a boy 
like Steve would generate independently. Lines 15-18 suggests that Mrs. Butler is a source from 
whom Steve borrows in defining his delinquency in tedmical terms and suggesting a commensurate 
mode of treatment.
Joyce’s subjection of Steve’s self-definition to cynical scrutiny draws, I suggest, upon 
the rules of thumb employed more generally to assess the sincerity of an account. Where the 
author is a) seen to use the conceptual language originally articulated by another which b) has 
exonerating implications and is c) of questionable moral status, then his account is susceptible 
to suspicion. The three features need not necessarily act in conjunction to prompt a cynical 
response, but where they do an attitude of suspicion is very likely. Of the three an assessment 
of a person’s moral character is the most influential in judging his sincerity.
The timbre of Leon Pryce’s description of his deviant behaviour is subjected to doubt 
in the following two extracts, the first of which is from a T.M.
1 Kate: I talked to him - after he did the windows* - in - unit 2 - last week. (1)1 had
him in my office for quite a long while talking and (.5) what he was saying to 
me was (.5) he said (.5) “I get really -verv verv angry inside - and I don’t know 
what I’m angry about”. And (.5) he said - “I look for something to blame my 
5 anger on” - he said - “I know I do that”. He said - “it might be another boy
- it might be - staff - or it might be - anything”. He said (.5) “I (.5) I don’t know 
why I’m angry” but ah (.5) now how much he picked up (.5) you know - “this 
8 excuses me” (1) type of jargon.
* :i.e. smashed the windows
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Two of the three elements mentioned above are present in Kate’s cynically suggestive 
fiiterpretation. In the first place the account is described as “jargon” which Leon may have 
picked up, and in the second it affords an excuse for his deviant behaviour (lines 7-8). The third 
element is predominantly at work in the informal interaction between Kate and I reproduced 
below. It follows a discussion between Roger Carter and Kate about how best to respond to a 
bout of “disturbing” behaviour by Leon Pryce.
1 Kate: Waste of time the two of us to see him.
Kim: Why?
Kate: I don’t know - I-I think (1.5) ah - ah - 1 think - it’s much easier to talk about
(.5) things if you ta (.5) I mean Le - old Leon knows all the things to use - 
5 “I don’t think my mother loves me” - and all this jazz. And - and - it’s only
when you get him to stop acting and start (.5) being honest (.5) you know - 
that you get anywhere with him. (1.5) It’s obvious - he’s had people (.5) 
saying - “teU me your problems” (in a deep seductive voice) ever since he 
9 was a baby. And it doesn’t work.
Here, it is Leon’s status as an experienced actor which provides the paradigm within 
which his emotional language makes sense. Only when his performance is interrupted and he 
is made to “stop acting”, a feat presumably rendered more difficult in Roger’s presence, can he 
start to be more honest, and can “you get anywhere with him” (lines 5-7). The manipulative 
powers with which Leon is endowed are seen to originate in his long history of involvement with 
the “caring” professions, epitomized by the voice of therapeutic understanding: “tell me your 
problems” (line 8).
B) Normalization. Criminalization and Pathologization
What. When. Whv and Who?
The preceding extracts display a routinely cynical orientation shared by the practitioners 
at St. Nicholas’ and other associated institutions which sensitized them to the potentially
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manipulative behaviour of their clients. The attribution of such an ulterior motive to a child did 
not mutually exclude a therapeutic interpretation of the deeper disturbance which itself may 
account for their survivalist tactics. A pathologizing schema, however, was not the only or the 
ultimate one to which the boys* deviant behaviour could be integrated. Two of the more 
coherent alternatives strained, on the one hand, toward a normalizing framework of interpretation, 
and on the other, toward a criminalizing one. The sense made of a child’s actions was contingent 
upon a reading of the contextual clues, including the considerations noted above: when it 
occurred, how and why it occurred, and by whom it was perpetrated. In this respect the 
interpretation of ‘Vhat happened” was under-determined by the actual behaviour and 
over-determined by the practitioners reading of the particulars.
If, for example, a child got into a fight just before his case conference, the temporal 
location of the event (when) may, depending upon its conjunction with the hows, whys and whos, 
have been understood either as an over the top reaction to normal anxiety, a conscious attempt 
by the child to court his own departure, or his need to “test-out” for love by engineering his own 
rejection, amongst many other possibilities. Similarly, staff may have employed their knowledge 
of the typical career trajectory through St. Nicholas’ to explain the meaning of a particular boy’s 
behaviour. What were acceptable and expectable levels of disruptiveness and disturbance 
during the early testing-out phase of a child’s residency were conceived as quite unacceptable 
and symptomatic of a child’s state of mind if they occurred during the later stabilization period. 
The timing of events thus entered the core of the interpretative process.
Retrieval of the motivation for why a boy acted in the way he did also helped to define 
the status of his behaviour. The forthcoming example shows how one new piece of information 
could provide the catalyst for transforming the meaning of behaviour from the essentially 
pathological to the normal. As my tape recorder was, on this rare occasion, inaccessible, the 
account is a replication of the notes I made immediately after the impromptu conversation 
between Kate and myself.
A) Kate speaks of how, in this business, people like to be able to compartmentalize
things. It makes them feel comfortable, and allows them to put things 
behind them. Kate gives the example of David Lyons and how, when he first 
came, he would sleep on top of the wardrobe. Unit staff would go into his 
room to wake him in the morning, and just find him there. Kate says she
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initially found David’s behaviour very bothering. It disturbed her, until 
Roger Carter explained that when David was younger, his father would 
come home at night and beat the family up. “Then it all made sense. I could 
comfortably put it behind me. I could make sense of his behaviour and start 
working with the boy”.
Again, in an earlier T.M.
1 B) Kate: D’you know -1 was thinking - about David - 1 don’t Gnd it surprising that he
sleeps on top of the wardrobe - because his dad - his dad was so violent - and 
he used to beat the hell out of his mother and (.5) the kids if he got his hands 
on them. And I can quite understand when dad - when a big - fight’s going 
5 - on at night (.5) he’d crawl on top of the wardrobe (5.) and perhaps go to kip
there for safety. So I can understand (.5) I don’t find that unusual - that he 
7 - sleeps on the wardrobe.
The “ah hah” clause, as I call it, is operative in both of the preceding accounts. 
Previously inexplicable behaviour is invested with rationality by linking it to events in the child’s 
past in relation to which it is not “surprising” (extract B, line 1), and quite understandable 
(extract B, lines 4 and 6). Ah-hah! By deflecting attention away from the behaviour per se, a 
rational motivation may be seen to be at work behind the apparently senseless, and therefore 
potentially pathological events.
When an act of deviance was committed and why were important contextual clues, but 
knowledge of who the act was performed by was the galvanizing thread in arriving at a persuasive 
interpretation of its meaning. The “same” piece of behaviour may assume a veiy different 
significance relative to what was known about the perpetrator; a process to which Mike 
GrifBth’s account below is responsive. The extract is from his interview.
1 [I ask Mike how he judges a particular interpretation to be true]
Mike: It sounds incredibly damning doesn’t it - if-ifi said that it sou - it sounds right
to you.
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Kim No - 1 think it -
5 Mike: If you uhm (7) I suppose you-you filter it through your own (2) conception
of a of - of a kid’s personality. (1.5) Say I’ve got my own (.5) my own ideas 
about what I think about a certain kid - O.K? and I interpret action his 
actions (.5) through - the picture which I’ve already built up (.5) of this kid.
Kim: That’s right.
10 Mike: Through his (.5) asse-through his reports-through my seeing him-through
my own sort of in - interaction with ’im at St. Nicholas’. And if a kid (.5) if 
one kid - heaved a brick through a window I’d say “well that’s typical (.5) you 
know - I’m not surprised in the least” (.5) if another kid heaved a brick 
through a window - I’d say - “Jesus Christ - there must be something really 
15 (1) you know (1) digging - digging at at this bloke - you know - for for him to
do that.”
Kim: Yer.
Mike: Uhm (4) my own interpretation wouldn’t be to say - well he-he’s obviously
expressing some - basic uhm - human (laughs) uh - sort of human - drive - 
20 going back to Neanderthal man - you know - so -
Kim: Yer
(1)
Mike: I-I don’t me - 1 don’t (1) mean-mean-mean to be that flippant. So (.5) what
I’m saying is (2) personally I just in-interpret what I see about kids or what 
25 I hear about kids . . .  through my - through my own - picture which I’ve -
which I’ve - developed - of them - you know.
Mike’s account neatly expresses his awareness of how sense is made by assimilating a 
child’s deviant actions to the picture that has been constructed of him (lines 23-26). Heaving a
- 203 -
brick through the window may thus be attributed to a typical behaviour pattern, or a symptom 
of disturbance, relative to the gestaZt within which it appears. Who, in relation to when and why 
are the indexical features whose elaboration provides the basis for interpretation.
Composite characterizations of a child, which drew upon the aforementioned typifying 
schemata, were not necessarily unequivocal. Dominant and recessive motifs often coexisted 
within any given portrait Very rarely were the boys at S t Nicholas* defined as wholly normal, 
pathological or criminal, since such pure characterizations would contradict the institutional 
ideology and brief. Thus a child’s deviance may have been seen as an extreme reaction to the 
normal problems of adolescence; or the boy whose stealing was conceived as a symptom of his 
emotional disturbance may nonetheless have enjoyed the benefits of his ill-begotten gain; or 
again, a skilled young criminal may have been responding to subcultural or peer group pressures.
Normalization, criminalization and pathologization are ideal-typical constructs, of the 
sort which lay actors and sociologists employ, notwithstanding relative differences in emphasis. 
In this respect Weber’s methodological apparatus is not exclusive, and the analysis of its 
operation within everyday “lay” theorizing constitutes a primary focus of the present work. 
Empirical analysis soon knocks the comers off ideal-typical models by exposing the complexity 
of practical reasoning, without necessarily invalidating their use. Actors within the “natural 
attitude” are also aware of how the concrete specifics of the real world confound the best laid 
constructs of sociologists and men. Given this unavoidable fallibility, what becomes interesting 
is how actors (lay and sociological) continue to relate specific details to a generalizing framework 
with relative methodological ease.
A great deal of interpretative work is done by members to select an appropriate 
typifîcatory schema. There is no book of rules to turn to in making this decision since no text 
could cover the infinite series of contextual contingencies which bring rules to life. This is why 
the accomplishment of sense is both awesome and mundane: awesome because members, as 
practical reasoners, are in a constant process of structuring the world of which they are a part; 
mundane because we all (with few exceptions) wield constitutive skills, and take our capacities 
fundamentally for granted.
Neither rules, nor the contexts within which they are elaborated, could be formulated 
without the capacity to typify: objects, events, people, behaviour, situations and the like. The
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typifying propensity of which Husserl, and following him Schütz speaks, is translated through 
ethnomethodology into a different terminology. Rather than an attribute of “transcendental 
consciousness” I consider the process of typification to be an achievement of social reasoning, 
which proceeds very largely without us even being consciously aware of it. For, the typifying 
schemata are an indigenous feature of everyday discourse, and are so engrained that they always 
already structure our perceptions.
The process of typification is a primary means through which the everyday world is 
organized. It helps make the strange familiar by incorporating it within an established 
framework of meanings. Because experience is always already articulated in a public language, 
with all the powers of typification that go with it, it is situated within a schema, or, to quote from 
Schütz, “a horizon of familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship” [Schütz (1962) - p.7]. In this process 
flesh is given to the ghost of generality which haunts the specific so that:
“Even the utterly novel and unfamiliar is grasped as such against this pre- 
established background of normality and typicality.”
[J. Heritage (1984) - p. 51]
The ghost schemata of typification as I have called them (page 27) are, of course, not 
random or arbitrary. By definition they exhibit routine orientations and tendencies which are 
not, for the everyday actor, logical and parsimonious. Such precision is part of the value system 
of the social scientist with her “second-order” constructs. To make this distinction is not to 
embrace a romantic irrationalism: the thrust of my analysis has been toward disentangling 
relatively homogeneous threads of reasoning. Nor is the issue whether or not “second order” 
constructs are legitimate, (they are the raison d'etre of any analytic study), but to recognize that 
they are built upon a fecundity of first-order constructs , shared by lay and expert members, 
which are primarily constitutive. It is this, the raw material, which has traditionally been 
considered unworthy of study; thrown over as so much jetsam and flotsom. Hence the 
ethnomethodological call to make a traditional resource into a focus; to articulate the 
taken-for-granted and usually silent machinery from which we construct a social world.
It is, patently, not only the more esoteric or specialist horizons that engage in typifying 
activity; these horizons are themselves built upon the foundations of common sense and the 
natural language which is its habitat. At the same time the texture and density of each schema 
or “map” will vary according to the intimacy and familiarity of the actor as well, crucially, as the
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practical purposes in hand. The practitioners at St. Nicholas’ had collectively cumulated a great 
deal of knowledge about the kind of boys who normally come into their care. This allowed them, 
amongst other things, to elucidate the typical range of motivations which underlay the boys’ 
deviant behaviour.
Having explored the therapeutic process and its elective afiOnity with a pathologizing 
tendency in the last chapter, let us explore the cognitive and moral criteria by which a child’s 
behaviour was accorded a definition in relation to a normalizing and criminalizing framework. 
Normalization was accomplished through a process of mitigation whereby a child’s ostensibly 
deviant behaviour was exonerated on the basis of his age or his circumstances. Thus, a 
normalizing "rule” converted actions which might otherwise have been conceived as disturbing 
or disturbed into behaviour which was expectable and/or reasonable... under the circumstances. 
Adolescence, for example, was constructed as a funny time in which a degree of emotional 
disturbance and delinquency is expected. Let us consider two accounts in which the propriety 
of a pathologizing interpretation is undermined by eliciting a chronological rule through which 
the behaviour may be normalized. The first excerpt forms part of George Wallace’s interview.
[George Wallace speaks of how a psychiatrist that David Lyons had gone to 
see had diagnosed him as very dangerous, and needing to be locked away for 
the safety of himself and others. This judgement, George explains, was 
based upon two situations in which dead birds had been found in David’s 
vicinity.]
Kim: Yer - the blood on the stick -
George: Yer.
Kim: uhm (1) interpréta - well (.5) fact?
George: Mmm.
Kim: Yer.
George: To me I read that m (1) uhm (.5) a kid - finding a dead bird and just -
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Kim: battering it around.
George: with a stick - yes - too a£raid to actually pick it up with his hand or-or - move 
it somewhere or - it-it’s like (1) kids when they see a hedgehog - they might 
get a brick and actually stone it to death.
Kim: Yer.
George: You know.
(1.5)
Kim: That’s right. Or splatter it if it’s already dead anyway.
George: Mmm.
Kim: See what its innards look like.
George: Yer.
Kim: But within the context of the report - that took on quite sinister (1)
connotations {didn’t it.
{
George: {Yer - and-and (.5) and (.5) and becus of that report he’s he
(2) he suffered (1.5) greatly.
George’s account can be seen as an attempt to wrestle David’s behaviour away from 
any pathologizing connotations by placing it within a framework of normal adolescent behaviour: 
something which any kid would do. The blood-stained stick is transformed from the instrument 
of torture it represents in other reports, to a means of distancing the fearful child from the object 
of his curiosity.
A similarly normalizing re-contextualization of apparently excessive or odd behaviour 
occurs in the extract quoted below from a T.M.
-207
1 [Nicola “feeds back” the details of Damian Tanner’s C.C. to the teachers, in
particular how the unit report had spoken of Damian’s tendency to “touch” 
female staff in a sexual way.]
Nicola: I felt it was rather awkward and rather ineptly brought up. It was that (1.5)
5 apparently Damian’s testing boundaries with female staff in the unit - which
is - sort of what you’d expect really (Nicola laughs softly).
Kate: Uhm.
Nicola: But (.5) it seemed to be - f ^  that it was a thing that - we should all kind of
turn and look at Damian and Damian should sort of (slight laugh) blush and 
10 squirm.
Kate: Uhm.
Nicola: I felt thoroughly uneasy about it and I also felt that (.5) if he’d done
something that needed dealing with (.5) it should - be dealt with - but if he 
hadn’t then why (.5) yammer on in a case conference.
15 Kate: Uhm.
Nicola: Because it just set the boy really ill-at-ease.
Kate: Uhm.
Nicola: And he sort of seemed to take his cue about being (1) you know ill-at-ease
and a bit aggressive from there. . .  He is much more sensitive than he’s given 
20 credit for I think - 1 think that boy is.
Kate: Well he does this sort of thing - that a lot of lads ^  - uh - when he’s sitting
beside a female he’ll put his knee beside vour knee
Nicola: Uhm.
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Rate: But (1) uhm - 1 do - (.5) I don’t think it’s in a threatening way. It seems a
25 perfectly normal (.5) experience - uh - for a young {lad
{
Nicola: (Mmm
Kate: to be doing.
(3)
Nicola He said a very - 1 thought a very significant thing - when he was actually ( 1 )
30 it was actually sort of requested that he justify himself in some way - you
know it was that (.5) kind of thing - and he said “well (.5) they never 
complained (.5) to me at the time”.
Ruth: Oww! (as in - “poor thing”.)
Nicola: Which (.5) I mean really when you think about it - what one of us hasn’t (.5)
35 done things that you’d be really embarrassed if you were asked to defend
(what you did at the time).
Kate: I-I-I’d (.5) I’d of thought it was the sort of thing that if anything needed to
be done about it - very much a one-to-one counselling with his special 
worker - not brought up - fairly normal adolescent be-behaviour (.5) at a 
40 case conference.
Two themes run through this account: firstly defining the appropriate framework for 
interpreting Damian’s behaviour; secondly the impropriety of the unit staff’s response to it. 
Both of these themes harmonize to orchestrate a normalizing version. The ineptitude of a 
pathologizing interpretation of Damian’s sexual forays is established by situating them within 
the domain of what is normal, predictable and usual. . .  for a boy of his age. The ghost network 
of assumptions about normal adolescent behaviour are onployed, in this instance, to reaccommodate 
the child’s behaviour within them.
On five occasions we are offered an explicitly normalizing interpretation of Damian’s 
behaviour, three of which achieve this effect by direct or indirect recourse to the schema of
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normal adolescent behaviour (lines 21,24-25,39). His sexual forays are aligned to: “what you’d 
expect really”, what “a lot of the lads “a perfectly normal (.5) experience for a young lad” 
and “fairly normal adolescent behaviour”. What is being utilized, without explicit formulation, 
is the ghost assumption about “boys of this age” exploring their burgeoning sexuality, testing 
females out, feeling confused and ambivalent about their newly acquired sexuality etcetera 
etcetera. Damian’s touching of female staff is thus conceived as a documentary manifestation 
of normal adolescent sexual exploration.
The propriety of Damian’s behaviour is brought into relief by antagonisticalty juxtaposing 
it with the impropriety of the staff response. A contrast structure helps define the horns of the 
dilemma - on lines 5-10.
a) Testing sexual boundaries with female staff is what you’d expect really (for a boy of this
age).
b) But it was felt that we should all look at Damian who should blush and squirm.
Part ‘a’ clearly furnishes a normative framework in relation to which part ‘b’ appears 
anomalous. The ‘but’ initiating part ‘b’ alerts the reader to a forthcoming discrepancy, marking 
the boundaries between the appropriate and the inappropriate. If testing sexual boundaries is 
normal and predictable, it is inappropriate for staff to treat it as a matter for embarrassment.
Once again on lines 21-27 the empirical description of Damian “putting his knee 
beside vour knee” is enveloped on both sides by normalizing interpretations: he does what a lot 
of lads do (line 21); it’s unthreatening and “perfectly normal” . . .  for a young lad (lines 24-25). 
The behavioural scenario is literally embedded in a web of normalizing assumptions. In 
lines 34-36, Nicola places the rule of “normal adolescent behaviour” within a more encompassing 
framework of “normal human behaviour”: what one of us hasn’t done something about which 
they’d be embarrassed if called to defend. Since the “us” of this description is a group of “normal 
adults” it further substantiates the normalizing case.
The two coterminous threads of argument are firmly plaited in the final section of the 
account which serves to reinforce a version of Damian’s behaviour as being that of a “fairly 
normal adolescent”. “If anything needed to be done about it” (lines 37-38) which is a matter for
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real doubt given the overwhelmingly normalizing emphasis of the account, it is a matter for 
one-to-one counselling, not public discussion in a C.C.
The preceding account draws attention to a routine method of establishing the 
propriety of a boy’s behaviour (even where deviant or disturbed), by invoking the impropriety 
of another party in relation to i t  In the above case the unit staffs reaction is rendered 
inappropriate in relation to Damian’s normal adolescent behaviour. More frequently, however, 
the boy’s family, or members thereof, are held as the measure against which his reactions are 
normalized. Consider the following extract from a S.S.M. in which Frank Mercer, manager of 
unit 1, discusses Simon Cutts.
1 Frank: I mean in many ways he’s a (3) if you can actually say this - he-he’s a normally
- normal well adjusted kid. Uhm (.5) his home situation (.5) what happens 
there - is - he has perfectly normal reactions - to an abnormal situation. It’s 
not him that’s abnormal - it’s the actual home situation - and his reactions are
5 perfectly normal - ’eus I’d react the same way if I were in that situation. An
- and all in all - 1 mean - he should actually be at home. Uh - and if he was 
at home and (.5) the situation at home was - as it should be - then he would
8 (.5) cope with it perfectly.
Frank works studiously in this account to disentangle Simon’s reactions as indeed his 
general status - which is, he claims, “perfectly normal” (lines 3 and 5) - from his “home situation” 
which is not. Or again, re-examine the psychiatric assessment of Leon Pryce on pages 125-126. 
In it Leon’s deviant behaviour (including glue-snifGng and “threat of suicide”) is defined as an 
assertion of independence and a resistance against a family which had hitherto: “successfully 
manipulated a whole series of difficult (adopted) children into becoming paradigms of artistic 
sensitivity” (lines 3-4). Leon’s response is thus accorded a rationality vis a vis his extreme family 
circumstances.
A normalizing framework can only extend to accommodate a degree of deviation. The 
status of criminal behaviour which falls within certain limits, (whose specifications are contextually 
contingent), may be neutralized by according to its perpetrator a normal and reasonable motive 
. . .  for a child of this age or type. Thus, for example, a level of delinquency may be deemed 
acceptable during the teenage years, or again a non-delinquent purpose may be seen to underlie
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delinquent manifestations. The desire for peer group approval is, for example, identified as the 
motivating force in the following a trac t from one of Ben Jackson’s C.C.’s.
1 Peter: . . .  we’ve taken on a lot of (1) boys in the last (.5) nine months - uh - many
of whom the school would not ’ave touched before - and that’s upset Ben 
Jackson’s apple-cart to some degree (.5) and he - finds it - like I guess most 
people of his age - very difficult to resist peer-group. And he has status and 
5 so occasionally (1) this is an interpretation on my part - 1 think occasionally
he ^  to become criminal - just to show the rest of the group that actually 
he’s still one of ’em. [Peter speaks of two recent incidents of crime from 
which Ben got no material benefit]. But I think (.5) there’s a bit of ‘im which 
occasionally pops up - does something naughty - just to reassure everybody 
10 else that he’s actually still bent you know.
F.S.W.: . .  .there’s pressure on him to still be one of the lads.
Peter: Something like that. . .  They never took spirits - 1 mean they broke into an
off-license -
S.F.S.W. I know.
15 Peter: and only took lemonade, (chortles)
Thomas: . . .  they’d be the laughing stock of D.C. - if they ever go in there over a thing 
like that. (Laughs all round).
Peter: I think it’s also important to point out who-who else was charged. (2) If you
look at the group he was charged with - they’re by and large much younger 
20 - they’re certainly much more - much less mature - both in terms of age - and
in terms of development. And - in that sense that-1 guess - supports to some 
degree my theory - that Ben was demonstrating in a sense - to a younger 
23 (?group?) that actually he’s quite tough.
Ben’s delinquency is invested with a motivating rationale which lends normalizing
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overtones to it. Like “most people of his age” (lines 3-4), Ben’s vulnerability to peer group 
pressure and desire to be one of the lads accounts for his presenting criminality. Peter Scott, the 
p3incipal during the final third of my fieldwork, weaves an elaborate explanatory web linking the 
influx of harder cases, to Ben’s status being threatened, to his exhibition of criminal behaviour 
to show “he’s still one of'em” (lines 6-7), “still bent you know” (line 10) and that “actually he’s 
quite tough” (line 23).
The persuasiveness of Peter’s theory is bolstered by his elaboration of certain 
contextual features of the crimes. The establishment of mens rea in the case of theft is 
contingent, inter alia, upon establishing a material motive. If pecuniary gain is an incidental 
feature, or is eclipsed entirely, as it is in Peter’s version of Ben’s behaviour, an anomaly is 
generated which prompts a resolution. Not only did Ben enjoy no material benefit from two 
recent incidents of crime, but in an off-licence break-in they only took lemonade (lines 12-15). 
In the absence of criminal intent, Peter finds a solution to the puzzle, why does Ben steal, in a 
theory of peer group dynamics. Identification of the younger and less mature group with whom 
he committed the crimes adds further weight to the burgeoning paradigm. Their lesser status vb 
a vb Ben, is used to suggest that he was trying to demonstrate his relative authority.
A normalizing interpretation in this instance steps into the breach which separates 
Ben’s criminal behaviour from his non-criminal motivation. A therapeutic interpretation, 
however, may equally work toward pathologizing the boy’s behaviour in cases where a mismatch 
is identified between the deviant action, and the motive which drives a child toward it.
A critical criterion through which deviant behaviour is allocated to a normalizing, 
criminalizing or pathologizing schema lies in the determination of whether the child is responsible 
for it. Where practitioners conceive the child to be a) in control of, and hence responsible for,
b) behaviour which exceeds or contravenes the allowances for normal teenage deviance, then 
a criminalizing interpretation comes into play. Paired to the notion of responsibility is the 
reaction of blame, and therefore punishment. Where the behaviour is identified as outside of 
the child’s conscious control and borne of emotional disturbance, care or therapy is deemed a 
more appropriate response. Qearly, once more, cognitive and moral considerations are 
rampant in investing behaviour with a criminal or pathological status; a determination which 
involves the assessment of a wealth of contextual particulars including those discussed above.
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In the first group of extracts below deviant behaviour is attributed with a pathologizing 
definition on the basis of a child being out of control. This brings with it a concomitant 
diminution in the level of responsibility for which the child is held accountable. In proportion 
to the reduction in blame is the ascendence of the therapeutic call for help. Some of the routine 
moral practices through which such determinations are accomplished in the everyday flow of 
institutional life are displayed in the following pieces. In the first Jan feeds back to the unit 3 staff 
the results of an emergency C.C. held on Paul Black in which she as his special worker, and Philip 
Hooper as the unit manager, participated.
1 Jan: We went (sighs) to a lengthy and verv heavy meeting. . .  concerning Paul
Black and (3) St. Nicholas* uhm (3) querying - whether we should re-examine 
the suitability of Paul’s placement with us and - uhm (1) basically - yer I mean 
just - presenting them with some of Paul’s bizarre behaviour - in particular 
5 the way he switches (.5) from being (.5) absolutely O.K. - to being (.5)
completely beyond our control - and his own - it seems to be. Uhm (1.5) and 
I think the message that we were saying was that (.5) do we leave him here 
(.5) and risk (1) his leaving us. . .  for a secure unit at (the local assessment 
centre) or borstal or something because he blows it - and he goes too far - 
10 and the way that the the violence seems to be escalating it seemed like a real
possibility - uhm -
Philip: That a member of staff or a boy’s - going to be seriously assaulted.
Jan: Yer - or-or do we actually you know (1.5) look at Paul - and whether we can
get him some kind of (.5) treatment - rather than - a holding place be it this 
15 place or a more secure place. And we thought we’d have a fight on our hands
- and as it turns out we didn’t - not particularly - in that (the local authority) 
after a long history of Paul - since he came into care - being recommended 
for psychiatric input - and-and - it never having been - provided. His father
- put in a strong case for - for Paul having some kind of - uhm - psychiatric 
20 treatment.
Jan’s use of the term “bizarre” in line 4 with all its pathologizing connotations,
provides a candidate schema for interpreting the nature of Paul’s deviance. The pathologizing
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effect is reinforced in lines 5-6 by the reference to the rapidity and intensity of Paul’s ‘‘switch” 
being “absolutely O.K” to being “completely (.5) beyond our control and his own”. This 
abrupt shift feeds into a Jel^ll and Hyde characterization often employed by staff at St. Nicholas 
to account for purportedly radical splits in a child between two personas ^ one of which is in, and 
the other out of control. The escalation in the Mr. Hyde type behaviour, necessitating the 
reappraisal of Paul’s placement at S t Nicholas, would risk a punitive intervention (lines 6-12). 
Since Paul’s violent episodes are deemed outside his control, the allocation of blame is rendered 
anomalous. The diminished responsibility which attends therapeutic categorization is matched 
with the need for some form of psychological treatment; a call Jan makes in lines 15-19. The 
“long history” (line 17) of calls for psychiatric intervention corroborate a version of there being 
something emotionally wrong with Paul of which his violent behaviour is symptomatic.
Kate Lambert’s pathologizing characterization of Paul Black’s behaviour (below) is 
similarly made to hang upon the existence of a split between an in control normal child, and an 
out of control disturbed one. The piece is drawn from her written educational conclusions for 
one of Paul’s C C ’s.
1 “I believe Paul has great conflict between the two sides of his nature: one is
to conform and be accepted, the other an inclination to self-destruct. When 
things are going well the negative side has to dominate and contrive his 
downfall.
5 In my opinion, Paul has no control over the diversity of behaviour and needs
specialized help. The fact that Paul has at times referred to himself as Paul 
vAvfei leads me to believe that he is aware of this duality of his nature and 
his bizarre behaviour is a ciy for help.
Unless we recognize his unspoken plea I truly believe we will have failed 
10 him.”
That the self-destructive side of Paul’s nature is out of his control is suggested on 
lines 2-4. For, Kate invests it with an autonomous power to “dominate and contrive his
downfall” when “things are going well”. Although Paul may be “aware of this duality” (line 7) 
he has “no control” (line 5) over it, and his “bizarre behaviour” is construed as a “ciy for help”
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(line 8). Indeed it is “specialized help” (line 6) rather than punishment which synchronizes with 
Kate's pathologizing definition of Paul's behaviour. The inappropriateness of a punitive 
response to acts of deviance which a child is incapable of controlling is echoed in her description 
of David Lyons in a T.M.
[The teachers discuss the persistence and extremity of David's behaviour 
which threatens the viability of his continued education at St. Nicholas'.]
Kate: I don't think (the local secure unit) would help the boy at all. . .  I think it
would be dreadful. Uhm but - you see - it's all very well - but I don't think 
he's capable (.5) of not behaving in that way - when - desire comes over him. 
And it seems wrong - to be punishing him - for something he’s - something 
he's not capable of (controlling).
Jason: I agree.
I quote the next piece at length because it so eloquently expresses the moral issues at 
stake in selecting an appropriate cognitive category. The extract is from one of Steve Butler's 
C.C.S.
1 Kate: Uhm - I-I think I’d like to (1.5) ^  Steven something - uhm (.5) regarding
the - the delinquency bit - right - the nicking - Steven - uhm - not long ago 
- we had a conversation (.5) uhm - 1 mean there's no question that in other 
areas in his life he's making improvements. It's almost as if there's two 
5 compartments - he got his examinations - and as Thomas says - he's getting
together somewhere along the line (.5) he's looking better. But there's j t e  
area (.5) that to my mind -1 don't believe Steve has any control over. (1) He 
said to me once - that he didn't think he could stop - that he hadn't got the 
control - internal control to stop himself (.5) taking things (.5) didn’t you 
10 Steve. (2) In fact you were talking about the possible help you could get -
with that - weren't you.
Steve: Yer.
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Kate: Do you still feel that’s the same? Becus (.5) even very recently - I’ve noticed
you on the look out (3) for what you could see. (1) Do you still feel that it’s 
15 true that you (.5) you can’t - you’re not really in control of that bit?
(1)
Steve: No.
Kate: What - no you’re not are you saying? (2) Be honest Steve becus nobody’s -
nobody’s blaming you i-if - we’re saying you can’t help it (.5) then we’ve gotta 
20 step in somewhere and do that bit that you can’t do. Now - how do you
honestly feel?
Steve: I am a bit - yer (.5) in control.
Kate: You are a bit in control of it?
Steve: Yer.
25 Kate: You’re still doing these things aren’t you.
(2)
Steve: {Yer.
{
Kate: {You (1.5) see I don’t think you are in control of it - and I think we’ve gotta
find a way of getting in control of it.
30 Steve: Well how will you if I don’t know?
Kate: Well that’s what I’m wondering - actually (.5) that’s what I’m wondering.
See I think if you walked out there now (.5) and there were a few cars (1.5) 
with the doors open - you might be trying them. (2.5) Isn’t that true?
Steve: No (3) no.
35 (3)
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Kate: Well that - that’s my feeling you know - 1 would like us to discuss (1.5)
whether Steven (3) can take this control in his own hands.
Mrs.B: Well I don’t think he can.
F.S.W.: He certainly doesn’t seem able to at the moment.
40 Kate: No.
F.S.W.: Uhm (.5) as we say in other areas he’s making leaps and bounds but there’s 
still this and {it is frustrating 
{
Mrs.B: {He can’t help himself taking what doesn’t belong to him.
F.S.W.: Mmm.
45 Kate: And in a way you see - if we condemn him for something that he can’t help
doing (.5) without us trying to (.5) to solve that one - we’re not helping 
Steven at all are we.
(1)
Mrs.B: The point is - how do you help him? (4) I mean I was thinking of taking him
50 to a (1) hypnotist wasn’t I . . .  I’m willing to try anything (.5) becus I don’t
think Steven will stop himself doing it.
[Sam King - Steve’s special worker - speaks of how Steve constantly wants 
the staff to give him another chance and to help him to get home quickly.] 
Sam: Uhm - and he’s asking us to do all these things for him. Uhm - but he’s not
55 not actually stopping - stealing - which is the - main problem (.5) as - as he
sees it.
Kate: Yes - yes - it-it appears at the moment that Steven doesn’t have the option.
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F.S.W.: Mmm.
Kate: That be has the compulsion to take things. And uhm (.5) it might be verv (.5)
60 in m% opinion - as I’ve said - I’m quite willing for you to disagree - if we look
at - getting specialized help for Steven. And if - as Thomas said - and I totally 
agree with him - anoth^ spell in D.C wül do - no use for Steven whatsoever.(l) 
And if we can say on a court report - "These areas (.5) he has made great 
improvement with (.5) and in this area - we are - looking at getting this help. 
65 Would you please allow the time (.5) to see if this help will (2) improve”.
A group of related themes are decipherable in the preceding excerpt, all of which bear 
upon the cognitive and moral process through which Steve’s behaviour is allocated to a 
pathologizing schema. A Jekyll and Hyde type anomaly is generated on lines 3-7 between the 
“other areas in his life” where, “he’s making improvements”, and the stealing compartment over 
which, Kate contends, Steve has no control. Kate resolves the puzzle of the uneven cognitive 
profile she constructs of Steve by ascribing his stealing habit to a force beyond his control. This 
de-criminalizing lack of responsibility is reinforced by Mrs. Butler and the F.S.W., both of whom 
join voice with Kate.
It is noteworthy how Steve’s solicited account of his own motivation is treated. Having 
sought his corroboration of her pathologizing version, Kate proceeds to dismiss Steve’s claim 
that he is a bit in control. This instance illustrates a more general tendency whereby, put simply, 
a child’s account tends to be authorised if it supports staff theories, and ironized if it subverts 
them. The boys’ assessments of themselves stand in this double-relation to the authoritative 
paradigm articulated by the legitimized experts. The rationale for such a dismissal is inscribed 
in therapeutic knowledge, since it is assumed that practitioners have a greater understanding of 
what drives the child to deviance, than the child does himself; an epistemological privilege which 
Steve himself questions on line 30.
It is not my purpose to subject therapeutic discourse itself to an ironic reduction by 
recognizing in it an ulterior motive to individualize and de-politicize deviance. More modest, my 
point is that in spite of the ironic proclivities of therapeutic reasoning, the child’s version is 
frequently solicited, and, where it supports the legitimized line, may be used to bolster a 
pathologizing explanation. Where it undermines staff accounts, by contrast, the boy’s views are
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relegated to an inconsequential status, or interpreted as a form of denial (see pages 161-173). 
The validity of the boy's account, in a nutshell, is assessed in relation to dominant staff versions.
Lines 18-51 above, to return to the text, allude to the exonerating consequences of a 
pathological explanation: no-one's blaming Steve if he can't help it; and that treatment rather 
than condemnation is the proper response to deviance which the perpetrator cannot help. 
Sam's miscreant suggestion that Steve's failure to stop stealing is a matter of choice ("he's not 
actually stopping" - lines 54-55) is quickly brought into alignment with the dominant cognitive 
pattern (‘‘it appears at the moment that Steven doesn't have the option" line 57). Steve, we are 
told, has the ‘‘compulsion" to take things.
Identification of the pathological origins of Steve's stealing problem is married to a 
therapeutic solution, either in the guise of a “hypnotist" that Mrs. B is “willing to try" 
(lines 49-50), or the euphemistically named specialized helper (line 61) suggested by Kate. For 
the punitive reaction, in the form of D.C., would be “no use" for Steve whatsoever. The final 
scenario on lines 63-65 resonates with the preliminary distinction between the in control good 
Steve, and the out of control bad one whose deviant symptoms recommend a period of 
psychiatric help.
Below, Brian Potter's incorporation of Leon's split presentation to a pathologizing 
schema is more roundly challenged by Peter French who claims it is a learned behaviour trait. 
The distinction again pivots on whether the child is responsible for his actions, or whether he is 
the victim of emotional forces which exceed his control.
1 [Brian speaks in the T.M. of how Leon Pryce had entered his art lesson the
day before, although he was not supposed to be there, whereupon:]
Brian: . . .  he just kept on shouting. He was shouting so loud - that no-one could
(.5) he couldn't - you know no-one could - you heard all the shouting didn't 
5 you? But then todav that was arranged he came in (.5) W  (.5) he - sat there
looking really morose (.5) and I said (.5) when the other boys were doing - 
their thing - 1 said-said “What's the matter - are you depressed or something?" 
“I dunno". So - he did some wood-buming then and he did a nice piece of 
work actually. But uhm (.5) he - he's sort of almost like a manic depressive
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10 - like yesterday - he was shouting and screaming - and was absolutely - over
the top - you know. And this morning - he’s right down - like this. . .  I’m
worried about the bloke’s mental health - 1 think he’s -
Peter: No he - he’s learnt all that trick off Samuel. It’s all put on - he’s learnt it off
Samuel.
15 Brian: I don’t think so myself - becus why - you can’t just say that becus (.5) he went
(.5) heavy glue-sniffing the other day - he was really high - and that was 
genuine - it wasn’t put on. And he was really down this morning. I mean - 
and the guy has tried to do himself in several times.
Thirty seconds later:
Peter: Samuel used to be like that exactly. At one moment he used to shout at you
20 like nobody’s business - and then two minutes later - turn round to somebody
else - and he’d be smiling.
22 Brian: Yer but I think - 1 think Leon is an unbalanced boy.
This piece captures an institutional tension between the routinely cynical orientation 
and the routinely understanding therapeutic one. Although the former may be encompassed 
within the latter, Russian Doll style, the two tendencies may equally pull in alternative 
directions. The radical extremes between which Leon’s behaviour vacillates is rendered 
symptomatic in Brian’s account of his pathological state of mind which assumes the appearance 
of manic depression. Peter French, however, cynically relocates Leon’s behaviour within the 
context of a trick, learned from Samuel, which the child wilfully “puts on” (lines 13-14).
Since the crux of the disjuncture between the two versions rests upon the issue of 
responsibility, Brian goes on in lines 15-18 to strengthen his case by finding evidence for Leon 
being out of control. Since glue-sniffing artificially reduces self-control, and diminishes 
conscious responsibility, the “high” induced in Leon by it cannot be “put on”. The sincerity of 
Leon’s low periods is further reinforced by the succession of previous attempts to “do himself 
in” (line 18). Since these incidents are irreducible to the boy’s artful manipulation of appearance.
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a similarly pathologizing rule may be extended to the manic-like behaviour observed by Brian.
The two opposing interpretations of Leon’s underlying motivation vie for credibility, 
without inducing a “reality disjuncture” in PoUner’s sense [M. Pollner 1975]. Actors rarely 
operate with a pure epistemological criteria accept in specialist modes of reasoning where such 
issues are prioritized. Because of this they rarely experience differences of perception as the 
clash of irreconcilable versions which require the stepping down of one in order to restore the 
unequivocal status of Monolithic Reality.
In both the forthcoming accounts a criminalizing schema is employed to define the 
very same Steve Butler whose behaviour was so vehemently pathologized in his C.C. two or 
three months earlier (see pages 215-218). The first report prepared by the consultant child 
psychiatrist at a local hospital is the one initiated by Kate’s call for “specialized help”. I quote 
it in full.
1 “I am writing to confirm the gist of our discussions after my visit to your unit
on the 18th November.
As you know, while Steven has settled and his behaviour improved in many 
respects since being with you, two main problems remain: His recurrent 
5 stealing and his difficulty in forming attachments except in a superficial
manner. My impression on meeting him was that currently Steven is not
motivated to stop stealing. The immediate reward for his stealing is that he 
spends the money and enjoys himself. His long term intention in stealing is 
that he sees it as a way of getting home faster, because he is likely to be 
10 “chucked out” of St. Nicholas’. Even when the possibility of detention
centre is raised, he still sees himself as returning home after this.
It seems that both Steven and his parents regard his stealing as an encapsulated 
“problem” over which he has no control. I do not share this view and think 
it is important for Steven to be faced with the realistic negative consequences 
15 of stealing.”
Paradoxically, the psychiatric assessment does not construct Steve’s delinquency as
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the symptom of underlying pathology (as theories of professional imperialism would have it). 
On the contrary, the psychiatrist invests his behaviour with rational motivation which is 
criminalizing in its connotations. Steve is not motivated to stop stealing; a) because he enjoys 
the material rewards and b) because he sees it as a way of being ‘^ chucked out" of St. Nicholas’ 
and going home albeit possibly via the route of D.C. Since both are conceived as choices which 
Steve exercises, they are not susceptible to therapeutic interpretation or intervention. Dr.B 
overtly rejects the pathologizing version of Steve’s stealing as a self contained “problem” 
(lines 12-13) which is held by the boy and his parents, and accordingly advocates a realistic, and 
hence punitive response to what he constructs as criminally motivated acts.
Although Dr.B. glosses the contextual work he has done to form his impression of 
Steven, and these are not retrievable to us, it is apparent that the pivotal criterion upon which 
he bases his judgement is whether or not the boy’s behaviour is within his control. In a C.C. three 
month’s after the one in which Kate attempts to establish Steve’s lack of control, Sam and 
Mrs. Butler corroborate a predominantly criminalizing account of Steve’s behaviour which is 
matched with the propriety of a punitive response.
1 Sam: Uhm (.5) the conclusions and recommendations are-that Steven has shown
that he is capable of promoting himself positively in almost ^  areas. But in 
spite of encouragement and help &om his home and this establishment he 
seems (.5) unwilling to control his dishonesty. Uh (.5) I feel - that Steven at 
5 this time may hold a particularly singular view of property - and life in
general. I feel that Steven’s conceptions of responsibility and acceptable 
conduct - are unreal (.5) uhm - and that - we should endeavour to get him to 
face up to the real consequences of his actions.
Mrs.B: Well I’m of the opinion that he’ll get D.C. and deserves it. Becus I feel now
10 (.5) he’s been given enough chances (1) uhm (1) everything’s been done - to
help him - to stop stealing - and he doesn’t seem to want to know.
Peter
Scott: Mmm.
Mrs.B: And uhm - after the last (.5) court appearance where he was given another
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chance - even though being on (.5) deferred sentence (.5) he didn’t seem to 
15 - to take the hint So - 1 don’t want to see him locked up for a long time (.5)
but where we (.5) at one time I thought it would do him more harm that good 
17 (^) I now (.5) feel - that it might do him some good to know that.
Steve’s capability of promoting himself in all other areas is employed in this instance 
to erect a paradigm within which to read his refusal to curb his dishonesty as a motivated 
unwillingness, despite the efforts of family and staff. Steve’s stealing is interpreted by Sam in 
lines 4-8 as a manifestation of his conceptual orientation to life; a world-view which is dubbed 
unreal (rather than disturbed), in relation to the authoritative voice of Reality. It is the latter 
with which Steve’s criminal deviance must be confronted, and made to face up. Mrs. Butler’s 
collusion in Steve’s criminalization constitutes a reversal on her previously pathologizing 
perspective. From his inability to help himself taking other people’s property, a lack of 
responsibility which required therapeutic intervention, Mrs. Butler now presents his continued 
deviance as something he doesn’t want to stop, and to which a punitive response is both deserved 
and possibly beneficial.
A final series of extracts from a day conference eloquently and succinctly articulates 
the cognitive and moral distinctions between criminalizing and pathologizing interpretations, 
and how St. Nicholas’ assumed raison d*etre was to deal with kids whose behaviour was 
symptomatic of emotional problems rather than criminal intent. The discussion concerns 
Samson Smith who had recently been expelled from St. Nicholas’ because of his persistently 
criminal behaviour.
1 Duncan: . . .  the way we work is open to that abuse because we’re working and trying
to build up trust - and work with kids (.5) you know (.5) who I mean may be 
bullying and everything else for - like Juniour Knight - or something like that 
(.5) I felt - you know - he’s bullied but it’s because of a need in him - whereas 
5 Samson seems quite (.5) straightforward. I mean it’s very sensible what he
gets off the other kid and things like that (.5) it’s not just that‘T want - you 
know - I’ve got a need to have these things” - perhaps like for Juniour. (1) 
And perhaps the system’s open to be abused by a boy like Samson who’ll be 
- you know - who’ll be working on that - whereas other kids who have - need 
10 of our system to help them through that.
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Again:
Brian: So are we saying we've got no defence against Samson Smith. You see -
because here - to me (.5) this is a street-wise kid who's comically using the 
system. As he says he wants what he wants - he organizes it (1) and within 
an open - democratic - system - he takes over. Do you see what I mean? (2) 
15 Not takes over - but to a certain extent he has done - you know - with the boys
with the boys (.5) not with us. But he's organized this nice little (.5) he's got 
his runners - he's got people who are brightened of him (.5) they will deny to 
us that they are frightened but they are - we know they're frightened. He - 
he's got it all worked out hasn't he - so how do we - how do we cope with that 
20 - with a boy like that (.5) or do we take boys like - that?
Mavis: He's got a different value system to ours.
Soon after:
Jan: I s’pose within his own environment. . .  he's successful by the measure of
that subculture.
25
Duncan: That's why I said that - yes - 1 mean (.5) it’s not so much disturbed as learnt 
behaviour -
Brian: pattern.
Duncan: Where we are dealing with disturbed behaviour - and our - and the way we 
deal with disturbed behaviour is open to the abuse of - of -
Brian: people like that.
Once more:
30 Kate: But I’d like to agree totally with Duncan's point that we are really geared to
helping disturbed boys (.5) and a disturbed symptom of the boy may be
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bullying (.5) and I agree with him that if the bullying is not a symptom of his 
disturbance - but a means of him acquiring goods (.5) ah (1) then it's a 
different ball game - and we can't treat the two alike - do you understand 
35 what I mean?
Jack: I don't think you're going to help this boy anyway (1)1 think he's just going
to be a criminal. And I don't think that you're doing him any good -
Brian: No.
Jack: by having him here quite frankly. I think you're doing him more damage by
40 having him here to the other children (.5) as much as I like Samson (.5) I
think everyone likes Samson (.5) he's a very likeable lad. But I tell you now
- he's quite a clever criminal (.5) and he will be - and I think he’ll be a 
successful criminal (.5) if that's the right term (1) uhm (.5) and it's not doing 
him any good being here - he-he'U-he'll probably end up in and out of nick
45 - half of his life (.5) before he becomes a successful criminal before he learns
- before he learns (?his way around?).
One minute later:
Jack: The Juniour Knight's from this school who is a far worse bully than-than
Samson (1) Td much prefer to have him here because I think we can do 
something with Juniour. Juniour is a bully because (.5) ahm (.5) he likes to 
50 be a bully.
Roger: It's {true.
{
Jack: (Samson is a buUy for gain.
Roger: Because it's a learned thing as Duncan was saying.
Jack: That's right.
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55 Brian: Yer.
Roger: It’s the only way he can - poor devil - it’s the only way he can survive at home
isn’t it!
Jack: There’s no way Samson’s ever going to change. That’s it (.5) you know -
that’s his mode of life now (1) for the rest of his life.
60 Duncan: And - and that’s the other thing I mean. . .  if we ^  change him he’d be lost
when he went. I mean he’d be crucified.
Jack: He would do - yer. (Laughs)
Kate: It’s one of the sad things about this sort of job that sometimes a boy arrives
and we know instinctively that he’s going to go through the penal system (.5) 
65 it doesn’t stop you trying everything you can (.5) but there are some boys -
who are going to do that.
What the preceding extracts illuminate with such clarity is how the documentary 
method is employed in assimilating a child’s behaviour to a pathologizing or criminalizing 
schema of typification. The “same” presenting phenomena - such as bullying and extortion in 
this case - assume a meaning relative to the anterior ghost framework in which they are situated. 
A key to the process lies in the identification of what motivates the behaviour. Unlike deviance 
which manifests an underlying emotional need, or a pathological liking, as in the case of Junior 
Knight whose behaviour is thus attributable to psychological disturbance, Samson’s motive is 
presented as criminally calculated: it is “quite straightforward” (line 5), “very sensible” (line 5), 
a cynical use of the system (lines 12-13), “all worked out” (line 19), “a means of acquiring goods” 
(line 33).
Whereas, in the pathologizing mode, the relationship between the emotional disturbance 
and the deviant manifestation is opaque, in the criminalizing mode a transparent and symmetrical 
relationship is constructed between the motive and the behaviour. Thus, Samson’s motivation 
to steal is in order to enjoy the benefits of his ill-begotten gain. If therapeutic discourse sets up 
a figurative play between the manifesting surface, and the motivating depth, a criminalizing
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discourse invokes a literal description of the relationship between the two. Whereas Juniour 
bullies “because of a need in him”, Samson, “wants what he wants” and “he organizes it”. Kate 
succinctly expresses the distinction between a child’s bullying as “a symptom of his disturbance” 
and as “a means of acquiring goods” (lines 31-33), and Jack in terms of Juniour being “a bully 
(.5) because (.5) ahm (.5) he likes to be a bully... Samson is a bully for gain” (lines 49-52).
Disturbance is, by definition, something from which one suffers, or to which one falls 
victim. Criminality, by contrast, is associated with an educational process through which certain 
skills are imbibed. Samson’s deviance is thus portrayed as “not so much disturbed as leamt”; his 
street-wisdom, cleverness and success, qualities he has acquired, or is in the process of so doing, 
even if it takes half a life time in and out of nick to perfect (lines 44-45).
The hint of a normalizing exoneration of Samson’s behaviour may be found in the 
periodic references to his subculture with its alternative value-system (line 21), and its different 
criteria of success (lines 22-23). Samson’s very survival is presented as contingent upon his 
cultivation of criminal prowess without which the “poor devil” could not “survive at home” 
(lines 56-57); “he’d be crucified” (line 61). The cognitive and moral relativism implicit in 
subcultural theories has normalizing overtones. Samson’s adoption of a deviant pattern flows 
from his adaptation to the social group in which he is enmeshed. If his survival is contingent upon 
the adoption of group values, and his success in their cultivation, it would appear that his choice 
is limited. Samson’s criminal propensities are softened by their entanglement with the normal 
motivation to find a niche in the group. The normalizing leitmotif, however, assumes a 
recessive status in relation to the dominant criminalizing one. The pervasive tendency is to act 
as i/Samson’s deviance is a product of his free will, unencumbered by sociological factors.
The therapeutic parameters of St. Nicholas’ are well illustrated by the attempts to 
draw the lines to exclude the criminally motivated deviant such as Samson. An institution 
purportedly built upon therapeutic and democratic principles is more vulnerable, we are told, 
to the abuse of kids like Samson who cynically use the system, and whose residence does more 
harm to the other boys than the good it does for him. In this lies the tension between the 
openness and trust, oi routine optimism if you will, which accompanies therapeutically informed 
discourse, and the thread ot routine pessimism bound up in the cynical institutional orientation 
to boys’ motives. The strain may appear at any time, but did not threaten to undermine the 
practical viability of the institution.
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The therapeutic approach to deviance is designed to bring about the desired change 
through the exploration and understanding of the emotional problems which purportedly give 
rise to it. Samson is allocated to an unchanging category of criminality ("I think he's just going 
to be a criminal" - lines 36-37; “there's no way Samson's ever going to change. . .  that's his mode 
of life now (1) for the rest of life" - lines 58-59; “sometimes a boy arrives and we know 
instinctively that he's going to go through the penal system" - lines 63-64) which is beyond the 
pale of therapeutic intervention. Where deviance is interpreted as a rational means to a self- 
interested end, its criminal status negates the pathologizing possibility.
Conclusion
I have attempted to show how the therapeutic method of reasoning was only one, 
albeit perhaps the most prevalent and systematic, of a number of institutional tendencies. 
Alongside the attempt to understand the boys' emotional problems was a routinely cynical 
orientation to their propensity to deceive. Therapeutic naivete was forsworn for fear it blind 
practitioners to the constant possibility that they may be tripped up or duped by the boys' powers 
of manipulation. A cynical attitude did not necessarily negate a therapeutic one. The child's 
penchant for deception may itself be accommodated within a pathologizing paradigm, as a 
response to his family history. Equally, the juxtaposition of the two contrasting perspectives may 
give rise to disagreement between advocates of the alternative versions.
Staff assessments of the motives underlying a child's deviance, itself contingent upon 
the processing of a morass of contextual particulars, gave rise to three systematic tendencies 
toward normalization, criminalization and pathologization. I have attempted to elucidate some 
of the key issues at stake in electing an appropriate schema. When an exonerating rule could be 
found, by dint of the level of acceptable deviance which attends adolescence, the behaviour may 
be normalized. The critical feature in distinguishing between a pathological and criminal 
motivation lay in the adjudication of whether the act of deviance was within the child's rational 
control, or whether it was the manifestation of a psychological disturbance. Where deviant 
means were symmetrically paired to the material ends they achieved a criminalizing process 
ensued.
The interpretation of who, why and when an act of deviance occurred were all 
important contextual considerations. The composite picture of who was responsible, however,
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was the most important component in assessing its significance. The staff employed a range of 
discursive procedures in typifying the patterns of a boy’s behaviour. In the process he was 
invested with dominant and recessive characteristics: if deemed exclusively bad, mad, or normal, 
his placement at S t Nicholas’ would be considered inappropriate. Hence Samson’s criminality 
and Paul Black’s disturbance were considered sufficient to terminate their residence in an 
institution whose raison d'etre was to work with the disturbed and disturbing; the problem child 
whose deviant reaction flowed predominantly from his status as a child with problems.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DOING HISTORY
Introduction
In the preceding two chapters I explored the ways in which practitioners invested the 
boys* behaviour with significance in relation to the underlying reality of their emotions and 
motives. In the second half of this thesis I want to move on from the discursive relationship 
constructed between the surface and the depth, to the relationship which practitioners set up 
between the present and the past. For, just as the boy’s behaviour was understood as being 
responsive to his underlying motives, these, in turn, were seen to be embroiled in his history. The 
emotional damage incurred by the circumstances of the boy’s past was thus typically held 
responsible, to some degree, for his present misdemeanours. To better appreciate the subtleties 
of this process, I start by offering a theoretical model of time, history and narrative which broadly 
informs my treatment of the empirical material.
i) The Dissolution of Dualism
The attempt to dissolve dualism, a leitmotif of modem philosophy and social science, 
has been taken up with renewed vigour in the last decade or two. Recent calls for dissolution 
have assumed a particular nuance characterized by the pursuit of a theory ot structuration [A. 
Giddens -1976], and the insistence upon a thoroughly historical orientation. Recognition of the 
in-time-ness of events equips the theorist with a finely attuned sensitivity to process. Phenomena 
which are usually kept apart can thus be brought into a relationship of interdependence.
While P. Abrams acknowledges that dualism has been "a stupendously powerful tool 
of thought, rightly celebrated. . . ” as the source of many of the accomplishments of Western 
Civilization, he also insists: "The weight of two and a half millennia of treating dualism as the 
obvious basis for effective thought is remarkably oppressive” [Philip Abrams (1982) - p.227-228]. 
Such cultural dominance makes any attempt to grapple with the dissolution as difficult as it is 
necessary for a more rounded understanding. In the words of Abrams:
‘Troperly to appreciate the historical and sociological relationship of individual 
and society we have, in my view, to make a determined effort to un-think
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dualism; to escape from the seductive clutches of the belief that the 
individual has a being distinct from that of society or, conversely, that society 
and the individual constitute separate realities. We have to try to convince 
ourselves that what we call individual and society are in fact aspects or 
phases of a unified human reality and not essentially distinct, let alone 
opposed, entities.”
Pbid-p.227]
The embrace of a dynamic orientation demands that one abandon certain of the core 
assumptions of Humanism, because:
"In principle the wall of self around the great individual collapses. . .  once 
we force ourselves to see social reality as a process rather than order, 
structuring rather than structure, becoming not being.”
[Ibid - p.267]
In this respect, a processual approach shuns methodological individualism as much as its 
collectivist counterpart.
Of course, the intellectual landscape is littered with attempts to undo dualism, only to 
reintroduce it in another form, or to render one term in the dichotomous pair full and the other 
empty. The general tendency of sociology, especially that which follows in the Marxist and 
Durkheimian tradition, has been to "solve” the problematic by making history and/or society 
objective and replete at the expense of depleting human agency by denuding it of any 
constitutive power. The solution fails to engage adequately with the "double-relation” [A. Giddens] 
of man-in-society-in-man. For:
"To enquire into the structuration of social practices is to seek to explain 
how it comes about that structures are constituted through action, and 
reciprocally how action is constituted structurally.”
[A- Giddens (1976) - p.l61]
From the opposing perspective, phenomenological philosophy built an apparent 
escape from old modes of thought by prioritizing "consciousness o f ’, thus collapsing both the 
observing subject and the observed object. The two are rendered inseparable and it is only their 
marriage in terms of "consciousness of” which can act as the solid foundation of reality. This 
sounds appealing until we realize that the kind of consciousness which is "conscious o f ’ is not 
a social one at all, but the apotheosis of transcendental subjectivity which Husserl certainly 
believed to be the culminating moment of the Cartesian tradition.
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Unlike Descartes the subjectivity proffered by Husserl is in no sense solipsistic. It is 
a universal structure which acts no less as an objective foundation of knowledge than do the 
structures inscribed in materialist versions of reality. In this sense phenomenology and Marxism, 
for example, are equally objectivist, although the location of the Absolute differs.
Schutz's conversion of phenomenology into a sociological enterprise was a significant 
advance. The “consciousness” posited by Schütz is inter-subjective and typifying. It is a social 
consciousness which shares in a community bonded not by a priori mental apparatus, but by its 
adherence to schemata of typification which define cultural membership. The concept of 
“typification” is doubly useful: it suggests an inventory of types through which actors link the 
specific to a generalizing schema; it also alludes to the procedures through which sense is 
empirically accomplished.
Notwithstanding the insights which Schutz's work yields, it is hampered by certain 
flaws which blunt its radicality. Two are particularly apposite to the present discussion. Firstly, 
Schütz fails to develop his theoretical assumptions through empirical exploration; a fault shared 
by many whose pristine programmatic formulations defy the muddled vicissitudes of everyday 
life. Secondly, the chimera of presuppositionlessness inherited from Husserl infests Schutz’s 
work, giving rise not to the impulse to strip consciousness to its essential, universal bone, but to 
the belief that the phenomenological observer can shed her cultural skin of presuppositions in 
order to see what is actually happening. In his denial of reflexive interdependence between 
observer and observed, Schütz reverts to the comforting arms of dualism.
By embracing both an empirical and reflexive orientation, ethnomethodology offers 
a most challenging and fruitful development on Schutz’s work. It cultivates what is most radical 
in the phenomenological tradition, while building upon it a new edifice. Ethnomethodology 
exorcises what Richard Bernstein calls “Cartesian anxiety”, epitomized by the search for an 
absolute foundation which lies either in one domain or the other.
**Either there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our 
knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with 
madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.”
[R.J. Bernstein (1983) - p. 18]
[Emphasis is the original]
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Yet, despite their persistence:
"There are, however, many signs that the deep assumptions, commitments, 
and metaphors that have shaped these oppositions, and from which they 
gain their seductive power, are being called into question. For along with 
the disquietude that is provoked by these extremes, there is a growing sense 
that something is wrong with the ways in which the relevant issues and 
options are posed - a sense that something is happening that is changing the 
categorial structure and patterns within which we think and act - a sense that 
we have an urgent need to move beyond objectivism and relativism.”
[Ibid - p.2]
This chapter began by alluding to one such attempt to “move beyond” by emphasizing 
the fluidity of action and structure which fuse in the process of structuring. Only by halting the 
incessant social motion and taking a snapshot can we harbour the illusion of stasis and 
separatism; only by ignoring the flux in which action and structure, the actor and society are 
involved in a relationship of mutual interdependence, each endlessly and inevitably articulating 
the other. The dance provides the necessary rules through which the dancer can bring it to life. 
Without sequential organization, an intrinsically temporal phenomenon, the dancer has no 
structure with which to work. But only through its enactment can the dance be realized. The 
relationship is reciprocal.
A processual appreciation has an elective afflnity with an historical form of analysis, 
although the latter by no means offers a guarantee. Time and history enter social processes in 
a number of senses, distinguishable for analytical purposes. In the first place a most basic 
anthropological sensitivity alerts us to how socially shared conceptions sculpt our way of seeing 
the world, and that such conceptions are cross-culturally and historically variable. History is 
more than a stage upon which actors play a part; it enters the script itself, and how actors 
conceive themselves and others in relation to i t  It is perhaps more misleading (not to mention 
passé) than it is enlightening to pursue a dramaturgical metaphor. We all know life is real. It 
simply serves to explode a conception of history as a husk within which action occurs. For this 
leads us to the curious paradox of a history outside of time. Heritage suggests a way of 
overcoming this difficulty with regard to “context”. I suggest we may learn something by 
applying his lesson to the historical context.
“A solution to these problems can emerge as soon as we abandon our 
traditional conception of‘context’ as something exogenous to interaction or
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as an external interpretative resource. Instead, we can begin to think of 
‘context’ as something endogenously generated within the talk of the 
participants and, indeed, as something created in and through that talk.” 
[John Heritage (1984) - p.283]
[Emphasis in original]
This quotation takes us farther along the path of discussion than we have presently 
reached, but let us take from it at this point the notion that history is not an external resource 
which can be utilized either retrospectively by the historian, or contemporaneously by the 
participant in a particular historical period. For the nuances of their own respective times have 
entered their mode of practical reasoning and entwined themselves in common sense thought.
In this sense we belong to history, we are from the outset “in amongst it all” in 
Heideggerian terms. There can be no doubt, he believed, of this ontological foundation to 
existence, and it was scandalous that so many philosophers have wasted so much time attempting 
to doubt it. For Heidegger our being in the world outside of our subjective selves is an 
indisputable fact. We are not subjects perceiving objects as modem philosophy previously had 
it. Heidegger insisted that this is not the mode in which human beings relate to the world. As 
Professor Drtyfus remarks this was a radical turn in philosophy because, from Descartes 
onward, philosophers had identified subject-object relations in this dualistic way. From this 
derived the primacy of epistemological questions: how do subjects have knowledge of objects, 
and how do we know that knowledge is true? Heidegger’s view, expressed in Professor Dreyfus’ 
words, is that we are not:
“separate subjects looking through some invisible plate glass window at an 
objective reality which is “out there” and to which we try and relate or which 
we try and get ^ owledge. We are from the beginning in amongst it all. We 
are in there in the world.. .  coping with it. So we’re not primarily observing 
or knowing beings at all in the way that traditional philosophers have treated 
us as being - we’re coping beings. . .  or being beings, and it’s from there that 
we start.”
[Professor Dreyfus - on the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and 
Heidegger - in the series “Men of Ideas” presented by Brian Magee. B.B.C. 
TV.]
It is this form of relatedness that ethnomethodologists consider in terms of the 
incarnate or indexical quality of social existence. We are practical beings. We cannot, nor in 
everyday life do we have any purpose, to spell out how we know the world, others and ourselves. 
We are in the muddle of social existence prior to attempts to intellectualize it. Social existence
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is at once an historical mode of being to which we “belong”, to use Gadamer’s term, prior to our 
consciousness of it belonging to us. It is here an enlightened philosophy and an aware sociology 
can constructively meet.
As practical actors first and foremost we are engaged in a range of projects, often 
interwoven and diverse. Sequentiality enters these programmes of practical action rendering a 
sense of time, (past, present and future), an intimate feature of them. “Projects”, signifying any 
form of organized practical activity, always bring with them a sense of the past, filtered through 
what Gadamer calls “effective historicity”. Objects always appear in one context or another 
which imbue them with meaning. To quote once more from Dreyfus (Ibid): “Things show up 
as mattering in a particular way. This is because we*re always already in a situation and it always 
already matters in some way. We don’t start from nothing”. What I take from this is an allusion 
to a rich and infinite inventory of background expectations or ghost assumptions, as I prefer to 
call them, which attend each occasion of practical reasoning. We are thus disposed to reading 
the significance of items by situating them within a schema of interpretation.
Yet each act of cultural reproduction is at once an act of production. As I attempt to 
display throughout, making sense is an active and artful accomplishment; not a passive 
correspondence or matching operation. Through discourse, in Heidegger’s sense, whether it be 
talk or work, the participant is actively engaged in articulating a world and in so doing 
perpetuates history or, to greater and lesser degrees, changes it.
On the third temporal horizon, our projects “press into the future” (Dreyfus - Ibid). 
We harbour routine assumptions about the consequences of our actions which we perform “in 
order to” bring about some future result. This three-fold temporal process alerts us to how 
present actions are not discrete, nor isolated instances. By utilizing temporal frames of 
reference as a resource, however, we are able to cut up and reorganize our projects for the 
practical purposes in hand. Actors may thus add a sense of clarity and precision to their 
proceedings where necessary. But the cutting up occurs while in the flow.
“There is no extratemporal “shore” upon which I could save myself from the 
stream. While I reflectively attend to the past phases or even the phase just 
become present, I remain “in” the stream of consciousness.”
[A. Schütz (1974) - p.53]
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Looking at historical structuration at the level of everyday practical action reveals how 
a sense of history, its appreciation, has nothing intrinsically to do with grandiosity of scale in 
terms of time or numbers. It is defined more accurately in terms of a researcher’s sensitivity to 
process. Analysis of two minutes conversation can be as much historical as that of Greek 
Civilization. In some senses potentially more so because in examining the minutiae of discourse 
one is forced to consider its sequentiality, its retrospective-prospective nature. Our conversation 
itself, in other words, is a temporally organized affair; only by analyzing it over time can we 
understand the patterns that emerge. No school can have contributed more to an empirical 
understanding of the sequentiality of naturally occurring talk than conversation analysis. 
Shunning the promiscuous theorizing which they see certain ethnomethodological parties to be 
engaged in, conversation analysts bring an acute empirical precision to the understanding of talk 
as an ordered social phenomenon which exhibits routine patterns upon analysis.
Talk brings the three temporal horizons into a structured relationship. Since 
communication has as its prerequisite an orientation to context, and context is itself "endogenously” 
generated, it is clear that any sequence of talk is both ‘‘context shaped” and ‘‘context renewing”, 
to use Heritage’s words.
‘‘A speaker’s action is context-shaped in that its contribution to an on-going 
sequence of actions cannot adequately be understood except by reference 
to the context - including, especially, the immediately preceding configuration 
of actions - in which it participates . . .  The context-renewing character of 
conversational actions is directly related to the fact that they are context 
shaped. Since every ‘current’ action will itself form the immediate context 
for some ‘next’ action in a sequence, it will inevitably contribute to the 
framework in terms of which the next action will be understood.”
[J. Heritage (1984) - p.242]
[Emphasis in original]
Thus, each new contribution extends the contextual canopy to the next and will renew the sense 
of context generated in previous talk. The sequentiality of talk is thus vital in the formation of 
communicative patterns.
A critique of conversation analysis, however summary, is inappropriate here, as is a 
detailed empirical elaboration. We only need consider practices such as turn-making and paired 
actions to identify the seriality through which meaningful conversation emerges. Inscribed in a 
conversational turn are the instructions for how and when to respond and on occasions who
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should take the next turn. Stripped of all the subtle nuances on which the conversation analyst 
thrives, consider this:
A: How ya been? Haven’t seen you for ages.
B: Oh - not too bad! We’ve been busy moving.
In spite of being cleaned up in a way quite unacceptable to the conversation analyst, 
this extract nonetheless displays the temporal organization of talk. Inscribed in A’s turn, by dint 
of its sequential location, is a question directed to a specific co-participant B, who, through her 
orientation to the paired action of question and answer, hears and responds in the following 
turn. Sacks uses the term “adjacency-pair” to describe this subset of paired actions which follow 
immediately one from the other. The enactment of the rule of adjacency pairs is described by 
Schegloff and Sacks as follows:
“given the recognizable production of a first pair part, on its first possible 
completion its speaker should stop and a next speaker should start and 
produce a second pair part from the pair type the Orst pair part is recognizably 
a member of.”
[Quoted in J. Heritage (1984) - p.246]
“Conversation analysis is therefore primarily concerned” says Heritage, 
“with the ways in which utterances accomplish particular actions by virtue of 
their placement and participation within sequences of actions. It is sequences 
and tums-within-sequences which are thus the primary units of analysis.” 
Pbid-p.245]
So what, one may rightfully ask, saves this form of analysis from being a highly 
technical and elaborate corollary of Pavlovian behaviourism. Is this not a form of mechanistic 
conversational conditioning: tum-taker “A” rings bell, tum-taker “B ” salivates. While this may 
be a splinter tendency within the school, to view the body of conversation analysis in this way is 
to miss its more enlightened insights. What is identified is not a set of invariant mechanisms, but 
flexible codes that members reflexively orientate to both in the construction and reception of 
talk.
The assumptions which undergird members’ communicative competence (which here 
is considered indistinguishable from their “performance”) act like any other typificatory schema 
- as a ghost framework which allows us to quite unthinkingly monitor talk as we do it.
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Conversation cannot proceed without the largely unconscious panoply of skills which participants 
employ in managing interaction. The skills consist in both knowledge of appropriate rules for 
the situation, as well as the capacity to procedurally activate them. Conversational competence 
then is grounded in the capacity to monitor talk as it happens and reflexively intervene in the flow 
of events which the talk is itself giving shape to.
The rules of talk are normative in the specific sense that they enter into our working 
criteria of the typical and normal through which any actual occasion of talk can be assessed. An 
orientation to the temporal features of talk, its seriality, is a primary aspect of the surveillance, 
allowing participants to gauge the significance of a conversational sequence. Where the 
interaction departs from routine assumptions, different motives can be ascribed to explain the 
deviation. The ongoing assessment of talk in terms of conversational codes is guided by both a 
cognitive-organizational criteria, and a moral one. Thus if A says “hullo” to B, and B does not 
respond, A will attempt to repair this deviation by drawing on the rule of adjacency pairs, 
exemplified in this case by the format of initiation-response. The breach of this pattern 
constitutes an anomaly which requires reparation. The permutations are multiple: B didn't hear 
me; B’s angry with me; B’s going mad; B’s got something on her mind; B’s doing a breaching 
experiment, amongst many others. The deviation appears against a normative background of 
what typically does happen, as well as a moral background of what should. Membership 
competence is a key component of the ethnomethodological model of agency, which restores its 
constitutive power, and rebalances the “double-relation”.
Talk is realized through time. Interactants also use time as a resource to organize 
communication. Through a shared orientation to discursive rules co-participants erect what 
Heritage aptly calls “an architecture of inter-subjectivity” [Ibid - p. 254] built upon the seriality 
of talk. For, in her response to A’s turn interactant B not only draws upon, but displays her 
understanding of what is said, which is thus made publicly accessible to A. A’s response to B’s 
response to A offers a similar opportunity. Through public accountability, co-participants can 
constantly monitor the adequacy of others understanding of their intended meaning. The 
seriality of talk and its distribution into turns is doubly effective a) in its provision of a method 
of monitoring inter-subjective communicability; and b) in terms of the way each new utterance 
builds upon and transforms the hitherto existing conversational canopy, thus driving the 
conversation forward. The temporality of talk is an important motor in this process, in the words 
of Goodwin and Goodwin:
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**rather than presenting a naked analysis of the prior talk, next utterances 
characteristically transform that talk in some fashion - deal with it not in its 
own terms but rather in the way in which it is relevant to the projects of the 
subsequent speaker.”
[Quoted in J. Heritage (1984) - p.260]
Does this not give a very precise and manageable grounding to Abrams suggestion
that:
"it is a matter of treating what people do in the present as a struggle to create 
a future out o f the past, as seeing that the past is not just the womb of the 
present but the onlÿ raw material out of which the present can be constructed.” 
[P. Abrams (1982) - p.8]
[Emphasis in original]
To summarize then, in Heritage’s eloquent words:
"conversational interaction is structured by an organization of action which 
is implemented on a tum-by-tum basis. By means of this organization, 
a context o f publicly displayed and continuously up-dated intersubjective 
understandings is systematically sustained. It is through this ‘tum-by-tum’ 
character of talk that the participants display their understandings of ‘the 
state of the talk’ for one another.”
[J. Heritage (1984) - p.259]
[Emphasis in original]
Through this circuitous route I come to the central plank of my argument. Everyday 
discourse, whether verbal or written, is the most fundamental and productive site upon which 
stmcturing occurs. Through examination of it we are given access to the procedures through 
which a sense of reality is accomplished. Discourse also displays the range of theories through 
which members give substance and shape to their world. The two components, members’ theory 
and methodology, are aspects of the same stmcturing dynamic. In the process of making sense 
the specific is linked into the wider network of typifications and thus becomes part of the shared 
world. The attempt here is to raise temporal codes to analytic visibility; to render them, in the 
words of the old ethnomethodological adage, a focus as well as an inevitable resource.
This analytical focus has been notably absent from the mainstream sociological 
enterprize. Over twenty years since the publication of Garfmkel’s Studies in Ethnomethodology, 
it is striking how few of the insights in this lucrative field of sociological exploration have filtered 
into the traditional core of sociological wisdom. The neglect is only minimally less apparent
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amidst those renewed calls for a new historical orientation to the problem of structuring with 
which we started this chapter. P. Abrams, for instance, in spite of his eloquence of exposition, 
ignores the orientations that members themselves have to time and how they construct a sense 
of history. His election of the sociology of deviance as the apotheosis of a processual approach 
reflects his ignorance of developments on interactionism. For, without wishing to diminish the 
major contributions that have been made in this fertile field of analysis, interactionism tends to 
gloss over what ethnomethodologists consider to be the most fascinating problem of all. While 
interactionist studies are, in the words of Abrams,
“explanations centred on the idea of temporally organized sequence. The 
crucial explanatory concepts refer to successions of action and reaction and 
of personal and social change in time: socialization, drift, the formation of 
sub-cultures, affiliation, the deviant career, signification. In all the varieties 
of the sociology of deviance deviants are explained in terms of their 
histories.”
[P. Abrams (1982) - p.269]
... they often fail to examine members “explanations centred on the idea of temporally organized 
sequence”, or their “crucial explanatory concepts”. The relationship between the analytical 
proclivities of lay actor and sociologist is drawn upon as an unexplicated resource in this mode 
of analysis.
A nice example of the analytical differentiation between classical interactionism, and 
genre of analysis employed in this study, can be gleaned by quoting Abrams’ admiring remarks 
about Lemert’s work. He seeks, we are told,
“to specify the interactions, junctures and episodes that mark the decisive 
passages in the life history of individuals.. . ”
[P. Abrams (1982) - p.270]
. . .  who are in the process of becoming deviant. It is clearly the sociologist’s analytical criteria 
that is being employed to determine the nodal points in the history of becoming delinquent. The 
focus here, by contrast, is upon the criteria through which members themselves select, organise 
and narrate the past by specifying junctures, episodes and “decisive passages”.
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Notwithstanding a nod in the direction of conversation analysis by acknowledging its,
"significant contribution in stressing that the managing of talk by social 
actors routinely employs the location of a conversation in time as a mode of 
organizing that conversation”,
[A. Giddens (1979)-203]
. .  .Giddens fails to take his appreciation further. Replete with programmatic formulations and 
sophisticated theoretical synthesis, he gives little clue as to how his theory of structuration can 
be effectively applied to the world in which structuring ostensibly occurs.
ii) The Historian's Task
We not only “belong to history”, in Heideggerian terms, it also “belongs to us”. To 
embrace one side of the equation to the exclusion of the other, is to lapse into either 
determinism or voluntarism. Historical traditions, as Gadamer identifies them, are not reified 
entities which stand over us; they are part of us and work only through our active engagement 
with them. We, as members of cultural and linguistic communities, make history. In our 
application of common sense theories and methods, we construct a sense of time and history: a 
collective and collaborative feat. In this lies the concept of historicity and the restoration of 
human agency to a properly constitutive role.
In reconstructing the past the historian brings to it a panoply of assumptions which 
derive (temporally and spatially) from her native culture. There is not an ahistorical arbitration 
on historical facts; they are constructed from the moving perspective of the present. In a 
nutshell, the historical “object” is inseparable from the observing “subject” who - situated in a 
diEerent time and place - brings her cultural repertoir to bear. For Gadamer:
“True historical thinking must take account of its own historicality. Only 
then will it not chase the phantom of an historical object which is the object 
of progressive research, but learn to see in the object the counterpart of 
itself and hence understand both. The true historical object is not an object 
at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a relationship in which exist 
both the reality of history and the reality of historical understanding. A 
proper hermeneutics would have to demonstrate the effectivity of history 
within understanding itself.”
[Quoted in R. Bernstein (1983) - p. 142]
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The reflexive tie between the observer and the observed is not destructive, nor an 
impediment: it is a productive relationship. Where observer and observed are separated by time 
and/or space, the gap ofifers an occasion to explore the hidden assumptions of the here and now. 
In the words of Ricoeur, it is:
“the dialectic between the alien and the familiar, the far and the near (which 
is) at the very heart of the interest in communication. . .  For to recognize 
the values of the past in their differences with respect to our values is already 
to open up the real towards the possible. The true histories of past uncover 
the buried potentialities of present.*’
[P. Ricoeur (1981) - p. 295]
[Emphasis in original]
In this lies the arc traced by modem hermeneutics between one point and another. By 
traversing it the historian, or indeed the anthropologist, may familiarize herself with the strange 
and, equally important, estrange herself, to some degree, from the familiar. Facets of the 
observer’s own cultural membership are reclaimed through the detour of distantiated signs. To 
quote from C. Geertz:
“If we want to discover what man amounts to, we can only find it in what men 
are; and what men are, above all other things, is various. It is in understanding 
that variousness - its range, its nature, its basis, and its implications - that we 
shall come to construct a concept of human nature that, more than a 
statistical shadow and less than a primitive dream has both substance and 
truth.”
[Quoted in R. Bernstein (1983) - p. 106]
Whether anthropology or history, the interface between the then and there and here 
and now is a productive one which allows for the reappraisal of both. What may be achieved is 
a mobile inter-play between the near and far, indigenous categories and analytically imposed 
ones. That we can and do interpret and make meaningful sense of other times and peoples (with 
greater or lesser sensitivity to their internal rationale) is a negation of the thesis of incommensurability 
which logically refutes communication across distances. In the words of Gadamer:
“The closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstraction. 
The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never 
utterly bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed 
horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that 
moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is moving. Thus the 
horizon of the past. . .  is always in motion.”
[Hans Georg Gadamer (1975) - p.271]
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The observer can only begin to suspend her structuring proclivities once aware of their 
constitutive power. Only through this awareness can she consciously bracket certain of her 
cultural assumptions, for some of the time, in order that the constitutive powers of those she is 
studying may be propelled into the analytical spotlight We never start from nothing; but our 
cultural predispositions need not determine our reception of the new. Through deliberate
methodological effort we can avoid the enthnocoitrism of cotain forms of history and anthropology 
which look for evidence of *Svhat we amount to as basic sticker price homo and essential no 
additive sapiens^* [C. Geertz (1984) - p.268 - Emphasis in original]. Exposure to other forms of 
rationality and, infinitely less visible to us, our own, cannot be achieved by suspending all 
presuppositions. It cannot be done. Exposure is achieved by keeping background expectancies 
at different tensions; by utilizing ones own methods as focus and resource.
Through this reflexive process one circumvents the pitfalls of both historicism and 
sociologism, on the one hand, and positivism on the other. In the latter case the facts, articulate 
as ever, speak loud and clear to the neutral observer whose only concept of “observer-effect” 
is negatively associated with “bias”, to be eradicated rather than explored. The observer is thus 
reduced to the status of a mouthpiece through which the object ostensibly speaks for itself.
By encouraging a concept of cultures and epochs having closed horizons which are 
incommensurable, historicism falls into the self-defeating circle of relativism. When applied to 
itself relativism becomes a relative system which has no basis from which to justify its universal 
application. It is classically self-negating. The historicist is motivated to achieve some form of 
inner harmony by stepping entirely into the native’s indigenous rationale, collective mentality, 
spirit of the age, or whatever. Now this may be an important moment in the research process, 
but it is ultimately unsustainable and hypocritical. Translation into a communicative mode 
suitable for the historian’s or anthropologist’s usually academic audience renders the notion of 
complete faithfulness impossible. It also begs the question about what, or who, one is being 
faithful to.
The point of it all, if one is interested in the reflexive process through which knowledge 
and understanding emerge, is not to strip the sociologist bare (which in different ways positivism, 
historicism and sociologism all do), nor to:
“achieve some iimer correspondence of spirit with your informant; preferring
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like the rest of us, to call their souls their own, they are not going to be 
altogether keen about such an effort anyhow. The trick is to figure out what 
the devil they think they are up to.”
[C. Geertz (1976) - pages 227-228]
Bernstein says how anthropology, and the same could be said for history, displays “two 
pervasive temptations” in understanding alien phenomena:
“the temptation to impose, read into, or project categories and moral 
standards that are well entrenched in our own society onto what is being 
studied, and the dialectical antithesis of this - the temptation to go native, to 
suppose that we only understand the Azande, or Balinese when we 
think, feel and act like them.”
[R. Bernstein (1983) - pages 93-94]
Geertz’s remarkable anthropological insights are borne of the dialectical inter­
relationship of far and near, strange and familiar, external conceptual apparatus and categories 
employed by the indigenous group. Bernstein offers an excellent example of the work that can 
be accomplished by this approach in exploring Geertz’s analysis of the variety of cultural 
conceptions of “self’. Geertz found it impossible to decipher one grand entity in which all 
cultural conceptions partake. Yet this did not prevent him from employing an analyst’s 
prerogative in holding a concept of “self’ constant in order to make cultural comparisons in 
relation to it. Without pinning down a loose notion of self, the mobility would have threatened 
to engulf him. Geertz’ compilation of cultural conceptions of self, fascinating as it may be, is not 
an exercise in butterfly collecting. It offers a platform for reassessing our own cultural notions 
by puncturing the “dulling sense of familiarity” [Geertz (1975) - p. 14] which keep them hidden 
from us. What we may accomplish is a sense of how:
“the western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less 
integrated motivational and cognitive univase, a dynamic centre of awareness, 
emotion, judgement, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural 
background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea 
within the context of the world’s cultures.”
[C. Geertz (1976) - p.229]
The lacuna between observer and observed opened up by history and anthropology is 
a productive one. By providing a distancing perspective and opening up the diversity of reason, 
it provides a sterling opportunity to examine our own common sense world.
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History must, at this juncture, be distinguished from first-hand anthropology by its 
reliance upon indirect material. Historians often depend upon the traces of the past inscribed 
in documents of various kinds. The documents are themselves of course part of a social 
organization, and brought to life by the contemporary documentator for particular purposes. 
The historian resurrects the past by re-organizing and re-contextualizing historical documents. 
As Ricoeur insists, the historian is not:
"some perturbing factor added to the past that must be eliminated."
It is a:
"methodological illusion that the historical fact exists in some latent state in 
the documents and the historian is a parasite on the historical equation." 
[P. Ricoeur (1984) - p.99]
The historical text thus provides an excellent empirical opportunity to analyze the 
theories and methods through which a reconstruction of the past is realized. It is a site upon 
which structuring processes meet. The very term "history" has an "intriguing ambiguity", as 
Ricoeur points out [Ricoeur (1981) - p.288]. It conjoins "what happened" with the story of these 
events. The doing of history, its discursive construction, is not an external "second-order" 
operation:
"It is constitutive of the historical mode of understanding. History is 
intrinsically historio graphy - or to put it in a deliberately provocative way, 
a literary artefact."
[P. Ricoeur (1984) - p. 162]
The kind of history with which this chapter deals is the case history. The object of 
exploration: the child’s past. Unlike a more general biography, it has the specific purpose of 
elucidating why the child has become a problem. This clear criterion of relevance is in operation 
both in the construction and the reception of the "history". Unlike the history of far off times 
and peoples, the social work case study is couched in a familiarity which, for my purposes, I have 
attempted to place at a distance. The creation of a sense of anthropological strangeness is 
necessary in order to hear the codes which normally run smoothly and silently.
I also attempt to partially suspend an external criterion of adequacy. In other words.
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the prevailing concern is not with whether chapters in a child’s history adequately account for 
his later problems from a social scientific perspective. It is the judgements of the participants, 
and the methods through which they achieve a sense of causality, which is topicalized. However, 
I inevitably draw upon my membership competence in identifying causal relations, and judgements 
of adequacy. The art is to keep the components of strangeness and familiarity in productive 
balance.
The case historian, like any other, is involved in an active construction of the past, in 
the context of later events. Since the ghost expectations about what is normal ( . . .  for an 
adolescent boy) have typically been breached, a search ensues for a series of historical clues 
which may account for the deviation. The past is scavenged for what went wrong, and in turn 
biographical items are used as a method for going beyond appearance in search of a child’s 
underlying and often unconscious motivation.
A child’s “problems” are thus situated on a two-dimensional matrix: the one longitudinal, 
offering a chronological perspective; the other latitudinal, tracing a trajectory from the periphery 
to the core. An archeological metaphor perhaps best characterizes this two-fold excavation 
engrained in the therapeutic process. The dig proceeds from the contemporary surface to the 
historical depth. The case historian’s, like the psycho-analyst’s:
“. .  .work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction, resembles 
to a great extent an archeologists excavation of some dwelling place that has 
been destroyed and buried or of some ancient edifice. The two processes 
are in fact identical, except that the analyst works under better conditions 
and has more material at his command to assist him, since what he is dealing 
with is not something destroyed, but something that is still alive.”
[S. Freud (1937) - pages 258-259]
lik e  any other form of historical account, the case history achieves a sense of pattern 
and sequential organization out of the interminable flow of events, tangled and infinite. A 
criterion of selection is at work deriving both from the wider culture, and the case historian’s 
immersion in occupational modes of practical reasoning. The child’s past is edited; cut up into 
manageable pieces conducive to the burgeoning explanation. What is included is given a 
particular location and emphasis within the text (or talk) according to the significance which the 
author accords it. Certain items may be propelled to the forefront of the text, and given the 
status of nodal points in the child’s emergent problems; other items recede into the background
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as so much narrative furniture. In Dorothy Smith’s words:
“The ordering of events in the narrative constructs the objectivity of the 
fact, the items which might serve to suggest the opposite are not only 
relegated to the background, they are also not constructed in the same way. 
They are merely, as it were lying about.”
[D. Smith (1978)-p.37]
Needless to say, the historical facts do not elect themselves, nor do they give rise to an 
obvious method of arrangement The editing and ordering of items is contingent upon the genre 
of historical explanation, and the authors purpose in hand. Although case historians vary 
considerably in their style, and the extent to which the narrative skeleton is given explanatory 
flesh, the variations are within a language game. All are concerned with how and why the child 
developed “problems”, and include a series of past events which may, and whose inclusion 
suggests are, pertinent to the later scenario. Each chapter in the documented history of a child 
is at once constructed and received in terms of its contribution to his developing problems, 
although the relationship may be complex. Each new episode is assimilated to, and helps 
constitute a dominant theme. This is what Ricoeur alludes to in saying that histories are always 
more than a catalogue of events. From the chronology emerges a configuration which, like the 
musical score, is irreducible to the sequential succession of notes. While the successive episodes 
of the history drive it along, they must be “grasped together” in Ricoeur’s terms. To follow a 
story the reader must be able to “extract configuration from succession” [P. Ricoeur (1981) - p.278].
The very pastness of events with which historical accounts deal facilitates their 
patterned reconstruction. Since the events are “over” the chain of causality can be disentangled. 
Because the chains are traced retrospectively they are treated as if devoid of contingency and 
chance; imbued with an incontrovertible finality. In Ricoeur’s words:
“This retrospective intelligibility rests upon a construction that no witness 
could have put together when the events were occurring, since this backward 
way of proceeding would be unavailable to any contemporary witness.”
[P. Ricoeur (1984) - p.l57]
The reader of an historical account of this kind is “teleologicaUy oriented” [Ibid - p. 150]. 
Earlier events are assessed in terms of their relevance to later events which, in turn, assume their 
meaning in relation to a chain of earlier ones.
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"In reading the ending in the beginning and the beginning in the ending, we 
also learn to read time itself backwards, as the recapitulation of the initial 
conditions of a course of action in its terminal consequences.”
[Ibid - p.67-68]
Also, the reader may be prepared to suspend judgement for the time being in the 
assumption that all will become clear in due course. In this lies the retrospective-prospective 
nature of discourse, spoken or written, which relies upon the reader or hearer doing much of the 
collaborative work necessary in making sense. The work is full of "holes, lacunae, zones of 
indetermination” [P. Ricoeur (1984) - p.77] which the reader bears the burden of repairing. I 
attempt to highlight certain features of this collaborative process of writing and reading (or 
talking and listening) in Chapter 7.
Ricoeur treats time, history and narrative as moments in a dynamic hermeneutic 
spiral, into which they all feed and are created anew. Both history and fiction are seen to exhibit 
many of the features of narrative to which genus they both belong. Case histories, for instance, 
like any story, are ensconced in the temporal structure of beginnings, middles and endings. 
Events in between are galvanized into an episodic chain, each building upon the emergent 
confîguration and pre-empting what may, prospectively, happen. Events thus configure into 
patterned sequences and motifs. The reader is directed through this quagmire of events; pushed 
forward by the logic of the narrative and expectations about the culmination of events.
Part of the bond of cultural communality which unites the "producer” and "consumer” 
of discourse, allowing them to communicate, is their shared orientation to different genres of 
story-telling. Ricoeur uses the term "emplotment” to describe the process through which 
narrative events configure into meaningful wholes. He uses the verb emplotment rather than 
the noun plot, because it depicts a dynamic process. The "facts” of history only exist in and 
through plots, and assume the significance that the logic of the narrative accords them. Only 
through these paradigms are the specific details of a particular case made meaningful. Against 
the backcloth of a familiar mode of telling, the details of the individual case come into relief.
Ricoeur argues it is the narrativization of (historical) events which lend them this 
rule-governed quality. Leaving aside the nuances of his complex theorization, much of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic explication of the inter-relationship between time and narrative is useful 
to our analysis, including his perception that narrativized:
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. .  events are singular and typical, contingent and expected, deviant and 
dependent on paradigms, even if this is in the ironic model.”
[Ibid - p.208]
[Emphasis in original]
Historical accounts do not stand or fall exclusively on the basis of their narrative 
architecture. While their encapsulation in a particular mode of organization constitutes one of 
the conditions of possibility, it is a necessary but not sufQcient explanation of how the case 
history is both constructed and received. Issues of adequacy are crucial, both factually and 
morally. Accounts of this kind are couched inprocedures o f authorization through which events 
are established as objective facts whose reportage is motivated, amongst other things, by the 
attempt to genuinely understand what went wrong and why. Facts are constructed through 
certain discursive procedures. To quote once more from Dorothy Smith:
“The actual events are not facts. It is the use of proper procedure for 
categorizing events which transforms them into facts. A fact is something 
which is already categorized, which is already worked up so that it conforms 
to the model of what that fact should be like. To describe something as a fact 
or to treat something as a fact implies that the events themselves - what 
happened - entitle or authorize the teller of the tale to treat that categorization 
as ineluctable.. . .
If something is to be constructed as a fact, then it must be shown that proper 
procedures have been used to establish it as objectively known. It must be 
seen to appear in the same way to anyone.”
[D. Smith (1978) - p.35]
To meet the criteria of factual adequacy events must be seen to have an independent 
and objective existence. To objectify events is to establish them as the same from any vantage- 
point. The “fact-effect” is achieved through a variety of procedures which I attempt to draw out 
and explore in the empirical analysis. Suffice to say for the present purposes that factual 
accounting tends to be bound up in the rhetoric of constraint. Facts, immutable and ineluctable, 
exist whether one likes it or not. This works especially well where the author is constrained to 
recognize a fact which she does not like because it strengthens the conception of facts being 
forced upon one.
To establish their facticity events must be seen as independent of the author’s 
interpretation. To accomplish this separation the author must display that she is properly
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motivated; that her understanding of events is not borne of an ulterior motive. If the author’s 
own purposes are seen to be at work, this would cast doubt upon her veridicality, and thus 
subvert the facticity of the account In this respect a moral assessment is of equal importance to 
its factual counterpart in judging the adequacy of an account As Cuff points out, consideration 
is not only given to whether events accord to the criteria of fact, but whether the author is a 
credible arbiter of the facts. In the words of Cuff:
**Any account can be scrutinized in such terms, i.e. (1) how does it come off 
as a 'proper’ description of what is happening in the social world: and (2) 
how does it display the teller - as 'impartial’ or as 'biased’ or as 'sensitive’ or 
as 'callous’ or as 'involved’ or as 'disinterested’ or whatever? The teller, in 
producing an account of what is happening in the world, is also unavoidably 
producing materials which make available possible findings about his 
characterological and moral appearances as displayed in his talk. Alternatively 
put, in telling about the world, he is also inescapably telling about himself: 
in seeing the world 'that way’, he is inescapably open to possible findings that 
he is 'that kind of person who sees the world that way’.”
[E.C. Cuff (1980)-p.35]
The issue hinges partly on how one version is allocated privilege of defînition given 
that any set of events can in principle be described in more than one way. The adequacy of the 
case historian’s account is inscribed partly in her status as an expert whose interest in detailing 
events is borne of professional rather than predominantly personal motivation. Of course a 
sense of expertise is discursively accomplished, but before she even comes to the case history the 
reader has already categorized the author and the basis of her authority. The attribution of 
professional expertise partially negates the necessity for scrutinizing the author’s underlying 
motives.
Simultaneously, through the machinery of "standard relational pairs” (see pages 274-283) 
the category of expert-professional is linked with that of lay-client. Where the specific expert 
is a social worker, psychologist or psychiatrist, for instance, the assumption of routine competence 
on the part of the one, is paired with the expectation of incompetence on the part of the other. 
By dint of this discursive logic the allocation of authority is skewed; definitional privilege is 
allocated to one party who is invested with superior methods of knowing what is really going on. 
Through the implicit identification of the other party as a "problem child” his authority is 
diminished; almost by définition such a category of person is not the best authority about his own 
state of being. Because the child’s "problem” status is the raison d'etre of the case history, a
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differential of authority is implicit firom the outset which serves:
a) to bolster the privilege of the “expert account”; and
b) to undermine the privilege of the “subject” who is under the professional gaze.
The case historian is the source of normative judgement; she is both the factual and moral arbiter 
of events. This does not mean, as we have seen, that the voice of the child, or his family, is 
excluded. But it is the case historian who allocates a space to the talk and frames it within a 
chosen context.
The case file typically consists of a range of reports written by representatives of 
different professions almost always including residential and field social work, education, 
psychology and psychiatry. The cumulation of accounts is itself significant in authorizing the file 
as a whole. It reinforces the rhetoric of fact as independent of any one observer. The succession 
of independent witnesses helps bolster the conception of a cognitive and moral community; 
each report “. . .  uncontaminated by the previous prompting or definitional work which might 
be interpreted as a source of bias” [D. Smith (1979) - p.37].
The irony of these authorization procedures will not be missed. In order to accomplish 
a sense of factual and moral adequacy, the author does a great deal of discursive work to make 
the facts appear to speak for themselves. That most pristine and granite of objects, the fact, is 
inextricably bound to the occasion of its production. In tracing some of the methods through 
which history is accomplished and rendered plausible, I therefore start from certain assumptions 
about members’ competence which lies at the heart of the ethnomethodological project. The 
case history is a repository of artful practices.
Before we turn to the empirical material it may be useful to distinguish this form of 
analysis from the semiological orientation to the exclusivity of the text The account, whether 
textual or verbal, is of central significance for ethnomethodology. It is the location upon which 
production and reproduction meet; where “new” occasions are assimilated to existing frameworks. 
Unlike the post-structuralist genre of textual analysis in which language is severed from its 
coimections to speaker/writer and world, the kind of discourse analysis in which I am engaged 
identifies a much more interactive relationship between the three. From this perspective 
accounts are the product of discursive procedures which must be activated by authors. The 
constitutive power of all actors is irreducible to their individual or subjective status; it is a shared 
propensity which defines membership in the social and linguistic community.
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Language becomes meaningful when it is articulated; when the structural pre­
conditions are realized in discourse. Ricoeur usefully distinguishes between language as a self- 
referential system, and discourse. Unlike language, discourse is realized as a process through 
time; it has a **subject", not at its origin in a simplistic sense, but located through signifiers like 
personal pronouns; and it refers to a world which it claims to signify. For language is not a world 
in itself:
**This is the ontological presupposition of reference, a presupposition 
reflected inside language itself as a postulate laddng any immanent justification. 
Language is for itself the order of the Same. The world is its Other. The 
attestation of this otherness arises from language’s reflexivity with regard to 
itself, whereby it knows itself as being in being in order to bear on being.” 
[P.Ricoeur (1984) - p.78]
[Emphasis in original]
To emphasize the realization of language through discourse is not to return to the 
notion of original subjectivity. The producer of text and talk is also the product of the social 
relations in which she is always already enmeshed. In turn social relations are unthinkable 
without the skills of discursivity with which actors are endowed. Structuring occurs in this 
interminable process of reciprocal articulation.
One final concept may be drawn from Ricoeur’s study of time and narrative which 
helps us to elucidate the process of doing history. Ricoeur offers a particular interpretation of 
the notion of mimesis which he borrows from Aristotle’s Poetics. In describing the mimetic 
qualities of the text, Ricoeur does not wish to suggest it passively reflects, or mimics the social 
world of which it is a part. What is at stake is an active representation. As a re-working of the 
world through its signification the mimetic process ofiers the possibility of new grids for reading 
experience. Mimesis achieves its organized sense through the process of emplotment which 
structures narrative events in terms of the paradigms which render them familiar.
Ricoeur identifies three mimetic phases connected through an arc of operations. 
Mimesis(l) alludes to the knowledge and procedures upon which the author draws in textualizing 
or accounting for events. The reservoir of social presuppositions is brought to any discursive 
construction. Mimesis(2) is the location of the text itself which dynamically represents the world 
from which it comes by weaving a configurational plait of themes from the temporal succession 
of events. Texts are not idle repetitions of cultural codes; the latter are brought to life through
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their discursive representation. Mimesis(3) is the final brace in the arc which defines the 
intersection of the text and the reader/hearer. Just as the author draws upon shared cultural 
methods in constructing the account, so too does the reader in making sense of it. Reading is 
not a passive reception of the word. It requires that the reader actively bring her skills to bear.
Ricoeur’s concan is exclusive^ with textual discourse, and he makes certain distinctions 
between the written and the spoken word. For instance, while talk is fleeting, text is fixed by its 
inscription. The spoken word has what Ricoeur calls a "*vis-a-vis** quality situated in the “here 
and now”. The conted of speech is a vital component in its interpretability, witnessed by the 
wealth of indexical expressions used in verbal discourse. In text, the moorings of ostensive 
reference, as Ricoeur sees it, are broken and can only be recovered through the long detour of 
literary signs. The interaction between text and reader is thus conceived as more creative than 
that between speaker and hearer precisely because the author and world are not self-evidently 
present.
Here, as elsewhere, Ricoeur is in danger of setting up misleadingly simplistic dichotomies 
between textual and verbal discourse. While a distinction can clearly be made, Ricoeur invests 
text with a wealth of subtleties by depriving talk of these qualities. For instance, he speaks of the 
ostensive 'Vis-a-vis ” of verbal communication, as if the clues to what talk means are self-evidently 
inscribed in the context. I would argue, first of all, that the reparation of indexicality in spoken 
discourse requires a great many interpretative skills. What fudges the issue is Ricoeur’s reliance 
upon an unexplicated definition of context as exogenous to talk. In so assuming he fails to 
identify the process through which context is interactionally generated in discourse. So radical 
a distinction between talk and text can be dissolved, because both endogenously build a context 
as they go along, through the interaction of speaker and hearer on the one hand, and text and 
reader on the other.
In this respect I make no a priori distinctions between the verbal and written modes of 
discourse. Both exhibit sense-making procedures, and are accessible to scrutiny. From this 
perspective the age old wrangles about which mode of discourse is superior are unnecessary and 
academic. I take from Ricoeur’s triply punctuated mimetic arc a way of thinking the power 
discourse has at once to produce and reproduce, maintain and modify the world of which it is an 
integral part. The segment defined by mimesis(l)-(2) can be understood in terms of the 
indexical reliance of discourse upon a ghost network of assumptions which are never simply
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present. The segment of mimesis(2)-(3) describes the reflexive process through which accounts 
reconstitute the social scene of which they are a part.
Conclusion
Many of the techniques which historians employ to (re)construct a sense of the past 
were shared by the case historian whose main purpose was to elicit ‘Vhat went wrong” with a 
particular child. In so doing she was engaged in forging a series of links in an historical chain, the 
composition of which forms a primary focus of the three remaining chapters. Armed with a 
theoretical appreciation of how time and narrative are socially constructed I turn to a range of 
accounts, particularly those which offer an historical appraisal of the boys and their problems. 
I start with a consideration of a story which was often told about how a child’s deprived historical 
circumstances accounted for his contemporary disturbances.
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CHAPTER SIX 
HISTORIES OF LACK
Introduction
The excavation of a child’s past was typically accompanied by guide-lines about where 
to dig, and what one might expect to find. Assumptions of this kind were sedimented through 
broader cultural traditions, as well as those relatively specific to social work and associated 
therapeutic professions. The very fact that a child’s history was considered relevant in the first 
place is an important feature of therapeutic discourse. Fundamental to the latter is a belief that 
the seeds of an individual’s present are sown in the past, whether he is “well-adjusted” and 
“normal” or the victim of emotional problems. This belief commissions a search into the 
subject’s background to elucidate the biographical antecedents that give rise to his “presenting 
problems”. Historical reconstruction, however, is not the sole or even the primary purpose: it 
is the vehicle through which a child’s underlying motivation can be recovered. In the pursuit of 
an explanatory kernel, the account continuously bobs and weaves between past and present; 
surface and depth.
Like any other practice, social work rests upon a cumulative body of procedures and 
theories which provide the routine grounds for going about one’s business. The network of 
typifying schemata always precede consideration of the particular, and provide the map upon 
which it is situated. However, there is always an interaction, a kind of mutual “sniffing out” 
between the strategies of typification and the contingencies of each new case.
In this section we will explore a deep vein of presuppositions which informed the case 
historian’s task and showed up as recurrent motifs in the account. As a body of ideas and 
typifications which pre-dated any specific historial construction, these can be likened to 
Ricoeur’s mimesis(l). The core theme which permeated the vast majority of case histories was 
that of lack. Children “of this kind” were typically seen to suffer from histories of deprivation, 
of a quintessentially emotional nature, which were held to account for later manifestations of 
delinquency and/or disturbance. How the links were precisely forged is a matter for the close 
empirical inspection to come. Suffice to say that one cannot be simply “read off” from the other: 
the relationship must be discursively accomplished.
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The recurrent theme of lack, and its position as a central explanatory girder, itself tells 
a story. If we suspend familiarity with these common sense concepts, we can see how their 
articulation relies upon a network of ghost assumptions about what children need to develop 
normally and healthily and what is at stake when such prerequisites are lacking. Only by defining 
the accoutrements of the normal do perceptions of deviance firm up. Inscribed in social work 
practice are a gamut of theories about normal and abnormal development. Thus, when any 
specific child comes to the attention of the social services through his identification as a 
^'problem child”, he is subjected to the professional gaze which often takes the guise of an 
historical perusal. One of the first ports of call in building an explanation of “what went wrong” 
is anchored in theories of lack. Since children are, for the most part, brought up by parents in 
families, this is the primary location in which deprivation is sought and found.
i) Characterizations of Multiple Lack
The first selection of extracts deal with characterizations of multiple lack. In the first 
piece Thomas McKinney, team manager of unit 4, traces the lineage of the problem for “boys 
of this kind” to their deprived circumstances.
[I ask Thomas how he accounts for the boys’ problems]
Thomas: Well (.5) uhm (2.5) could I just take it out of context for a minute?
Kim: {Sure.
{
Thomas: {and just imagine it was vou - yer? And you had gone through the areas of 
deprivation O.K. - internal deprivation - primary deprivation. .  .how would 
you express areas of your own - uhm (1.5) lack of (.5) need satisfaction?
One minute later:
Thomas: I’m really talking about an unmet need - o r . . .  I’m re-really talking about 
what happens at a primary level - yer? With primary groups and so on and 
so forth. Uhm (.5) and what would happen no doubt -your humanity would 
be that you would uhm - uh - shout and kick and scream yer - to a lesser or
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greater extent yer? As any other human being would.
Kim: Yer.
Thomas: O K. - uhm - what these lads are doing in fact their-their actions are (.5) 
symbolic to the uhm - to the deprivations and the unmet needs that they’ve 
actually uh experienced (.5) you know. Uhm (1) I’ll use the word again 
they’re uhm - powerless (.5) yer? (1.5) of not in fact being able to make 
decisions (1) for themselves - yer - and ending up - actually when they (.5) 
chose to make a decision - yer - in fact it’s a bad one.
[Thomas McKinney’s interview]
In the preceding extract a common causal chain of deprivation is seen to lie at the heart 
of the problem amongst the population of residents at St. Nicholas’. Let us consider how this 
generalized mode of theorization operates in relation to specific histories. In each forthcoming 
extract a background of multiple deprivation is implicitly or explicitly held to account for the 
boy’s later manifestation of problems. The first piece is once more from Thomas’ interview.
1 [I ask Thomas to give me an example of a particular boy, and what led him
into care. He chooses Steve Butler.]
Thomas: Steve Butler - has suffered from (.5) ^  of the things that we spoke about - 
the lack of love - the lack of understanding - the lack of a place in the pecking 
5 order (1) lack of care-lack of warmth-lack of power. His life is meaningless
(2) he is powerless inside it - yer? (1) Both (1.5) he - both he and his primary 
group - desperately want in fact to bring about a change (2) they desperately 
want - in fact - to love each other (1) yer? (1) They’re not quite sure how to 
do i t  It’s almost like a “Catch 22” (1.5) thev in fact - punish (.5) bits of 
10 behaviour (.5) that (.5) they see as attention seeking - but because it’s
attention seeking behaviour - he’s - he’s doing it ^  the wrong way as far as 
12 they’re concerned.
This piece exhibits quite an elaborate explanatory architecture, bridged by the theory 
of psychological motivation to be examined in detail in the following chapter. What is of interest
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to us here is how the term “lack” resonates like a drumbeat, particularly in lines 4-5. Having 
catalogued six areas of deprivation, Thomas goes on to specify their effects: Steve’s sense of 
meaninglessness and powerlessness within the family. If we turn back to Thomas’ theoretical 
exposition on pages 256-257 we can detect the symmetry between the generalizing conception 
of “boys like this”, and its elucidation in the particular case of Steve Butler. Notice also the 
theme of victimization through deprivation: Steve has “suffered” multiple lack. We will return 
to this in due course.
The bedrock of compound deprivation is similarly placed at the origins of Nigel 
Wyatt’s multifarious problems in the following segments. The first is drawn from the case history 
written by his F.S.W.
“The Wyatt’s first became known to (the local social services) in March 
1970. There were then considerable marital difficulties and repeated 
separations and reconciliations, and both parents received in-patient treatment 
in psychiatric hospital. Between 1970 and 1972 Nigel’s mother left home on 
several occasions. Both children were reported as suffering neglect and 
emotional deprivation. They were left alone for long periods often hungry 
and not allowed to use the toilet without permission. Nigel’s mother was 
also reported to be lacking in affection and admitted to hitting Nigel, 
causing him a black eye. In February 1972 (Nigel’s sister and he) were 
received into care for two months after their mother had left home.”
The lineage of responsibility for Nigel and his sisters “suffering” is traced back most 
clearly to the mother who is portrayed as, amongst other things, neglectful, lacking in affection 
and violent. In the absence of explicit exoneration, which appears in some of the accounts, 
blame is allocated to a mother who is held to account for perpetrating the “suffering” borne of 
deprivation. The motif of multiple lack is echoed in the summary of Nigel’s final assessment 
conference.
1 “The psychiatrist gave a detailed outline of the boy’s and the family’s history,
and a remarkable list both of presenting problems and of sources for these 
problems. Overall the list of causes encompassed a wide range of deprivations,
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including insuÉBcient warmth, care, control, security and predictability. The 
team felt that these expressed his needs."
Again:
“The team felt that not only has Nigel experienced a devastatingly painful 
and poor childhood, which has failed to help him to develop adequately, but 
that his future is a void. His internal world seems somewhat chaotic and 
confused and he seems to have only disjointed views of part of his future. 
10 The result, the team felt, was that he does not know who he is or what he is."
What is apparent in this extract is the language through which temporally antecedent 
events are associated with later ones in such a way as to bond a casual relationship. In line 2, for 
example, we are told how the psychiatrist, an authorized witness, outlines a “remarkable list of 
presenting problems”, and '^sources for these”. The term “presenting problems”, so frequently 
used in social work, alludes to the systematic tendency explored throughout to treat surface 
manifestations of behaviour as merely a point of access to the underlying realms where the real 
motivations lie. Use of the term “presenting” thus invites us to go beyond the ostensible 
behaviour to its source, which the account proceeds to do in lines 3-5. The “wide range of 
deprivations” (line 3) thereby assume the status not of individual items, or contextualizing 
furniture, but of causes of later problems.
In lines 6-7 Nigel’s purported failure to develop adequately is causally attributed not 
to chance, or his own inabilities, but his experience of “a devastatingly painful and poor 
childhood”. We will go on in chapter 7 to consider the methods through which casual chains are 
more or less persuasively forged. What I take from each of the above extracts is the primacy of 
lack as a fundamental cause of the child’s later problems.
The placement of deprivation at the origin of a child’s problems, (including the 
“presenting” ones which delinquency was usually considered to be), relied upon a range of ghost 
assumptions about what he fundamentally needed for normal, healthy development. The 
identification of the need was a prerequisite for recognizing its lack in the histories of “children 
of this kind”. Since children in our culture are dependent, and therefore immune from the 
responsibility for supplying their own needs, they cannot be blamed, at least entirely, for the
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behaviour to which such lack gives rise. It is this conception which underlies the therapeutic 
orientation to the delinquent whose misdemeanours are the document of earlier events for 
which he bears diminished responsibility.
Each of the previous accounts is permeated by a rather vague sense of lack which 
underscores a child’s difGculties and disturbances, whether the association is fashioned explicitly 
or not. More typical of this mode of analysis is the attribution of a child’s problem status to a 
specific form of deprivation which is given explanatory priority. It is to a series of more precise 
characterizations that I now turn.
ii) Lack of Love
Lack of love and affection was most frequently quoted as the source of a child’s 
disturbance, relying once more upon the assumption that he needed to be given these things if 
he was to grow into a well-adjusted human being. Failure by those in the child’s environment to 
supply the basic demands thus provided an embryonic explanation for certain forms of 
maladjustment. Examine the following piece extracted from my interview with Roger Carter, 
principal during the first two-thirds of my fieldwork.
[Roger says that the most important factor shared by the kids is the level of 
deprivation they have suffered - most often of love, with a capital “L”.]
Roger: I mean I think these kids have suffered (.5) ah - you’ve only got to look at the 
history of most of the kids who come to St. Nicholas’ and you find that 
they’ve all been deprived - somewhere along the line of love. And if they’re 
deprived of that - they also then are deprived of areas of achievement - becos 
I think the two go - hand in glove (.5) with each other. I think that uhm (.5) 
uh if you don’t feel safe and secure and you’re not surrounded by love - 
you’re unlikely to achieve very much - you’re going to be on the defensive 
and fighting so much and defending yourself so much - you can’t achieve 
very much because it’s a question of survival. These kids are survivors and 
they haven’t survived very well.
The lack of love which according to Roger punctuates most of the boys’ histories, is
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held accountable for their lack of achievement, engendering as it does a defensiveness and 
preoccupation with survival. The identification of an emotional vacuum in a child’s past is also 
categorized under the rubric of deprivation of warmth or affection; a lack which is topicalized 
in the following segment from Simon Wells’ case history. The report is written by his F.S.W.
1 “Simon’s home life is extremely unhappy and emotionally deprived. The
members of the family show no signs of warmth or affection towards one 
another, except Simon’s younger sister, Tricia, who demands attention from 
her parents. (Simon’s mother) seems to have been the most active in her 
5 attempts to control Simon, although neither parent seems to speak a great
deal to him, instead resorting to locking him in his room for long periods and 
stopping his pocket money.
Soon after:
Simon is deprived of positive affection from his parents and from his older 
brothers, none of whom takes an active interest in any family life, while 
10 Tricia is too young to form any relationship with him. As a result, he spends
long periods alone when he is at home, and receives no experience in
12 socializing.”
The account starts by plotting the typified scenario enshrined in Simon’s deprived
background. We tap into a stratum of practical reasoning so deep that its logic is axiomatic. It 
is unnecessary to question the need for warmth and affection in a child’s early environment; it 
is part of our cultural wisdom. The only member of the family who is shown to exhibit these 
qualities is rendered demanding of attention (line 3); an insistence which serves to marginalize 
Aar behaviour as well. The recognition of Simon’s mother as the “most active” (line 4) in her 
attempts to control her son is enveloped in such a way as to discredit her capacities. Given that 
we know that Simon comes from an “unhappy and emotionally deprived” home background 
(line 1), his mother’s efforts are already defined as inadequate. This sense of deprivation is 
supplemented by the recognition that “although” Simon’s mother is “the most active” neither 
she nor her husband communicate with him and resort to punitive methods of control. The 
account draws to a conclusion by repeating the resonant theme of Simon’s deprivation. Tricia, 
his only apparent escape from this syndrome, is considered too young to compensate in her
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relationship with him, and her demands are, in any case, already construed as excessive. The 
result: inadequate socialization.
In the next cluster of extracts the identification of a child’s deprivation of love, warmth 
and affection provides in each case access to what he needs. If the boy has lacked love and 
affection, he needs a belated dose of it to compensate, albeit professionally administered. In the 
first section, from Simon Wells’ case history, the spillover between the areas of deprivation and 
need are apparent. The account is composed once more by his F.S.W.
Adults in charge of Simon must be prepared to meet his needs for affection 
and discourage him from victimizing himself through his attempts at exploiting 
others. He was seen as emotionally deprived and as he is at present rejected 
from home, apart from short visits, he needs other adults in whom he can 
depend to act in a responsive way toward him.”
Where an historical lack is identified the need for compensation is often paired to it; 
a recognition borne out in the following extract from a senior staff meeting in which Leon Pryce 
is being discussed.
Bob B: One of the things that - that he seems to have missed out on is lots and lots
of cuddles. There’s no way -
Roger: Lots of what?
Bob: Cuddles.
Roger: Who - Leon?
Bob: Uhm.
Roger: Oh yer - that kid needs so much love mate - it’s {unbelievable.
{
Bob: {There’s no way (?any-
one?) can go and cuddle him.
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Roger: No! But he does - he needs so much affection that kid. Oh God - yer. I’ve
put my arms round him (1) many times.
Two themes run through this account which can be distinguished in terms of voice 1, 
coincident with Bob’s account, and voice 2, coincident with that of Roger. In the version 
articulated by voice 2, what Leon has *'missed out on”, i.e. love, cuddles and affection, defines 
the inventory of what he needs. Voice 1 adds another layer of complexity by drawing upon a 
theory of how Leon’s needs are paradoxically subverted by his behaviour. The lineage of 
reasoning goes something like this:
a) Leon has missed out on lots and lots of cuddles;
b) therefore (it is silently assumed) he needs to be compensated for this lack;
c) but, (because of his past) there’s “no way” anyone can go and cuddle him.
Through a tri partite movement of reasoning Leon is seen to subvert the very thing he lacked 
and therefore needs.
A child’s family environment is most often held responsible for its failure to supply 
what he needs. However, this does not necessarily assume the guise of blame; the parents may 
be exonerated on the basis of their own histories of deprivation and/or inadequate parenting 
skills. Below, Mr. Hughes is not being accused of not caring for his son, but of being unable to 
show his love and concern except through the symbolic detour of material gifts. The piece is 
extracted from a meeting between the P.O.’s and a group of visiting magistrates.
1 [One of the magistrates enquires about a typical St. Nichlolas “case”. Roger
Carter invokes that of Peter Hughes.]
Roger: I can tell you - something about Peter that I think is - very obvious. Peter has 
just decorated his (.5) his bedroom. And uhm - he comes first of all - from
5 a broken home - as a lot of them do actually.
Mag: Uhm.
Roger: But Peter has just decorated his bedroom - and (.5) his father - for some
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reason (.5) came along - with the wallpaper to do his bedroom.
Mag; You sound as if that’s a surprise.
10 Roger: Pardon?
Mag: That - is unusual is it?
Roger: Well it - it’s not a - well I don’t think it’s particularly unusual - but it’s very sad
- for me - becus father came along with the wallpaper to do the bedroom and 
(1) uhm (1) father will supply these things.
15 Mag: Yes.
Roger: I wish father (.5) would do what I do - and that is put your arm around the
kid.
Mag: Uhm.
Roger: Because that’s what Peter wants. I mean I - Peter came to me - as he did
20 about a fortnight ago - and cried his eyes out - throwing himself round - my
arms - round me - you know and -
Mag: Uhm.
Roger: and - and but he couldn’t do that to his father.
Mag: Uhm.
25 Roger: And his father couldn’t do that to him. And - and - to me-I wish dad wouldn’t
come along with wallpaper - becus ^ ’11 give the kid the wallpaper for his 
room - whatever he wanted for his room we’d give him the wallpaper -1 wish 
dad would come along - and put his arms round his son. And that sort of 
thing and (.5) that’s - you know -
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30 Mag: Uhm.
Roger: that to me is what this kid (.5) has lacked - you know - he needs somebody
who really does care - about him - and that’s - us - you know - people - adults.
But of course he needs his dad -
Mag: Uhm.
35 Roger: to care about him. And his dad is - does care.
Mag: Yes.
Roger: He’s a charming {man.
{
Mag: {This is his way of showing it -
Roger: {Absolutely.
{
40 Mag: {of course - isn’t it.
Roger: {Through - material goods.
{
Mag: {But the child doesn’t appreciate it.
Roger: He’s a charming fellow.
Mag: Yes!
45 Roger: And has been terribly supportive to us.
Kate: Yes.
Roger: But when I - when we said to dad at a meeting - “get cross with Peter when
he offends” (.5) like ^  get angry and my gosh we do - you know - 1 do (.5)
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dad can’t do that. So it’s all very inconsistent. . .  A-and so - uhm - to me - 
50 that-that’s Peter.
Mag: Yer.
Roger: That’s Peter. A-and what we’re offering him (.5) is (1) a hell of a lot of
caring. ‘Cus I-I actually am very fond of that boy becus I think he’s got a hell
54 of a lot of good in him.
Mr. Hughes’ parenting is subjected to Roger’s expert gaze - and found lacking thereby. 
Clearly a “no blame” clause is in operation: it is Mr. Hughes’ own inadequacies which cause him 
to mistake material generosity for physical and emotional warmth. Withdrawal of responsibility 
is accomplished by treating Mr. Hughes’ poor parenting as beyond his control. He “couldn’t” 
show his son physical affection, or vice versa (lines 23-25) rather than “wouldn’t” which entails 
a choice. What’s more Mr. Hughes is “charming” (lines 37 and 43), “terribly supportive” 
(hne 45) and does care (line 35).
What lies at the basis of Peter’s deprivation, and thus his unfulfilled need, is his father’s 
genuine inability to express his care and love appropriately - i.e. through physical affection rather 
than material gifts. His ineptitude is epitomized by the story Roger tells of Mr. Hughes’ 
provision of wallpaper for Peter’s room at St. Nicholas’; an apparently positive gesture until the 
excess in this area is paired with an involuntary lack in Mr. Hughes’ capacity to express his 
affection in a physical form.
Mr. Hughes’ inappropriate behaviour is compared with Roger’s own relationship with 
Peter which is rendered appropriate and fulfilling by dint of the logic of juxtaposition. An 
interesting transference occurs: Mr. Hughes, the “real” father, is depleted of paternal skills in 
relation to Roger, the professional practitioner, who is rendered replete with them. It is Roger 
who puts his arms around the kid (lines 16-17) which he “wishes” Mr. Hughes would do; it is 
Roger who Peter chooses to throw himself around and cry his eyes out with, a feat which he could 
not accomplish with his father (lines 19-23); it is Roger and the other staff who get cross with 
Peter when he offends, not his father (lines 47-49). In a nutshell, it is the “professionals” who 
personify the qualities which the good parent should have; they who offer the boy a “hell of a lot
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of caring” (line 52-53). The ghost of the ideal parent hovers in the background of Roger’s 
account as just that: a typified ideal against which actual parents are judged.
The ideal family is thus not necessarily enshrined in concrete natural families, any 
more than professional non-parents are barred from exhibited certain of these qualities. One 
of the consequences of the emergence of a family focus, together with the increasing theorization 
and professionalization of social work knowledge, has been the construction of the family as a 
quasi-scientific object: a system with complex dynamic functions and capacities. As Burchell 
points out, while these conceptions of healthy and good parenting are drawn from a model of the 
natural family, with all the concomitant virtues which attend it, they are also separable from it. 
In the words of G. Burchell (1979 - p. 128):
“Whilst these norms of upbringing which inform intervention are justified 
by reference to ‘natural’ virtues, concretely they do not depend upon either 
real or simulated natural familial and conjugal forms.”
[Emphasis in original]
As Burchell continues, residential care of children has decreasingly been modelled on 
a family substitute, with house-mother’s and father’s assuming the maternal and paternal role:
“but rather depend upon a ‘scientific’ kno\\iedge of the individuafs personality 
and the determination of his or her developmental needs within a context of 
the dynamics of total group processes in a ‘therapeutic community’. In this 
situation an ‘intensification’ of relations between residential staff and 
children is demanded, but one which does not call for simulated parental 
roles derived by analogy from the conjugal parental uni t . . .  One might 
perhaps say that i) parents are, in a sense, ‘de-parentalized’ and assigned 
determinate functions on the basis of capacities they may or may not 
possess, whilst, ii) in those communities of residential care which still refer 
to themselves as ‘artificial families’ there are instituted forms of up-bringing 
within a set of relations which are non-familial.”
[Ibid - pages 128-129]
[Emphasis in original]
Thus, when Gary Pallin speaks of the need for staff at St. Nicholas’ to cultivate a 
“warm caring attitude” which,
Gary: . . .  should sort of permeate everything we do (.5) as I think kids (1) the
majority of kids here - that’s been - one of the elements that’s missing in their
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lives - and it’s one of the elements they respond to as human beings.
Kim: Uhm.
Gary: I mean they find it very difficult (.5) not to respond to that. (1.5) Uhm - and
consistency (1) a kind of firmness I guess (1) you know - a strength.
Kim: Right.
Gary: I think they respect people who are strong (1) in that they’re resolute and
determined.
Kim: Huh hum.
Gary: And I think people who are resolute and determined can also (.5) put across
a very caring (1) and I think these kind of kids respond to that.
Kim: Right.
Gary: ’Cus that’s usually something that’s sadly lacking all their lives.
[Gary Pallin’s interview]
. . .  he is not so much advocating the adoption of a parental role, as the cultivation of an 
atmosphere conducive to a child’s development which the natural home background lacked.
The chains of causality are most firmly secured where an historical event or series can 
be linked to later manifestations of delinquency and disturbance through the bridge of psychological 
motivation. The nuances of this will be examined in the next chapter. For the present purposes 
I want to emphasize how the earlier absence of love, care, warmth and affection in the following 
two excerpts is linked to the later manifestation of delinquency, bridged by a theory of 
“attention-seeking” behaviour.
[I ask Andrew what typical problems the boys who come into St. Nicholas’ 
have.]
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Andrew: I suppose a typical example is - is somebody who doesn't - have a - caring 
family background - uhm - who is left out or in some cases scapegoated. 
Uhm (2) and (1) their way of (1.5) uh (.5) seeking of - seeking affection 
requires some sort of attention seeking - and - the way they’re best able to 
(.5) seek attention (.5) in some cases is is through - acts of delinquency.
Kim: Right.
[Re: Simon Wells]
Andrew: Uhm (1) but he - 1 mean he-he suffers from an incredible lack of affection 
(1) in his home I think.
Kim: Huh hum.
Andrew: And I would imagine that that’s - partly got to partly the reason for (1) his 
being - certainly - at least partly if not more so - the reason for his being (1) 
having been delinquent.
Kim: Right.
[Andrew also mentions Ben Jackson who moved down to London with his 
father when his parents’ marriage ended, and started to steal.]
Andrew: Presumably as a - as a way of saying (.5) “Look nobody cares about me - I’m 
gonna make you care about me -
Kim: Huh hum.
Andrew: one way or the other”.
[Andrew Chetland’s interview]
In both Simon’s and Ben’s case, Andrew defines their stealing in terms of an 
underlying motivation to compensate for an emotionally impoverished past. David Lyons’
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"horseplay" and mischievousness is similarly interpreted below as a document of his underlying 
need to be noticed and loved to make up for the past. The extract is drawn from one of the boy’s 
CC s.
Kate: . . .  the mischievous bit - likes to be chased - likes to be cuddled - and I think
it ties in with what George said - the uncertainty he had earlier of whether 
he was loved or not. And I feel that my own impression is that behind quite 
a lot of his horse play and dashing around - is the need for people to notice 
him and want him and to love him. That may be over-simplifying what I want 
to say - but that’s what I believe.
[Kate says on the one hand if she needs a boy to do a menial and mundane 
job like washing up, tidying, carrying etcetera, David is the boy she will 
inevitably ask because he’s the most willing and reliable]
. . .  there’s that side to him which is - perhaps - a desire to gain approval uhm 
- by David. Ahm - on the other hand there’s the little boy.
The apparent contradiction between the immature, mischievous and attention- 
seeking child, and the helpful, reliable and mature young man is resolved by yoking both to 
David’s subterranean need to be noticed and cared for.
iii) Lack of Good-Enough Parenting
In the excerpts above the boys’ "problems’’ are given focus and shape in terms of their 
historical deprivation of love, and all the accompanying features considered necessary for 
healthy development. Another decipherable category of deprivation, interwoven in some of the 
previous extracts, (especially that regarding Mr. Hughes on pages 263-266) is associated with 
parental inadequacy. The lack of good enou^  parenting is an assessment which betrays an 
orientation to a range of ghost assumptions which "appear’’, to a greater or lesser extent, on the 
occasion of their breach. Consider, first, two generalized allusions to the frequency of 
Èiadequate or insufficient parenting amongst this type of child.
[I ask Brian Potter in his interview what significance the family have in 
understanding the boys’ problems.]
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Brian: I think it’s deeply significant - yer -1 think uhm (3) I-I yer -1 think that there’s
- a lot of the boys are (.5) obviously victims of inadequate parenting -1 think.
5 Kim: Right.
Brian: Uhm (3) inadequate mainly in the sense of - well largely anyway - to a great
extent in the sense - of parental neglect (.5) through either the parents 
inadequacy or just an absolute lack of interest (slight laugh).
Kim: But (.5) parental neglect can be seen as part of a wider social (.5) thing?
10 Brian: Yes.
Kim: Is that is that (.5) what {you’re saying?
{
Brian: {I would say so - yes. I’m not blaming the parents -
13 as such.
And again:
1 [I ask Joe Duggan, senior social worker in unit 1, what distinguishes the
population of kids in an institution like St. Nicholas’ from those on the 
outside?]
Joe: As I said earlier. . .  they may just be victims of circumstances.
5 (1.5)
Kim: Right.
Joe: And there are kids who’ve (3) had really bad (?) experiences in childhood
8 and (4) are damaged (.5) noticeably (2) through insufficient parenting.
[Joe Duggan’s interview]
The leitmotif of victimization runs through both accounts (line 4 of the first, and 4 of
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the second) exonerating the child from original responsibility for his problems. This line of 
reasoning extends to the acquittal of parental blame in the first piece by attributing to at least 
certain parents an inadequacy which they are not in control of. This distinction is reinforced by 
juxtaposing parents whose "inadequacy** accounts for their deficient parenting with those who 
“absolutely lack interest** out of choice.
Both accounts refer to inadequacy bound up in lack, rather than the application of 
inept child-rearing techniques. In Brian*s account the deprivation is named as “neglect**; in Joe’s 
as “insufficiency”. The latter term suggests a new dimension to the complex network of 
typifications which attend any specific characterization. Not only are there qualities and skills 
which help define “good parenting” they also apparently come in optimal amounts! The 
administration of too little, or presumably too much, can thus disrupt an implicit balance.
In a series of extracts from Jimmy Mason’s case history we see the systematic erosion 
of Mrs. Mason’s parental authority as an adequate mother. The preliminary piece is drawn from 
the F.S.W. *s potted history.
1 “The documented background history describes a one parent family in
which the mother is basically caring but suffers severe physical and emotional 
handicaps, in part caused by her own deprived circumstances. These have 
impaired her ability to cope with the dual parental role and in consequence 
5 Jimmy has experienced short but fragmented periods of residential care. He
has acted-out in the home setting and, with his more devious and influential 
7 brother R., has demanded attention through aggressive displays and stealing.”
Mrs. Mason’s parental skills are dubbed as well intentioned, but impaired by handicaps 
themselves partly attributable to her own “deprived circumstances” (line 3). Her inability to 
adequately play the maternal role (let alone a “dual-parental” one) is temporally linked within 
the account to Jimmy’s “acting out” (line 6); and his “aggressive displays and stealing” (line 7) 
are aligned to his demand for attention rather than bloody-mindedness, or the pursuit of gain 
amongst other possible motivations.
The link between parental inability and the manifestation of delinquency is further 
secured below in a piece drawn from Jimmy’s psychiatric report compiled during his assessment.
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1 “The personality of his disturbed mentally subnormal and epileptic mother
who has spent many years in a psychiatric institution has been described 
elsewhere.
I understand that much of her unusual behaviour is of an hysterical nature. 
5 She has three children, from three different men, one of whom a girl, the
oldest, is adopted by her sister who will not let her see her mother.
The mother has a male friend who visits the family about twice a week and 
needs much support himself; he is not liked by the two sons because of his 
strictness. In such circumstances it is not surprising that the children go 
10 astray and both boys have committed offences against the law and manifested
neurotic symptoms such as wetting and soiling, etcetera. One does not know 
which one of the boys is the major culprit and emotions are frequently high 
13 in this completely unstable family set up.”
I want to draw attention to the work being done here, and some of the procedures 
through which a version of maternal inadequacy is accomplished. Effective work is done, I 
would suggest, by the invocation of the category of “mother” on line 1 to which the array of 
related maladies are then appended. We incorporate Mrs. Mason’s disturbance to the status of 
“mother” rather than woman, housewife, shop-assistant, human being etcetera. This, in 
coalition with our knowledge that the report is “about” Jimmy, not his mother/jer^e, structures 
our tendency as readers, I suggest, to forge embryonic explanations throughout. The report has 
been written because Jimmy has come to the attention of social agencies, and knowledge of this 
fact precedes any particular reading. Mrs. Mason, “his . . .  mother” (line 1), assumes the 
position of a link in the historical chain culminating in Jimmy’s problems.
The version of Mrs. Mason-as-inadequate-mother continues in lines 4-9 which 
compounds her mental instability by alluding to her inability to make stable sGcual relationships, 
and thus provide a secure conjugal base for her children. By dint of the discursive logic of the 
account, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we assimilate Mrs. Mason’s present 
relationship with a male friend to the history which precedes it. It constitutes another instance 
of a relationship destined for failure, especially in view of the man’s own problems. In the
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context of Jimmy’s mother’s inadequacies qua mother, his delinquent and disturbed symptoms 
are presented as a matter for “no surprise” (lines 9-11).
A third onslaught on Mrs. Mason’s maternal competence and her implication in her 
son’s disturbance is apparent in the conclusion to the psychiatric report
1 “(Jimmy)____ asked to go home to his mother and undoubtedly seeks
closeness to her physically and emotionally needing a lot of babying which 
he certainly did not get in his unstable home.
He still seeks the unattainable stability of home life with his mother which 
5 he has missed all his life and which has been instrumental in his emotional
and social problems.”
Jimmy’s desire to go home to mother is placed in the context of his delusion that he will 
receive the “unattainable” (line 4) mothering and stability that he has always lacked. The 
account rests upon a bedrock of assumptions so basic that they effectively operate without being 
spoken. Like good puppet theatre we do not see the strings, nor the hands which operate them. 
We know that babies need babying and this is usually and primarily done by mothers whose 
vigilance provides the basis for the child’s security. But Jimmy’s search for love is placed in a 
self-negating spiral: his social and emotional problems predispose him to seek closeness and 
stability from the mother who, incapable of providing them, was the cause of the problem in the 
first place.
To better grasp the nuances through which parental adequacy is assessed I want to 
introduce some of the conceptual tools in H. Sacks’ repertoire, and place them within the 
context of my own theorization. I have attempted to present throughout much of the foregoing 
material a model of actors as practical theorists, methodologists and moralists. We are 
constantly in the process of making sense of events both in terms of their factual and moral 
status. Such scrutiny is nowhere more apparent than where events are seen to deviate from our 
ghost assumptions about the typical and the normal.
The social unit in which problems are predominantly seen to emerge in this data is the 
family which thus becomes the site of interrogation and moral excavation in search of a solution
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to the puzzle: why is so-and-so a child with problems. If we divide the family into its component 
parts a major distinction is between parent and ofE-spring which, in our culture at least, can be 
mapped on to the pair adult-child. It is this double distinction which, I shall argue, is crucial in 
understanding a certain class of anomaly.
Members organize the world, as I have argued, with recourse to typifications and 
categorizations which cluster into groupings bound by their **family resemblance”, to use 
Wittgenstein’s phrase. The term membership categorization devise (M.C.D.) developed by 
Sacks alludes at once to the existence of these collections, and the procedures through which an 
item is identified as a member of a collection and assimilated to it. Through this process items 
are invested with familiarity and significance. The concept of M.C.D. is another way of exploring 
the sense-making process. It is a “device” of practical reasoning because it is employed in the 
second by second production of sense.
A sub-species of the M.C.D. which is of value to my exposition here is the standardized 
relational pair (S.R.P.). Sacks developed this concept in the course of his study of how a “locus 
of help” is sought for the member identified as suicidal (1972). While the specifics of his 
research are irrelevant to the problem-in-hand, the extrapolation of S.R.P. machinery is faithful 
to Sacks’ own project in pursuit of the invariant structures of talk. S R P.’s describe the 
organization and deployment of social knowledge. Members orientate to pairs of items which 
are standardly related to one another, where the invocation of one item in the pair necessarily 
presupposes the other. In such cases the paired referent is unnegotiable: the term “parent” 
necessarily implies “off-spring”, and “husband” is inextricably linked to “wife” as part of the 
S.R.P.
A series of expectations including moral obligations are attached to the related items 
as part of the shared body of social knowledge. The actual incumbents of these pairs are judged 
in relation to the background of ideal-typical assumptions which are brought to the assessment 
of any particular case. The routine expectations which accompany the S R P.’s adult-child and 
parent-offspring are asymmetrical: one party is assumed to have qualities which the other lacks. 
The adult/parent is assumed to have responsibility, wisdom and experience borne of age and 
stage. They are thereby attributed with a power and status over the child. Such moral 
expectations, descriptive and prescriptive, are embedded in the kernel of the definition.
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Standard relational pairs such as adult-child or parent-offspring are abstract ideals 
which are, in the words of E.C. Cuff (1980) “empty”: elaborated in the act of their articulation 
and reception, which usually deals with concrete empirical cases susceptible to scrutiny. 
Accounts which concern actual parents and children draw upon the machinery of S.R.P.1 on to 
which they map the specifics of the case. In this lies what Cuff (Ibid.) denotes as S.R.P.2 which 
allows the analyst to gain purchase on a wealth of subtle distinctions between concrete adults 
and children who may be: caring parents and disruptive children; irresponsible parents and 
neglected children; patient parents and trying children; immature parents and long suffering 
children; loving parents and monstrous children; wicked parents and victimized children, 
amongst infinite other possibilities. Through empirical elaboration S.R.P.1. is given substance 
and specificity. To repeat a major theme of this study alternatively: S.R.P.1. is the ghost which 
hovers in the background providing the conditions of possibility for S.R.P.2. The former 
provides an anterior transparency upon which the concrete is superimposed. Ghost frameworks 
only survive as part of the social body of knowledge to the extent that they are articulated and 
re-articulated: the typical and specific are cut out together in the same articulation.
Nowhere is this more apparent than where a deviation is mapped on to the 
ideal-typification of S.R.P.1. And since one of the institutional tasks of St. Nicholas’ was to 
unearth what went wrong with a child, deviations were firequently sought and found. Our focus 
here is limited: it concerns how S.R.P.1, parent-child is subverted by S.R.P.2., particularly with 
regard to the issue of parental adequacy.
Judgements of adequacy are premised upon the reasonable fulfilment of expectations, 
albeit they are often concealed by their very taken-for-grantedness. Judgements of “good 
enough mothering” thus presuppose a compendium of attributes which given empirical mothers 
may or may not have. The criterion of adequacy also contains a conception of appropriateness. 
We may formulate this “rule” in terms of the expectation that the incumbent of the maternal 
role will behave in a variety of ways toward the incumbent of the paired role - daughter or son 
- and not in others. The point is that the rule of appropriateness is inscribed in the categorized 
pair of roles in relation to which concrete mothers and children are assessed.
The rule of appropriateness surfaces in all of the forthcoming extracts where it is 
breached. The first is drawn firom Barry Painter’s case history compiled by his F.S.W.
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1 *‘Mrs. Painter’s diffîcult adolescence and family background had an effect
on her later life. She is the first to admit she is a very immature woman who 
has a great deal of difficulty in her relationship with her children.
[She always found it very difficult to enforce discipline and consistency - 
5 largely because this was lacking in her own childhood. On occasions she
colluded with her children working against social workers].
Mrs. Painter seems to relate to her children more as an adolescent sister 
than a mother, and she has frequently used the children for her own support 
and as confidantes, putting them in a role far in excess of their years. 
10 However, although Mrs. Painter’s mothering has been unorthodox, she is
concerned and in many ways caring and there is no doubt the children’s 
behaviour has caused her a great deal of distress. Over the last year there has 
been evidence of Mrs. Painter trying to be a more consistent mother to the 
children and she has co-operated more with (her local) social services in 
15 their plan for the children.”
[Brackets in original]
What we have in this piece is a contravention of expectations which accompany the 
S.R.P. mother-child. The pair, in its ideal-typical relationship, is unique and cannot be mapped 
onto other pairs such as husband or wife, or, in this case, the relationship between siblings. For 
mothers, by dint of their status, are assumed to have qualities in relative excess of their children: 
it is appropriate that they are more mature, consistent, powerful and independent. Mrs. Painter, 
by contrast, is “very immature” (line 2), caimot impose consistent discipline (line 4), is devious 
(lines 5-6) and dependent on her children for support (lines 8-9). We routinely graft empirical 
relationships on to the anterior map of ideal-typical models and judge their cognitive and moral 
adequacy in relation to it.
The inappropriateness of Mrs. Painter’s behaviour vis a vis her maternal role is 
explained in terms of her own historical lack of stability as a child, because of which she is 
ill-equipped to deal appropriately with her own children. The diminution of responsibility 
attendant upon this version is crystallized in lines 10-15. The section starts with the pronoun 
“however” which alerts us to a forthcoming divergence. Since the preceding section consists of
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a catalogue of Mrs. Painter’s faults, we listen for compensatory factors. “However, although” 
invokes familiarity with the linguistic rule “although this - also that”: although Mrs. Barry’s 
mothering techniques are “unorthodox”, she is concerned, caring, and distressed by her 
childrens misdemeanours. What is more in the last year there is evidence she has been “trying” 
(line 13) to imbibe the orthodoxy.
The moral overtones of the assessment of mother-child relations are even more 
apparent in the following extracts. What is at stake here, as above, is a subversion of the 
chronological expectations inscribed in S.R.P.1. Each of the forthcoming accounts refers to 
James Bryan, a boy of thirteen who was resident in unit 1. The first piece is drawn from a 
psychiatric assessment of James and his mother prior to his arrival at St. Nicholas’.
1 “The striking feature about the session was the relationship between Mrs.
Bryan and James which was much more as of a spouse and equal relationship, 
in no way like a mother and child. There was a total absence of authority. . .
Interestingly enough James overtly said that he thought his mother’s view 
5 of the neighbours was excessively persecutory. James consistently agreed
with all his mother said. However, at one point in the session he was almost 
in tears when discussing the reason for coming to see myself as a child 
psychiatrist. James himself showed no evidence of an abnormal mental 
state. His mood was not excessively anxious nor depressed and he was co- 
10 operative and helpful. In contrast Mrs. Bryan came across as highly volatile,
emotional, labile and totally unrealistic in her view of James, society and 
social services. She was unable in any way to conceive of herself as having 
anything to do with the problems of James blaming everything on other 
14 people around her.”
We are immediately alerted to the subversion of the S.R.P.1 on lines 1-3 where mother 
and son are seen to relate more on the level of husband and wife. The assumptions inscribed in 
each S.R.P. are made explicit: spouses have “equal relationships”, whereas the mother exerts 
authority in relation to her son. By contravening the latter clause (line 3) S.R.P.2 subverts the 
ideal-typical model of S.R.P.1. Lines 8-14 pivot around a distinction between James as a child 
of normal mind “in contrast” (line 10) to his mother who is seen to exhibit a cluster of qualities
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which verge on the abnormal. In relation to S.R.P.1 the empirical relationship between James 
and his mother is rendered deviant The relationship is thus conceived in terms of a range of 
secondary pairing^: stable son-unstable mother; bad mother-damaged son; normal son-abnormal 
mother, etcetera etcetera.
It might be noted here, as in the forthcoming pieces, that James is constructed both as 
normal, or at least ‘^suffering from no evidence of abnormal mental state*’ as well as having 
"problems”(line 13) which are squarely attributed to the kind of parenting that a woman/mother 
of Mrs. Bryan’s kind could offer.
For an account to be morally adequate it must be authorized. Particularly where 
blame is being allocated the author’s own account may be scrutinized for ulterior motives. 
Certain procedures are thus employed to establish the non-partisan nature of the account. We 
tend to have as a background assumption the knowledge that psychiatrists are not personally 
movitated in their assessment of clients (S.R.P.1, professional-client). As a consequence we 
tend to invest their interpretations with a neutrality home of professional detachment, and 
hence authorize their status as arbiters of the normal and deviant. This sense of detachment is 
partially accomplished by silencing the narrative voice. The only time the author enters is as a 
character in the story (lines 6-8), not as the story-teller.
Notwithstanding the authority inscribed in professional status, close analysis reveals 
more specific discursive procedures which accomplish the allocation of blame. I think the key 
to this accomplishment lies in lines 10-14. We are told Mrs Bryan exhibited “totally unrealistic 
views” in relation to her son, society and the social services. Her unrealistic attitude brims over 
to the inability to accept blame for her son’s “problems”. The extremist proclivities of the 
wording in the extract suggests both an excessiveness and an absolute denial of reality. She is 
unable in anyway to see herself as having anything to do with her son’s problems blaming 
everything on those around her. A great deal of work is being achieved in lines 9-10 where James 
is seen to show appropriate and non-excessive emotion in relation to which the histrionics of his 
mother appear inappropriate. The normalizing rule embodied in the son is breached by the 
mother. The extract exhibits a hive of discursive techniques. Of particular interest for our 
purposes is how it engages the ghost of ideal-typical parent-child relationships which are 
subverted in this particular empirical case.
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Reminiscent of the psychiatric report is the F.S.W.’s comments in one of James’ C.C.’s.
[The F.S.W. says how the relationship between James and his mother is 
more akin to girlfiriend and boyfriend than mother and son. The F.S.W. 
speaks of how, for example, they share little secrets together.]
Kate: Are you suggesting then uh-a sli^tly incestuous nature to their relationship?
F.S.W: I-I think - probably on an emotional level certainly.
Kate: Uhm - but not on a physical level?
F.S.W: I don’t think so -1 mean - even though I think mother’s capable of that I don’t
think James would do i t . . .  I think he’s a sensible boy. But in relation to his 
mother - he is treated as an adult.
The subversion is even more pronounced in the preceding extract where the mother-son 
relationship assumes the appearance of that between girlfriend and boyfriend, rendering it 
emotionally and possibly physically incestuous. In a manner similar to the psychiatric report, this 
account pivots on a description of son and mother which subverts the expectations embedded 
in S.R.P.1. What concerns us here is how responsibility is being allocated to Mrs. Bryan and how 
we, as hearer/reader, judge her to be blameworthy. Once again authority is ascribed to the 
F.S.W. whose version, as a professional in relation to a disturbed family, is given greater validity 
and clout as an impartial assessment.
We also bring to the account a welter of assumptions about mothers and sons and 
adults and children, of which a key element is the asymmetrical relationship between the two. 
Adults/parents are assumed to be more responsible, mature, experienced, wise etcetera than 
children-oGspring in which lies their licence to exercise legitimate power over them. The 
reciprocity and equality which both the psychiatrist and F.S.W. observe in the relationship 
between mother and son constitutes a fundamental breadi of the S.R.P.1. The sexual coimotations 
invested in S.R.P.2 serve to exacerbate the deviation. As the ideal-typical mother-adult is 
responsible for nurturing, educating and controlling her child, in the absence of a powerful 
mitigation she is held to blame where she fails to exercise her moral obligation. This is where the
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subversion becomes almost a role reversal. Bad mother-suffering son is elaborated into 
immature, irresponsible, incompetent, paverse, excessive, unrealistic mother - sensible, mentally 
stable, mature, adult son.
In the final extract below from one of James* C.C.*s at St. Nicholas’ the breach of the 
ideal-typical mother-child relationship is tantamount to a transmutation. James becomes the 
parent in relation to his juvenile mother.
[The F.S.W. speaks of how James and his sister have managed to muddle 
through, although they are disturbed and need special care.]
F.S.W: But they’re still very very attached to mother - very protective and uhm.. .
I think they feel responsible for her - 1 mean yes - yes - 1 think that that’s 
important - and they actually do take quite a lot of responsibility for her 
welfare.
Eileen: This is because she’s making them.
F.S.W: Oh yes - they-they in a sense are acting as her parents. . .  because she’s so
juvenile - uhm - that they have to - at the end of the day they’re the ones that 
have to go and swear at the boyfriend to get him off her back - or yes - ball 
her out - constantly - ah - that’s the situation - and they seem to have done 
that throughout - as far as we know.
An adjacent category of deprivations is witnessed in the next account. What is at stake 
is not the mother’s adoption of an inappropriate “sibling” role, but the child’s expropriation 
from the role of child. The lack, once more, explains the need; or, perhaps, the identified need 
commissions a retrospective glance toward its possible cause. Consider the following extract 
from my interview with Thomas McKinney:
1 [Thomas is responding to my request for him to assess the basis of Tony
Salter’s problems.]
Thomas: He was coping with the confusion of not being allowed as part of a child care
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programme (1) to become a child (1.5) never knew what it was to be a child 
5 (.5) becos of the - the-the-the - if you like the-the-the-principles of the-the
- beliefs or philosophies of his own family was that I mean - he was the oldest 
son and therefore then - the eldest child... so Tony Salter really and truly was 
8 never allowed to be a child (.5) yer?
A similar breach is apparent in the following extract from a S.S.M. The subject of 
discussion is David Lyons.
1 Thomas: If we give him some sand and water - he’d probably have great fun.
Kate: Yer.
Agnes: Yer.
Thomas: Uhm.
5 Roger: Yes.
Agnes: Yer he probably would.
Philip: Well I mean that’s half of the problem he - he’s been an adult - since he was 
sort of that high (.5) in {so many areas
{
Roger: {Man - man of the family.
10 Thomas: Yes yes.
Philip: Yer - that he’s - he’s now looking for space to be a child.
In each case a fundamental breach of the assumptions inherent in S.R.P. 1 is identified 
in the parents failure to allow their oGspring to “be children” for a circumscribed period of time. 
Blame in both cases is implicitly allocated to the parent/s who have deviated from the responsibilities 
incumbent upon them as parents. The negative connotations are apparent in lines 1-2 of the first
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extract and line 7 of the second. Never being allowed to be a child is responsible for the 
“confusion” with which Tony is now having to cope, and constitutes “half of the problem” with 
David. S.R.P.1 is thus the receptacle for a range of more specific moral characterizations which 
in this case may be postulated as; deficient parent-suffering child.
It appears that empirical mothers can be children, and concrete children deprived of 
their status. For the conceptions in which these identities lie are typifying ones, measured 
against the ghost schemata which define our cultural knowledge. The spectre of ideality lurks 
in the back-reaches of discourse itself.
In the preceding accounts the parents, or more usually the mother, is being implicitly 
or explicitly blamed for the child’s disturbance, by dint of the expectations which accompany the 
S.R.P. In other instances, by contrast, the parent may be exonerated of blame either on the basis 
of her own emotional disturbance, or the intervention of events which exceed her control. In 
the first extract below Eileen Walker, basic grade social worker in unit 1, traces the lineages of 
inter-generational deprivation.
[Eileen speaks of parenting being a hard job, knowing where to draw the line 
and administer punishment.]
Eileen: And if you’ve not had - that - handed down from vour sort of parents (.5) uh
and you were lacking initially. I mean very (1) very often I would think a 
small lack (.5) say two or three generations ago uhm - can develop into (.5) 
quite a wide gap -
Kim: {Uhm.
{
Eileen: {by the time it reaches (.5) the third or fourth generation.
In one of James Bryan’s C.C.’s Eileen places his mother’s maternal incapacity in the 
context of her own past lack.
1 Eileen: I don’t knowMrs. Bryan’s own sort of uh-history but-from what 1(1) sussed
out by talking to her - and talking about her problems - and things - 1 don’t
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think she had very much of a mothering (1) because - when (I do) the 
mothering bit to her - in the way of advice and talking and that (.5) she loves 
it.
F.S.W: Uhm.
Eileen: She doesn’t seem to have had any mothering herself.
Frank: Well this is what you were saying also - you told me that ah (1) Mrs. Bryan
herself actually wanted a mother - mother figure now.
10 Eileen: Uhm.
F.S.W: Uhm.
Frank: She wants mothering - herself.
(2)
F.S.W: Well - that’s been part of the problem. She’s not actually been a parent to
15 either of the kids - she’s been more a (1) a - an older sister or (?).
Eileen: But without knowing her history - 1 mean I don’t know why -
F.S.W: We don’t know.
Eileen: she’s turned out like this.
F.S.W: No.
20 Eileen: But that might well be why - if she’s not had any proper mothering herself - 
she won’t know how the hell to go about it.
The inability of the mother to mother is attributed here to her own historical lack of 
mothering. Eileen’s hypothesis is evidential; “sussed out” by talking to Mrs. Bryan and the
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latter’s response to Eileen’s attempts to “mother” her (“she loves it” lines 4-5); as well as her 
established incapacity to mother her children. The arm of deprivation stretches back into past 
generations at least back to James* grandmother who failed to mother Mrs. Bryan. In the 
absence of a mother model it is not surprising that she *Svon*t know how the hell to go about it” 
(line 21).
In a second mode of abrogation circumstances beyond parental control are seen to 
intervene. In such cases as the one quoted below, the adequacy of the mother does not hinge 
upon her capacity perse. The excerpt is taken from Chris Jones* case history, compiled by his 
F.S.W.
“Chris spent the first year of his life in hospital and physical contact with his 
mother was very limited. Shortly after returning home, Mr. and Mrs. Jones 
separated. Almost immediately (Chris* brother) was bom and as a result the 
maternal-infant bond was never really established.
Mrs. Jones says that despite her attempts, Chris is never able to accept her 
affection fully. During the past months Chris has consistently reiterated to 
his mother that he feels she doesn’t want him.”
Aversion of circumstantial conspiracy against the formation of the mother-child bond 
discursively suggests itself. Neither inadequacy or inappropriateness are the dominant rule, 
although they may have a recessive status. Chris* stay in hospital was, presumably (in the absence 
of any modifying evidence) unavoidable, and thus in the category of “no-one’s fault”. Mrs. 
Jones* conception, and subsequent separation may be considered a piece of bad timing, but do 
not in themselves suggest maternal culpability.
The next and final extract in this sub-section adds a twist of complexity to characterizations 
of inadequacy. In it Mrs. Jones’ self-identified inadequacy is seen to lie in her excessive 
compliance to her childrens* wishes in an attempt to compensate for their father’s absence. In 
this, one may argue, resides her lack of proportion and constraint. The context is one of Chris’ 
C.C.S.
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[Joyce, Chris* special worker, suggests that Chris puts a lot of demands on his 
mum.]
F.S.W: I think though - to be fair on Chris - the history of it as well - is that his other 
two (.5) brothers. . .  do make a lot of demands on mum.
Mrs. J: Yer they do. It’s just became I think because mums there-and (.5) dads not
there. I mean any other kid can go to his dad.
Joyce: Uhm.
Mrs. J: And it’s always been to mum - to mum - to mum. And I’ve always said - “yes
alright then” - you know. (1) But then the time had to come when I had to 
stop and say “No - you’re growing up - you don’t” (1) although they still need 
me - they don’t need me twenty-four hours a die - a day.
iv) Histories of Rejection
Amongst the repository of assumptions about what the child needs for a normal 
development is the unqualifîed acceptance by his parents, who may on occasions reject what he 
does y but not, if they are good enough parents, what he fundamentally û. Parental rejection was 
conceived by the staff at St. Nicholas’ to be a source of many of the boys’ problems; a specific 
feature of the background instability which nurtured them. In the first extract below historical 
lack of ongoing support for the boy is seen to erode his emotional stability which crumbles in the 
wake of the normal traumas of adolescence.
[Peter French, “basics” teacher, speaks of the ages fourteen, fifteen and 
sixteen as being a traumatic time.]
Peter: I-I just put it down to - you know - it’s (.5) hard enough (.5) in a wav to get
through that time - when you’ve got a very stable background - with say 
parents who - care a lot for you - and who are prepared to keep - you know 
(1) take a lot of rubbish that you’re giving them.
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Kim: Huh hum.
Peter: I mean I don’t know whether this is typical of every kid (.5) but - you know
that (2) at that age you’re definitely going to give stick out to people around 
you.
Kim: Uhm.
Peter: People that you know care for you - but you’re testing it out or whatever.
Kim: Uhm.
Peter: And it’s - and it’s difficult enough to go through that period with with people
around you who’re prepared to take that from you - becus they care for you
- becus they love you - and are willing to (.5) uh accept it and - knowing full 
well that eventually you’ll grow out of it. Whereas some of those kids are 
going through that period with nothing like that behind them.
Kim: Uhm.
Peter: Instead of people who care for them they’re just getting rejection - rejection
- rejection.
[Peter French’s interview]
In the forthcoming piece, rejection is given a central explanatory status as a milestone, 
or starting point on the road to emotional disturbance. The extract refers to Simon Wells and 
is drawn from the written summary of his assessment conference.
1 **Discussion of the family and Simon’s situation was then opened up. It was
possible that Simon was rejected early on but his mother had always blocked 
on this when the subject had been raised. Simon does not know who his 
father is and this could have affected his feelings about himself and his 
5 identity. Simon’s mother was seen as not having the concepts or intellectual
equipment to understand what she might contribute to Simon’s problems.
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She saw her role as looking after the home and maintaining material 
standards. Simon’s step-father had put in an effort with all the boys but was 
giving up with Simon at present. . The psychiatrist, in his report, had 
10 found that Simon’s problems were in a significant way related to family
functioning.”
Rejection plays a cryptic part in the historical emergence of Simon’s problems. It is 
given the status of a probable occurrence. Notice, however, how this version of potential 
rejection is authorized. Simon’s mother “always blocked” on the question of his early rejection 
we are told (line 1-3). Leaving aside the issue of what is meant by rejection here, the rhetorical 
tone implies that there is something to be blocked; it implies an actively defensive manoeuvre. 
In lines 3-5 we are offered a descriptive slice of Simon’s past which, I suggest, bolsters a sense 
of his rejection. I, certainly, read into the description of Simon not knowing his father, a sense 
of the latter’s early disappearance, engendering the feeling of rejection in his son and the 
erosion of his identity.
Lines 5-8 lend a particular nuance to Simon’s mother’s denial of possible early 
rejection. It is attributed not to her deliberate attempt to distort the truth, but to her inadequate 
conceptional grasp of her own complicity in Simon’s problems. Her impoverished view of the 
maternal function, as the maintenance of material standards, epitomizes her insufficiency. The 
allusion in lines 8-9 is to another possible rejection by Simon’s step-father who, having put in an 
effort, “was giving up on Simon at present”. In the concluding scenario the psychiatrist adds his 
authorial weight to this version of Simon’s problems being “(significantly) related to family 
functioning” (lines 9-11).
The rejection-connection is also forged below with reference to Peter Hughes. The 
occasion is a day conference in which Mike Griffith, Peter’s special worker from unit 4, speaks 
of the family meetings which had been taking place between Peter, his father, his F.S.W. and 
relevant unit 4 staff.
1 Mike: And I think the (1) main object of them is to look at the kind of family - uhm
- set up and how it - how it’s actually affected Peter actually arriving in St. 
Nicholas’. Very briefly what it - what it’s about - Peter has felt (2.5) rejection 
from two very significant females in his life. His own mother and also his step
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5 mother. And he’s had to (.5) he’s had to try and cope with that. We’ve tried
to sort of coax these - these kind of feelings out - out of him. And his father 
seems to have uhm (.5) felt as though he - spilt the beans if you like - to Peter 
about how - Peter was treated by his own mother (.5) in his early life. 
Anvhow - Peter had to - to face up to some - fairly unpleasant (1) uhm - facts 
10 which I don’t think he was aware of before. Also we’re having to deal with
- uhm - Peter’s own delinquency. . .  So - we’ve still got a hell of a lot of work 
to do (2) uhm (.5) there’s a - it’s a (1.5) it is a kind of can of worms which is
- which is being opened. I can’t - you know - obviously predict what is what 
14 is going to happen but . . .
An implicit connection is forged here between Peter’s rejection from two significant 
women, and his manifestation of later problems. The holes and gaps left in the fabric of the 
account (regarding how, for instance, rejection by mother figures gives rise to emotional 
disturbance) are plugged by the reader who is able to draw upon the substance of her cultural 
and occupational knowledge.
The therapeutic voice rings clearly in this account, which achieves its authority by 
identifying Peter’s maternal rejections as a fact which we are constrained to recognize, and 
which Peter too, for his own development, must come to terms with. Let us consider how the 
therapeutic fact-effect is accomplished. In lines 3-5 we are told that the two-fold rejection is 
something with which Peter has had to try and cope, thus suggesting something inherently 
unpleasant which was forced upon him. It is these rejecting feelings which they, the therapeutic 
excavationists, are trying to coax to the surface. The term coax (line 6) suggests that these 
feelings are something Peter is reluctant to admit, but which exist, whether he likes it or not. The 
"spilt beans” (line 7) again assume the status of immutable facts which the boy must face up to 
for his own salvation. It is in the opening of this "can of worms” (line 12) that the remainder of 
the therapeutic work is seen to lie. The unequivocal existence of the worms are constructed as 
the indisputable basis from which Peter’s emotional disturbance derives.
The specific behavioural manifestations of Peter’s underlying sense of rejection are 
not specified in Mike’s account above. In the following excerpt, by contrast, Keith’s school 
difficulties provide the occasion for tracing the lineage of his rejecting history. The report is 
written by an educational psychologist at a child guidance clinic.
290-
1 Ed.Psyc: It seems to me an extremely rejecting home background and personal
relationships are the key to Keith's school difficulties. In the short time he 
was (at his secondary school) he appeared to invite fights with his peer group 
and was involved on the edge of crime with other boys and men. He appears 
5 to be ''acting-out" his anger at the rejection of his family in delinquent acts.
The construction of historical and behavioural patterns facilitates the assimilation of 
new items. Oiled by the recognition of Keith’s "extremely rejecting home background and 
personal relationships" (lines 1-2) recent events slide more easily into the framework. I hear this 
as quite a persuasive account because the connection between Keith’s rejecting history and his 
contemporary difiBculties is bridged by a theory of psychological motivation, namely "acting-out", 
which forges a rational link between them. For an appraisal of this mode of causal connection 
see chapter 7.
Conclusion
A polymorphous array of deprivations were seen to punctuate the histories of "boys 
of this kind". However well buried, these were seen to work their way to the behavioural surface 
in a variety of guises from criminal delinquency, to aggressivity, to a range of emotionally 
disturbed manifestations. The dominant mode of "emplotment" to show up in the case history 
was that which unfolded from a kernel of lack. The vast majority of these accounts offered 
variations on a series of related themes. From this font of typicality and familiarity sprung the 
specifics of each case whose precise configuration was unique. To repeat Ricoeur’s words:
" . . .  events are singular and typical, contingent and expected, deviant a?id 
dependent on paradigms, even if this is in the ironic mode."
[P. Ricoeur (1984) - p.208]
[Emphasis in the original]
And the stories which cast the historical events into an organized whole are also both familiar 
and strange. The traditional themes are never simply played through; each enactment is always 
a creative production as well as cultural reproduction.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ARCHriECTURE OF GAUSAUTY
Introduction
In this chapter I am primarily concerned to examine the methods through which 
historical accounts forge causal links between events in constructing a more or less persuasive 
version of ‘Svhat went wrong”. Like facts, causes reside in the procedures through which they 
are encoded as such. To construct or identify a causal connection requires the employment of 
a mode of reasoning which is practical in nature. What the logician or philosopher topicalizes 
as “the problem of causality” appears to be managed by the participant in everyday life without 
too much trouble. I now turn to this practice of mundane causality to make a bit of trouble, 
though not by subjecting it to philosophical doubt, or by suggesting it is defective. The disruption 
is caused by asking radically naive questions, like how is a sense of causation accomplished? 
Through what methods are events, whether temporally segregated or juxtaposed, causally 
related? In a nutshell: how do we do cause?
To gain purchase on the mechanisms of causal explanation I consider a variety of 
accounts, most notably those drawn from the written case histories which accompany children 
in care. In biographical accounts of this kind a series of events are implicitly or explicitly linked 
together, as well as being interwoven into the narrative fabric as a whole.
Orientation to time and narrative is a necessary prerequisite of achieving such causal 
connection. Time enters into conceptions of cause because sequentiality is a necessary 
component of them, and sequentiality is inherently chronological. For a cause to be established 
a preceding event must be seen to give rise to a consequent one. Pure Logic differs from 
mundane reasoning in its demand that certain a priori conditions be met. For A and B to be 
causally related it must be proved that B could not have happened without the presence of A, 
its necessary and sufGcient pre-condition. We need venture no further into Logic, a mode of 
reasoning whose purity has only a degree in common with the pragmatism of everyday life. The 
latter entertains a more tentative, hypothetical, wait-and-see quality, more flexible in its 
application.
ThQ raison d'etre of historical analysis is its capacity to create a reconstructed sense of
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order inaccessible to participants who were in the thick of i t  Precisely because history has 
happened, a sense of what caused it to happen may be disentangled. What the past has made 
happen, in the kind of account considered here, is a problem child and the attempt is to unearth 
why by an exploration of his biography. This historical reconstruction is based upon a range of 
secondary sources, including the verbal recollections of significant figures such as parents, and 
the written accounts of various professionals who may have been involved with the child or his 
parents, such as teachers, doctors, psychiatrists and the like. In the service of this pursuit 
good enough reasons are sought; causal coimections which are persuasive and meaningful. 
Logic enters into the endeavour, for what is it if not an attempt to sieve and purify the common 
sense reasoning from which it is drawn? The difference is that the contingencies and vicissitudes 
of the everyday render this too rigid a criterion.
Mundane causality, if we can call it that without casting aspersions on its validity, is 
accomplished through setting up a relationship in which A and B are meaningfully related 
through, most effectively, the inscription of motives. Thus a child’s deviant behaviour is seen to 
bear the trace of his underlying disturbance engendered by historical events. For example, early 
rejection and later delinquency may be bridged by a theory of “testing-out”. The behaviour is 
read in terms of its underlying motive, (often unconscious to the child himself), itself borne of 
earlier happenings. The child “tests out” for love, approval, acceptance, etcetera, in the present 
because he was deprived of them in the past. Through the construction of a motivational bridge, 
temporally distinct events enter into a causal relationship. [For a discussion of “testing out”, see 
pages 146-151].
Present events and behavioural items are thus conceived as documentary in a double 
sense: as inscriptions of the past, and of underlying emotions and motivations. The search for 
causes operates on these two trajectories of the longitudinal and latitudinal. The two paths cross 
at a number of nodal points where one helps elucidate the other. Since historical events are 
believed to cause a child’s problems, rather than their being innate, they are important sign-posts 
in the search. Similarly, later manifestations of deviant behaviour are held to signify a child’s 
state of mind, level of disturbance, or whatever. But the fundamental bridge which connects 
earlier events to later behavioural scenarios is a motivational one, at least in the rational mode 
characteristic of institutional discourse at St. Nicholas’. To engineer the connection participants 
must interpret the underlying significance of events. In the process of attributing motive and 
meaning an extensive body of assumptions are brought into play. These include, as we have
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witnessed repeatedly, ghost assumptions about what is normal and healthy in, for instance, the 
upbringing and parenting of a child. Only in relation to this normative backcloth are deviations 
detectable.
The theory of psychological motivation being proffered here places it firmly in the 
public domain. By employing the documentary method of interpretation the practitioner is able 
to accomplish a sense of the motivation underlying a piece of behaviour for the practical purpose 
in hand. My intention is not to deny, with Garfînkel, that there is anything of interest under the 
skull. Judgements of this kind are suspended in favour of an analysis of how the sense of an 
emotional realm is achieved by drawing upon and galvanising an array of documentary traces.
While all accounts rely upon a body of unspoken assumptions, the extent to which the 
line of reasoning is explicitly articulated varies. This brings us to a tenet fundamental to an 
understanding of how such accounts work. However explicit or implicit the explanatory 
architecture of an account, the making of sense requires the mutual collaboration of both the 
producer of the account and the recipient. It is not my purpose to explore what differentiates 
talk from text, nor to deny the differences. But in spite of these a core of communality unites 
both spoken and written discourse which lies in the onus of responsibility being shared between 
both producer and consumer. For although the author wields a number of skills bequeathed by 
cultural membership, the product is never complete. As Ricoeur says, the work:
“consists of holes, lacunae, zones of indetermination, which. . .  challenge 
the reader’s capacity. . . ”
The reader, abandoned by the text,
“carries the burden of emplotment.”
For the text:
“is a set of instructions that the individual reader or the reading public 
executes in a passive or creative way.”
[P. Ricoeur (1984) - p.77]
The historical analysis of a child’s problems, like any other account, relies upon the 
utilization of a range of membership skills. But the extent to which the reader has to work to fill
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the gaps is inversely related to the level of explicit theorization. This is not to suggest that more 
explicit accounts do not necessarily challenge or stretch the reader. Precisely because the reader 
has to follow a line of reasoning espoused by the author, she cannot necessarily rely upon a 
bedrock of familiar assumptions to forge the connection.
Ricoeur suggests that for histoiy to make sense, it must be tacked onto a narrative 
organization. Without exploring the complex nuances of Ricoeur’s understanding of time and 
narrative (1984) certain rudimentary points should be made. Firstly, history as a discursive 
artefact provides the contedual kernel within which events are brought into alignment. We 
know narrative events are connected - even if they do not appear to be so at present - because they 
are all part of the story. Operationalization of the “everything relevant” (until further notice) 
rule of narrative instructs the reader to treat all items, even if ostensibly unconnected, as 
potentially significant. Thus events, simply by dint of the narrative context, assume an inchoate 
connectedness. We read them in relation to their contribution to the unfolding story. In the 
words of Ricoeur:
“an event must be more than a singular occurrence: it must be defined in 
terms of its contribution to the development of a plot.”
[P. Ricoeur (1981) - p.277]
We have seen in previous sections how social workers and related professionals have 
a bank of typified plots which they employ in recognizing “another instance o f . . . ” and “the 
same old story”. Lack is a central pillar of the paradigm. What is more, both in producing and 
reading the historical account, participants share the typified knowledge of where the unfolding 
events are going to lead. Episodes are read as a series of clues which help explain the emergence 
of a problem child. Ricoeur alludes to many of these points in the quotation below:
“To follow a story is to understand the successive actions, thoughts and 
feelings as displaying a particular directedness. By this I mean that we are 
pushed along by the development and that we respond to this thrust with 
expectations concerning the outcome and culmination of the process.. .So 
rather thanbcingpredictable a conclusion mmtbcacceptable. Looking back 
from the conclusion toward the episodes which led up to it, we must be able 
to say that this end required those events and that chain of action. But this 
retrospective glance is made possible by the teleologically guided movement 
of our expectations when we follow the story.”
[P. Ricoeur (1981) - p.277]
[Emphasis in original]
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Three modes of causal connection are identified for the present analytical purposes 
which I gloss the conjigurationaly the rational and the paradigmatic. The configurational is the 
most weakly theorized mode of connection which draws a bond of causality firom the narrative 
context and the logic which attends i t  The plethora of ghost assumptions about the nature of 
causation come most explicitly into play where the connection between episodes is poorly 
articulated. It is here that the reader/hearer must draw most obviously upon her own resources 
to make sense. The rational mode, as distinguished here, is accomplished by constructing a 
psychological bridge between the boy*s behaviour and its purported motivational underpinnings. 
The paradigmatic mode is characterized by the assimilation of items to a burgeoning pattern; a 
procedure which I explain more fully in the following chapter.
The adoption of one mode does not mutually exclude the others, but entails a 
difference in emphasis. In practice the three modes were usually intertwined, though one may 
temporarily have assumed dominance, driving the other two into a recessive status. What is 
more, in each of the compendium of reports which composed the child’s case history one mode 
of causal coimection may have been given priority over the others.
i) Constructing the Causal Chain
Biographical Sketches
As a preliminary to more detailed analysis of various aspects of the architecture of 
causality I want to consider a series of extended biographical sketches. In particular I juxtapose 
two extracts which exhibit the configurational mode of causal connection with two that are 
predominantly rational in tone. The comparison of weak with strong causal connections will 
help us gain analytical purchase on the different procedures of causal accomplishment. Consider, 
first of all, the lengthy biographical account of Simon Cutts* life extracted firom his case history. 
This offers a classical example of the configurational format.
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Date Age
August 1967 Birth
Comments
Bom at home. Midwife delivery.
Simon did not breath straight away. Kiss of 
life administered by midwife. As far as Mrs. 
Cutts knows there was no brain damage. 
Simon weighed approx. 71b.
1970 3 years Simon gave himself nervous diarrhoea when 
he attended his first play school.
1973 6 years 6 months
10
Teachers spoke of it being a “pleasure” to 
teach Simon because he was so keen on 
learning. Simon is described as “polite, 
well-mannered, angelic”. He joined a 
swimming club at his own instigation.
1976 8 years 6 months
15
Simon “very worried” when his sister 
contracted suspected meningitis. Primary 
school: Simon in choir and football team.
1976 9 years
20
Joined table-tennis and swimming club. He 
also took up trumpet and joined school 
orchestra. He would like to have played the 
clarinet but his fingers were not long enough 
so he took up playing his own trumpet. He 
passed three music exams in one year and 
his teacher said he had a photographic 
memory for sheet music.
1977 10 years
25
Continued sporting activity - though it did 
tend to affect homework.
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1978 11 years Went to Wales for 10 days with school.
30
1979 11 years Mr. Cutts* mother dies. Simon very upset as 
it was sudden and she was a close and 
important member of the family. Mr. Cutts 
had a nervous breakdown following his 
mothers death and this caused much distress 
to Simon and his mother. Prior to this they 
had both considered him a strong character 
and one to rely on.
35 1979 11 years Simon homosexually propositioned by a 
Y.M.C.A. friend. He saw this as a betrayal.
Early 1980 12 years Developed headaches which disappeared 
when he heard about the transferral of 
schools.
40 July 1980 12 years Gained a good report in last year of junior 
school.
45
Sept 1980 13 years He went to the school of his choice where 
his friends were. He was the member of 
many sports teams and the orchestra playing 
trumpet: but he did not continue long with 
the orchestra.
Sept 1980 13 years Member of cross-country running team, good 
at gymnastics. Very active at the Y.M.C.A. 
club and athletics club, and tennis club.
50 Easter 1981 13 years 9 months First senior school exam. Simon very anxious.
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Sept1981 14 years Back at school. However severe headaches 
reappeared (formerly had them in Spring 
1980). They were migraine in character. 
Simon vomiting and being very sick.
55 Oct/Nov 1981 14 years Started missing school, helping the milkman 
with milk-round instead.
Simon started dabbling in crime, stealing 
money from houses. He confessed this to 
his parents - he wasn't caught.
60 Nov 1981 14 years 6 months Simon referred to adolescent unit Diagnosed 
“depressed and school refuser”. G.P. felt 
Simon needed treatment to protect his 
mother from his “murderous intent”.
Xmas 1981 14 years 6 months
65
Although emergency admission, Simon kept 
in family over Xmas.
Jan 1982 14 years 6 months Admitted to adolescent unit of a psychiatric 
hospital. Mother takes course in shorthand.
14 years 9 months Simon ran back to hospital from a weekend 
at home.
70
72
June 1982 14 years 9 months Police involved in Simon and a group of 
other boys making a disturbance. He was 
cautioned.
The above synopsis of Simon’s history requires a high level of reader participation to 
achieve a sense of significance and connectedness. The individual entries, organized chronologically, 
configure into a meaningful whole largely through the knowledge and assumptions which are 
brought to them. The identification of the document as one in which a child’s history is being 
told, instructs the reader to search for a relationship between different biographical episodes
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and between each episode and the narrative context as a whole. Knowledge of where the stoiy 
inevitably leads provides a further yoke upon which to hang reported events.
Notice the very first entry, “birth”, on lines 1-5, which in itself points to some of the 
procedures through which we accomplish a configurational reading. Since we know this is a 
story about Simon’s emergence as a problem child whose disturbance is sufficient to necessitate 
entry into care, we structure our reading of events accordingly. In spite of Mrs. Cutts knowing 
of no brain damage, this does not detract from our reading of Simon’s initial failure to breath as 
a candidate solution to the puzzle: what went wrong with Simon and why? It is an embryonic 
explanation we may keep in mind until it is either further corroborated, or subsumed under a 
more plausible version. Similarly Simon’s “nervous diarrhoea” (line 6) on his attendance at play 
school feeds into our search for historical traces, and suggests itself as an indication of Simon’s 
general state of mind.
Although no explicit causal canopy connects the events sketched from 1970 to 1978, 
they are thematically conjoined in their identification of Simon’s progress and success in his 
education, attitudes and his sporting and musical abilities. With the exception of only minor 
blemishes we are led to assume that Simon’s achievements, until the age of eleven, are 
significant. However, as readers armed with a knowledge of what the story is “about”, we read 
Simon’s progress in the context of a general scheme of things. We know the progress does not 
last and thus asssign to it a transitory status. The reader, I suggest, anticipates a juncture in the 
narrative flow from which the boy’s problems begin to emerge. The very positiveness of his 
earlier life begs for a pivot upon which a before-after picture balances.
A textual turning point occurs in line 27 with the death of Mr. Cutts’ mother. The 
event is depicted as not only upsetting for Simon in itself, but in terms of his father’s reaction. 
Mr. Cutts’ “breakdown” is seen to shatter the image Simon had of his father as a strong and 
reliable character. The sense of a bad break in Simon’s hitherto sunny «dstence is reinforced 
with reference to a homosexual proposition he received from a Y.M.C.A. friend soon after his 
grandmother’s death. While these events, once more, are not explicitly associated, they 
coagulate thematically in terms of their sense of threat to the security of Simon’s world. The 
turnaround in his fortunes, however, is not unequivocal. In spite of preceding episodes, and the 
emergence of “headaches”, Simon goes on to succeed in the spheres in which he had previously 
done so.
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The second nodal juncture occurs in Easter 1981 when Simon is reported to have 
experienced extreme anxiety due to a school exam. Periodic episodes thereafter serve to firm 
up a conception of Simon’s emergence as a problem child. The migraine headaches which 
appear during his second year at secondary school resonate with an earlier entry (line 36). At 
least two different versions of the significance of these headaches are possible. They may, on 
one version, be traced back to the traumas of birth, Simon’s failure to breath immediately, and 
the allusion to brain damage. On a second version, the one which informed my reading of the 
account, Simon’s headaches resonate with his nervous tummy (lines 6-7), his worry about his 
sister (lines 13-14), and his headaches at the age of 12. What I hear this group to signify is Simon’s 
high levels of anxiety which tend to express themselves in somatic symptoms.
An incipient causal connection suggests itself in lines 50-73. This collection of 
episodes neatly displays how the account is structured through the reader’s interpretation of the 
instructions embedded in it, and the assumptions brought to bear on it. The exam anxiety feeds 
into the re-emergence of migraines when “back at school” which implicitly connects with 
Simon’s starting to miss school in Oct/Nov 1981. By dint of this truancy and “dabbling in crime” 
a professional diagnosis is made which culminates in Simon’s admission to a psychiatric 
adolescent unit. The allusion in lines 61-63 to the need for Mrs. Cutts to be protected from his 
“murderous intent” (apart from the curious exclusion of any empirical substantiation of the 
circumstances which may have given rise to this interpretation) is the first clue to there being 
something seriously wrong, and the only item which of itself would seem to justify psychiatric 
intervention. In conjunction with the clinical diagnosis of “depression” these two sequentially 
juxtaposed items assume a pathologizing connotation.
If we bracket some of the procedures through which we “read” connections between 
events, we may begin to see how a sense of alignment is achieved through the reader’s utilization 
of the codes of narrative and interpretation of instructions which, in the configurational mode, 
lie implicit within the text. In contrast with the foregoing account consider a comparably full 
biographical sketch where the more explicitly theorized rational mode is operative. The 
juxtaposition of extremes facilitates analytical vision as well as heightening the sense of drama. 
The extract below which was partially reproduced in earlier sections, is the full psychiatric report 
on Jimmy Mason which composed part of his case file.
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1 “I saw this boy at (a named assessment centre) on 30.6.77.
The personality of his disturbed mentally sub-normal and epileptic mother 
who has spent many years in a psychiatric institution has been described 
elsewhere.
5 I understand that much of her unusual behaviour is of an hysterical nature.
She has three children, from three different men, one of whom a girl, the 
oldest, is adopted by her sister who will not let her see her mother.
The mother has a male friend who visits the family about twice a week and 
needs much support himself; he is not liked by the two sons because of his 
10 strictness. In such circumstances it is not surprising that the children go
astray and both boys have committed offences against the law and manifested 
neurotic symptoms such as wetting, soiling, etc. One does not know which 
one of the boys is the major culprit and emotions are frequently high in this 
completely unstable family set up.
15 In August 1975 the brother was recommended for a boarding school for
maladjusted pupils and apparently did not go, but frictions between the boys 
and their mother, accompanied by aggressive behaviour, became more 
frequent.
When the mother had to be admitted to hospital in May 1976 the two boys 
20 went into a children’s home where they settled down during the nine weeks
in a satisfactory manner. Other placements were equally successful until the 
mother seemed to have upset Jimmy sufficiently for him to act out his 
conflicts in an unacceptable manner.
When away from home for a few weeks and after they were sent back home 
25 Jimmy seems to have reacted by unruliness and stealing. His brother went
to a boarding school in 1977 but once he was away Jimmy made considerable 
problems with which his mother could not cope. He also began to truant 
from school and was investigated at a child guidance centre. There was
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concern, both for non-attendance in school and delinquent behaviour, 
30 some of which was quite dangerous. He was sent (for assessment) with the
possibility of suitability for placement in a community home.
He was seen by (a senior registrar of child psychiatry at X hospital) on 
15.5.77 and no evidence of formal neurotic disorder was found. The boy 
denied problems but his mother said he would not go to the lavatory on his 
35 own and required a light at night unless someone watched outside.
(The psychiatrist) described the unusual way Jimmy treated his mother at 
the joint interview when she described him, in his presence, as a 'little 
monster’.
(Educationally) he is slightly slow and unsophisticated and has little 
40 understanding for more intellectual and subtle aspects of life. He asked to
go home to his mother and undoubtedly seeks closeness to her physically 
and emotionally needing a lot of babying which he certainly did not get in his 
unstable home. He still seems to seek the unattainable stability of family life 
with his mother which he has missed all his life and which has been 
45 instrumental in his emotional and social problems. He seems to have, at
times, simple childish phantasies and day-dreams largely due to regression. 
He needs to regress and this would best be accomplished within a small 
48 group setting of a therapeutically orientated community home.
It is not a coincidence that the account begins with a description of Jimmy’s mother, 
and particularly the disturbances and disabilities which impair her status as a mother. We have 
already explored this extract, on page 273-274 above, but what is of interest at present is how we 
hear a connection between Jimmy’s disturbance and that of his mother. Since the reader knows 
that the story is about Jimmy, she accords a significance to what is said about other members of 
the family in relation to him. The descriptions of Mrs. Mason which configure into a document 
of disruption, disturbance and deprivation, are explicitly held to account for Jimmy’s problems 
in lines 10-12. It is “not surprising” that he exhibits delinquent behaviour and “neurotic 
symptoms” in such circumstances. His disturbance (this) is because of his unstable background 
(that). The causal link is expressly articulated.
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Lines 15-33 accord to the “dates and places” mode of presentation. But even here 
there is not the apparent segregation between episodes characteristic of the configurational 
mode. A period of intensifying conflict is described in lines 15-19, in the nine month period 
between August 1975 and May 1976 when Mrs. Mason had to be admitted to psychiatric 
hospital. That the firictions and aggression apparently diminished during the brothers* nine 
week stay in a children's home implies a causal association between the disruptive behaviour and 
their indigenous home environment. Indeed the onus of responsibility is shifted once more to 
Jimmy’s mother, linchpin of the “home”, in lines 21-23. An authorization procedure is at work 
here, based upon the cumulation of instances which militates against any accusation of 
coincidence. That Jimmy and his brother settled into the first children’s home “in a satisfactory 
manner” may have been chance; that “other placements were equally successful” suggests that 
the causal key to their problems lie not within themselves, but in relation to their mother. All 
is well “until the mother seemed to have upset Jimmy sufficiently for him to act out his conflicts 
in an unacceptable manner”. The causal connotation is apparent: it is because Mrs. Mason 
upset her son “sufficiently” that he acted-out his conflicts.
The account moves towards an inexorable climax which, I suggest, the reader is 
already looking for. Jimmy’s unruliness and stealing in lines 24-25 are, again, interpreted as a 
reaction to his return home which reinforces the link of causality. During his brother’s absence 
Jimmy exhibited considerable problems at home, truanted from school and was involved in some 
“quite dangerous” delinquent behaviour. It is this deterioration which is held to precipitate 
Jimmy’s formal assessment, and the intervention of authorized experts.
A discursive alignment is achieved in lines 32-38 between the psychiatrist and Jimmy 
which serves further to discredit his mother by treating her version with a degree of cynicism. An 
anomaly is generated within the text between the “expert” evidence which finds no formal 
neurotic disorder, and Jimmy’s own denial of problems on the one hand, and Mrs. Mason’s 
detection of disturbance on the other. Since the weight of authority tends to be situated with the 
professional knower, strengthened by Jimmy’s corroboration of his version, systematic doubt it 
placed upon the mother’s competence and legitimacy gmz mother. The gravitational pull is once 
more toward incriminating her.
The conclusion on lines 40-48 supports the established nexus of causation. Jimmy’s 
paradoxical wish to become close to the mother who has forsaken him is precisely borne of his
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need to compensate for the historical lack of maternal nurturing which lies at the heart of his 
problems. The solution posited is a form therapeutic intervention in which professionals may 
help elicit and partially repair that which was missing in the natural mother-child relationship.
Jimmy*s psychiatric report relies both upon the configurational and a rational mode to 
achieve a sense of causal association. However, its overall frame is rational in that the text quite 
forcefully instructs the reader to treat the boy’s problems as the behavioural manifestation of his 
mother’s psychological disturbance.
Educational Breakdown
The comparison of two further accounts, one drawing predominantly on the 
configurational and the other on the rational mode, serves to elucidate the broader differences 
between the weak and strong modes of causal theorization which characterize each respective 
type. Both refer to a child’s educational breakdown which culminates in their entrance into care. 
The first extract is from David Lyons’ case history compiled by his F.S.W. We hear first of all 
how:
“He claims to have enjoyed school but reports state that he was always 
aggressive to a troublesome degree. Mrs. Lyons was unaware o f . . .  his 
problems at school.
‘78 It became increasingly obvious that David was easily led into wrong company.
Mr. Lyons would beat him for his misdemeanours, which led to David 
holding his father in awe and fear.
‘78 The school reported David to be continually causing trouble with one other
boy in his class in particular, and that he was frequently getting into fights.
[When the school requested interviews, Mr. Lyons would attend them 
alone, not informing his wife who remained oblivious to David’s difficulties.]
‘79 David began at X comprehensive school. At the first open evening the
teachers mentioned David’s odd behaviour, in particular his lack of
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concentration, inability to sit down for long, his malicious fighting with other 
children and his threatening behaviour. Mrs. Lyons remained unaware of 
these traits in David’s behaviour, because he did not exhibit them at home. 
David was referred to a (local) child guidance clinic, but many of the 
appointments offered were not kept. At this time David was also pilfering 
money from his mother’s purse, and had been sent home from school for 
causing a small fire.
1981 (David interviewed by school’s psychological service after)".. .  continual
11th bad behaviour including sexually exposing himself in front of his class,
March maliciously hurting other children, damaging school property. He claimed
that he didn’t like school, and that things were "better at home”, preferably 
on his own. He was described as a rather sad and depressed character, being 
generally uncommunicative and uncooperative.
11th David attended (disruptive pupils unit). He remained there for only two
May days, because they were unable to contain him, describing him as "uniquely
disturbed”.
30th David was suspended from X school. [The Lyons’ did not appeal as there
Sept. had been much previous discussion with them about David’s disturbance.]
7th David was expelled from X school. Home tuition began at the Lyons’ house
Nov. while Mrs. Lyons was present and not at the tuition unit because of his
violent attitude toward his peers.
1982 Home tuition ceased, because his first home tutor could not cope. The
March tuition was not maintained further.
March [David involved with juvenile bureau because he’d been rude to local 
residents and kicked an old man and a security guard.]
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May David threatened a man with a knife
August/ [After two court cases David was committed to the care of the local
Sept. authority and placed in an assessment centre.]
[Bracketed sections summarized in my own words]
The second piece is drawn &om Paul Black’s secondary school report which charts his 
progressive deterioration. Initially the reader is told:
1 “It was soon apparent that Paul found it difGcult to settle in Y high school.”
And, a few lines later:
It was noticed from early days in Paul’s schooling that he was attention-seeking. 
Soon after:
During his first Autumn Term at Y high school the head of year wrote to 
Paul’s parents inviting them to visit the school to discuss Paul’s difficulties 
5 and inability to settle to the high school routine. Only Mr. Black came to
discuss the matter with Mr. B who drew the conclusions that there was a 
great deal of aggression within the family, and frequently Paul had head-on 
clashes with his mother before leaving for school. Probably the reason for 
the outbursts in school. Mr. Black wanted the school to discipline Paul even 
10 to the extent of corporal punishment if necessary. Mr. B. was going to
control Paul in a caring way.
During the Spring term there seemed to be little improvement so Mr. B. 
interviewed Paul’s father once again. The request still came that Paul 
should be disciplined by being kept after school and given extra work, and 
15 to be withdrawn from lessons where he proved to be too disruptive and
uncooperative.
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A comment was noted about the death of Paul’s grandfather, which might 
have brought out more resentment and aggression. Not long after this 
Paul’s youngest sist^ died, after which Paul was very angry. Two bereavements 
20 in close succession must have had a deep impression on Paul.
During the Summer term Paul’s behaviour became more anti social. He 
had been reported for vandalising a heavy glass door at school, and very soon 
after a complaint was received from a neighbour of the school that milk had 
been stolen from local doorsteps - Paul was caught drinking milk in the 
25 vicinity.
A fresh start was given to Paul at the beginning of his third year but very early 
in the term he was behaving in a disruptive manner in the classroom. One 
day he was so bad he was sent out of the class. There was at the same time 
a complaint of Paul being locked in the boys’ changing room on purpose, 
30 then money was stolen. He was also truanting from lessons. Paul was placed
on report and a letter was sent home.
Mr. Black accepted the invitation to discuss some of the problems with 
Mr. H and Miss W. Although he was expected Mr. Black did not turn up for 
the interview so it became an interesting observation for this was the first 
35 contact made by Mrs. Black. It was obvious she had lost control over Paul
and he resented the discipline being imposed by his father.
A series of superficial similarities unite both accounts in their description of the boy’s 
deterioration toward educational breakdown, and the father’s involvement in school discussions 
to the virtual exclusion of the mother. Beyond this the emphasis of the two accounts differ in 
their level of causal theorization. In the first account regarding David Lyons the reader is 
furnished with a wealth of behavioural details and definitional labels fix)m aggressive, troublesome, 
odd, malicious, sad, depressed, uncommunicative, uncooperative, to uniquely disturbed. Apart 
from a passing reference to Mr. Lyons’ physical punishment of David, we are offered no 
framework to explain the boy’s underlying motivation to behave in such deviant ways. While 
reference is made to David’s emotional state this plays only a tangential part in an account whose 
main concern is with what happened rather than why.
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The second account provides just such a because motive in relating Paul Black’s 
“presenting” behaviour at school to an underlying and possibly unconscious motivation which 
derives &om his circumstances at home. Through the detour of Paul’s psychological rationale, 
a bridge is built between his school disruption and the home background from which it eminated.
The account commences (line 1) with clear instructions about how it is to be read: as 
Paul’s diffrculty in settling at high school. To whom “it was soon apparent”, and who “noticed 
from early days” is unclear, but the effect is to situate Paul’s behaviour in a realm which is 
apparent, noticeable, clear for all to see. What is being encouraged is an interchangeability 
between the empirical observer who was there at the time, and the reader who was not, but had 
she been would, presumably, have made the same sense.
Two explanatory motifs are present in lines 3-20 which causally account for Paul’s 
behavioural diffrculties. The first accounts for his outbursts in school as a displacement of the 
aggression which is rife within the Black family. Mr. Black’s solution of yet more punishment to 
curtail Paul’s school misdemeanours represents the very attitude in which the problem originated. 
His solution is discredited through this paradoxical operation. The second motif treats Paul’s 
disruptive behaviour as the documentary manifestation of his resentment, aggression and anger 
at the death of his grandmother and, in close succession, his sister. In both instances Paul’s 
behaviour is linked to earlier events at home, and in the wider familial environment which give 
rise to emotions which are displaced onto the educational context.
Through the analysis of quite lengthy historical extracts, an attempt has been made to 
elicit some of the broader differences in theorizing causal connections. I now turn to a 
consideration of the more narrowly circumscribed nuts and bolts, comparing once more 
accounts which err more towards a configurational mode of operation with those where the 
emphasis is rational.
ii) Nodal Points in the Child’s Biographv: the Nuts and Bolts 
Beginnings
Like all good stories we will begin at the beginning. Stories must, of course, begin 
somewhere, though by no means always at the chronological genesis of the train of events which
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the story describes. One of the incarnate features of all stories, fictional or factual, is the “all 
things relevant” rule. It is assumed by the competent reader that what is included contributes, 
in some way, to the chain of narrative events or our appreciation of them. And this is especially 
so where the account takes place as part of a field of practical intervention, such as social work.
The beginning of a story is material in furnishing a preliminary interpretative frame. 
It is read in its prospective connection to a series of events which we have not yet heard. We are 
prepared to suspend the ultimate saise of opening events in the knowledge that their significance 
will become clearer as we go along. While the conclusion may be the magnet of attraction (as 
Ricoeur claims), it is, in the social work case history, broadly known in advance. “What 
happened” is a problem child. What remains is a search for the specific historical routes through 
which the problems developed. The competent case historian and her reader will thus attend 
to openings, and all that follows, with an a priori criterion of relevance. They will, as it were, lend 
an appropriate eye and ear.
By dint of narrative logic, then, the reader may use an opening to orientate herself to 
a sense of what is to come. Historical starting points create a dominoe-effect; they act as the 
catalyst for a dynamic chain of happenings. We expect beginnings to instigate a series of changes 
which together compose the stories point. Such expectations, driven underground by sheer 
cultural familiarity with the narrative mode are, like many other social phenomena, brought to 
visibility when they are breached.
A mannered, but apposite example of such a breach is found in Beckett’s 
Waiting for Godoty which roundly challenges our narrative assumptions. The point of the play 
is that it has no point. The story goes nowhere, and there is nothing resembling what we might 
conceive of as a plot, at least in any conventional sense. Waiting for Godot ends where it begins; 
or alternatively begins where it ends. And what happens in the middle? Well nothing! Nothing? 
Well talk happens, walk happens, indeed degradation happens. But quite unlike conventional 
drama or narrative these events do not propel the drama forward; they do not crystallize a 
scenario. Much of the action, or inaction, is designed to “pass the time” while waiting. At the 
end of each scene the promise of action going somewhere is curtailed by the voice of stage 
direction.
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End of Act I:
Estragon: Well, shall we go?
Vladimir: Yes, let’s go.
[They do not move]
CURTAIN
End of Act II:
Estragon: Well, shall we go?
Vladimir: Yes, let’s go.
[They do not move]
CURTAIN
We expect the drama of a narrative to go somewhere, although part of the pleasure of the tale, 
and engagement with it, is in not knowing exactly where it will go, or how it will reach its 
destination.
Openings, in synopsis, are not just where things begin. They provide a dynamic 
orientation to the forthcoming events. This may include the provision of what Dorothy Smith 
[1978 - p. 32] calls “preliminary instructions” for how to read the significance of later events as 
“instances o f ’ a particular category. This is part of the complex process through which an 
account is reflexively constituted. The events do not speak for themselves; they are invested 
with sense through their contextualization. To quote from D. Smith:
“(The account) is not just a record of events as they happened, but of events 
as they were seen as relevant to reaching a decision about the character of 
those events. This is a common feature of the kinds of records, etc., etc., with 
which the social scientist in the field of deviant behaviour is concerned. The 
various agencies of social control have institutionalized procedures for 
assembling, processing, and testing information about the behaviour of 
individuals so that it can be matched against the paradigms which provide
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the working criteria of class-membership, whether as juvenile delinquent, 
mentally ill, or the like.”
[D. Smith (1978)-p.24]
We commence with the examination of a particular mode of opening where an actual 
historical point or event is identified as the genesis of a trend. The point of origin is attributed 
with different kinds of significance. It may be incorporated in a purely chronological sense as a 
date or age at which a child’s problems initially appeared. In most accounts however the opening 
events enter into the architecture of explanation by being set up as responsible for what follows. 
A rational connection is forged, though sometimes embryonic in stature. In isolating various 
nodal points in the narrative I attempt once more to compare the loosely theorized configurational 
mode of causal connection which prioritizes w/mf happened, with the rational mode in which the 
motivational substance of the account offers a more or less «q)licit theorization of why.
The elicitation of an identifiable starting point - when, without any allusion, apparent 
or otherwise to why a child developed problems - appears to be the primary purpose in a number 
of historical accounts. This temporal referencing is effective in constituting a sense of order 
manifest in the conception of when it all began. Consider, for example, the following extract 
from Paul Black’s court report composed by his F.S.W.
“Mr. and Mrs. Black began to experience difficulties in controlling Paul 
when he was about six years of age. They claim that prior to this he was a 
“normal” child in every respect. As concern grew about Paul’s behaviour his 
parents felt it necessary to consult child guidance (although they didn’t 
continue this due to the very personal questions asked). As Paul got older 
Mr. and Mrs. Black began to find him more and more difficult. Since Julie’s 
death they have been unable to exercise any control over Paul.”
[Brackets in original]
This extract offers a purely chronological account of the origins of Paul’s behavioural 
“difficulties”. The schema of deterioration is punctuated by a visit to child guidance and the 
death of Paul’s sister. But these events do not enter into an explanatory matrix; they are simply 
presented as temporal markers in tracing the trajectory of Paul’s regression. A temporal 
preoccupation with when the problem first emerged similarly infests the next two pieces drawn 
firom Kevin Mead’s and Keith Fletcher’s case histories respectively.
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“Kevin has a history of illness and is reported to have had difficulty with 
social relationships and behavioural and learning problems from the age of 
eight. He has had a number of changes of school and educational provision 
during this period. Kevin’s behaviour and educational difficulties over the 
last three years have caused some considerable concern for a number of 
agencies involved with the family (which led to a court appearance and his 
admission into residential care.)”
[Bracketed section - my summary]
And again:
**Mrs. Fletcher tells me that Keith has been a difficult lad since he was about 
ten years old, when he began stealing from home and became more difficult 
to control. Although he is usually a quiet, shy lad, on several occasions he 
has become very aggressive towards his sisters and mother.”
In each of the preceding extracts a specific dating procedure is employed. The child’s 
chronological age is used as a resource to mark the genesis of his problem and nodal points in 
its deterioration. Such temporal specificity lends a sense of concreteness to the historical 
analysis. But the identification of when it all began more typically harbours an incipient 
explanation of why. The story begins with an event in the child’s life which for reasons more or 
less explicitly stated assume the status of a primal cause. In the next group of extracts the mode 
of derivation is only poorly, impartially or implicitly drawn and as such is reminiscent of the 
configurational mode. In the first piece extracted from my interview with Damian Tanner, one 
of the residents in unit 1, the event with which the story begins instigates a chain reaction which 
culminates in the child’s commission of delinquent acts and eventual admission into care. The 
web of causality is a superficial one, and notably excludes any detailed reference to the 
underlying significance of such events, or how they may furnish the boy’s motivational rationale.
[I ask Damian to remind me a little bit about how he came into care.]
Damian: Well I’m in care becus - uhm (1.5) dunno - about (1) two - three years ago 
(2) maybe a bit more alright - it started off - I went into ’ospital with 
rheumatic fever - right?
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Kim: Huh hum.
Damian: Then I started missing school - where - when I was in ’ospital for ten weeks. 
Then I - and I s’pose I got in the sort of habit of not going to school. . .
Kim: Were you worried about being behind when you got back?
Damian: Not really - and then uhm -
Kim: This was how long ago Damian?
Damian: ’bout four years - three four years I think.
Kim: Huh hum.
Damian: Then I started getting into trouble and then -
Kim: What kind of trouble did you get into?
Damian: Well (.5) stealing and things like that.
(1)
Kim: Huh hum.
Damian: Right - and then (1) then they put me - then - no -1 had to go to a psychiatrist 
(.5) place down uhm (.5) Hammersmith - and (1) ’ad to see this doctor - and 
’e goes that I was (2) uhm - suicidal or someink -1 ’ad suicidal tendencies and 
things like that
Kim: Why - what did he base that judgement on?
[Damian explains that because he had been run over riding his bike across 
the road, and picked up a “diptheria bug” by swimming in the Thames, the
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psychiatrist claimed he was trying to kill himself by getting ill. Damian finds 
the interpretation laughable and untrue.]
Damian: ... and then (.5) he - and then he also classified me as maladjusted. So I went 
to this school in (N. town). . .  Then (.5) I went out (.5) one day - ’ome for 
'oliday (1) then I (.5) on the last day I didn’t want to go back so I got myself 
nicked.
Kim: Huh hum.
Damian: That’s - and ever since then I started getting nicked.
[I ask what happened then?]
Damian: I refused to go back - then I started - you know - getting into more and more 
- getting arrested about six times in a row - in a couple of months. (1) And 
my social worker asked for a care order - and she got it.
The demarcation of the nodal point of Damian’s hospitalization with which the story 
begins suggests that prior to this occasion nothing happened of any relevance to his ultimate 
admission into care. Of course what is relevant is relative to the purposes in hand. Damian’s 
emphasis is upon a chain of behavioural episodes rather than of psychological motivation and 
as such contrasts with the professional accounts quoted on pages 319-321 below.
One can see in Damian’s account how the nexus of events are yoked together. The 
illness and hospitalization are seen to create a chain reaction: because o f this he got out of the 
habit going to school and started truanting; because o f this he started getting into trouble for 
stealing; because o f this he went to a psychiatrist who diagnosed maladjustment; because o f this 
he was sent to a residential school which he hated; because o f this he got himself "nicked” while 
on holiday to avoid returning; because o f this he continued stealing, getting arrested on six 
consecutive occasions; because o f this his F.S.W. recommended a care order; and so on and so 
forth. And all because Damian was hospitalized for ten weeks.
A single calamitous event is seen to lie at the temporal and emotional origin in both
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forthcoming extracts. The drama itself does sterling work in provoking the “ah hah” response 
in the reader who nonetheless has to bridge the explanatory gap left by the author. The first 
excerpt is drawn from the introduction to the file of reports compiled during Paul Black’s 
assessment.
[We hear how Paul had been admitted to the assessment centre on a care 
order in early 1981, having run away from home and “lived rough” for a few 
weeks. He was dirty and hungry, although:]
“Paul remained polite and willing to talk about his circumstances. He 
pin-pointed some major events; everything at home had been “magic” until 
the death of his sister, Julie, last year. After that things started to go wrong, 
Paul started stealing and began to have problems with his father and got the 
blame for every misdeed in the home, although he had not been guilty for all 
of them.
The second piece is extracted from an informal counselling session between Kate and 
Andy Fisher to which I was witness.
[Kate raises the question of Andy’s parents separation and asks if there had 
been lots of fights in the house prior to it. Andy replies that there had not, 
they just split up:]
Andy: That’s when I started - not going to school and (2) mum used to get me up
in the morning “I ’aint going to school mum” . . .  “let me ’ave the day off’. 
And she used to say “ooh - 1 dunno about that!” . . .  but always in the end I 
used to know she’d say “yes”. It was then that the trouble started.
In the first of the above extracts the child is allocated a voice through which to tell his 
story. In it he nominates his sister’s death as the nodal point from which events took a dramatic 
turn. A before-after dichotomy is set-up giving weight to the temporal anchor: before his sister’s 
death everything was “magic”; after that “things started to go wrong”. The stealing and the 
“problems with his father” which flow in the wake of Julie’s death are associated with this event, 
although the architecture of causality is weakly construed.
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Andy’s account exhibits a similar procedural style by causally associating his parents 
separation with the advent of his truanting and the genesis of trouble. Notable by its absence is 
any explanation which would give substantive grounding to the relationship between events. 
Their causal association is accomplished simply by dint of their configuration. We nonetheless 
read them, through the skilled interpretation of narrative codes, as more than randomly related.
Although the boys were more inclined toward a configurational mode of causal 
accounting this was not exclusively the case. In the next extract Julian Pines offers a more 
explicit theorization of the connection between earlier biographical events and his later 
adoption of a pattern of (deviant) behaviour. Of course significant differences do exist between 
professional versions and the lay ones of the boys, not least in the complexity of psychological 
reasoning and the procedures of authorization. But for the present purposes it is also important 
to note that the rational mode was not confined to the staff any more than they were exempt 
from the configurational mode. The boys too were capable of forging more explicit connections 
in telling their (his)story. Examine, for example, the forthcoming extract from my interview with 
Julian. In it he offers a rational motivational account of the origins of his truancy.
1 [I ask Julian why he started to truant from school, which was the primary
reason for his admission into care].
Julian: First of all me nan died.
Kim: Huh hum.
5 Julian: And after that I never really sort of - wanted to go to school after that.
Kim: It upset you so much?
Julian: Yer - *cus I didn’t have no sort of - me nan used to be me incentive to go to 
school sort of fing.
Kim: I see.
10 Julian: But-Ijust didn’t waima go. And then - uh - then - that Christmas me uncle
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(who lived in the same household) had a bad stroke. So that’s two fîngs - 1 
didn’t - well that really stopped me at all - 1 didn’t wanna go at all then.
Kim: Uhm.
Julian: I didn’t wanna le - 1 didn’t wanna leave the ’ouse.
Kim: {I see
{
Julian: {With me mum and me uncle (.5) so two fîngs ’appened within the space of
a year.
Kim: Uhm.
Julian: Never knew what could ’appen to me mum -so -I  didn’t wanna go to school
for that reason.
In lines 3-5 Julian brings two events, A and B, into sequential alignment: first A 
and then B. The remainder of the account is an attempt to convert the temporal coincidence 
into a causal relationship between one event and the other. To accomplish a higher level of 
adequacy and plausibility as a causal explanation, the connection must be rationalized. Event 
A must provide good enough reasons, if event B is to stand up as a reaction. The mode of 
rationalization characteristic of this type of account brings events into causal alignment through 
the bridge of psychological motivation. In this case the bridge is two fold: on the one hand the 
incentive for Julian to go to school embodied in his nan had been removed; on the other this 
death, in conjunction with his uncle’s stroke soon after, made him fear that things “could ’appen 
to (his) mum” (line 19) if he were to leave the house.
Julian’s account erects a plausible explanatory architecture, built from the material of 
subjective feeling. Explicit rendition of this kind is not an essential prerequisite in identifying 
causality. We saw in the previous class of extracts how the reader/hearer may draw causal 
inferences fi'om the temporal juxtaposition of events. However, where an internal nexus of 
causality is rationalized, a more therapeutically persuasive case is made.
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The point is that causal plausibility is not a priori but bound up in the procedures of 
practical reasoning. Dorothy Smith’s exposition on the nature of facts may equally be applied 
to causes. Where she says fact in the forthcoming quotation, also read cause:
"The actual events are not facts. It is the use of proper procedure for 
categorizing events which transforms them into facts. A fact is something 
which is already categorized, which is already worked up so that it conforms 
to the model of what that fact should be hke.”
[D. Smith (1978)-p35]
And these "proper procedures” are components of the social knowledge which all 
competent social actors wield. In Giddens’ words:
“The reflexive monitoring of behaviour operates against the background of 
the rationalization of action - by which I mean the capabilities of human 
agents to ‘explain’ why they act as they do by giving reasons for their conduct 
- and in the more ‘inclusive’ context of practical consciousness.”
[A Giddens (1979) - p.57]
While the capacity to rationalize action is a generic feature of practical reasoning, it 
is particularly prevalent and polished amongst the therapeutically inclined professions such as 
social work. A typical source of divergence separating the boys’ and their parents’ accounts of 
origins from those of the professionals lie in the nature of the explanation being proffered. 
"Expert” analysis, by those in the business, tended to exhibit a more elaborate mode of 
psychological reasoning and specialize much more in articulating the invisible "hidden hand” 
which operates behind appearance. Boys and their parents, by contrast, were more likely to 
focus upon the manifest surface of behaviour. In this respect Julian Pines’ account quoted above 
is untypical in that he gives voice to his emotional fears. The conceptual distinction between his 
analysis, and that of the F.S.W., quoted below, is nonetheless apparent.
1 "He has further developed a phobic fear of actually being in school though
he finds it impossible to articulate such primitive fears which originate from 
separation anxiety. School has become both a feared and a hated place 
which he will not now test out in reality. The dog, attention-seeking for love 
5 in the meeting, seemed to symbolize very nicely Julian’s central conflicts
over separation anxiety and unmet needs for security and affection.”
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The divergence between the two accounts is both temporal and theoretical. While 
Julian dates the emergence of his problems to specific events which engender them, the 
assessment report assimilates his emotional disturbance to an altogether more primal experience 
of which the events are a documentary manifestation. For Julian, his grandmother’s death and 
uncle’s stroke caused his school refusal; for the expert it prompted a re-awakening of a primal 
fear. A hint as to why Julian should be so disabled by an anxiety which most children are held 
to overcome in the course of their psychological development is provided on line 6. His unmet 
needs for love and security have, we assume, deprived him of the prerequisites necessary for the 
growth of independence.
The distinguishing features of the configurational and the rational modes (or the 
professional’s and the client’s accounts in the extracts considered here) is even more dramatic 
if we juxtapose the accounts of two boys - Damian Taimer and Paul Black - on the origins of their 
problems (see pages 312-314 and 314-315) with those of the practitioners who were involved 
with them. On Damian’s account, for instance, his problems originated in a spell of hospitalization. 
A minor difference separates Damian’s analysis from that of his parents who are allocated a 
voice within the F.S.W.’s report.
“Mr. and Mrs. Tanner report no difficulties with Damian until January 1980, 
three months after he started secondary school. He began to truant, ran 
away from home to Scotland and committed an offence which resulted in an 
appearance before the court on 20th March 1980.”
This contrasts with the psychiatric assessment from which we will quote snippets:
1 “Damian is a depressed and turbulent youngster who urgently requires a
secure environment in which he can be held and contained. . .  It was very 
clear in hospital that his behaviour can be erratic in the extreme and 
dangerous to himself (e.g. he refuses medication, even though this is a 
5 severe threat to his health). The seriousness of the aforesaid behaviour
should be recognized by the court. It is not to be mistaken for a childish 
prank because it effectively amounts to a self-injury and even suicidal
strategy Damian’s depression and his disordered psychological state
reflect the rifts, antagonisms and tensions that are chronic in his family. In
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10 conclusion, Damian is a sick boy v/ho requires chronic treatment for rheumatic
heart condition which he is self-destructively inclined to refuse or sabotage 
and he is severely psychologically disturbed. His psychological disorder 
precedes the rheumatic illness and it has reached a point where he urgently 
requires to be held in a caring environment away from home until a long 
15 term placement in boarding school is arranged for him.*’
[Bracketed section - my summary]
The logical priority given in the F.S.W.*s conclusions to her court report are similar:
1 “As I have stated, in my opinion Damian is a boy with a lot of emotional
problems and his offending must be seen in the light of this. He appears to 
be the pivot for conflicts within the home, and unfortunately I do not think 
4 his problems can be resolved there.”
A patent discrepancy is apparent between Damian’s assessment and that of his 
parents on the one hand, and that of the professionals on the other. In the former two cases, a 
temporal juncture is found, albeit three months apart, from which time Damian’s problems are 
seen to emanate. In the boy’s own account the explanation is without recourse to deep-seated 
emotions which generated his deviant behaviour. It is construed, rather, as an habitual pattern 
engendered by a chain of prior events. Mr. and Mrs. Tanner are similarly involved in the process 
of assimilating the origins of their son’s difficulties to their behavioural appearance in January 
1980. There is no reference to the parents judgements about why Damian developed disturbances. 
Indeed, their exclusion from insight into the emotional antecedents is apparent in another part 
of the court report where Damian’s F.S.W. noted that Mr. and Mrs. Tanner “have been 
reluctant to accept the reality o f . . .  Damian’s serious emotional problems”.
It is this original emphasis which differentiates Damian’s and his parents’ accounts 
from both the psychiatric and social work ones. The latter two are united in their attribution of 
Damian’s behavioural disturbances to the emotional domain. Throughout the psychiatric 
report Damian’s delinquent behaviour is clearly relegated to the status of a presenting problem. 
The real issue, which is seen to underlie it, is an emotional one which, the psychiatrist insists, 
pre-dates his physical illness and, other segments of the full report suggest, is responsible for it. 
In this respect Damian’s account of origins is irreconcilably different.
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The exact time of the emergence of Damian's problem behaviour on the therapeutic 
version is unimportant relative to the earlier scenarios which gave rise to it, because the 
manifestation of surface disturbance is seen to proceed from what is already present. The cause 
of Damian's disturbance is thus on another dimension both temporally prior and logically 
anterior to his delinquency. In both professional accounts the emotional dimension is located 
within family life.
As well as their reluctance to acknowledge the ineluctable fact of Damian's emotional 
disturbance, in both accounts the Tanners are held at least partially responsible for i t  Their 
implicative role in Damian's problems is discursively accomplished, to some effect, in lines 1-2 
of the psychiatric report without being explicitly named. That the depressed and turbulent 
Damian urgently needs a secure environment in which to be held and contained suggest that this 
quality is lacking at home. The theme is echoed in lines 13-15 in which his urgent need to be 
“held in a caring environment away from home" has obvious connotations, and in lines 2-4 of the 
F.S.W.'s account in which the removal from the family is judged the prerequisite of any solution 
to Damian's problems.
It should of course be recognised that accounts are written in a particular context, for 
specific purposes. Part of the context effective in shaping discourse is the author's identification 
(whether speaker or writer) of the purposes of the report and the audience to whom it is, or will 
be, addressed. In this instance the professional accounts form part of a court report written for 
the purpose of securing a care order. The recurrence of themes, and the emphasis they are 
given, is a feature of the attempt to make a persuasive case. By defining Damian's troubles in 
terms of the emotional effect of family instability, the solution^ by logical extension, is to remove 
him from the problem-generating context.
As the above accounts suggest divergence may occur over when and relatedly why a 
child's problems developed. The meaning of events and incidents is in this respect mercurial; 
they have no fixed status. It is the architecture of the account, its plot if you like, that confers 
a particular significance on the individual item. Thus the occurrence which is seen to catalyze 
a chain of reactions in one account, may be seen merely as a symptom of altogether more 
profound emotional problems in another.
This distinction between the configurational and rational modes of causal connection
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is nicely illustrated in the following series of extracts. Although they do not explicity link the 
nodal point of Paul Black’s sister’s death to his later manifestation of deviance, they nonetheless 
reveal how different levels of significance are accorded events. Return, first of all, to Paul 
Black’s version of these biographical events as firamed by the residential staff in the assessment 
centre (see page 315). Consider, by contrast, the account below which is drawn from the case 
history compiled by Paul’s F.S.W.
1 [The report speaks of how Paul had said that his strongest tie in the family
was with Julie who died as an infant after a three day illness.]
“Paul said he used to take Julie everywhere with him and he used to fight all 
her battles and suddenly she wasn’t there anymore. His parents blame the 
5 doctor for Julie’s death. Paul at a conscious level blames his parents and the
doctor, but at a deeper level he blamed himself. He was in fact sometimes 
7 teasing and unkind to Julie.”
[Bracketed section - my summary]
That this mode of theorization is assumed to yield a more fundamental understanding 
is apparent in lines 5-6 of the F.S.W’s account. Here, Paul’s conscious and unconscious 
orientations betray a contradiction; the former blaming the parents and the doctor for Julie’s 
death, the latter himself. That his unconscious beliefs are considered more profound is apparent 
from the metaphorical reference to their being “deeper”; a phrase which reveals the therapeutic 
persuasion of the account. A clue as to why Paul is motivated to blame himself is contained on 
lines 6-7. Because Paul was sometimes unkind to his sister during her life, he unconsciously felt 
responsible for her death.
This gloss disguises an elaborate chain of practical theorizing. The assumptions 
requisite upon a sensible interpretation of this account include, as mentioned, a dual level of 
motivation - conscious and unconscious - and concomitantly the belief that what appears at the 
surface of consciousness may subvert that which lies at the deeper, unconscious level. A linchpin 
of this mode of reasoning is the belief that the outside agent, especially if therapeutically 
informed, is better equipped to interpret the child’s unconscious than he, himself, duped by the 
conscious mind is. The reader does not have to explicitly articulate this line of reasoning; it is 
processed at lightning speed.
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Finally, examine the informal comments made by Kate Lambert upon receipt of Paul 
Black’s referral papers to St. Nicholas’.
1 **When Paul was one year old his sister, Karen, was bom. About this time
father came out of the army; suddenly two more people competing for
mother’s attention; and there is some talk of her child-minding during the
early years - more competition!
5 His problematic behaviour appeared to begin in 1973, when he was six,
coinciding with the birth of Julie - another competition for mother’s affections. 
When she (Julie) died, 1980, aged 7 ,1 believe the feeling of guilt about his 
animosity towards her birth put an unbearable burden upon Paul. It may be 
that until he can come to terms with such feelings it will be impossible to help 
10 him.”
As well as displaying increasingly more elaborate webs of causality, this group of 
extracts manifest a divergence as to when the problems began. For the child the temporal 
juncture between before, when everything was “magic”, and pivots on the death of his sister.
Both the parents’ and Kate’s version are united in their perception of this tragic event as a point 
of exacerbation rather than genesis. Both date the origins of Paul’s deviant behaviour from his 
sixth year.
More significant for the present purposes is how events are invested with a different 
causal status in accounts which “speak for” Paul and his parents, compared with those in which 
the professionals offer their interpretations. The latter exhibit a more therapeutically elaborate 
explanation of nodal points in Paul’s life. Characteristic of the rational mode a psychological 
predisposition is set up in Kate’s account which is temporally punctuated by the birth and death 
of Paul’s sister. The coincidence of “problematic behaviour” (line 5) with Julie’s birth is 
construed as more than accidental: not “this then that”, but “this because of that”. What 
distinguishes this category of accounts is the way in which the causal relationship is overtly 
formulated. The breach between “this then that” is filled by a theory of psychological 
motivation.
Kate’s comments, which are obviously influenced by the F.S.W.’s case history, prioritize
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Paul’s unconscious motivation. The feelings of guilt which Paul ecperienced attendant upon his 
sister’s death are, again, causally connected to his feeling of animosity towards her birth. The 
theorization is more comprehensive in Kate’s extract since the arm of causality traces a 
trajectory not only between the surface and the depth, but the present and the past The two 
intersect upon the nodal occasions of Julie’s birth and death. The former - Julie’s birth - is 
portrayed as another instance in a long line of his mother’s diversion of attention from him, thus 
accounting for the animosity felt towards the offending object The latter - Julie’s death - is the 
occasion upon which Paul’s bad feelings about her are converted into guilt The interplay of 
historical events and psychological affect, render the web of causation quite effective in this 
account. An even more tightly-joined rationale emerges if we probe some of the hidden 
assumptions which form a shadow support for Kate’s argument The absent-presence in her 
theorization goes something like this: Paul felt guilty upon Julie’s death because he unconsciously 
experienced his hostile feelings towards her to have been responsible for actually killing her. 
Regardless of whether we accept this as a substantively plausible explanation it does - 1 contend 
- provide the hidden foundation of Kate’s explanation.
The preceding extracts deal with nodal points in Paul’s biography which, in the latter 
two accounts, are given causal status in explaining the emergence of his emotional disturbance. 
The precise nature of the connection between these earlier episodes and the later manifestation 
of deviance is, however, unstated. A death in Simon Cutts’ family, in the forthcoming extract, 
is similarly invested with psychological significance without specifying its relationship to the 
behaviour which later brought him into care.
1 “The family have not really been right since the death of Mr. Cutts’ mother
some three years ago. This led to a serious depression in him which he 
decided to cope with by deciding not to show his feelings ever again. I think 
Simon and Mrs. Cutts were deeply shocked at seeing Mr. Cutts in such deep 
5 distress. At the same time Simon began to feel that his father was weaker
than he would have liked he was homosexually propositioned which he felt 
to be a betrayal by a male friend and this made him even more distant from 
8 his father.”
Witness in this account the chain reaction instigated by the death of Simon’s grandmother. 
Unlike the surface configurations quoted above (see pages 311-316) this piece provides not only
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a sequential exposition, but a rational chain of causation. The extract starts, once more, by 
establishing the temporal association between events: "The family have not really been the same 
since the death of Mr. Cutts* mother some three years ago** (lines 1-2). These events are then 
sewn together with the thread of psychological explanation. The sense of double betrayal by 
significant men in Simon*s life, especially his father, is called to account for Simon*s distantiation 
from the relationship.
While the boy*s psychical perception is brought to bear in constructing a sense of 
causality, the line of reasoning nonetheless requires heavy input from the reader. To question 
the basis of the apparent connection may seem pedantic because you and I have already done 
the work necessary to achieve it. We tend to read the homosexual encounter as a further instance 
which may be assimilated to Simon*s already crumbling faith in masculine authority. But a gamut 
of ghost expectations materialize in coming to such an understanding.
What is more, the preceding account does not detail either here or subsequently the 
impact these events may have had upon Simon*s emergent behavioural problems. Reliance is 
placed upon the background assumptions which the reader brings with her as a cultural being 
and the member of a professional body of knowledge. This occasions a sense of what it “must 
be like*’ for a child to have the image of his father’s strength undermined and, through a 
homosexual proposition, have his trust in the male world challenged. But precisely why this may 
have led to his later behavioural disturbance is obscure.
Of course, the wider institutional context furnishes the reader with a framework for 
interpreting the significance of nodal episodes, even if their relevance is not e7q)ressly articulated. 
Since the reader knows that the story leads to the child’s exhibition of deviant behaviour in one 
form or another, prior events are scrutinized for their potential contribution to the emergent 
pattern.
How far the historical search should go is a moot point. We have seen, in a cluster of 
excerpts, how the arm of deprivation is seen to stretch into past generations. The boy’s parents 
are thus construed as victims whose short-fall is home of their own deprived backgrounds. The 
point is articulated by Eileen Walker in her interview.
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[I ask why some boys from the same environment do well, and others do 
badly.]
Eileen: Well again I think it-it-it-it comes down to - uhm - what’s been instilled in the 
parent from their parents.
Kim: Huh-hum.
Eileen: I think it’s an on-going thing.
In principle the search for ultimate origin could go on indefinitely; in practice the 
purpose in hand renders this as unnecessary extravagance. Exploration extends only to the 
parent’s history, usually the mother’s, and only then when her childhood circumstances are seen 
to have a direct bearing on those of her problem child. In the cases of Barry Painter and 
James Bryan (quoted on pages 276-279 and 283-285 ) both mothers are presented as caught in 
the nets of their own past lives which have inhibited the development of their own parental 
competence.
In some case histories the point of the opening scenario is obscure in itself; open to 
clarification only in relation to the reader’s knowledge of where the story leads. Through the 
rule of “all things relevant’’, it is incorporated into the tale. Consider, for example, the following 
snippets from Tony Salter’s case history. His social worker has chosen the logical juncture of 
Tony’s birth as her starting point from which to piece together the clues which may account for 
his later difficulties.
1 “Mrs. Salter was in labour for thirty-six hours with a difficult forceps birth,
the baby eventually being placed in an incubator to relax him - he was very 
tense.”
And again:
“Mrs. Salter was not allowed to see or touch her son for a day. Tony was a 
screaming baby.”
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Further:
“his toilet training appears to have been neglected and Tony was not “dry” 
7 until over five years of age.”
The long, difficult birth, the forceps delivery, the baby’s tenseness requiring placement 
in an incubator, the mother’s separation from her screaming baby for the first day of his life, are 
events which, individually, are not altogether out of the ordinary. Collectively, however, we hear 
them as an inauspicious start to life. Lines 6-7 suggest another layer of difficulty. While the other 
events are out of anyone’s control, the term “neglect” (of Tony’s toilet training) has more 
incriminating connotations regarding parental, and more particularly maternal competence. 
Had Tony not developed into a child with problems the events of his early life would be accorded 
no particular relevance. It is the reader’s prospective awareness of what transpires in Tony’s life 
that lends prior events a retrospective significance as a candidate cause of later difficulties.
Each of the following three extracts forges a connection between rejection in the 
child’s early life and later emotional problems. In constructing a rational causal relationship 
between one thing and another they go one step further than the preceding snippets regarding 
Tony Salter. What is not articulated in so many words is how or why the disturbance incurred 
by earlier events led to the child’s later deviance. The reader, versed as she is in therapeutic 
knowledge, is left to plait the causal threads. The first piece is drawn from Chris Jones’ case 
history.
“Chris spent the first year of his life in hospital and physical contact with his 
mother was very limited. Shortly after returning home, Mr. and Mrs. Jones 
separated. Almost immediately (Chris’ brother) was bom and as a result the 
maternal infant bond was never really established. Mrs. Jones says that 
despite her attempts, Chris is never able to accept her affection fully. 
During the past months Chris has consistently reiterated to his mother that 
he feels she doesn’t want him.”
The account above silently traces a line of filiation between the early events in Chris’ 
life, and his later difficulties in relationship to his mother. The onus of sense making is very much 
a collaborative project between the assumptions buried in the account by the writer, and
328-
retrieved by the reader. That adequate "bonding*' is considered a necessary prerequisite of 
normal, healthy development is witnessed by the fact that its lack or insufficiency is held 
responsible for Chris’ later inability to accept maternal affection, and his feelings of being 
unwanted. We enter a naturalistic discourse, couched in a plethora of background expectations 
about what the mother-child relationship should instinctively be like, in respect to which any 
empirical instance can be judged.
While the emotional impact of Simon Wells’ possible early rejection has greater clarity 
in the forthcoming extract, the looseness of the link is premised upon its hypothetical nature. 
The "trigger” event identified is one which lies in the realm of supposition and conjecture. The 
extract is from the written account of Simon’s assessment conference prior to his admission to 
St. Nicholas’.
"Discussion of the family and Simon’s situation was then opened up. It was 
possible that Simon was rejected early on but his mother had always blocked 
on this when the subject had been raised. Simon does not know who his 
father is and this could have affected his feelings about himself and his 
identity.”
Because the reader knows Simon has gone off the rails in some way, his history 
becomes a hunt for clues. While the therapeutic reasoning in this account is more elaborate, 
based as it is upon a rational mode of causal connection, its empirical substantiation is weak. In 
the first instance there is a "possible” early rejection, and in the second a definite event - the 
premature departure of Simon’s father - which "could” have affected his sense of identity. Quite 
how such incidents bear upon Simon’s contemporary deviance is ill-formulated, though the song 
is sung so often the reader will almost certainly be able to join in the chorus.
Contrast the story of how Simon’s possible early rejection could have caused the later 
development of problems with Mavis Baron’s account of Leon:
1 [I ask Mavis in her interview what she sees as being the source of Leon
Pryce’s problems.]
Mavis: Well - 1 think rejection - when he was two (2) yer.
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Kim: Uhm.
Mavis: Yes - rejection - that’s the problem - just can’t deal with it.
10
Kim: And - also - his rejection (.5) since that age or his perception of being (.5)
{rejected - becus of 
{
Mavis: (No - no I think - that - the perception - the-the - what had happened - uhm
(1) mentally - or unconsciously (1.5) uhm - that he hasn’t ever worked 
through -
Kim: Huh hum.
15
Mavis: from the time he was adopted which was - or not adopted - or taken in ^  the 
“M” family - his family - 1 don’t think he’s ever actually worked through 
those initial first two years - when he was rejected. . .  and I think any sort 
of sign of rejection since that time has-has ju s t.. .  he just doesn’t know how 
to deal with it.
17 Kim: Uhm.
Two related features of this account are noteworthy. Firstly, Leon’s rejection when 
he was two is not presented as merely a catalyst for a chain reaction. As a trauma in his emotional 
history it is part of the psychical composition which attends him throughout later life, resuscitated 
at each “sign of rejection since that time” (line 15). Secondly, the sense of rejection which has 
entered the unconscious strata of Leon’s mind nominates the therapeutic solution of “working 
through” in order that the irrevocable fact and the psychological connotations of it, can be come 
to terms with by being made conscious.
The accounts considered above all deal in one way or another with the causal origins 
of the boy’s emotional disturbance, if not their manifestation of deviance. Very often, however, 
the practical point of interpretation was to account for a particular bout of deviance rather than 
to reflect upon its ultimate origins. In such cases a causal nub was often constructed from the 
conjunction of events by invoking the child’s underlying motivation. In the first excerpt Damian
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Tanner’s F.S.W. transforms the temporal coincidence of two events into a causal connection.
1 **Damian’s relationship with his father continues to be quite a difficult one
and I feel Damian senses rejection from him, for instance, when Mr. Tanner 
threatens to send him back to St. Nicholas* when his behaviour at home was 
a problem.
5 [Also Damian committed his first offence in nine months after his father
refused to collect him from the other side of London when he had run out 
of money].
For his part, Mr. Tanner believes this is the only way of exercising any 
control. When Damian is well behaved however, Mr. Tanner gets on well 
10 with him.”
[Brackets in the original]
My focus here particularly is upon a snippet contained in lines 5-7 parenthetically 
bracketed in the original. Lines 1-4 furnish an interpretative framework: Damian’s sense of 
rejection from his father. This antecedent knowledge provides the reader with the rhetoric of 
motives necessary for the two events on lines 5-7 to gel. For it precipitates a reading of 
Mr. Tanner’s refusal to pick Damian up as, from the boy’s perspective, another instance of 
rejection. Damian’s commission of his first offence is nine months after this refusal is imbued 
with significance in relation to the child’s sense of being spumed.
The temporal juxtaposition of events is similarly converted into a causal connection in 
the next excerpt from Chris Jones’ case history.
[During 1981 following the application of care orders upon the three 
youngest Jones’ boys and a stint in care, we hear how the F.S.W. and his 
senior established contracts with each of the boys whereby the care orders 
would be revoked in return for improved behaviour.]
"Chris’ immediate response was to declare that he did not wish his care 
order to be revoked, but was unable to outline his reasons for saying this.
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During the following week, Chris and his brother were involved in two 
offences. .
[Bracketed section - my summary]
The onus is upon the reader to secure the narrative link, although a causal filiation is 
suggested in the account Chris* delinquency is seen to cany a message. In coalition with his 
verbal resistance to having the care order rescinded his acts of delinquency may be seen 
metaphorically to signify Chris* opposition to being taken out of care. A sense of causality 
emerges from the sequential juxtaposition: a) Chris verbally resisted the revocation of the care 
order; b) Chris committed two acts of delinquency the following week. Since we have been told 
that the dissolution of the order was contingent upon improved behaviour, Chris* participation 
in increased levels of delinquency symbolically reinforces what he has said in so many words.
Since crime was considered to be meaningful as the document of a child*s conscious 
and/or unconscious motivation, it was “fair game’* for interpretative sports. The money, in the 
case below, is upon an institutional favourite: peer group pressure and one-upmanship. The 
extract is from one of Ben Jackson’s C.C.*s.
1 [A discussion ensues about a recent break-in at an off-license in which Ben
was involved. The F.S.W. says that it sounds as if they wanted to be caught. 
Peter Scott, the principal, suggests that he can shed some light on the 
matter.]
5 Peter: We’ve taken on a lot (1) of boys in the last (.5) nine months uh - many of
whom the school would not ‘ave touched before - and that’s upset Ben 
Jackson’s apple-cart to some degree (.5) and he - finds it - like I guess a lot 
of people of his age - very difficult to resist peer group. And he has status 
and so occasionally (1) this is an interpretation on my part - I think 
10 occasionally he has to become criminal - just ta show the rest of the group
that actually he’s still one of 'em.
[Peter speaks of two recent incidents of crime from which Ben got no 
material gain.]
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But I think (.5) there’s a bit of 'im which occasionally pops us - does 
15 something naughty - just to reassure everybody else that he’s actually still
bent you know.
F.S.W:  there’s pressure on him to still be one of the lads.
Peter: Something like that.
Soon after:
Peter: They never took spirits. I mean they broke into an off-license -
20 F.S.W: I know.
Peter: and only took lemonade (chortles)
[Thomas says they’ll be the laughing stock inside D C. if they get a sentence 
for this.]
Peter: I think it’s also important to point out who who else was charged. (2) If you
25 look at the group that he was charged with - they’re by and large much
younger - they’re certainly much more - much less mature - both in terms of 
age - and in terms of development. And in that sense that -1 guess - supports 
to some degree my theory - that Ben was demonstrating in a sense - to a 
29 younger (?group?) that actually he’s quite tough.
Although assigned to the status of "interpretation”, Peter’s account provides a causal 
formula for Ben’s recent acts of delinquency. The account brings both a typified stratum of 
assumptions and the specific contingencies of the case together. It is in relation to "boys of this 
age” in lines 7-8 that Ben’s lack of resistence to peer group is normalized. However, the context 
in which he has to exhibit his authority and one-upmanship (especially with reference to the 
tougher referrals to St. Nicholas’) is defined as "criminal” (lines 9-11). Ben’s incentive to 
commit crime thus appears doubly motivated by his desire to be "one of the lads”, as well as a 
leader amongst them.
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The recent off-license theft stands as a documentary metaphor of this double motivation. 
The line of reasoning suggests that since Ben stole lemonade from the off-license, his motivation 
was not pecuniary. This identified, we may search around for an alternative solution. The puzzle 
of Ben’s behaviour may be resolved with reference to peer group politics. In terms of Ben’s 
motivation to seek authority over his peers Peter cites his co-participants in crime, all of whom 
are defined as chronologically and developmentally less mature than Ben, as evidence for his 
burgeoning theory (lines 24-29). The crime thus neatly documents Ben’s membership credentials 
in the delinquent group, while at the same time, demonstrating his relative superiority in the 
pecking order.
iii) Divergence and Convergence in the Practice of Causal Accounting
Throughout this chapter I have attempted to illustrate the different methods through 
which an architecture of causality is constructed from the details of the boys’ biographies. I 
considered first of all the configurational mode in which the connection between events is 
loosely theorized, and the onus of responsibility is placed more roundly upon the reader to piece 
together the causal threads. In accounts which tend toward the configurational format the 
preoccupation is with what happened when. The rational mode, by contrast, spins a more 
coherently theorized web of causation which attempts to explain not only what happened but 
why. The causal link is characteristically forged by invoking the boy’s underlying motivation, 
often unconscious to him. The rational mode is not homogeneous. In particular, the complexity 
of psychological reasoning varies; witnessed by the differences between Julian Pines’ account of 
his truancy and that of his F.S.W. for instance (see pages 316-319).
A characteristic distinction between the configurational and rational mode lies in the 
significance given to when the deviant behaviour appeared. While configurational accounts 
give greater emphasis to the behavioural manifestation, rational accounts typically prioritize the 
child’s underlying motivation. Such accounts are more likely to treat the behaviour itself as the 
symbolic expression of emotional disturbance which derives from the child’s history. In this lies 
an elective affinity between the rational mode of causal accounting and therapeutic reasoning.
The boys and their parents typically tended toward the configurational mode, just as 
the professional practitioners characteristically employed the rational mode. This led on
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occasions to divergences between the two groups regarding when and why it all began, as I 
attempted to illustrate above.
Such divergence, especially between boys and the staff, rarely, if ever, developed into 
a fully fledged ^'reality disjuncture" [Melvin Pollner -1975]. This is partly because social work 
practice is recognized and treated by members as an interpretative pursuit, facilitated by 
qualities of sympathy and understanding rather than scientific experimentation. More than one 
explanation may emerge and coexist without challenging the epistemological foundations of the 
practice. Of course, each advocate may be convinced of the rightness of her own version, but 
interpretative discourse is in principle democratic, admitting a pluralism irreducible to one 
authoritarian voice.
In practice however, members of staff would often undermine the boy’s version or that 
of his parents, by recourse to their lack of therapeutic insight, and in so doing deprive them of 
a democratic voice. The authority vested here is based on therapeutic principles. Since the 
child’s motivations may be unconscious, and hidden to him through their very primitiveness or 
subjection to the mechanism of repression, he was almost always not considered the best judge 
of his problems. By percolating the information supplied by the boy, his family, and the army of 
experts who had produced his case file, the practitioner at St. Nicholas’ was given access to the 
origins of his disturbance which, for the time being, may have been closed to the subject who 
bore them. The authority at work in enforcing the legitimacy of one version over another (what 
we might call, borrowing from theorists such as Laing and Pollner, the politics of everyday life) 
was based upon the assumption that it was in the childs “own best interests” to do so. The 
therapeutic aim, for the practitioner thus motivated, was to give the child himself access to his 
own motivation. But this was ironically achieved, in many cases, by denying his own version of 
reality.
Another method of deflating divergence between the accounts of boys and staff was 
to place them at different points of the historical scale. The more recent events which Julian 
invoked to explain the instigation of his truancy, for example, (pages 316-317), may indeed have 
been an influence. these events affected him so profoundly may also be incorporated as 
part of an older story, stretching further back into his history and which he is unable to articulate. 
Jim Taylor, in his interview, offers such an understanding of the routine discrepancies which 
separate boy and staff versions. He aligns the split more to a chronological criterion of
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difference between adults and teenagers than a professional criterion between expert and 
problem child, and thus accords to adult versions an authority borne of age and stage.
Jim: Oh yer -1 - you see -1 mean (.5) comes back to interpretations. We're trying
to find out why they did it - 1 mean - teenagers can’t see any further than the 
ends of their nose. I’m sure if they sat down and thought about it - they’d 
realize why they were bored.
Kim: Uhm.
Jim: But (.5) they’re telling you. . .  they’re bored - which is right - on the day in
question - on the time in question - they were bored so they did x y or z.
Kim: Uhm.
Jim: What we’re doing is we re going much further back - and we’re saying “becus
of (.5) this (1) he was bored (.5) which is whv he - 
(1)
Kim: {Right.
{
Jim: {you know - went into the (1.5) whatever he did” y’know.
Kim: So it’s part - it’s the same - part of the same explanation that they’re using. . .
[Jim explains that it wasn’t until he came into this work that he was forced 
to look at things - including himself - which can be quite painful. And he 
started thinking about things that happened to him as a child and began to 
ask why he drove a motorcycle up the road at the age of thirteen. He did it 
because it was fun.]
Jim: But did I - when you start looking back (1) you know? What was going on?
(1) Was I trying to get at dad or (.5) you know - 1 mean it’s putting a
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glamorous interpretation on the thing. But (.5) there are (.5) sort of - fairly 
hard and fast interpretations that you can make.
Kim: Uhm.
Jim: But the kid isn’t going to see that (2) He might adore his mother who beats
him up - you know.
Kim: Uhm.
Jim: So - he’s not gonna see that - that he’s bored becus. . .  ’eus he’s not gonna
turn round and say “that’s the reason” - becus then he’s being disloyal to 
somebody he loves. (1)1 think we do a lot of things on impulse you know (.5) 
kids more than anybody probably. . .  But they’re you know (Jim sniggers) 
you’re asking them - they’re telling you (Jim laughs) you know “I was 
bored”.
Kim: Yer - that’s right.
Jim: So (.5) I think that’s why we (.5) we clash sometimes. (Jim laughs)
[Bracketed section - my summary]
In this instance the incongruity is borne not of the child’s exclusion from professional 
expertise, but of their chronological status as teenagers, with all the ghost assumptions which 
attend it.
Divergence was a routine feature of institutional life. Staff were familiar with it and 
the methods through which, if necessary, it may have been satisfactorily repaired. Such 
procedures entered into the everyday doings of social work. However, the diversity betrays a 
profound congruity which lies in the capacity to make meaningful sense of origins, beginnings, 
starting-points and the like. All the members of staff and boys’ who I interviewed shared the 
capacity to hear and orientate to my question (about why a child ended up in care) as a request 
for an historical origin &om whence the problem began.
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The nature of the explanation between the two groups tended to differ, as we have 
seen. For instance most staff accounts did not begin in so clearly circumscribed a way as did those 
of the boys. Since the genesis of “the problem” tended to be conceived as more nebulous, the 
propensity to date an exact temporal event from whence it all began was rarer. The emotional 
origins were propelled to a position of greater significance in expert analysis which accounts for 
the temporal vagaries in defining beginnings. But the differences should not obscure the shared 
reservoir of narrative competence which united them. Each group displayed their capacity to 
hear the request for a starting-point, and furnish me with one.
Consider the boys’ narrative orientation to beginnings exhibited in the following 
snippets, mainly from previously quoted extracts.
Andy Fisher:
[Kate asks about Andy’s parents separation in 1979.]
Andy: That’s when I started - not going to school. . .  It was then that the trouble
started.
John Kenyon:
John: Right - I’ll start when my first step-mum left my dad - yer?
Kim: Right - what age were you then?
John: I was (.5) uhm (1) I was about (1) I don’t know man (.5) you know about six
- about six I was. . .
Julian Pines:
[I ask Julian why he missed so much school. What put him off?]
Julian: First of all me nan died.
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Kim: Huh hum.
Julian: And after that I never really sort of - wanted to go to school after that.
Clive Dennis:
[I ask Clive to remind me a little bit about his history and why he is in care.]
Clive: What tell you (.5) about what happened?
Kim: Yer - if you - yer - as you see it.
Clive: From the start (.5) from the start d’you wanna know?
Kim: Ah - from the start as you see it - saw it leading up to come - to coming into
care.
(1.5)
Clive: Yer -1 was ah (.5) I used to do - when I was (.5) when I was in primary school
I was alright. But when I - when I went to the secondary school (.5) I started 
bunking off in the third year - 1 mean first year.
Kim: In the first year.
Clive: And it carried o n . . .
Damian Tanner:
[I ask Damian to remind me a bit about how he came to be in care.]
Damian: Well I’m in care becus - uhm (1.5) dunno - about (1) two - three years ago
(2) maybe a bit more alright - it started off - 1 went into ’ospital with - 
rheumatic fever - right?
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Kim. Huh hum.
Damian: Then I started missing school.. .
In each case a decipherable starting point is found from which the origins of the history 
date. The “history” in question is thematically circumscribed by the purpose in hand; in this case 
to decipher the lineages of the child's propulsion into care. The faculty of knowing how to start 
at the beginning was shared by boys and adults, clients and professionals, who employed their 
narrative skills in doing history.
In discussing this notable symmetry in the boys' response to my question with 
sociological colleagues I was met with very similar explanations of this propensity to define 
when it all began. Their response revealed the routine cynicism familiar to seasoned social 
scientists: “they've clearly learned the rules of the game” I was frequently told. This reply nicely 
illuminates the distinction between the methodological proclivities of this study and that of 
mainstream sociology. From my perspective, such cynicism becomes a crucial object of analysis 
if the actors themselves systematically doubt the veridicality of appearance, which in this study 
was certainly the case. The structures of doubt themselves become an object of interest.
The point is not to deny that the boys, ensconced in an institutional culture, learned 
some of the codes which defined it. That they were asked about their past so much must have 
facilitated the ease and rapidity of their response. But these capacities to recognize the request 
for a chronological starting-point were not learned exclusively in the institutional context; they 
were skills which the boys had before they arrived. In this sense the raw material from which the 
institutional edifice was built was already there. The capacity to tell stories, and from the 
beginning at that, is inscribed in wider cultural knowledge. Such rudimentary skills, along with 
a multitude of others, form what Heritage calls the “architecture of inter-subjectivity” 
[Heritage (1984) - p.254] from which particular institutional forms emerge.
Conclusion
In this chapter I subjected the mundane methods through which a sense of causality 
is accomplished to empirical scrutiny. In so doing I distinguished between two modes of causal 
coimection: the configurational and the rational. In the configurational mode the association
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between events is weakly theorized and relies more heavily upon the reader/hearer to forge the 
incipient connection. The rational mode, by contrast, is more explicit in terms of its causal 
theorization, often linking events through a bridge of psychological motivation. Each, however, 
relies upon a narrative competence on the part both of the producer and the consumer of the 
account, in their capacity to grasp events together, to use Ricoeur’s terminology.
While the boys and their parents - the "lay" participants if one prefers - tended more 
toward the configurational mode, the professional participants were more adept at formulating 
rational causal connections. The distinction was, however, by no means absolute.
In the final chapter of this thesis I consider how accounts so often exhibit both a 
retrospective and prospective quality: how a sense of the past and the future meet in 
constructing a contemporary account While this feature was particularly prevalent in professional 
child care accounts, it is a generic feature of all forms of practical reasoning and its elucidation 
thus has a general application. To open up the retrospective-prospective nature of accounting 
I introduce a third mode of causal coimection, which I call the paradigmatic. In the process of 
paradigmatic patterning the past, present and future are brought into a structured discursive 
relationship, as I attempt to empirically demonstrate below.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
TELUNG THE PAST, TELUNG THE FUTURE: THE RETROSPECTIVE AND 
PROSPECTIVE NATURE OF INSTRUTIONAL ACCOUNTS
Introduction
Practitioners at S t Nicholas’ squatted Janus-like in the present, with one head turned 
towards the boys’ past in whose circumstances the foundation of their present was seen to lie, 
and the other head turned towards the boys’ future which, through their interventions, they 
wished to influence. In this, the final chapter, I want to explore the processes through which a 
sense of the past, present and future are brought into structured temporal alignment in a variety 
of institutional accounts.
To better appreciate the temporal features of discourse I introduce one further mode 
of causal connection. Theparadigmatic may be employed in the service of either the configurational 
or rational mode. Its distinguishing feature lies in the procedures through which items are 
invested with meaning in relation to a pattern of associations to which they are assimilated by 
dint of their assumed resemblance. The detection of a pattern is intimately entwined with the 
application of a range of ghost schemata through which events are typified. That is to say, 
patterns are inextricable from the procedures through which they are organized: they are 
reflexive accomplishments.
In the process of examining and re-examining the data I have disentangled four 
categories which differ in emphasis, though all are united by certain procedural similarities, in 
particular their paradigmatic format The fi)ur categories fashion an arc between the retrospective, 
contemporaneous and prospective. Analyzed collectively they enhance our understanding of 
the temporal nature of practical reasoning, particularly as it was employed by staff in a 
community home for deviant adolescent boys.
i) Telling the Past: Retrospective Accounting
In the first category of extracts, the emphasis is retrospective in as much as the pattern 
being woven is purely historical. In certain instances the pattern is sewn together with a thread 
of psychological theorization. In others, an amalgam of episodes or stories are accumulated
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which bear the traces of an incipient pattern. In these accounts which employ the configurational 
mode the significance of the pattern - the rule which unites the disparate elements - is left to the 
recipient of the account to decipher.
In the first cluster of accounts the point of the paradigmatic exercise is to identify an 
habitual historical pattern in the boy’s behaviour. In the preliminaiy extract Melvin Hardy, Leon 
Pryce’s special worker from unit 2, adumbrates the sequential patterns which characterize 
Leon’s mood cycles. The piece is drawn from a written report prepared for a C.C. in which 
Leon’s future at S t Nicholas’ was being considered.
1 “Leon initially presented a polite, well-mannered young man, well skilled in
the social graces.
Christmas was possibly the time when Leon displayed the first signs of his 
depressive nature; a depression that has continued intermittently and 
5 increased.
The depressive periods (time wise 1 hour approx.) follow a fairly regular 
pattern. After unacceptable incidents in which Leon has been involved or 
instigated (these being of an abusive, threatening or destructive nature) 
Leon complains of a medical condition. His complaints continue until he 
10 appears to have convinced himself he is suffering acutely and hence deep
depression sets in.
When Leon’s depressive period is nearing an end he wants to be cuddled 
and reassured he is cared for.
Overall, the extreme facets of Leon’s nature from diabolical verbal abuse, 
15 extreme threatening behaviour to both boys and staff (which incurs fear in
the recipient) deep depression to baby-like charm, raises the question as to 
17 the suitability of Leon’s placement.
Melvin’s detection of a recurrent pattern in Leon’s behaviour is not purely academic. 
It is used as evidence to support his case for questioning “the suitability of Leon’s placement”
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(lines 14-17). Indeed his patterned predisposition is treated as the manifestation of Leon’s 
“depressive nature” (line 4). Notice how this “nature” is construed as something which 
inherently belongs to Leon, but which only emerged on the behavioural surface after an initial 
period at S l Nicholas’ when Leon presented a polite, well-mannered, socially skilled persona 
(lines 1-2). The recurrence of cyclical patterns since that time enforces a version of Leon as a 
boy who is depressed underneath it all, and whose placement is thereby rendered potentially 
problematic. Having constructed an over-arching canopy of meaning a variety of behavioural 
items - from Leon’s abusiveness and threats, his deep depressions, to his baby-like charm - can 
be assimilated to a monolithic cause: Leon’s depressive nature.
In the three forthcoming excerpts all drawn from the same C.C., Paul Skinner, Colin 
Lynch and Thomas McKinney respectively, identify the patterns inscribed in Ben Jackson’s 
behaviour. The first piece is concerned with the sequence Ben goes through “where he’s done 
something wrong”. Paul Skinner’s adumbration of this process alludes to a history of repetitions 
of a theme which is known, identifiable, and thus a conceptual platform from which present and 
future behaviour can be understood.
1 Paul: He goes through a process where he’s done something wrong - he won’t
acknowledge it initially.
S.F.S.W: Yer.
Paul: Now we might find that (.5) difficult to handle becus I can speak to ’im now
5 and if he’s done something wrong I know full well he’d say.
S.F.S.W: Yer.
Paul: And we’d be able to talk it through.
Thomas: Yer.
S.F.S.W: Yer.
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10 Paul: Whereas for the first-so many hours or whatever after he’d (?) depending
on the seriousness of it -
S.F.S.W: Yer.
Paul: he will not even acknowledge the presence -
S.F.S.W: No.
15 Paul: of a member of staff. And in fact he will make it worse - he’ll be rude or
abusive and swear (.5) and get into a temper tantrum. Then - you can 
gradually see him coming round. (1) If we could perhaps (1) leam from our 
experiences - from our experiences that ultimately he will come round.
Thomas: Yes.
20 Paul: And he will be - he will (??) But we’ve just gotta go through that sort of -
storm (.5) period - to get to the other side.
Like the first extract regarding Leon, Paul’s identification of a typical sequence of 
events in Ben’s behaviour is placed in the context of a higher cause: it is something from which 
he suggests they should “leam” (line 17); “we’ve just gotta go through that sort of - storm (.5) 
period - to get to the other side” (lines 20-21). What the repeated scenario can apparently teach 
practitioners is a method of reading contemporary and prospective events, investing them with 
a predictable conclusion; a skill which allows Colin Lynch and Thomas McKinney, below, to pre­
empt future patterns on the basis of a typical past.
Colin: Uhm (1.5) it’s worth noting that Ben - always returns from home leave in a
very (1.5) positive frame of mind uhm (3) very sensible - reasonable - not too 
reasonable - you know - he’s still fifteen but ah (.5) great for two or three 
days and we can almost predict now that - within two or three days he’s gunna 
take a dramatic ^ ve and (.5) and get into the (1) messing around that goes 
on in the unit - which is (2) more disappointing - when it comes from Ben 
becos he is (.5) or can be - one of the most mature (.5) boys in the group.
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The sequence is echoed in Thomas’ account.
1 [Thomas speaks of how Ben is making "great strides forward” and he can
also tell from the way Ben approaches them on return from trips home that 
he’s had a good time.]
Thomas: We also know like that in two or three days time he’s almost gonna go back 
5 into his pram again - yer? (1) and kind of blame - almost blame us (.5) for
his (1) present situation if you like - yer? And it’s (1) picking up - Paul’s bit 
there (.5) Ben actually always having to blame (.5) outside here somewhere 
- yer - for the way he’s feeling or the way he’s acting or whatever. And he’s 
gonna have to - take on some of the (?strains?) to manage it, and have these 
10 feelings himself.
Colin’s predictive powers reside in his capacity to read the patterns embedded in the 
past. Similarly, Thomas McKinney’s identification of what typically/wj happened structures his 
knowledge of what will. However, Thomas’ account goes one step further than each of the 
preceding three. He endows Ben’s behavioural tendencies with a psychological motivation 
which lends them a rational status. For, underlying the pattern deciphered by Paul Skinner, 
Thomas recognizes Ben’s habitual tendency of “actually always having to blame” external forces 
for the way he is feeling or acting, instead of managing and having “these feelings himself” 
(lines 7-10).
This process of psychological penetration is also at work below. In this instance the 
identification of a recurrent pattern affords a theorization of the deeper unconscious motivation 
which undergirds Paul Black’s behaviour. The author is Kate Lambert who offers the following 
synopsis in a T.M.
1 Kate: He-he-he’s thrown up all-all sorts of odd behaviour in the past. Er - at times
he let himself be known as Paul White - when he was younger - and being 
Paul White seemed to be associated - with when he was being very - very 
difGcult. Almost as if - “this is the opposite of what I want to be - I’m Paul 
5 White when I’m like” - 1 mean again this is being too glib - 1 know that - ^
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- you-you know -1 can understand someone wanting to to {call themselves -
{
Nicola: { I t’s a nicely
8 simplistic way of presenting the polarity of your character (laughs).
The detection of patterns is very rarely the object in itself. Practically orientated, it 
equips the theorist with a mode of access to what makes the child tick. The routine tendency for 
Paul to call Black White is inscribed with a significance which penetrates the surface. In the 
account Kate gives voice to Paul’s hidden motivation. He calls himself Paul White when 
involved in very difiicult behaviour: “Almost as if - this is the opposite of what I want to be - I’m 
Paul White when I’m like” this (lines 4-5). The pattern is thus sewn together with the thread of 
rational argumentation.
In the next group of accounts the paradigmatic pattern emerges through a kind of 
molecular accretion. A series of episodes are linked together into a chain which is more, or less, 
explicitly theorized. In the first piece below, the theme is being woven in the very process 
through which various participants articulate a series of events. Andy Fisher is the topic of 
discussion in a unit 3 staff meeting.
1 [The unit 3 staff discuss how, unlike Ben Jackson, Andy can’t stand up for
himself.]
Tina: He’s a very frightened boy.
[Jan speaks of how, on an occasion when Samuel Nailer had Andy by the 
5 throat, he wasn’t defending himself but just waiting for Jan to come and save
him.]
It’s as if he just gets a bit sort of numbed - and doesn’t do anything. . .
[George tells of the occasion when Leon Pry ce came into the unit and 
before he left he and Andy had a “tumble”.]
10 George: But Andy made it into a sort of play fight but I think that was a way to sort
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of gain some trust - and friendship with Leon -you know - rather than try and 
show Leon - “I’m stronger than you” which he isn’t anyway.
[Philip says how he banned Samuel from unit 3 one night.]
Philip: And come to think about it - Andy was quite pleased - and it didn’t click.
15 Tina: He’s very frightened.
[Andrew Chetland says how Andy had asked him to ban both Samuel and 
Leon from the unit.]
Tina: He won’t stop them - he’ll invite them in. But you’re asked to go out and do
the dirty work - you’re like - the Guardian Angel at the gate - protecting him 
20 all the time. He’s very frightened - that’s what worries me.
Through the sequential association of a series of empirical episodes a galvanizing 
theme emerges. To grasp each of the stories together as a paradigmatic whole requires that one 
elicit a generic rule germane to each situation. A clue lies in the preliminary instructions, and 
those scattered throughout the text, for how to read it; what the events are collectively “about”. 
Tina’s identification of Andy as a “very frightened boy” (lines 3 and 15), fashions our hearing of 
the account. We search for evidence which may corroborate or challenge the predisposing 
contention.
Andy’s fear is one motif that runs through the interaction, but it is overlaid by another. 
While underneath it all Andy is “very frightened” of Samuel and Leon, he attempts to appear 
to the contrary. A paradoxical subversion operates here to structure the discursive relationship 
between Andy’s surface behaviour and his underlying feelings. While underneath he is very 
frightened, his overt behaviour gives the impression of friendliness, by for instance inviting 
Samuel and Leon into the unit when he in fact is scared of them. By paradoxically displacing the 
apparent a homogeneous theme emerges from the conjunction of episodes.
A paradigmatic pattern similarly emerges in the next account through the compilation 
of stories. Resonance is once more achieved through the operation (and identification) of a
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general “rule” which unites a group of events or stories through the principle of “one rule for 
all”. Once the rule is “cracked”, each new item can be incorporated to i t  The following piece 
is drawn from a T.M.
1 Kate: So it looks as if Damian Tanner might be on the wav out. See the trouble is
that that boy - when the papers for him first came to us -
Brian: Uhm.
Kate: it said - “there’s one boy who must not be allowed to visit him - the two of
5 them together are a disaster”. It was a kid called Billy Ryan. And in fact
when we got papers asking us to take this Billy Ryan - we refused on the 
grounds that we already had Damian Tanner. Then there was Nicky Wicks 
- he teamed up with Nicky Wicks. Niclqr Wicks got borstal.
Brian: Mmm.
10 Kate: Damian very much involved.
Brian Mmm.
Kate: Then he’s teamed up with Perry and Richard Ashworth you know it-it just
- I’m afraid is Damian.
Brian: Mmm.
15 Kate: He’s got a very nas ah-ah - one of the things that’s been causing trouble -
young uhm - Ja-James (1.5) his mum - had him when she was thirteen - and 
she is (1.5) uhm - well - she acts as though she’s about thirteen still! She-she 
has got - what the doctors call uhm - an untreatable -
Brian: personality disorder
20 Kate: personality disorder. She wears ^ y  little skirts - ribbons in her hair
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25
although she’s in her thirties now - and uh - behaves as if she’s a young 
teenager - very much - and goes around with different men (she’s always got 
a different boyfriend to sleep with). And they rigged this tape recording. 
Now I don’t know whether they had - some idea of what his mum is like - or 
whether it was just (1.5) saying - "James’ mum’s a slag and a whore and a
(1.5) prostitute” - and all the rest of it - and kept playing it to James - and 
James was getting -very upset about i t  And so he went to (2) ah (2) Samuel 
- and Samuel decided to play the Godfather and he’s been threatening 
Richard Ashworth in particular.
30 Brian: Well he’s very uhm - he’s much brighter than the others - in that group - and
he’s incredibly manipulative - and he’s got the use of them - like a shield - like 
he used uhm - Nicky Wicks like a shield. And really - it’s a classic of Nicky 
Wicks going down and -
Kate: and Damian Tanner still here!
35 Brian: and Damian Tanner still here!
38
Kate: Yer - and so I think it’s being decided that we may be able to do good for
Damian but how many kids can we let him destroy before - we get rid of him. 
So - that’s the unit 1 situation.
The reader is immediately instructed to configure events in the context of their being 
sufficiently serious for Damian to be possibly ‘‘on the way out” (line 1). Thereafter a series of 
deviant episodes are quoted, each of which involve Damian in a Machiavellian seat of power. He 
is implicated on three occasions where some deed, specified or not, is perpetrated, and for which 
another collaborator ‘‘takes the buck”. A rhythmic beat is built up through the presentational 
procedures. First there was Billy R yan.. .then there was Nicky W icks.. .then there was Perry 
and Richard Ashworth. A sense of continuity engendered by ‘‘this-then-that-then-this” - etc. 
helps identify the generic rule through which separate items can be assimilated to a paradigmatic 
framework.
The boy’s motivational rationale is articulated more clearly in lines 30-32 of this
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account than in the prior one. Brian defines it in terms of his clever and conscious manipulation 
of his less able peers into positions of danger which shield him from exposure. We are guided 
throughout the piece to read Damian’s behaviour as a cynical and conscious manipulation of 
those around him, laced with an element of nastiness rather than emotional disturbance. The 
emphasis is, if you will, criminalizing rather than pathologizing.
In the next account a rhythmatic resonance is orchestrated between a series of 
sequential episodes during Leon Pryce’s stay in the assessment centre. The piece is extracted 
from a written report composed by the head of Leon’s residential unit.
1 “With regards to Leon’s contacts with his foster parents, these have been
bizarre to say the least.
Initially Mrs. M. visited regularly if briefly. She was always ready to have 
Leon stay weekends in the family house in Sussex, but Leon invariably 
5 refused. He wanted to visit their town home in (S.E. London) which he was
forbidden due to the proximity of his old mates on the glue-scene.
Then Mrs. M. took Leon out for the day, but arrived with another boy in tow 
who was French and spoke not a word of English and with whom Leon had 
to share his day out with his mother.
10 Finally “dad” called to see if Leon would like to go to Sussex with them for
the weekend and if so he’d pick him up immediately. For the first time Leon 
agreed. Fifteen minutes later Dr. M. ‘phoned back to say he’d ‘phoned his 
wife who’d informed him they had full house - and there was no room for 
Leon.
15 Why Dr. M. could not have ascertained this fact before, or instead of ringing
to invite Leon there is, alas, only too typical of the family dynamics and staff 
here felt that such incidents as the two described above illustrated how
undervalued Leon must have felt in his “family”  On the latter occasion
Leon just took the cancelled invitation in his stride and manfully concealed 
20 any disappointment or anger.”
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We are instructed in lines 1-2 how we are to “read” the forthcoming episodes which 
configure under the rubric of the “bizarre”. In each of the following scenarios a paradoxical 
contrast is constructed between two parts. In the first part the good intentions of Leon’s foster 
parents are set-up, only to be undermined in some way by their subsequent behaviour.
A) i) Mrs. M. would invite him to the country house where he didn’t want to go, 
ii) but forbid access to the town house where he did.
B) i) Mrs. M. took Leon out for the day,
ii) but brought along a non-English speaking stranger to share it.
C) i) Dr. M. invited him to the country house in Sussex for the weekend, and for the first time
in ages he accepted,
ii) only to hear fifteen minutes later that he couldn’t go because the M’s had a “full house” 
that weekend.
In lines 15-20 the final subversive episode is incorporated into a schema held to typify 
“M” family dynamics, and to epitomize Leon’s sense of being undervalued. Even before the 
reader has reached this point of interpretation, however, the thematic resonance accomplished 
through the cumulation of three instances encourages her to find the rule through which they 
can be “grasped together” in Ricoeur’s phrase. Although the first episode (lines 3-6) may, in its 
singularity, be read as a sign of Mrs. M’s good intentions to protect Leon from his old 
glue-sniffîng mates, its formal symmetry with the next two episodes suggests a collective reading 
in retrospect. The discursive use of bi-partite contrasts to characterize each of the three 
chapters facilitates the identification of a series of paradoxes through which the benevolent 
intentions of the M’s are subverted by their behaviour which, consciously or otherwise, verges 
on the malevolent.
The final extract in this sub-section is perhaps the most elaborate, and nicely displays 
the interaction between the rational and paradigmatic mode. It well illustrates how, once a 
pattern has been identified, it offers a framework to which a range of items may be assimilated. 
This, in turn, confirms the validity of the original pattern. Clearly this process of mutual 
elaboration depends upon the documentaiy dynamic.
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The process of paradigmatic assimilation is even more impressive where it is spontaneous, 
as is the case below. The extract is &om a T.M. which was partially devoted to a discussion of Paul 
Black in the light of his recently disruptive behaviour in education. Jan Butler, Paul’s special 
worker from unit 3, was invited to the meeting for the purposes of the discussion.
1 Kate: Uhm (.5) there’s something I wanted to ask you about and find out if it’s
right It seems to me that when things are on a more even keel - so to speak 
- with the boy - when he’s not in danger of going to court - when - ah - he- 
he hasn’t got anything heavy hanging over him (.5) that’s the time he’ll turn 
5 to glue - or to - very disruptive behaviour. It’s almost as if “things are going
too well - 1 can’t - 1 can’t trust this (.5) I better check-out” - {you know.
{
Jan: {Uhm - his-
his glue-sniffing - spate (1) which lasted several weeks and culminated - with 
the (.5) old lady’s money being stolen by him - that came after - no apparent 
10 reason that we could understand.
Kate: Mmm.
Jan: (He’d) had a successful holiday with the unit and a successful holiday - with
his parents and ahm (2) it seemed to come out of the blue.
Kate: Yer - almost as if “this is all going too well - 1 better have a quick check that
15 (1.5) ah-ah you you know {I’m
{
Jan: {Yes - he seems to enjoy feeling that there’s
something hanging over his head. It’s a control - it’s an external control 
which he can then use (.5) for himself (.5) I mean he can say - “well I’d like 
to do - such and such (.5) but I know I can’t - be-because you know” - and 
20 then he won’t! And he seems to enjoy a sort of dire feeling of - of some kind
of threat hanging over him.
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Brian: Maybe that {gives him -
{
Nicola: {He does that -
25
Brian: some sort of structure. Maybe he {feels
{
Nicola: {Yes
Brian: he hasn’t got enough structure - you know.
30
Nicola: He does actually - con (1.5) conversationally he uses - that kind of structure 
- much more than most boys could think of it ’eus he’s always saying - "I want 
to do such and such but I won’t because” and then he’ll go round the room 
and give all the different opinions that he thinks he’ll get back and why he 
therefore won’t do it. He’s done that - you know - quite a lot - it’s quite a 
common conversational device with him.
Jan: It’s quite common within his family as well (clears throat) not so much “I
want to but I won’t”. Paul says - “Oh - I’m going to do - such-and-such-and- 
35 such-and such” which he knows isn’t acceptable - and his father - sort of
semi-joking - semi-seriously - says something like - you know - “Oh well - fine 
- you do that I’ll break both ya legs” or something. And then Paul will say - 
“Oh alright dad” - and that’s the sort of pattern within the house is that Paul 
says something which he knows he’s not going to get away with - dad - half- 
40 jovially threatens him - and then Paul backs down and then dad is sort of
boosted up a bit as as the (2) the father-figure - and the the authority figure 
and Paul - you know Paul enjoys it.
44
Nicola: So Paul attributes other people being the reason for him never taking the 
initiative.
Kate primarily identifies in lines 1-6 the kind of retrospective gloss which furnished the 
accounts on pages 342-346 above. A paradigmatic schema is sketched which has the tentative 
status of “how it seems” to Kate. Jan responds to Kate’s provisional observations in a way that
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displays her understanding, as well as lending her authority to the burgeoning pattern. She does 
so by o£fering an empirical example of how a recent spate of glue-sniffing, culminating in a 
handbag snatch, took place after a successful summer holiday. The procedures employed here 
smack of those considered in the next section.
The theorization contained on lines 14-26 is dedicated to a retrieval of the motivations 
which undergird such patterned manifestations. Two candidate explanations emerge to account 
for Paul’s predilection for messing things up when all is apparently well. In the first Paul is 
testing, or checking-out the trustworthiness of the environment and those who reside in it. In 
the second, Paul’s behaviour is interpreted as an attempt to ensure the erection of a structure 
of external control in which he feels more secure.
Notable throughout this extract is how the stronger the identified pattern, the more 
a sense of randomness is systematically reduced. Rather than conceiving Paul’s unexpected 
bouts of glue-sniffing as a testament to their randomness, they are brought into a causal 
correlation with the behaviour which preceded them. Periods of reasonably even-keeled 
behaviour (this) followed by (then) bouts of disruptiveness (that), are transformed into this 
because of that: a procedure which is key to the establishment of causality.
A pattern is established then by investing Paul’s behaviour with a psychological 
motivation toward either testing-out the reliability of the world, and/or imposing an external 
structure of control for himself. The suspension of disruptive behaviour after these episodes is 
similarly endowed with a consequential status which in due course will itself produce the "even 
keel” responsible for activating a further bout.
The edifice of paradigmatic and rational reasoning erected on lines 1-26 is further 
strengthened by the cumulation of two more instances of behaviour which exhibit the same 
recurrent pattern. The unfolding of Paul’s behavioural map provides the requisite organization 
through which Nicola is able to identify conversational patterns in the classroom (lines 27-32). 
Finally, on lines 33-42 Jan extends this characteristic conversational mode to the family in which 
Paul suggests the unacceptable in order that his father will impose an external structure of 
authority which Paul seems to "enjoy”.
If a pattern is to be shown to inhere in a child’s behaviour rather than the environment,
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it must be trans-temporal and trans-locational. Without historical and geographical resonance 
paradigmatic patterns are weakened, or transferred to another candidate bearer, such as the 
institution for example. That Paul’s behaviour exhibits typical scenarios through time and across 
different settings, strengthens the paradigmatic case.
ii) Assimilating Present Events to a Historical/Paradigmatic Pattern
The last account points toward a mode of paradigmatic accounting whereby a 
contemporary event is brought within the fold of an established pattern. In so doing the present 
item is temporally aligned with the past as another instance o f . . .the same thing. Consider, first 
of all, three extracts in which the boy’s recent relationship with his peers is explicitly identified 
as the manifestation of his historical tendencies. Ben Jackson’s patterned predisposition toward 
making destructive relationships informs the interpretation of his recent relationship with 
David Lyons in both extracts below.
1 George: Uhm (.5) Ben then (.5) began a similar love-hate relationship with David
Lyons. In the past - uhm - two case conferences - you know - we’ve uhm - 
mentioned about this sort of - love-hate relationship which Ben and - this 
other boy - Simon Wells - had. And you know - he seems to be - taking that 
5 sort of (1) into the actual relationship with uhm David Lyons - a West Indian
boy.
[George Wallace - Ben Jackson’s C.C.]
And similarly:
1 Philip: Uhm (1) Ben was very involved in (.5) things with David (Lyons) (2) and it
was quite a destructive relationship. And - one of the jobs we’re left with 
now is getting - Ben to look at that (.5) more - and not just say - “well I was 
winding him up - but I won’t do it again”. But to look at whv - how he gets 
5 into these sort of relationships. And when *e first came in here - it was a sort
of love-hate relationship with Simon Wells. And as soon as David (.5) came 
(1) most groups have a fight for - position of the top dog - of the - place. He 
had a position - fight for the position of bottom dog. And the two of them 
- were fighting out for who was the mascot of the group. (1.5) Uhm (.5)
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10 an-and that was a very destructive relationship - for-for both of them. And
- you know - why does Ben get himself into these things?
[Philip Hooper - day conference]
Both extracts explicitly map a connection between Ben's relationship with Simon Wells 
and David Lyons. Ben's relationship with David is grasped together with the earlier one and 
placed within the same mantle. The protocol of patterning is such that events which were 
hitherto isolated and specific assume the status of collective generality. What is at stake is not 
just Ben's destructive relationship with two individual boys, but his propensity to have destructive 
relationships in general, of which these two cases are examples. Hence we hear in George's 
account how "he seems to be - taking that sort of (love-hate pattern) into the actual relationship 
with uhm David Lyons” (lines 4-5), and in Philip's, how the point is not to look at the specifics, 
“But to look at whv - how he gets into these sort of relationships” (lines 4-5) in the first place.
For the relationship between temporally distinct events to gel one factor must be held 
constant as the connecting brace between the different episodes. What unites the two events 
here is the continuity of “Ben” who is thus conceived as the bridging agent. Through this 
discursive manoeuvre the problem is attributed to the boy and his psychological predisposition. 
The boy, Simon Wells, is similarly the “factor x” which is held constant across past and present 
events in Roger Carter’s resumé of a holiday period in the extract below. The context is a day 
conference.
1 Roger: Now ( 1 ) the (.5) holiday with the exception of the fair - has been I think very
quiet on the whole. Uhm (3.5) Simon Wells uhm (2) it was arranged that he 
actually spent some time with his girlfriend - and lived at - the girl friend’s 
house. But as - always with Simon - it became a very intense relationship - 
5 and it broke down uh - as for living there - and at the present moment she
- this girl comes in - but (.5) he-he seems to get so intense this kid - that ah 
7 - it blows hot and cold so - so often.
The thread of continuity is secured in lines 4-5: “as - always with Simon” his 
relationship with his girlfiiend became “very intense” and “broke down”. This sense of 
repetition is reinforced by Roger’s recognition that Simon “blows hot and cold so - so often” 
(line 7). The uniqueness of recent events is displaced in this process of paradigmatic assimilation.
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The break-down in Simon’s relationship with his girlfriend thus assumes the status of “another 
instance o f ’ the same old pattern.
The preceding three accounts all present the boy’s contemporary behaviour as the 
expression of a pattern which is already established. It is thus a matter of no surprise. In the next 
piece a recent episode prompts Kate Lambert and Tom Paine - the bursar - to cast the line of 
paradigmatic reasoning back to a previous event which is thus brought into conceptual 
symmetry. The discussion takes place in a P.O’s meeting.
1 [Paul Skiimer, head of social work, describes a recent occasion where Sam
King had lost his temper and “blown a fuse” after a series of incidents which 
upset him, and started “f-ing and blinding” in front of boys and staff.]
Tom: He seems on a very short fuse doesn’t he.
5 Paul: It was good - 1 think it was good the way he came round.
Tom: Oh yes - 1 mean - yer.
Paul: I mean he was saying - I-I then walked out with him on Tuesday night -1 think
he had had enough. And I said “Well you know (.5) it’s not like you”.
Tom: {That’s right.
{
10 Paul: {“It’s not - what we’d expect -
Tom: Yer.
Paul: of you” - and he seemed to be quite (?). He said “I was going to do some
apologizing this afternoon but I didn’t get round to it -1 was a bit frightened” 
he said “but I’ll make sure I do it tonight”.
15 [Tom says a lot of good things are said about him and it does seem to be a bit
“out of character”.]
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Kate: Yer (.5) i-it always amazes me how he came here - it was becus - wasn’t it -
at (his previous position at a children’s home.)
(1)
20 Tom: {Yes.
{
Kate: {he’d had a ^  (.5) blow up with the staff there.
Tom: That’s right {yer.
{
Kate: {That’s why he came here. And-and I ’ve always thought - “I’ve
never seen any of that”.
25 Tom: Yer well that’s right-I think that was at the back ofmy mind-becus I knew-
Kate: Yer.
27 Tom: you know what happened there.
The fact that the person under scrutiny - Sam King - is a member of the social work 
staff, does not alter the discursive devices through which a sense of continuity is achieved. Sam’s 
“blown fuse” provides the occasion for re-evoking an incident from his past of which it is 
remindful.
That the recent occurrence is portrayed as a matter of surprise (“not like” Sam, line 8, 
not what they’d “expect”, line 10, “a bit out of character”, line 16), only serves to authorize 
Kate’s identification of a connection. That she is “amazed” how he came to St. Nicholas’ 
(line 17) has connotations for how we read the legitimacy of her account. In spite of appearance, 
and the lot of good things said about him (which provide the grounds for being “amazed”) Sam’s 
recent behaviour is assimilated to a previous episode categorized as sufficiently similar to 
suggest am embryonic pattern. That they are surprised, amazed and dismayed, implies that they 
had not been looking for or expecting the repetition of previous aggression. If accorded a 
singular status Sam’s recent outburst may have been defined as “one-off” and out of character; 
in conjunction with a previous incident an emergent paradigm is brought into tentative
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existence. Historical knowledge which may remain at the “back of the mind” (line 26) is brought 
to the forefront when resonant events occur. Hearing repetitions of the same or similar items 
is the precondition of identifying a paradigmatic pattern.
A prerequisite of accomplishing a patterned relationship is the assumption that the 
patterns belong to the same person. In the preceding piece, for example, “Sam” is the entity 
which is held constant in relation to which behaviour then and now can be meaningfully 
connected. What is assumed is a quality of “Samness” about Sam in relation to which isolated 
occasions and events can be paradigmatically aligned. What Sam’s recent loss of temper may be 
assimilated to is a violent streak which had lain in wait since the last episode. Symmetry and 
asymmetry are only decipherable against this ghost background.
In the final extract below concerning Steve Butler, recent information invites not the 
confirmation of a previous trend, or the reawakening of a hidden propensity. Rather, a 
gestalt-switch occurs which transforms the meaning of earlier events. The setting is one of Steve 
Butler’s C.C.’s.
Peter S: Is that a fair summary (.5) Sam (.5) of what you said? Is there (.5) anything 
that you would want to add to what I’ve just said? Or are there any questions 
that you might wish to raise - any one of you - not just Mr. and Mrs. Butler?
(1.5)
Mrs. B: Well - with Steve coming home (.5) I didn’t know there was still - he was still 
trying to get out of it becus - the other weekend Steve asked us if he could 
stay permanently (.5) and come in on a day basis. Whether - that was just - 
becus he’d (.5) taken something from here at the time - 1 don’t know.
Peter S: Yes I suspect it might be becus he was worried about coming back.
Mrs. B: Yer.
Peter S: Yer.
Steve’s desire to become a day-boy is subjected to cynical scrutiny in the context of
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later knowledge of his theft from St. Nicholas’. The attribution to Steve of an ulterior motivation 
messes up appearance and commissions a search underneath.
iii) The Retrospective-Prospective Nature of Institutional Accounts
In this class of extracts the genre of accounting is both retrospective and prospective 
in that a chain of prior events is seen to lead to an ineluctable conclusion. The final scenario thus 
provides the occasion for retracing antecedent events, investing them with a significance that is 
only fully apprehendable in the light of later ones. Accounts in this category are retrospective in 
that they create a sense of semantic symmetry by reorganizing the past in accordance with later 
events. They ducprospective in that they perceive in earlier events the seeds of later development.
The first excerpt from a T.M. nicely elaborates the ways in which retrospective- 
prospective accounts forge links between past and future events, galvanizing them into a chain.
1 [Kate, as P.O. on duty the previous night, speaks of it being “hell”.]
Jason: See I-I said to you last night didn’t I - that - it seems to me that in an evening
(.5) like last night (.5) you could see what’s ‘appening - they were working 
themselves up from very early on.
Kate: Uhm.
J ason: And they were getting higher and higher. So - bound - something was bound
to happen eventually. . .  it seemed to me that instead of the staff being sort 
of (1) uhm (1) grouping - and actually attacking the problem - and doing 
something (.5) all the staff.. .  all-all drifted away. . .  And it’s - again easy to 
10 see ’eus they were all milling around the school getting wound u p . . .  But I-I
mean that-that’s - those were just my thoughts on it - and I - you could see 
it ’appening - they were getting higher and higher and more excited. And 
when one staff (.5) came out - they would sort of (1) uhm (.5) wind-up that 
member of staff. . .  it just seemed - generally around the place when you 
15 walked through - there were (.5) groups of boys - and a number of staff (.5)
over there somewhere.
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Kate: Yer.
Jason: And no - there didn’t seem to be any involvement.
[Kate asks if this all happened between six and seven p.m.]
20 Jason: Yes on (.5) but the build up - 1 mean - it was - obviously straight after tea -
whatever they (.5) they got into - they got up to they-they (.5) it looked like 
- it was gonna get worse - and it was - bound to - 1 mean if I can see it - surely 
everybody else can see it.
Kate: Uhm.
25 Jason: By the end of the evening there’s gonna be a confrontation. And that’s the
sort of evening where somebody’s gonna get badly hurt.
Three recurrent motifs are rythmatically interwoven in Jason’s account. One theme, 
which does not concern us here, consists of Jason’s allocation of blame to the staff (lines 7-9,14-18). 
The other two themes are pivotal in the retrospective-prospective construction of events. The 
first theme is embedded in Jason’s assumption that the events he perceived were clear for all to 
see (lines 3-4,9-10,11-12,22-23). Jason’s admonition that you could “see it ‘appening”, it was 
easy to see, and if he saw it, surely everyone else must have, relies upon a theory of the world in 
which meaning is unequivocal; where the reciprocity of perspectives, based as it is on the same 
sensory stimulus, is perfect.
The second theme lies in the retrospective capacity to read in events a chain of 
prospective inevitability which could be seen (at least by those who looked) “all along”. A past 
point is cited from which the future was foreseeable: a procedure well encompassed by the term 
“hindsight”. The account skilfully bobs and weaves between past and future events, linked 
through the discursive dynamic itself.
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Past Patterns Future Patterns
lines 3-6 they were working themselves up
from very early on. And they were 
getting higher and higher.
Lines 6-7 So bound - something was bound to
happen eventually.
Lines 10 they were all milling around the
school getting wound up.
Lines 12 they were getting higher and higher
and more excited.
Lines 20-21 but the build-up - 1 mean - it was -
obvious^ straight after tea - vliatever 
they (.5) got into - they got up to -
Lines 21 -25 it looked like it was gonna get worse
-and it was bound t o . . .  By the end 
of the evening there’s gonna be a 
confrontation.
Lines 25-26 Typification: And that’s the sort of evening where somebody’s gonna get
badly hurt.
This format of presentation, gross as it is, illustrates how, through temporal organization, 
events are placed on a course that they were retrospectively “bound” to follow. The next extract 
exhibits a similar method of practical reasoning. It is part of a “feed back” from unit 3 at a day 
conference.
Philip: Uhm (.5) in the last half-term the obviously major feature (.5) of life in unit
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3 has been David Lyons (.5) and his (.5) departure. (1) Uhm (1.5) it ended 
up in an incident that (1.5) we knew had been coming (.5) for a number of 
(.5) well for quite a while. It’s (1) it was one incident which got out of hand. 
It could have been any one of another dozen incidents (1) in the previous - 
two to three months quite easily.
David’s career at S t Nicholas’ ended, we are told, with an event they knew would 
happen all along. The culminating occurrence, retrospectively fixed in the past, is also fixed, 
pincer-like, in the trap oi a priori inevitability. The future tAen (now past) could thus be “told”.
In each of the three forthcoming accounts Samuel Nailer’s deterioration at St. 
Nicholas’ is treated as the manifestation of a predictable pattern which the staff either should 
have expected or did expect all along. In the first excerpt drawn from an emergency C.C. Melvin 
Hardy, Samuel’s special worker, directs the following observation to the boy himself.
A)
1 Melvin: I was talking to a member of staff this morning who said (1) when Samuel
first came here he said “Oh I’m a nice boy - I’m a really great boy now. But 
you wait ’til I’ve been here some time - then you’ll see what [?]”. I mean - 
that’s what’s coming out - but it’s not just happened here - it happened at
5 (names a previous placement) it’s happened at your boarding schools. The
majority of placements you’ve had - you’ve been there for so long - and it’s 
started to break down - and the same thing’s happened. (2.5) Why? There’s 
a limit to how much ^  can help you - and how much every other place can 
help you - you’ve got to help yourself some of the time. For us to help you 
10 you’ve got to help us.
Again, from a T.M:
B)
1 Jason: I mean - when he first came here butter wouldn’t melt in his mouth - he was
such a nice boy and everything.
Kate: Yes.
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Jason: Well behaved - intelligent - you know.
5 Kate; What the hell’s he doing here?
Jason: But we all know from read - if you read his reports - his file - every
establishment he’s been in his done exactly the same.
Brian: He’s deteriorated.
Jason: So it was bound to happen sooner or later.
10 Brian: Uhm.
Kate: Uhm.
12 Jason: Uhm (3) So I mean - you know - we shouldn’t all be so surprised.
And Onally, from another T.M:
C)
1 Brian: I mean-I was chatting to uhm Melvin-Samuel’s special worker-and he was
saying that uhm (1.5) now Samuel’s showing - when he read Samuel’s notes 
he couldn’t believe it was the same boy. . .  and now he’s displaying everything 
- Samuel just about everything that’s written - but the shame is (.5) it’s far too
5 late -
Kate: Uhm.
Brian: for Samuel really - not only as regards this place - but as regards Samuel
really.
9 Kate: If he gets borstal.
In the preceding extracts a resonance is set up between Samuel’s career at St. Nicholas’
and at previous placements. Through this connecting causeway history is seen to repeat itself.
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Where the pattern of behaviour can be shown to be translocational it can more readily be 
identified as a feature of the child than another candidate bearer, such as the institution. Since 
Samuel’s behaviour had “not just happened here”, but at a number of previous institutions 
(extract A, lines 4-6), and at “every establishment he’s been in” (extract B, lines 6-7), his recent 
deterioration at St. Nicholas’ is treated as something which staff may reasonably have expected 
all along.
Samuel’s degeneration is thus incorporated into an historical pattern, according to 
which his exhibition of “really great” (extract A line 2), “butter wouldn’t melt” (extract B line 1) 
type behaviour in the early period of his stay is relegated to a deceptive and preliminary status, 
prior to the appearance of the “real” Samuel. The identification is both retrospective and 
prospective. On the one hand Samuel’s deterioration fulfils the prospective expectations 
inscribed in the written reports. On the other hand his initial behaviour is retrospectively 
subjected to cynical scrutiny as a temporary facade which is repetitively donned by Samuel for 
his own ulterior purposes. In spite of the initial appearance which threatened to dupe them, 
Samuel’s behaviour is categorized as “one more instance o f . . .  the same old pattern”.
In the next piece Thomas McKinney sees in later events the confirmation of prior 
anticipation which itself feeds from and into a network of typifications about what we might 
expect from “boys of this type”.
1 [A discussion ensues about a fight which Richard Dickens had that morning
at work where he “lost control” over a petty incident. Richard was an 
ex-resident of unit 4 who was presently in the “half way house” on the 
premises of St. Nicholas’].
5 Thomas: ’Cus that just again highlights in inverted commas - 1 know it’s not the right
kind of - “the damaged kid” - you know - when things are going fine - when 
things are going - hunky-dory - kind of thing - there’s no problem at all - 
y’know. They tend to main-maintain a pretty (2.5) pretty reasonable 
equilibrium... they are O K until they’re faced with conflict and they cannot 
10 cope with it at all - yer? In fact it’s a total break down. And sometimes (.5)
it’s a break down where there’s a total imbalance between the thing that’s 
triggered it off (.5) and the action taken. And normally kind of thing - it’s
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punished at the level of-of - at the level of action - yer? Where in fact what 
it is is a whole series of - a build up.
15 David W:But I mean I would have an ah anticipated something - you know - it’s
getting near him going out - and he’s gonna try and piece - a whole series of 
things together.
Thomas: Yes-yes-yes-yes-yes.
David: And he’s stuck.
20 Thomas: Yes - yes - it’s not just the Richard Dickens’ but I mean most of our kids -
most of our kids.
Caroline: Uhm.
David: Oh yer - but I mean it’s just that-that - we’ve had a whole series of things -
from Richard being -
25 Thomas: Oh yes and will continue to. That is - 1 mean that’s a - that’s almost a pre­
determination now.
David: Uhm.
Thomas: I mean a beautiful example I s’pose is the Juniour Knight’s - look (.5) I mean 
when Juniour Knight was good I mean he was scellent. In fact when he was
30 good he was a pain in the arse - ’cus he didn’t really know how to manage that
one either.
David: No.
Thomas: But like when he was faced with stress - look what happened to him.
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David: Uhm.
35 (1)
Thomas: As soon as they’re faced with a problem for which there is no immediate 
answer (Thomas claps his hands and blows a loud raspberry). (3) And (.5) 
they’re not quite sure - somehow or other like - they the-the actual strategies 
needed - yer - to succumb to that next problem - that next barrier - next 
40 hurdle - they actually haven’t got it yet (2) and that’s - that’s a kind of
psychological kind of thing - a kind of psychological threshold - where they 
42 become almost inhuman.
Richard Dickens’ fight provides an occasion upon which to incorporate his behaviour 
into a pattern which is held to characterize not only Richard per se ^ but the class of damaged kids 
from which he is drawn. It is Richard qua “kids of this kind” who “maintains a pretty reasonable 
equilibrium” when “things are going hunky dory” but who “cannot cope” and “totally breaks 
down” when faced with conflict. Thomas adumbrates the typical response of the disturbed kid 
to conflict, a model to which the individual cases of Richard and Juniour are assimilated: “It’s 
not just the Richard Dickens’ but I mean most of our kids most of our kids” (lines 20-21) and “I 
mean a beautiful example I s’pose is the Juniour Knight’s” (line 28). Thomas maps the 
typificatory process onto individual boys - the Richard Dickens’ and Juniour Knights’ - who are 
thus denuded of their individual status and return as representatives of “the damaged kid”. This 
“gallery of rogues” method was sometimes employed by staff at St. Nicholas’ as a typifying 
shorthand.
The schema Thomas uses to typify the response of “boys of this kind” to conflict welds 
together past, present and future by identifying in behaviour a “pre-determination”. Richard’s 
behaviour can thus be reflexively assimilated to a pre-existing pattern of interpretation. This 
process is also apparent in David’s account (lines 15-17), which has a prospective flavour. David 
would purportedly have “anticipated something” given Richard’s imminent departure. This 
assumption itself feeds from the pool of institutional wisdom about what one might typically 
expect from the boys at particular stages of their career at St. Nicholas’, in this instance, near 
leaving.
In the next extract, like the last one, the author generates an eloquent
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retrospective-prospective account which weaves between a typified past and a specified present; 
between this particular boy and boys *'of this kind”. Enjoy the artistry of this court report written 
by a member of staff at the institution where Steve Butler was situated prior to his admission to 
St. Nicholas’.
1 **He is always very vulnerable to any delinquent excitement within the
school, and if his circumstances become at all insecure he will invariably 
act-out in a delinquent way. In general terms we feel that Steve was well 
placed with us and he was responding well to our treatment.
5 Serious difficulties arose for Steve and a number of other children . . .
shortly after the announcement of (the home’s) impending closure. Your 
Worships will appreciate the whole basis of our work with emotionally 
disturbed boys and girls is based on our providing them with a secure and 
stable base from which to move forward. The proposed closure of (the 
10 home) the provider of this stable and secure base, undoubtedly created
considerable anxiety and significantly three days after this announcement 
was made Steven became involved with (other boys) in the incident which 
brings him before this court. Since this incident Steven has tried to block out 
the facts about (the home’s) closure and because of the uncertainty of the 
15 future, we have decided to curtail his home visits because of his vulnerability
to acting-out.
While accepting that these offences are of a serious nature, it is important 
to indicate that they are in our view very closely linked to feelings of 
insecurity and uncertainty. Given a more stable base then the prognosis for 
20 Steven is much more positive.”
This account is retrospective because its author presents a reconstruction of events 
already past, the pattern of which could not have been known contemporaneously. It is 
prospective in as much as the author attempts to situate what happened in the context of what 
may have been expected all along from an “emotionally disturbed” boy (line 7) such as Steve 
Butler.
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Lines 1-3 identify an habitual association between “this” - Steve’s feeling insecure - 
and “that” - his “acting-out”. The propensity itself is placed in the context of Steve’s 
vulnerability to delinquency suggesting an “elective afOnity” between the two. The typifying 
framework “if-this-then-that” offers a method of assimilating the empirically specific instance 
in lines 5-6: the closure of the home. We progress in lines 1-6 from Steve’s typified propensity 
to behave in predictable ways under certain circumstances, to a depiction of events which 
represent the necessary catalyst (“if this. . . ”).
The emphasis shifts once more in lines 6-9 which wrap the foregoing account in a further 
discursive layer. We are transported from the case of Steve to “children of this kind” who are 
emotionally disturbed and of whom he is representative. The threat to the security through 
which they work with these lands of children is thus seen to give rise to a generalized anxiety.
Provided with a key to fit Steve’s behaviour into a biographical and categorical pattern 
the account returns on lines 9-12 to the specifics of the ofifence. Its temporal situation, three 
days after the announcement of closure, is imbued with a significance which resonates throughout 
the layers of the account:
i) A secure environment is the prerequisite of work with emotionally disturbed kids.
ii) The home’s impending closure threatens security and hence causes anxiety.
iii) Steve “acts out” when he’s insecure and has a propensity to delinquency.
iv) Steve commits his offence three days after the announcement of the closure.
And so we return to point (i).
From this web of practical reasoning a preventive awareness emerges in lines 13-15 
culminating in a curtailment of Steve’s home visits. Why? Because as we the readers already 
know, he is vulnerable to acting-out. Steve is subject to the rhetoric of underlying motives in 
which his behaviour is seen to “block out the facts” (line 13) which are incontrovertibly there for 
the experts to see. The “case” concludes on lines 16-20 by reinforcing the “if-this-then-that” 
formula. Thus if “this” is removed then “that” will disappear.
The accounts analyzed so far in the retrospective-prospective ge/ire invest events with 
a “pre-determination” to use Thomas’ phrase; an ineluctable sequentiality. We now turn to a
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selection of extracts where later events serve to confirm what was previously constructed as “just 
a suspicion", or which prompt a re-examination of previous interpretations on the basis of “new 
evidence". We are in the realm of intuition, gut feeling and vague suspicion which later events 
serve either firm-up or slacken. Hie first piece is extracted from a P.O s meeting.
[Roger tells the story of how Samuel and Leon asked him for permission to 
go out over the previous weekend when he was on P.O’s duty:]
Roger: And - so -1 just sort of smelt a rat there - 1 said “O.K. - fine. Now off you
go" - we’re in the risk game - “off you go!" sort of thing. And at eight-thirty 
a telephone call came through fi^ om Samuel - very responsibly actually - 
Leon Pryce is paralytic (Roger laughs) down by the uhm (.5) Mercedes Benz 
place - down there... So ah (.5) it sounded very - so I thought - O.K - well I’ll 
get in my car and go and pick them up - so I drove round and found the place.
The rat that Roger smelt is given authentication by later events. In the forthcoming 
piece Roger tentatively smells a whole pack of rats in accounting for his growing suspicion of 
Brenda Derby, a member of staff who had recently been promoted to a senior social work rank 
within the institutional hierarchy. It was planned that Brenda would move from unit 2 to unit 3 
to fill the vacancy in that unit for a higher grade social worker.
1 [Roger reports back from the weekend - in particular the day before -
Sunday.]
Roger: You know my-my views - my-my beginning concern with Brenda Derby
don’t you.
5 Kate: Yes.
Roger: I think I’m being confirmed.. .  uhm - to a point where I don’t think I’m going
to put her into unit 3 - becos she is thick in - with Tina Wait - and the Waits’. 
(1)
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Kate: Uhm.
10 (2)
Roger: And yesterday lunch-time you see (.5) we had (1) difficulty in getting the
kids to lunch - some of ’em because they were playing the galaxy machines 
(i.e. “space invaders”).
Kate: Uhm.
15 [Roger details the difficulty they had in getting the boys off the machines.]
Roger: And then (.5) at about one o’clock (.5) casually arriving (1) was Brenda
Derby (2) for her lunch (2) but there wasn’t much left - so I said “Where 
have you been Brenda?” - “I’ve been for coffee”. So I said “I’m sorry Brenda 
you haven’t been for coffee” - jokingly I said “you’ve been for drinks” which 
20 is obviously what she’d been doing - she’d been drinking (.5) at the Waits’
house. What - was a concern of mine is that - we re trying to say to kids - you 
know - “here is a meal - we sit down and have a meal together” and she 
arrives at one o’clock for i t . . .  I’m very angry with Brenda Derby.
A minute later:
Roger: Uhm (.5) but I think I’ve gotta get hold of Brenda Derby. At - at the moment
25 you see - 1 (.5) do not want Brenda Derby working in - unit 3.
Kate: Uhm.
Roger: Because ah - she’s ah - 1 think quite dangerous actually - and I think there’s 
a lot going on at the present moment and I - happen (.5) becus of my anxiety 
- you hear more things - when you’re anxious than you actually (.5) realize 
30 you’re going to hear.
Kate: Uhm.
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Roger: Uhm - and that depends perhaps on what you want to hear. But uh (.5) I
understand she’s also spewing out an awful lot about (.5) things going on. 
Ah-so I’m (1) I’m fairly anxious about the lady at the moment. I’ve always 
35 told you I’m anxious about her.
Kate: Yes.
Roger: I’m more anxious about her now  But uhm (1.5) I’m afraid my lady’s
causing me some worry.
(1)
40 Kate: Uhm.
Roger: __she’s not going into unit 3 with with Tina Wait - no way.
Kate: No - well - you’ve (1) with the Jan Butler business - you’ve felt she was
somewhere in there.
Roger: Without any doubt at all. I’m now more convinced than ever.
45 Kate: Well if-if-if-
Roger: She’s in the games (?stuff?) I’m afraid my dear.
Kate: Really?
Roger: Uhm - at our expense too - management I think she’s very anti-authority.
Kate: Yes.
50 Roger: Huh-hum.
(2.5)
Kate: Well you’ve always said that - haven’t you.
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Roger: Well I’ve (.5) felt so - but ah . . .  But I think uhm (.5) our Mrs. Brenda
Derby’s right in the middle of this lot.
55 Kate: Uhm.
Roger: I-I would love to have been a fly on the wall when she left her last place -
to see what people were saying then.
Kate: Uhm.
(1)
60 Roger: Now - with hindsight. But we’ve made her a senior too.
Kate: Yep [softly].
(8)
63 Roger: Mmm!.
I quote at length from the above account because it reveals so richly the temporal 
processes through which tentative suspicions are galvanized into a definite sense of Brenda 
being a “dangerous” member of staff. Lines 3-6 show how later events serve to invest earlier 
suspicions with the status of “confirmations”. Just as earlier suspicions inform the interpretation 
of later events, the latter at once serve to justify or give credence to prior doubts. A reflexive 
relationship is set up between the past and the present; individual examples and the interpretative 
framework to which they are assimilated.
The episode in which Roger describes Brenda coming late for Sunday lunch (lines 11-23) 
is fiinged with presumptions (about her fraternizing with the Waits’, drinking, doing her work 
casually and the like) which assume significance as an exemplification of a wider trend. It serves 
to bolster an apparently rather vague anxiety that Brenda is “quite dangerous” (line 27) and that 
“there’s a lot going on at the present moment” (lines 27-28) upon which firm decisions to cancel 
Brenda’s transfer to unit 3 are based.
The knowledge of Brenda’s “spewing-out” of information about St. Nicholas’
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(lines 32-33), which Roger himself attributes to his heightened sensitivity or selective perception 
home of anxiety, serves to further validate the anxiety which Roger “always” had about her; the 
retrospective confirmation of doubts he had “all along”.
Each new episode at once takes its place within the conceptual schema (Brenda is a 
trouble-maker, dangerous etc.) while also reinforcing i t  For instance in lines 42-43 Kate alludes 
to Roger’s suspicion about Brenda’s involvement in another scandal involving Jan Butler, about 
which he is “now more convinced than ever” (line 44). Niggles and doubts in the past are given 
certainty in the present, just as present observations are authorized in terms of what Roger has 
“always said”. The sense of temporal fluidity is accomplished through the conceptual apparatus 
embodied in the account which forges an alignment between what is past, passing, and to come.
iv) Telling the Future: Prospective Pessimism
In the final category of extracts, the emphasis is upon a prospective orientation to the 
boy’s future based upon a reading of the patterns inscribed in his past. The tone of these 
forecasts is characteristically both probabilistic and pessimistic, though not exclusively so. They 
are probabilistic in the sense that such projections are couched in the rhetoric of what is likely 
to happen in the future, given the past record. The skill of telling the future, or “preventive 
awareness” as if was often called by the staff at St. Nicholas’, lay not in the capacity to fortell the 
future with absolute certainty; a feat which is impossible within our temporal model of the 
universe. Rather, it resided in the practitioners’ capacity to utilize a range of ghost assumptions 
in constructing historical patterns which may bear the traces of what is to come. Interpreting the 
past was thus a vital component in telling the future.
Overlaying the capacity to “learn” from the past was a recurrent institutional tendency 
to forecast disaster in one guise or another; a capacity enshrined in what I call prospective 
pessimism. This orientation was a component of the deep vein of routine cynicism which ran 
through the institutional culture and gave rise to the suspicion about appearance (see pages 191-199). 
Forecasting disaster is a way of pre-empting the worst which cannot then trip you up. If the most 
disastrous expectations are realized, it was what you said all along; if they are not then nobody 
minds being happily surprised. A range of “secondary elaborations” can be brought to bear 
when an expected breakdown has not in fact occurred.
-375-
To speak of prospective pessimism as a theme which overlays much of the material we 
have already explored is to recognize a) that there are always many things going on in talk at any 
one time and b) that I am employing a theorist’s prerogative in highlighting different threads of 
discourse at different times.
In the first cluster of accounts the prediction is premised upon an interpretation of 
what is likely to happen in the future. An orientation to the prospective possibilities allows 
Thomas McKinney, for instance, to interpret Leon Pryce’s present behaviour as the genesis of 
a future trend. The extract is drawn from a S.S.M.
1 Thomas: But I-I-I think young Leon you see is - just - probably very similar to a lot of
young lads that we’ve actually dealt with in the time here - the Wayne Tallis’ 
of this world - where in fact - the Paul Black’s ... where in fact they haven’t 
got it within themselves to say “right - thank you for the service” and walk 
5 out the door. And I think like - there’s a strong possibility Leon will use this
next two or three weeks - yer - to create a kind of disturbance inside here (.5) 
yer? (1) And I think last night might quite easily be the beginning of it - yer? 
8 That’s all I’m saying.
Thomas draws upon his institutional knowledge to identify the way in which boys 
typically leave St. Nicholas’. The obliteration of Leon’s individuality helps facilitate his 
incorporation into a typifying schema. Like a lot of young lads they’ve dealt with, the Wayne 
Tallis’ and Paul Black’s, Leon might not be able to leave graciously through the front door 
(lines 1-5). Against this ghost backcloth Thomas predicts the “strong possibility” that Leon 
might create a disturbance in the following fortnight which will culminate in his forced departure 
(lines 5-7). An appropriate schema identified, Leon’s behaviour the previous evening can be 
placed in the context of the rumblings of a typified end (lines 7-8).
Note the qualifiers in which Thomas’ prospective interpretation is embedded. Thomas 
“thinks” that Leon is “probably” similar to other lads who cannot thank them for the service, and 
he “thinks” there is a “strong possibility” that a typical ending is in sight. Since we cannot know 
the future (at least within the dominant cultural conception of time) its prediction is usually 
articulated in the language of probability.
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The institutional inclination toward prospective pessimism often manifested itself in 
the practitioners* tendency to predict a future of institutionalization for a boy. For instance 
Peter French, one of the ‘^ basics** teachers, situates the fate of many of the boys at St. Nicholas’ 
in an escalating spiral. The piece is extracted &om a casual conversation between Peter and I 
which was covertly tape recorded.
1 Peter: DifBcult to see what kind of a future a lot of them have got really.
Kim: Yer (in a gloomy tone).
Peter: . . .  I think for a lot of them it’s going to be a life of - ah - in and out of
institutions.
5 Kim: Uhm.
Peter: You know.
Kim: Just the type of institution will change.
Peter: Yer.
Kim: And get less pleasant (1.5) as time goes by.
10 Peter: As for people like Juniour - 1 can’t see anything there.
Kim: As much as you can understand what sort of social prac - processes lead to
that kind of dreadful -
Peter: Uhm.
Kim situation.
15 (2)
Peter: But he brings a lot of it on himself.
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Kim: Uhm.
Peter: He - if he wasn’t such a big bastard -
Kim: Yer.
20 Peter: at times - he wouldn’t be treated -
Kim: No - that’s right
Peter: you know -
23 Kim: But why is he a big bastard?
The institutionalized gloom to which Peter’s predictions are responsive is apparent in 
his forecast of “no future” (outside of institutions) for a lot of the boys. For Juniour in particular 
Peter sees “nothing there”, by which he means “nothing worthwhile”, an assumption which is 
itself a gloss for a repertoire of others. You might also note the voice of the sociologist fighting 
for authority in the early days of her fieldwork; who draws attention to the “social processes” 
(line 11) that lead the boys to being “big bastards”.
This mode of prospective logic is employed in the next two extracts to predict the 
probable cycle of institutionalization in the case of two particular boys. In the first piece Agnes 
Turner forecasts a catalogue of disasters following Simon Wells’ recent departure from 
St. Nicholas’. The account is extracted from my interview with Agnes.
Kim: Has he gone back to his - family - in Hackney is it?
Agnes Well he’s gone back to (.5) the the (.5) the discharge address which is mum’s.
But I-I (.5) you know I really can’t see him staving there - and I think (1) that 
- you know the nature of (.5) you know the obvious move is that he-he’ll 
eventually sort of commit offences - he’U-he’U obviously go and squat 
somewhere - and - commit offences to get money (.5) and then he’ll be back 
in institutionalized living again.
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Agnes’ account traces a full circle back to institutionalization punctuated by her 
projection that Simon will move out of his home, squat, and commit offences for gain. Juniour's 
future is also subjected to a pessimistic forecast in the next piece drawn from Roger Carter's 
interview. After being sentenced to three-weeks in D C. Roger predicts:
1 Roger: And uh (2.5) Juniour I suppose will go inside again some time becus he will
injure somebody - and he will go inside - uhm (2) I-I make it sound as though 
he's you know - not a (.5) very nice kid. But actually I-I-I'm - personally very 
fond of him. I-I think that he has a really very lovely (.5) side to his nature. 
5 (1) But he spends so much time doing his best to convince you that is actually
very short lived an-and uh - you know - most of his is a pretty nasty (1) uhm 
(.5) a nasty boy - whereas in effect he's not - he's a very nice lad. (But unless 
there's a Roger Carter around to give him one to one attention) he'll just 
be a survivor - and he'll go in and out like a yo-yo.
10 Kim: Uhm.
Roger: So that's my description of a - of a - a kid who was presenting very disturbing 
behaviour - and trying to understand why he was and - and I don'tknow what 
13 we achieved - 1 don't think we achieved too much really - you know.
[Bracketed section - my summary]
Roger's predictions that Juniour will go inside (lines 1-2) and “in and out like a yo-yo'' 
(line 9) sandwiches an authorization procedure in lines 2-7. The non-partisan nature of Roger's 
forecast is legitimated by his disclosure of a fondness for Juniour who has a “really very lovely 
(.5) side to his nature" (line 4) which he tries to conceal. Roger's pessimism can not be attributed 
to a personal grudge or dislike for Juniour. On the contrary, in spite of Roger's good relationship 
with the boy and the achievements they have tried to bring about through their work with him, 
Roger is constrained to recognize a gloomy future.
While probabilistic in tone the following three extracts are united in the dramatic 
extremity of their projections, all expressed from the security of relatively intimate professional 
grouping where opinions were not rigorously called to account, nor formally recorded. The first
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two predict the possibility of Wayne Tallis’ future death. Both were uttered in unit 4 staff 
meetings, the first by David Walsh:
1 David: I think we’ve hit -we hit a point about two months ago where we were really
trying to work out the drugs thing - work out - trying to find out what was 
happening. And (.5) we’ve still (.5) got nowhere in that. . .  And uhm - he 
- it’s - the two things that worry me are - one - his (2) his lack of self-image 
5 and his total abuse of himself. I mean this week I guarantee he stabbed
himself in the arm - he says he got stabbed.
Joyce: And sat burning his arm at lunch-time.
David: I mean I’m - it wouldn’t surprise me if one morning when someone goes to
wake him up that he’s - he’s dead - that he’s actually lying on his bed. I mean 
10 I’m getting to that sort of stage. I mean he’s not really bothered. It’s just lack
of - total disinterest with everything. That’s one of the things.
A series of increasingly ominous statements about Wayne culminate in David Walsh’s 
projection of his potential fate - death - which would be a matter of “no surprise’’ (line 8). We 
are offered in lines 4-5 a glossed formula for interpreting Wayne’s behaviour in terms of his 
self-image and self-abuse. Lines 5-7 nicely illustrate how the bringing into play of an explanatory 
schema facilitates ease of interpretation. The “stabbing” wound becomes evidence for further 
self-injury which is echoed in Joyce’s observations about the burning of his arm. In this context 
the death bed scene (lines 7-10) becomes a meaningful prospective scenario.
Wayne’s probable death is also predicted by Sandra Crossley, his special worker, in 
another unit 4 meeting.
1 [Sandra says that she doesn’t feel confident that if Wayne had a regular
income he wouldn’t blow it all on drugs - not just a bit of dope or booze, 
but he’d mix it, he’d really go over the top.]
Sandra: He’d probably end up killing himself or something. It’s an awfiil thing to say 
5 - but -
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David: Well that’s it! I’m not worrying about having a death within St. Nicholas’ -
7 I mean - but I just think - there may be an alternative to uhm . . .
The fatalistic foresight proffered by David is firmed up by Sandra’s statement that 
Wayne would probably end up killing himself (line 4). This realization prompts the necessity for 
intervention to search out an alternative to this pessimistic future path. If Wayne’s fate is seen 
to lie in his probable self-destruction, Ted Vincent’s is seen to lie, in the next account, in his 
potential to destroy others. Kate is speaking in the wake of Ted’s court appearance in which he 
was charged with Actual Bodily Harm for his assault on a social worker at St. Nicholas’ and 
sentenced to six weeks in D.C.
1 Kate: And - the guy at the court - the policeman was saying (.5) ah - he knows Ted
quite well - and he was saying - it’s such a shame - ninety-nine point nine 
percent of the time you couldn’t wish for a nicer lad -
Brian: Uhm.
5 Kate: he said-“but in one of his rages he’s going to kill someone someday”. And
(.5) you know - he could see it as being inevitable and -
Ruth: He was quite a favourite at (the D.C.) according to Len.
Peter: Uhm.
Kate: Oh was he?
10 Nicola: He was a favourite here - remember the - they clapped when he did his -
Kate: Yes.
Nicola: woodwork just (1) after he joined.
13 Kate: Yer - he was for ninety-nine percent of the time - a lovely lad.
[Extracted from a T.M.]
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The identification of Ted's capacity to kill is authorized in two principle ways. Firstly 
through the method we saw in Roger's account of Juniour's future on page 378. This procedure 
removes the possibility that the prediction is borne of a dislike for, or a grudge against Ted, but 
a realism about his potential to destroy despite being "ninety-nine percent of the time - a lovely 
lad" (line 13). The second mode of authorization lies in the proliferation of expert versions. A 
collection of separate groups are seen to like Ted: the policeman; staff at the D.C; and those 
at St. Nicholas' where he was "a favourite". The forecast of disaster is authorized by a similar 
means. A sense of neutrality is achieved by invoking the words of a policeman who, entirely 
separate from St. Nicholas', is seen to confirm Ted's destructive capacity as an objective reality. 
The method of objectification at work here draws upon the common sense assumption that if 
something is objectively real, it will appear the same to everyone from which ever perspective 
they stand. Reciprocity of perspective is assumed to be based on the same external stimulus. If 
a policeman predicts what members of St. Nicholas' have always known, it serves to bolster its 
status as an independent fact.
It is attention to the rich detail of events and relationships and their psychological 
machinations which affords Melvin and Brian in the two extracts below an orientation to ‘‘what 
will happen when" a relationship ends. Predictions of this kind are similarly structured through 
the marriage of the ideal-typical and the specific-individual both in terms of how ‘‘boys like this", 
and ‘‘this particular boy" will typically react. They differ slightly firom the preceding accounts in 
that the pre-emptive thread of reasoning is contingent upon an intermediary event. The first 
piece is from one of Leon Pryce's C.C.’s.
[Melvin speaks of how Leon has a good relationship with his older sister.]
Melvin: But I think we're going to see a disaster in that area fairly soon if and when 
his sister finds another interest - which I think is going to happen. . .  Leon's 
going to feel very let down and we're going to see more problems with Leon.
And again, in this elaborate account articulated by Brian Potter in a T.M.:
1 [Brian speaks of Leon's tendency to emulate Samuel Nailer.]
Brian: The thing is it's almost grotesque in the sense that he's become (.5) Samuel.
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And that - we saw him - we were looking at him going down the corridor and 
he - could have been Samuel. . .
5 Kate: Their walk is identical.
Brian: He was wearing the same clothes - it’s just unbelievable And he adopts
the same poses and attitudes and (.5) it’s like he’s sub - he’s such a weak 
personality he’s submerged himself totally in Samuel’s identity.
Peter F: Uhm.
10 Brian: You know - and once Samuel goes - 1 think he might - have some sort of
minor personality collapse becus - he hasn’t got much personality himself 
12 you know.
To understand why Samuel’s departure threatens to provoke a minor personality 
collapse in Leon one must appreciate what it purportedly represents. The intricacies of Leon’s 
emulation of Samuel are set-up in the account as a document of his “weak personality” 
(lines 7-8), thus explaining the need for Leon’s submergence to a stronger identity. In 
articulating the invisible, i.e. Leon’s unconscious motives, Brian finds a key to unlock his future 
. . .  “once Samuel goes”.
Unlike the preceding two accounts which predict disaster for Leon when “his sister 
finds another interest” or “once Samuel goes”, the following group of accounts replace the when 
clause with an if. Since the projected problem will only emerge (fan avoidable event intervenes, 
such accounts incorporate a means of avoiding the disaster. Indeed, such accounts are often 
designed to warn of the danger, and thus attempt to remove the possibility of this^  which if 
allowed to occur may lead to that. In the first clutch of extracts the if  refers to the boy’s removal 
from St. Nicholas’ to another institution which, it is argued, would be bound to lead to disaster. 
The first piece is from a T.M.
[Brian speaks of the propulsion of Perry Sanders into a deteriorating state 
if he were to be moved on from St. Nicholas’.]
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Brian: I think you see they feel that (2) if - 1 think the dilemma is - that if - he went
somewhere else he’d almost certainly get worse. . .  because if the pattern is 
that - like he talks about (a previous placement) as if it were Nirvana. When 
he was there he actually hated it - or said he did. But if he went somewhere 
else - it’d probably make him worse - whatever - unless it was an intensive 
care sort of place.
A similar prediction of failure concerns Perry’s fate if he were to return to a big 
Comprehensive from the small teaching unit at St. Nicholas’. The discussion occurs in a T.M 
soon after Perry’s C.C.
Brian: Ah - the education bloke - 1 didn’t think he was -
Kim: He was a psychologist.
Brian: A psychologist.
Peter: Uhm.
Kate: Yes.
Brian: Well he wasn’t very - he more or less said “well I don’t agree that you should
go home. But if you ^  going to go home we’re going to send you to the 
biggest Comprehensive possible”. That’s what his drift was wasn’t it - “and 
therefore you’re going to fail - and come back here”. That was - he was 
totally unconstructive wasn’t h e . . .  But I personally feel that if Perry goes 
to a Comprehensive he’ll be back with us. The option is that if he fails - 
rather like Mark Smith’s thing - that he comes back with us.
The issue in hand here is not whether Perry will fail at a big Comprehensive, Brian 
“personally feels” that he will, but what arrangements there are when he fails. In the case of 
Charlie Hudson, presented below, the emphasis is upon proving beyond reasonable doubt the 
inevitability of failure if he were to go home and return to a local Comprehensive for the last two 
terms of his education. The F.S.W. raises the issue broached at the previous C.C.
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1 F.S.W.; And I just don’t see (.5) in any way - how Charlie will fit into a large
Comprehensive school for two terms.
Thomas: That’s right
F.S.W: I think he wouldn’t go and I think you think that too don’t you?
5 Mrs. H: I don’t think he would.
Caroline: No - Charlie didn’t himself either think so.
[Thomas says that was just one of the ideas that were floating around. The 
F.S.W. says it might have been viable if he were a year younger.]
F.S.W: I actually think that (3) that just wouldn’t - that-that wouldn’t work - so ah -
10 Thomas: Oh yes - probably not - yer? In fact it wouldn’t. But it’d be wrong not to look 
at it.
F.S.W: Yes.
Thomas: It would be wrong in the service we’re giving Charlie Hudson - 
F.S.W: Oh yes.
15 Thomas: and Mrs. Hudson not to look at it.
F.S.W: Yes.
Thomas: Yer?
F.S.W: Yer.
Thomas: But here we come out and say - it doesn’t actually work - or it isn’t on (.5) now
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20 that’s fine! O K. - we go along with that. But it would be wrong - to pretend
that-that - the possibility isn’t there - O K. (.5) and then hopefully like we can 
look at other possibilities.
Malcolm: We-we’ve tried it before - and it’s -
Thomas: Yer.
25 Malcolm: fallen flat on its face!
Thomas: Yes.
Malcolm: There is a hell of a difference between this school and (1) so-called 
ordinary -
Thomas: Yer - and most schools are dead frightened of taking lads back in - yer? (1) 
30 ’eus you’ve been to community school - good God - they’ve got horns
sticking out of their heads there - you know. I mean that’s the system we 
have.
F.S.W: I just think it would be asking a tremendous amount (.5) of Charlie - to go
into - you know (.5) a school for two terms really (1.5) which is different from 
35 here.
Thomas: Yer.
37 F.S.W: Which is much - more (.5) subject orientated.
A community of opinion is galvanized within the account that lends authority to the 
claim that Charlie’s return to a Comprehensive would not work. In lines 1-4 the F.S.W. states 
his failure to see how such an arrangement would work. The ball in then thrown to Charlie’s 
mother who lends weight to the rolling version (lines 4-5). Furthermore Charlie himself is given 
a share in this increasingly authorized claim albeit Caroline who gives Charlie a voice (line 6). 
In lines 10-11 Thomas expresses his affiliation to The View which is expressed first in probabilistic
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and then in fatalistic terms: “Oh yes - probably not - yer? In fact it wouldn’t.” The growing 
weight of authority mounting around the (wouldn’t work) version renders necessary an explanation 
of why it was raised at all which Thomas provides at length in lines 10-22.
Lines 23-37 involve a triple cumulation of reasons for the predicted failure, each 
embodying a different mode of justification. In Malcolm’s account present pessimism is 
informed by past experience in which such transfers have fallen flat on their faces. Thomas 
blames the educational system for its attitude towards boys who’ve been to a C.H.E. The F.S.W. 
shifts the emphasis to Charlie for whom it would be a tremendous effort and too much to ask. 
A triple package of justifications wrap up the case. Each acts as a documentary support for the 
underlying contention that it would break down.
The “if this” in the next extract relates to the possibility of Pete Hughes being “put 
away” at a forthcoming court case. The discussion occurs in the T.M.
Jack: ’E’s been recommended to stop ’ere ’asn’t he?
Kate: Yes.
Jack: Which I think - 1 think if he goes - if he gets put away it’ll do him a lot of
damage. Quite frankly he’ll go right through the system. Uhm - at the 
moment he is behaving himself - 1 don’t know about other peoples classes
(1.5) he is in mine anyway. ’E’s a very good lad.
Jack’s reasoning procedures follow the classical “if-this-then-that” format in his 
expression of future pessimism: i/Peter is given a custodial sentence then it will do him a lot of 
harm and he will go through the penal system.
The two forthcoming accounts differ in as much as the if  concerns the dangers 
incurred by the child remaining at S t Nicholas’ beyond a certain point, or being transferred from 
the status of day boy to full-time resident. An orientation to disaster r/Simon Cutts stays on 
beyond his exams is found in the following interchange in a T.M.
-387-
[Brian asks if Simon will be leaving after Christmas if he's taking his exams 
in November. Gary says that decision will be made in his December C.C.]
Brian: You see I mean I think after his exams it’ll be disastrous becus (.5) he may
be into something in his exams - 1 dunno - to what extent. . .  this is relative 
you see becus (.5) certainly outside the exam based (1) subjects he just 
completely - doesn’t give anything at all - you know (.5) in fact he’s a bloody 
nuisance around the - unit - he’s always in confrontation si-situations and 
he’s just bored out of his brain. And to take - uh -once you take that away 
from him - then you know there’s nothing we can do for him.
Gary: I mean I don’t want to pre-empt the decision -
Brian No.
Gary: of the next case conference t o  -1 mean - it’s pretty certain he will be going -
Brian: Yer.
Gary: I would think unless he radically changes.
Brian: Which he won’t - yer.
Gary: You know - the responsibility is his.
Brian: Uhm.
(1)
Gary: We have to give him the opportunity to do that.
In the preceding case the potential trouble is contingent upon the child remaining at 
St. Nicholas’ beyond a specifiable point. Brian Potter culls evidence from what Simon is like 
outside of the exam based subjects and in the unit to predict disaster after the exams are finished
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i fhc  stays in residence. Below, Roger Carter forsees break down if Keith Fletcher becomes a 
resident.
Roger: Yer - I-I just believe this is right - and I-I - what I don’t want to do - we don’t 
want to spoil it - becus (.5) he is such a complex kid that (.5) to bring him in 
I am actually convinced (1) it will blow. And uh-you’ve got... nothing then.
F.S.W: Yer.
Kate: I mean it seems to me we’re all in one mind {over that.
{
Roger: {But we might be absolutely
wrong!
The routine cynicism embodied in forecasts of gloom provided a guard against a naive 
embrace of incipient optimism and positive thinking which constituted another apparently 
contradictory thread in the institutional cloth. The following interaction, taken from Perry 
Saunders C.C., illuminates both of these aspects.
1 Ed. Psy: Perry has said that if he goes home he’ll be able to cope. But let’s be realistic.
We’re already building up crutches for him - demanding special educational 
attention and what have you.
F.S.W: Perry has a care order and it might be thought that we’re doing ourselves out
5 of business. But if he’s now unsuitable to be kept at St. Nicholas’ then it’s
negative and potentially harmful to keep him here.
S.F.S.W: And just because there isn’t the right resources within the borough - it 
doesn’t mean that Perry shouldn’t be allowed to go home.
Ed. Psy: Would you like to withdraw that statement?
10 S.F.S. W: No -1 don’t know why I should. Just because there’s not the right resources
- and there’s not the capacity for low ratio teaching doesn’t mean that Perry 
shouldn’t be allowed to go home.
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£d. Psy: Well if you’re not prepared to withdraw that statement I’d like it put in the
minutes You seem to have a crystal ball but I’m afraid that my picture
15 of Perry isn’t so bright.
The educational psychologist takes issue with the optimistic certainty that it will work 
out for Perry when he goes home, given the right educational provision. The latter he sees as 
a “crutch” (line 2) and calls for a “realistic” attitude (line 1), tantamount to the routine cynicism 
in which many such accounts are enshrined. The allusion to a “crystal ball” (line 14) suggests a 
breach of the attitude of probabilism, and the suggestion of a bright future breaches the rule of 
pessimism. Interestingly greater certainty is allowed to attend pessimistic projections, so that 
the educational psychologist can forecast the probability of problems without this being seen as 
a form of professional crystal ball gazing.
Orientation to future possibilities, when plaited into the thread of routine cynicism, 
often resulted in the prospective pessimism which I examined above. But, the institutional 
culture of St. Nicholas’ also exhibited an intersecting thread of positive thinking or routine 
optimism. On occasions the cohabitation of the two tendencies, pulling in alternate directions, 
created a level of discursive tension. Prospectively optimistic accounts tended to emphasize, in 
a more consistent and deliberate way than their pessimistic counterparts, the basis of the 
forecast being purportedly contingent upon the continuance of present patterns of good 
behaviour, hard work and the like. Only “if this then that”. The forthcoming extract is taken 
from one of Simon Wells’ CC’s.
1 Roger: If he carries on like this - this kid’s future’s very light. He’s got no problems
in my view - ah - O K. - he’s got to work at the basics and that sort of thing 
- you know - and he will. And I’m sure that as he’s getting better he’ll
continue to do so  And the thing about him - that I think’s important - is
5 that if things get - a bit dicey - you can talk to Simon and he responds - and
that’s - pretty positive stuff you know. So uhm - the reason I’ve come in - 1 
wanted to come in because it’s - very good indeed - and we’re very chuffed 
with him. I’ve had a horrible feeling he’s going to leave fairly soon. I’m 
9 delighted to hear he’s not actually. . .  so if he keeps this up he’ll be O K.
Simon’s very light future (line 1) is premised on him continuing as he is: working at the
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basics (line 2); and talking when things get “a bit dicey” (line 5). A canopy of meaning is thus 
erected from Simon's past and present behavioural patterns from which, all things remaining 
equal, a rosy future is foreseen. A comparably optimistic tone is apparent in the following 
extract from Kate Lambert’s written educational report composed for one of Karl Fowler’s 
C.C.S.
“During these early days of Karl’s stay at St. Nicholas’ he is proving to be a 
pleasant - considerate member of the educational group. In my own dealing 
with him he has been polite and friendly. He is certainly very socially mature 
and initiates contact in a very open way. He has undoubted academic 
potential and if he continues in the responsive - intelligent manner he has 
commenced - 1 am sure it will come to fruition in his examination work.”
Once more the realization of Karl’s academic potential is predicated upon his 
continued exhibition of the glowing qualities with which Kate attributes him. I f  he continues in 
this way then he will be successful in his exams.
The extract below from Leon Pryce’s first C.C. nicely demonstrates the tensions which 
exist between prospective pessimism and optimism which manifest themselves in two alternative 
versions.
Melvin: Conclusions (3) Leon’s made a good start at St. Nicholas’ - though it’s early 
days. I feel that there’s a great deal of anger bottled up in him and this may 
well come out in the future. However should he continue as he has done so 
(1) as he has done so far - he should turn out to be a responsible young man.
The possible scenarios are split between the following:
a) Leon should turn out a responsible young man if he continues with the 
“good start” he has made at St. Nicholas’.
Or:
b) Leon may give vent in the future to the “great deal of bottled anger” 
he has inside him.
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While not mutually exclusive the two versions strain in different directions; a tension which 
arguably betrays a dual afGliation to positive thinking coupled to the mocking partner of routine 
cynicism. Put simply, Melvin’s account exhibits an attempt to eat his cake - and have it!
The level of pessimistic certainty expressed about the likelihood of break down and 
the extremity of the projected disaster fell along a continuum depending on a number of 
considerations. H ie more informal and off-guard the statement, the more the author felt able 
to indulge in unqualified certainty. Formal assessments, by contrast, especially those recorded 
and logged, were steeped in qualifications, thus negating present and future criticisms. Note, for 
example, how the extracts above which articulated greater certainty and/or extremity of disaster 
were drawn from more intimate arenas like unit meetings, P.O.’s meetings and the T.M. where 
a greater play of speculation was tolerated. Occasionally predictions would breach the rule of 
probabilism attendant upon most readings of the future.
In the final two accounts the typificatory rationale suggests an inevitability based upon 
the child’s deep seated historical propensity. The first piece is from a T.M. in which the building 
instructor, Jacko, complains about what he sees as discrimination against Ted Vincent, who had 
been removed into police custody after a violent episode at St. Nicholas’, while the likes of 
Junior Knight and Samuel Nailer were allowed to continue with their delinquent behaviour.
1 Kate: You see (.5) the point is (.5) Ted has already been to court once - for
assaulting a member of staff.. .  he assaulted Lawrence - so it was the second 
time (.5) and ah (1) I mean the first time (.5) he assaulted Lawrence - it’s 
when he threw the electric cooker across the room (.5) and the (.5) heated 
5 food trolley - when he went berserk - he really did - he was (.5) such a terrible
danger -1 think that was the (1) and people thought he would go on until he 
7 killed someone unless (.5) he was stopped - you know.
A prospective awareness of Ted’s potential as a “terrible danger” who would “go on 
until he killed someone” provides a justification for removal to prevent the occurrence which 
the proclivities of his past would suggest. As part of the P.O.’s group who collectively authorized 
Ted’s removal, Kate makes a persuasive case in support of the decision that Jacko criticizes.
The extremity of Kate’s prediction that Ted “would go on until he killed someone”
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may be compared with the extracts on page 380 which forecast similarly dramatic events for the 
boys. Unlike the latter, Kate’s account is couched in terms which exceed the probabilistic. 
Nonetheless, Kate employs certain devices which soften the edges of her certainty. First of all 
she authorizes her version of Ted as a ''terrible danger” by extending it to an unspecified 
community: "andpeople thought” (line 6). That they "thought”, rather than knew, accords to 
a theory of time whereby it cannot be known in advance. Kate also introduces a prevention 
clause: "people thought he could have gone on until he killed someone. . .  unless (.5) he was 
stopped” (lines 6-7). Since Ted was stopped, by dint of his removal from St. Nicholas’, Kate’s 
prediction is never put to the test Indeed, Ted’s removal is implicitly held to have prevented the 
very thing - i.e. murder - which "people thought he would go on to commit”.
In the final extract below from one of David Lyons’ C C ’s George Wallace, his special 
worker from unit 3, both exceeds the rhetoric of probabilism and fails to employ the kind of 
softening devices which characterize Kate’s account.
[George suggests that David Lyons should become a day boy. The F.S.W. 
insists that for this arrangement to work both David and his mother must be 
persuaded of its merits which they are not at present.]
S.F.W.: And unless you’ve got her cooperation and Dave’s I can’t see it being 
successful.
George: Well yer - I-I’d certainly agree because you know (2) ah -1 still state that uhm 
(3.5) even if it’s - a year from now - David’s still not gonna change his mind 
- no matter how much - and - you know - there shouldn’t be - no pressure - 
I-I-I m-
S.F.S.W: It’s wrong for us to make that assumption.
George: I-I know -1 know but I’m just saying - well I’ve been right so far in everything 
which - you know I’ve said about David.
[A few people laugh.]
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Roger: I wouldn’t say that about anyone mate.
By asserting the ineluctability of his prediction George Wallace steps beyond the 
rhetoric of tendency in which such accounts are usually couched. When preventive awareness 
and prospective sensitivity are converted into a language of certainty they breach an incarnate 
criteria of authorization and thus become the object of institutional criticism.
Conclusion
The focus in the last two chapters has been upon how professional child care accounts, 
particularly those of a more historical bent, employ the procedures of their own causal 
rationalization. Identification of these methods requires the displacement of our normal 
everyday engagement with the world, as well as an inevitable reliance upon it. The sociologist’s 
account also exhibits practices and procedures amenable to discourse analysis. Her account too 
is in a process of rationalizing reality at the point ot realizing it in written and verbal discourse. 
Absolute privilege is forsaken in favour of a liberation:
“from the straightjacket of what Bloor (1976) has called the ‘sociology of 
error’ which arises whenever the attempt is made to grant an absolutely 
privileged status to social scientific constructs of social reality.” 
[J.Heritage (1984) - p.67]
With this acknowledgement in mind, the reader is invited to reconsider my own 
account to detect the patterns of causal association and the retrospective-prospective procedures 
which it employs in making sense of members methods of making sense.
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CONCLUSION
In general terms the aim of this thesis has been to cast an anthropological perspective 
on a range of institutional practices in a community home for deviant adolescent boys. In 
particular I wanted to explore the broadly therapeutic mode of reasoning which practitioners 
often employed to interpret the boys and their behaviour. The success of the project hangs upon 
the persuasiveness with which I have demonstrated the accomplished nature of institutional 
realities. I attempted to achieve this feat by detailed empirical analysis of verbal and written 
accounts. These revealed both the social knowledge and the methods through which actors 
invested appearances with a sense of significance by assimilating them to an underlying 
framework of typified assumptions. In this lies the dynamics of the documentary method of 
interpretation.
Like all ethnomethodological enquiry, the present piece of research was inspired by 
a paradox: that the accomplishment of sense is an everyday miracle; an extraordinary aduevement 
which is at once truly mundane. This fascination with the steadfastly familiar (as well as the 
institutionally peculiar) requires a similarly paradoxical methodology. On the one hand I started 
from the assumption that in a vital sense institutional meanings are generated endogenously. As 
Garfinkel recommends:
“. . .  any social setting (should) be viewed as self-organizing with respect to 
the intelligible character of its own appearances as either representations of 
or as evidences-of-a-social-order. Any setting organizes its activities to 
make its properties as an organized environment of practical activities 
detectable, countable, recordable, reportable, tell-a-story-aboutable, 
analyzable - in short, accountable. ”
[H. Garfinkel (1967) - p. 33]
For this reason I believe that institutional and occupational settings should be treated:
“as self-organizing domains of recognizably competent work practices 
which ‘compose themselves through vernacular conversations and the 
ordinariness of embodied disciplinary activities’ (Ibid). And work practices 
are found, not in the privacy of individual consciousness, but as publicly 
observable courses of specific, local and temporally organized conduct.” 
[J. Heritage (1984) - p.302]
If meaning emerges from within the institutional context as an indexical feature of it.
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and realities are the product (not the condition) of a range of reflexive procedures, it follows that 
the ethnomethodological researcher must situate herself very firmly within the setting, either as 
a participant, or non-participant observer. Only through this level of immersion can she fully 
appreciate the complex nuances of institutional practice.
On the other hand, while the cultivation of such intimacy is a necessary prerequisite, 
it is not sufficient in itself. For the researcher is always already immersed in the sea of 
assumptions which she shares with the people she is observing. Only by struggling to partially 
suspend these assumptions, to place them at an anthropological distance, do their constituent 
features begin to appear. In this, I believe, lies one of the real skills of ethnomethodological 
enquiry; for it takes an enormous effort to even temporarily displace that which resides 
underneath ones nose. Yet this is essential if one is to translate it into an object of investigation. 
Thus, the reflexively inclined ethnographer is involved in a dual manoeuvre: she must attempt 
to acquire increasingly intimate knowledge of the institutional context, while subjecting it to a 
process of analytical alienation.
In treating reality as a practical accomplishment ethnomethodology is anti-essentialist. 
Its exponents claim that there is nothing fixed or a priori about the way in which reality is 
constructed by a particular social group. I, for instance, was not concerned to judge the validity 
of a therapeutic version of the boys’ deviant behaviour (as the manifestation of their underlying 
historical and emotional disturbance), nor to counterpose it with another version of what it was 
really underneath it all about. Such questions of “truth status” are simply suspended for the 
methodological purposes in hand, in order that alternative questions may be propelled into the 
foreground.
Just as it is not my concern to embrace a particular version, nor is my purpose to deny 
it. It is not a case of refuting the existence of reality, or claiming that it is produced out of thin 
air, like a rabbit from the conjurer’s hat. The interpretations which give shape to reality do not 
exist in some autonomous realm, but engage with a set of empirical particulars. What is 
interesting, from an ethnomethodological perspective, is the way in which empirical appearances 
are attributed with a sense of significance by assimilating them to a ghost schema. In this material 
process appearances are patterned in a particular way.
This process of documentary interpretation is not mechanical, as I hope this thesis
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amply demonstrates. The kind of sense that is made of appearances, is not the only sense that 
could have been. Otherwise, there would be no particular skill involved in this procedure, and 
one would simply be replacing the normative dope of Parsonian theory with a more sophisticated 
cognitive dope. As Heritage says:
"A 'scripted' analysis of action in which the actors' actions are treated as 
determined by hierarchies of preordained cognitive schemata is just as 
capable of ignoring the common-sense rationalities of judgement (c& Gaifnkel, 
1%7:68) as its sociological and psychological forerunners. Such an analysis 
would profoundly threaten the theoretical gains of the past twenty years." 
[J. Heritage (1984) - p.308]
Any interpretation must take into account a unique configuration of items or events 
which may suggest the propriety of this interpretation, or hint at that one. But there is, at the 
same time, a systematic tendency to reproduce the underlying schemata of typifications,
whether these are generic cultural assumptions, or specifically institutional or occupational
ones. What is more, a similar panoply of procedures is employed in this pursuit. The point is that 
reproduction is never passive, it is always at once an active production.
By bracketing common sense assumptions about the "given-ness" of reality, thus 
constituting it as a serious topic of empirical enquiry, one is gaining a great deal more than one 
is giving up. Reality per se does not disappear, but it loses its absolutist dimensions. What 
re-emerges as the product of such analytical investigation is a version of reality as a robust and 
sinewy product of a sustained body of knowledge and practices. There is nothing fragile or 
illusory about it. Producing an account of reality (which contains within it the accoutrements of 
reality production) is, to adapt Wittgenstein's analogy, like “spinning a thread":
“we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in 
the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the 
overlapping of many fibres."
[L. Wittgenstein (1958) - paragraph 67]
This interaction between a body of knowledge and the empirical world, which I 
previously referred to as a kind of mutual “sniffing out", also characterizes the research process. 
While I was committed to empirical exploration, I started with a theoretical model which was, 
broadly speaking, reproduced along the way. This is not to say that the empirical experience did 
not teach me a great deal at a substantive level, but that such learning took place within a
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framework of indefeasible assumptions which were less likely to be challenged.
To identify reality as a practical accomplishment which is bound up in members’ 
methods of making sense is not, as I hope to have made quite apparent, to adopt a subjectivist 
orientation. Indeed here, as elsewhere, a reflexive approach challenges the validity of traditional 
distinctions between the subjective and the objective, and the range of dichotomies which tend 
to flow from it. For, the knowledge and procedures through which the environment is organized 
are shared amongst a cultural and linguistic community.
In this sense methodological individualism is as misplaced as its collectivist counterpart 
The very distinction should be dissolved in favour of what Knorr-Cetina [1981 cf. pages 7-15] 
usefully defines as "methodological situationalism”. For, it is within particular situations that 
actors bring their repertoire of skills to bear in elucidating a precise configuration of events. 
Making sense of the world is never devoid of these contextual contingencies, how ever well 
sociologists have usually managed to conceal them. In this sense, as Knorr-Cetina insists:
“The ultra-detailed observations of what people do and say in situ is not only 
considered a prerequisite for any sociologically relevant understanding of 
social life, but concrete social interactions may also be considered the 
building blocks for macro-sociological conceptions.”
[Ibid - p.7]
[Emphasis in original]
Of course, a committment to “the ultra-detailed observation of what people do and 
say in situ*' does harbour certain limitations which are well rehearsed. Clearly such an approach 
cannot cope with large-scale phenomena, whether in terms of time or numbers. But this 
complaint is only valid from an external perspective. For it criticizes micro methodologists for 
their incapacity to deal with an order of phenomena which they are neither particularly 
interested in, nor do they believe it is possible to investigate in a straightforward way.
What is more, micro methodologies are by no means a homogeneous group. Conversation 
analysis, for example, certainly engages in “ultra-detailed observation” of the unfolding minutiae 
of discourse without, classically, engaging in ethnography. But even those who do conduct 
ethnographic research may differ radically in the perspective which they bring to it. This, in turn, 
will influence the way in which they appraise and deal with the problem of selectivity, and how 
they define the junctures between micro and macro data. To proceed then it is necessary to
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elaborate the distinction already made (see pages 32-36) between mainstream, or classical 
ethnography, and that which entertains a more reflexive orientation.
To start with, the reflexively inclined ethnographer tends to be more responsive to the 
inflnite complexity of institutional reasoning which, like Geertz's account of “thick description”, 
reveals:
“a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them super-imposed 
upon, or knotted into one another, which are at once strange, irregular and 
inexplicit, and which (the anthropologist) must contrive somehow first to 
grasp and then render.”
[C. Geertz (1975) - p. 10]
For this reason no piece of research, however “thick” its descriptive propensity, can 
hope to “grasp and then render” the nuances of institutional life in their entirety: firstly because 
of the very complexity involved; secondly because the process of ana^is and literary representation 
imposes an order which is different from the institutional one. Selectivity is thus at once 
unavoidable and necessary as the prerequisite of any form of analysis. But there is a difference 
in the way the two traditions of ethnography deal with the issue. Practitioners of the “naturalist” 
school of ethnography are more predisposed toward attempting:
“a comprehensive overview, wherein the ethnographer sets out to condense 
into one volume as full a description of the structures, operations, procedures 
and activities of whatever organization or group he is examining as possible.” 
[B. Rawlings (1980) - p.l:10]
In this process, the ethnographer assumes an aura of expertise:
“He becomes a sort of oracle, who, knowing everything there is to know 
about one particular field, however small, is capable of producing wise and 
carefully considered pronouncements about matters that have to do with 
that field.”
[Ibid. -p .l:ll]
But such completeness can only be implied by glossing over the practices through 
which members account for their environment, and in so doing render it coherent. To seriously 
attend to the unfolding minutiae of accounting practices is to sacrifice the ideal of comprehensive 
description, and the attendant image of expertise.
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Different theorists offer alternative solutions to such necessary and unavoidable 
limitations. One "solution" is to deny the validity of ethnographic enquiry as, on the whole, 
conversation analysts have done [cf. Atkinson and Drew (1979) - pages 22-33]. Another 
alternative is to concentrate upon one small piece of data, even if one has been engaged in 
lengthy ethnographic investigation, as both T. Walker (1986) andB. Rawlings (1980) have done. 
Both choose to prioritize a particular piece of data which is subjected to lengthy and meticulous 
analysis, both, interestingly enough, drawing liberally upon the methods of conversation 
analysis. While Rawlings does devote the first half of her thesis to the perusal of more general 
topics, she reserves the serious analysis of members’ methodology to the second half in which she 
examines a short piece of transcript.
While this mode of response is certainly a pragmatic solution to the constraints of 
reflexive analysis it did not satisfy my own requirements. I wanted to examine a range of 
institutional practices, albeit limited, on a variety of occasions of their articulation, without 
stretching the analysis too thinly. I outlined some of the ways in which I attempted to manage 
this compromise in chapter 1. But in meeting my own demands for the detailed analysis of a 
slightly wider range of institutional particulars I had to leave out a great many of the themes and 
practices which I had found fascinating. My eventual selection of topics was based upon two 
equally balanced criteria of what I considered the most prevalent and important fi'om an 
institutional perspective, and what I considered most interesting from my own.
One whole empirical area which I almost wholly neglected was, for instance, the boys’ 
accounts of themselves, their behaviour and their situation. I chose to concentrate predominantly 
upon staff discourse; a decision largely guided by my interest in the therapeutic sense to which 
their interpretations of the boys’ deviant behaviour characteristically gave rise. While I have, on 
occasions, attempted to illustrate how staff accounts accommodated those of the boys through 
the processes of assimilation, modification or refutation, any more extensive elaboration of the 
boys’ versions would have detracted from my consideration of the primary topic.
Such parameters are a necessary discipline if one is to conduct in-depth analysis. But 
by excluding the boys’ accounts I do not wish to suggest, by implication, that they were 
"judgemental dopes’’ in Garfmkel’s phrase, whose identities were formed, like waxen images, 
from staff interpretations. They too were competent social actors who brought their skills to 
bear in making sense of their environment. The kind of sense they made was relatively distinct
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from that of the staff, while their discursive capacities, though in certain respects less polished, 
were much the same.
Having said this it appeared that the power to define reality was not equally shared 
amongst the boys and staff. For a start, the boys already came to the institution characteristically 
labelled as ''problem adolescents**, this itself being the reflexive product of their entanglement 
with a range of social agencies, usually over many years. While in my experience at St. Nicholas* 
the boys tended not to concur with this assessment, their placement in a community home 
suggested that others had more control over defining their status, than th ^  themselves. This 
lack of power was reinforced by their chronological status.
More specifically, the therapeutic discourse so often employed by practitioners at 
St. Nicholas* tended to deprive the boys of their autonomous powers of definition, particularly 
when in disagreement with the staff. The staff rationale for imposing their definition of the 
situation was inscribed in the therapeutic mode of reasoning itself. Since the boys were typically 
conceived as the victims of emotional disturbance engendered by their historical circumstances, 
they were not considered the best judges of their own motivations. Hence, while their 
corroboration of a staff version was frequently sought, this was not a prerequisite of establishing 
its validity, any more than their denial would necessarily undermine it. Indeed, as I considered 
on pages 161-174, a boy*s "denial** may be incorporated into the symptomology of his problems 
and thus made to bolster the very claim the child was attempting to refute. As a general rule the 
boys* accounts tended to be authorized if they supported staff versions, and ironized or ignored 
if they did not. Their version of reality was thus characteristically defined in relation to the staff 
framework which was treated as more reliable for the practical purposes in hand.
No account, let alone a descriptive analysis of anything as complicated as an institution, 
can be complete in so far as it says everything there is to say about a given topic. The principle 
of indexicality alerts us to the fact that there are always holes in the filigree of threads, which the 
recipient of the account, whether reader or hearer, must sew together. Not that the producer 
or consumer could fully articulate the incarnate assumptions upon which they draw. It is these 
which constitute the abiding preoccupation of the ethnomethodologist, who must nonetheless 
employ the very same assumptions which she at once attempts to topicalize. It is for this reason 
that reflexive analysis only really appeals to those who enjoy the conundrums of irony.
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Reflexive ethnography, much more than its classical cousin, attempts to dissolve the 
split between the micro and the macro. Its practitioners strive to demonstrate that through the 
close examination of local practices one may jointly elucidate both aspects of the institutional 
fabric, and the threads of wida" culture from which it is woven, hi this respect the ethnomethodologist 
is not exclusively concerned with what is unique or newsworthy about a social group or 
institutional setting, although this is part of her ethnographic brief. As Woolgar says:
“the strategic role of ethnographic study is that it provides an occasion for 
reflecting upon, and reaching a greater understanding of, those aspects of 
our own culture which we tend to take for granted.”
[S. Woolgar (1982) - p. 486]
But just as the failure to winkle out the wider ramifications of ethnographic study is a 
missed opportunity, so too must one exercise extreme caution about the kind of inferences 
which may legitimately be drawn. Two studies which do not, in my opinion, exhibit the necessary 
caution are those conducted by Pat Carlen (1976) and Paul Willis (1977). Starting with a 
structural bent, both authors employ their ethnographic knowledge of the local setting as a 
vehicle for making grand theoretical statements about the nature of capitalist society without 
adequately explicating the methodological link between the two.
Thus, for instance, having examined a range of genuinely fascinating details about the 
workings of the magistrates court, Carlen proceeds to draw gross theoretical conclusions, like 
the following:
“The court is not a theatre. It is an institutional setting charged with the 
maintenance and reproduction of existing forms of structural dominance. 
Courtworkers, unlike stage actors, have to account not only for the way they 
interpret their parts but also for the authorship and substance of the scripts 
. . .  called to account for the mode and substance of their performance, 
courtworkers, using the imagery of the theatre, claim that they perennially 
tell a tale of possible justice. To conserve the rhetoric of justice in a capitalist 
society such a tale is as necessary as it is implausible.”
[P. Carlen (1976)-p.38]
My purpose is not to refute the substance of Carlen’s claims, but to question whether her 
empirical material warrants such a reading.
Paul Willis’ study (1977) starts by offering a colourful description of the (counter)
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culture of “a group of twelve non-academic working class lads” (p.4) at a secondary modem 
school in the North of England, which he couches in a conventional ethnographic mode. Having 
furnished the reader with the empirical data, he starts part 2 of the study (which he entitles 
“Analysis”) with the following remark:
“Although we have looked in some detail through case stucfy at the eq)erience 
and cultural processes of being male, white, working class, unqualified, 
disaffected and moving into manual work in contemporary capitalism, there 
are still some mysteries to be explained... We have seen how their genuinely 
held insights and convictions lead finally to an objective work situation 
which seems to be entrapment rather than liberation. But how does this 
happen? What are the basic determinants of those cultural forms whose 
tensions, reversals, continuities and final outcomes we have already e?q)lored?”
Willis continues:
“In order to answer some of these questions and contradictions we must 
plunge beneath the surface o f ethnography in a more interpretative mode.** 
[P. Willis (1977) - p.ll9]
[Emphasis added]
And there are no prizes for guessing where this “plunge” takes Willis; on to the familiar ground 
of structural analysis.
Through a commonplace sociological manoeuvre, both Carlen and Willis ultimately 
subsume the “micro” data under what Atkinson and Drew call those “favourite metaphors, 
namely the ‘macro’ social structure of capitalism” [1979 - p.l4].
The kind of ramifications which derive from the present study are of a very different 
order, and one much more amenable, I believe, to empirical verification. How far I have been 
substantively successful in at once elucidating local aspects of institutional practice while also 
teasing out wider features of cultural reasoning is, of course, the reader’s prerogative to judge. 
I want to conclude, however, by detailing some of the achievements which I believe this piece 
of research with some success yields. These can be arranged on three inter-connecting tiers.
At the first and most basic of local levels I hope that the present research reveals 
something about St. Nicholas’ as a specific institution at a particular point in time. This attempt 
to grasp the idiosyncrasies of the institution is made more poignant by the closure of St. Nicholas’
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in 1987, and the decline of the community home system of which it was a part. The therapeutic 
approach to juvenile deviance which emerged in the 1960’s and 1970’s has been eroded in the 
process.
The reader may also have cultivated an acquaintanceship with some of the more 
distinctive institutional characters during the course of the thesis. She may, for instance, identify 
a piece of talk as “typical of Roger Carter” or recognize Thomas McKinney to be “on his hobby 
horse”, just as members of St. Nicholas’ and I myself routinely did. I do not deny the significance 
of such specificities, and indeed recognize that for some readers they form part of the pleasure 
of the text. It is not my purpose or desire to reduce the local colour to a grey and lifeless 
stock pile of common denominators. But there is, I contend, something in excess of the peculiar 
and unique characteristics which provides the background against which they appear as such.
My primary purpose in this thesis has been to identify and examine some of the key 
institutional practices through which the staff at St. Nicholas’ organized their environment. In 
particular I think that the empirical analysis does illuminate the typifying processes through 
which the boys’ behaviour was accorded a dominant status, most typically as the manifestation 
of their underlying emotional disturbance. I also attempted to illustrate the recurrent modes of 
causal connection through which the boys’ contemporary disturbances were linked to a series of 
historical events which were seen to engender them.
Through the “ultra-detailed observation” of a concrete institutional setting, populated 
by empirical actors who made sense of events in the unfolding flow of everyday life, I hoped:
“to disclose the detailed, reticulated textures of practices through which 
culturally transcendent objects are created as their project and as their 
embodied, yet disengageable outcome.”
[J. Heritage (1984) - p.304]
The “culturally transcendent object” which was the “embodied, yet disengageable outcome” of 
the “detailed, reticulated texture of the practices” performed by the staff at S t Nicholas’, was 
the “child with problems”, whose construction has been well documented throughout the thesis.
On the second tier, I want to argue that by analyzing a multitude of concrete 
therapeutic interpretations, certain thematic patterns began to emerge which characterize
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therapeutic discourse in general. More specifically, I became increasingly aware of the 
relationship which was being constructed in therapeutic accounts between the boys '^presenting 
behaviour”, as it was known, and their underlying motivation. The empirical analysis thus 
opened up an appreciation of the structured play between surface and depth which can fruitfully 
be understood in figurative terms. Thus, for instance, a boy*s manifest deviance may have been 
treated as the metaphorical representation of his depleted self-image or the displacement of the 
anger he really felt toward his parent/s. Alternatively his behaviour may have been construed as 
an ironical expression of his need to “test out” for love by apparently subverting the possibility 
of it. On a third figurative horizon, his deviance may have been seen as a metonymic 
condensation of the interactional patterns which belong to the family as a whole. Which 
explanation was proffered depended upon the practitioners reading of the contextual clues.
What a close consideration of institutional accounts also revealed on the second tier 
was the historical dimension which therapeutic discourse typically employs. This historical form 
of analysis helped practitioners erect an architecture of causality by linking past and present 
events into an episodic chain. I was able to identify three modes of causal connection which, 1 
suggest, extend beyond the specific institutions to all forms of historical and causal analysis, 
whether “lay” or professional. The distinctiveness of each mode lay in the nature of the links it 
forged between events, and the explicitness with which they were articulated. But a feature 
which traversed all modes was their reliance upon what one might call participants’ narrative 
competence. Episodes from the boy’s past were selected and edited and ordered in such a way 
that they “told a story” whose conclusion was, loosely speaking, known in advance. Events may 
thus be “grasped together” as part of the narrative whole. Analysis of the historical accounts so 
prevalent at St. Nicholas’ thus reveal features of historical narrative and therapeutic discourse 
which extend beyond the institutional context.
The empirical material not only revealed the discursive relationship between surface 
and depth, past and present, but also the deviant and the normal. Since institutional accounts 
so often concerned the boys’ deviant behaviour they also had the capacity to promote a deeper 
understanding of the ^w st framework of normalizing assumptions in relation to which any 
particular interpretation appears. This reservoir of taken for granted knowledge emerges no 
where more clearly than in accounts of deviance which, by breaching conceptions of the normal, 
bring their parameters into sharper relief. Thus, any characterization of problem children relies 
upon a complex anterior web of assumptions about normal ones, just as the identification of
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emotional disturbance presupposes a conception of emotional health, or bad parenting assumes 
a knowledge of good parenting, and so on. Accounts of deviance thus offer a sterling 
opportunity to consider the range of ghost assumptions which inhabit conceptions of the 
normal.
Since the therapeutic has become such a pervasive mode of cultural reasoning, 
especially with regards to certain forms of deviance and categories of deviant, a more systematic 
analysis of its discursive features seems important in itself. The present study may also provide 
a useful basis for comparison with other institutional forms of therapeutic reasoning. But, on the 
third tier of theorization, by exploring the empirical intricacies of therapeutic reasoning in the 
process of its articulation, one may simultaneously cast a perspective on the workings of perhaps 
the most important procedure of practical reasoning: the documentary method of interpretation. 
The latter is responsible for assimilating appearance to the ghost schemata of typifications which 
invest it with significance. Part of the artistry of documentary interpretation lies in the 
recognition that appearances may be deceptive. While this knowledge, and the attendant skills 
of reparation, are part of common sense wisdom, they are given priority status in therapeutic 
discourse. Practitioners of the latter offer a systematic analysis of the cryptic ways in which the 
underlying emotional reality may manifest itself on the behavioural surface. This **reality" is 
typically deciphered, and meaning restored, through the kind of figurative penetration considered 
above.
I have spoken many times of how a special effort of the imagination is required if one 
is to articulate the common sense foundation of social reality. Certain forms of discourse do, 
however, aid the imagination. By dramatizing the play of levels between surface and depth, past 
and present, normal and deviant, therapeutic accounts of deviance cast a quasi anthropological 
perspective on the ordinary workings of the documentary method. By so doing they demonstrate 
how such levels are brought together in the process of their articulation: the ghost is always 
already in the discursive machine.
Such common sense practices, driven underground by sheer cultural familiarity, are so 
primitive that at first they look peculiar. We are ordinarily unaware of such machinery because 
we employ it so elegantly and unthinkingly. As Tom Stoppard says:
“All your life you live so close to truth, it becomes a permanent blur in the
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comer of your eye, and when something nudges it into outline it is like being 
ambushed by a grotesque.”
[T. Stoppard (1967) - Act One - p. 29]
My purpose in this thesis has been to nudge the common sense blur of practical 
reasoning into outline, and thus propel some of these everyday aliens into the foreground. For, 
I believe with Geertz that:
'^Looking into dragons, not domesticating or abominating them, nor drowning 
them in vats of theory, is what anthropology has been all about”
[C. Geertz (1984)-p.275]
Having taken its bow, and uncomfortable with celebrity status, common sense returns 
to the wings where it is at home. Modest as ever, it might describe its performance in the 
preceding pages like the Tragedians from Rosencrantz and GuUdenstem are Dead:
“We keep to our usual stuff, more or less, only inside out. We do on stage 
the things that are supposed to happen off. Which is a kind of integrity, if 
you look on every exit being an entrance somewhere else.”
[T. Stoppard (1967) - Act One - p. 22]
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